

## Racialized People in the Spotlight: Public discourses about racism in Germany

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**Abstract.** Racialised people in Germany shared their experiences of everyday racism by gathering behind the anti-racist MeTwo that is inspired by the anti-sexist MeToo. Racialized people set out to correct common sense notions of Germany being a post-racial society after World War II and to disseminate their subjugated knowledge about contemporary racism in the country.

Based on racial categories that are salient in Germany, I investigate how a cross-section of German newspapers (*Die Tageszeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *Die Welt*) covered this collective uprising. These racial categories are the backbone for my qualitative content analysis to identify how racism was negotiated in connection to the hashtag. In so doing, I seek to answer the following three questions: (1) What were the prevalent public discourses? (2) How were these discourses justified? (3) To what extent did the distribution of the discourses differ across media outlets?

There were three main discourses surrounding MeTwo: Approximation of subjugated knowledge shared online, denial of the full extent of racism in Germany and explicit denial. The distribution across the four newspapers was not identical; *Die Tageszeitung* favoured approximation, while *Die Welt* centered around explicit denial of racism. Both *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* mostly denied the full extent of racism in Germany.

Despite the qualitative differences between all three discourses with respect to the general conceptualisation of racism itself, none actually acknowledges the full extent of contemporary racism in Germany. For example, Black voices are rarely included in any of the discourses. Therefore, all three perpetuate the subjugation of the knowledge racialised people possess.

## Introduction

The hashtag MeToo encouraged many women around the world to take to social media. After many years of denying issues, the public was pushed towards listening to women's experiences of sexism, misogyny, and harassment. Connecting to this success, in the middle of 2018, racialised people in Germany created MeTwo: a second take, this time drawing attention to various experiences of contemporary racism, an issue that has rarely been publicly addressed at that time.

As MeTwo welcomed racialised people into the spotlight of the German public, it addressed a sore point: Racism still exists after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, and it may even exist within oneself. Indeed, the public conception of racism in Germany is predominantly limited to the country's history. The German Empire as the first modern German state, participated late in imperialism and colonialist expansion. Because they were ruling over a limited number of colonies the colonial history of Germany is often neglected. Accordingly, atrocities such as the genocide on the Herero and Nama are only investigated starting in the 2010s. The topic of racism is often reduced to the period of Nazi Germany from 1933-1945. In both academia and the public eye, the contrasts to racism before 1945 can serve as a tool to either belittle or entirely neglect modern-day racism (Messerschmidt, 2011, p. 59). This limited perspective is further exacerbated by the representation gap of people of color in German academia. Even the topic of racism tends to be discussed in predominantly white spaces, if discussed at all. Incidentally, the Wikipedia page 'Racism in Germany' only exists in English but not in German (Racism in Germany, 2020).

Even using the German word 'Rassismus' can be considered taboo (Mecheril & Scherschel, 2011). Although this has been changing, the overall trend remains to focus on overt, 'extremist' (neo-)nazism while ignoring racialised people and their experiences of racism and the underlying structures in society (Mayer, 2013; Seufert, 2018). Racialised people in Germany are affected by structural discrimination in all domains of society and are therefore underrepresented in various institutions. Furthermore, politics and general discussions ignore incidents of racism such as racial profiling, police brutality and racial discrimination.

I have an ambivalent position in the racialized society. I am a person of color myself, and I know what it means to experience racism and how it can impact one's biography. However, I am mixed, growing up with a Brown father and a white mother. This means that I also catch myself having racist prejudices. The reflection of this ambivalent role is why it is important to me to acknowledge the predominance of racism in German society. The voices of the hashtag MeTwo are living proof that the framework surrounding racism in Germany is incomplete and even harmful. In light of these circumstances, people of colour in Germany are in a difficult situation: While they share their knowledge and

criticise the public conception of racism, their success still depends on the public and, thus, the media.

In this article, I address this issue by raising the question: How is racism depicted in the German media as racialised people make themselves heard? To approach this, I introduce literature to describe racism not as a side issue of political fringe groups but as a structure of oppression. This allows me to leave the limited framework in Germany and move towards the distinction between overt and covert racism discussed in Critical Race Theory. This way, I can describe racism in a larger sense to approach the concept of common sense and its influence on what is considered overt racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). To understand the dynamics behind this common sense, I apply Foucauldian understandings of discourse, power, and knowledge. I then connect this to theoretical concepts developed by Ulrich Beck (2016), who describes how the position of people in public power structures determines what is commonly considered to be true. Using this theoretical framework, I introduce a category system to guide my analysis of the racial structure in German press coverage. The analysis is based on a sample of four nationwide German newspapers, namely *Die Tageszeitung*, *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*. I analysed articles during MeTwo to ascertain how the German press reacts to the experiences of racism as a contemporary structure in society. I specifically focused on the precise ways in which the knowledge about racism as a larger social issue is either acknowledged or belittled and derive three discourses that differ in their acknowledgement of racism in Germany. In this paper, I describe each discourse by applying my theoretical perspectives to the articles in my sample. Finally, I argue that the knowledge of racialised people remains subjugated because the racial structure of society is stable enough to maintain itself.

## Literature Review

### The Racial Structure

Racism works within a system of discourses and practices used to legitimate historical and contemporary power relations (Rommelspacher, 2011, p. 29). Therefore, it is not an issue of isolated fringe-groups, but a system of dominance referred to as the racial structure of society by Bonilla-Silva (2018, p. 8-9). This structure favours white people labeled as ‘belonging’, and works against people of colour, who are labeled as the ‘other’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Miles & Brown, 2003, p. 84-86).

The prevalent blind spot on various forms of racism is not just a matter of apathy but a result of racism itself. Recognising the manifestations of the racial structure depends on the observer: Due to their privilege, white people tend to overlook what racialised people

experience first hand (McIntosh, 2015). Overt forms of racism, such as the Holocaust, (neo-)Nazi ideology, and slavery tend to be commonly identified as racism. Covert racism, on the contrary, is often the center of debates. It includes, for example, geographical segregations, religious and cultural exclusions (Hall, 2016), as well as intersections with other systems and structures of oppression, such as sexuality, gender, and ability (Collins, 2009; Crenshaw, 1991; The Combahee River Collective, 1986).

Manifestations of social structures differ depending on time and context (Foucault, 2002, p. 36). Likewise, the distinction between what is overt and covert racism refers to a blurred, variable, and contingent line. It depends on what is widely seen as 'bad' and what is commonly accepted to be 'normal', while racially privileged people tend to be in positions to dominate these discussions. As most people in Germany, especially those in powerful positions, are racially privileged, the prevalent focus on the most overt forms of racism is, therefore, the perpetuation of the racial structure itself.

It follows that there is an unquestioned common sense maintaining the racial structure in society (Lawrence, 1982, p. 63, 79). A common set of knowledge used to justify that only overt racism is recognised, while covert forms are legitimised, hidden, or denied (van Dijk, 1992, p. 93). This way, the racial structure (re)produces through common sense no matter where exactly a line between overt and covert racism is drawn (Hall, 2016, p. 176; Lawrence, 1982, p. 84-85).

## **The Racial Regime of Truth**

Not all people in society perceive racism in the same way. People of color have first-hand knowledge about racism, while predominantly white people tend to neglect the topic. This, inherently, creates tension: Who holds the truth? What is commonly accepted knowledge about racism is dependent on discursively (re)produced relations of power as they influence how 'true' and 'false' are defined (Foucault, 1980, p. 131; 2003b, p. 24). This Foucauldian knowledge/power is enacted within relations of domination (Collins, 1993), creating and maintaining a regime of truth (Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Foucault, 1980; Hall, 2018). Therefore, in a white supremacist society, it is white definitions of racism that make use of a racial regime of truth to (re)produce racism in society.

There are commonly visible parts of racism and also aspects that are 'hidden'; just like an iceberg does not reveal its actual size above the surface of the water. The regime of truth allows for white definitions of racism to be discussed publicly, while first-hand knowledge of racialised people is made invisible. I refer to this division as overt and covert racism. Inherent in this setup is a difference in perception: White supremacy allows white people to only look at the tip of an iceberg and pretend it is the whole thing. Racialised people, however, are aware of the whole iceberg and the regime of truth it originates from.

A common sense that is defined by a white supremacist society is confronted by the bigger picture that is apparent to people of color.




Figure 1. Iceberg Model of Racism. Own illustration, adapted from Gee & Ro (2009, p.367)

Gee & Ro's (2009) iceberg model illustrates this difference in perception. The visible part represents racism that is commonly recognised in a white supremacist society, while covert racism lies beneath the surface and is recognised by racialised people. In my adaptation (see Figure 1), I have categorized some terms relevant to this paper and added a water line: The distinction between overt and covert racism is based on a white notion of common sense.

As shown above, common sense delimits commonly accepted knowledge. Foucault developed theories to reveal how common knowledge is created and maintained within a society's discourse in relation to power (Foucault, 2002). In the Foucauldian sense, the term discourse describes all statements and practices which are considered to be meaningful within society (Hall, 1997, p. 44). Stuart Hall (1997) points out that even though topics can exist outside of discourse, "they only take on meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse" (p. 45). This entails that "statements different in form, and

dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the same object” (Foucault, 2002, p. 35). These analyses reveal that it depends on discourse how a topic in society can be addressed and whether it can be addressed at all. Since discourse creates the realm of what can be said, every knowledge exists only with regard to what already exists discursively (Hall, 1997, p. 47).

This means that the racial structure of society is (re)produced by the commonly accepted knowledge and vice versa. The reality of racism is only discussed within a limited scope as long as that scope is commonly believed to be complete. Thus, the racial regime of truth is (re)produced discursively which creates the incomplete and distorted picture in society. A picture that “will have real consequences [...] and will become ‘true’ in terms of its real effects, even if in some absolute sense it has never been conclusively proven” (Hall, 1997, p. 49).

Although discourse consists of all statements about overt, covert, and anti-racism, the knowledge of racialised people is hidden in plain sight as it is not commonly accepted. Instead, people of colour know the consequences, experiences, and variations of racism in society. This reflects what Foucault (2003a) describes as subjugated knowledge (p. 7). It connects to the collective experiences of people that have been historically and racially disqualified and excluded, labeled as naïve, subjective, and invalid (Collins, 2009, p. 269-270; Foucault, 2003a, p. 7). Subjugated knowledge about racism bears a history of darkness in the shadows of the European Age of Enlightenment (Foucault, 2003c, p. 70). Alcoff (2013) concisely summarises Foucault’s analyses:

“Foucault’s work offers a critical reassessment [...], suggesting that we consider the relation of truth to power/knowledge and the process by which some knowledges become subjugated or classified as ‘naïve’. The point is not to reject all dominant or received knowledges, but to raise the question of power as a matter of course in regard to existing knowledge.” (p. 222)

These dynamics between discourse, truth, power, and knowledge about racism show that it is important to look at who exactly is a speaker in discourse and what their perspective is: Inevitably, discourses are dependent on the people who (re)produce them (Foucault, 2002, p. 55-56). Ulrich Beck’s *Metamorphosis of the World* (2016) sheds light on how the position of speakers can shape perspectives. He discusses power structures in the public and the individual positions within (p. 97-98). A connection of this approach with Foucauldian ideas, therefore, allows looking at what is said and what is not said as well as who is in a position to define what can be said and what not (Beck, 2016, p. 130; Foucault, 2002, p. 30).

Even though Beck’s understanding of global risks originates from analyses of issues concerning nature and climate change, it is applicable to the racial structure in many ways. He describes risks as issues of inequality and nationalist viewpoints (Beck, 2016, p. 82-

83). Framed like this, they tend to be externalised as side effects and are hidden, while they already harm many people who do not have the privileges to make their suffering publicly visible (*ibid.*). On a global level, the people most affected by climate change are silenced by colonialist and racist structures. The racial structure itself can also be seen as a social risk as mechanisms of hiding knowledge maintain it: The way of dealing with racism follows repeating patterns which claim to explain the racial structure while at the same time misrepresenting and hiding it (Bonilla-Silva, 2018, p. 54).

As mentioned above, the regime of truth with its relations of domination define what is considered true knowledge about racism: The relations of definition are relations of domination (Beck, 2016, p. 97). This means that racism can only be made visible if white people in their dominant and privileged positions step back and entirely replace their bystander definitions with the lived experiences and knowledge of racialised people. Consequently, there are two points of action that people can build on: keeping the racial structure invisible or making it visible (Beck, 2016, p. 107-111).

From the perspective of invisibility, risks are described within the context of profiting from them (p. 107-108). People who (re)produce them tend to be part of dominant institutions, and if risks such as racism were fully visible, they would lose their position of definition (*ibid.*). This dominant institutional position makes it easy to limit and control the information that is publicly discussed (p. 103). This is reflected in white privilege (McIntosh, 2015): Insufficiently describing racism from a dominant position maintains that description in society. White people who create media content are both producers and profiteers of keeping racism hidden. If they can define what racism is, it is only discussed within a framework that does not question their position of defining racism. Beck (2016) states that this role within institutions can be described as a failure and function at the same time: “They fail because they have no idea or answer as to how to cope with these global risks. They do not fail because their politics of invisibility is continually making exactly those risks invisible to the public.” (p. 101). A public sphere that indirectly or directly tries to keep issues invisible is what Beck (2016) calls progress publicness: For the sake of an exclusive understanding of progress, it “focuses on the production and distribution of goods” (p. 130). This focus on perceived advantages comes with a downplaying and denial of the consequences of the status-quo (*cf. ibid.*). It reveals the way common knowledge is put above subjugated knowledge in practice.

Conversely, a perspective of visibility connects to the subjugated knowledge of racialised people. Beck (2016) notes that the people behind this perspective can relate to anthropological shocks, which are contained in a collective memory about a risk in society (pp. 122-23). Unlike the perspective of invisibility, the perspective of visibility is not interconnected with but exists independently from powerful institutions, such as the media (p. 112). Even though this independence means they are harder to control, these people tend to be less dominant in the public and therefore need to fight for inclusion into institutional communication (p. 110). Regarding racism it is people of color and their al-

lies who communicate the perspective of visibility. They do not profit from the invisibility of racism but its visibility: Their goal is to make the consequences of the racial structure as widely known as possible (pp. 111-12). By doing so, other affected people gain parts of this knowledge and have it easier to make sense of their own experiences (pp. 99-100). Therefore, a perpetuation of subjugated knowledge allows a critique of the status quo to grow and become more prominent in discourse (Foucault, 2003a, p. 8). A public sphere building on the experiences of people affected by risks is what Beck (2016) calls risk publicness (p. 130). Applied to racism, it would aim to establish the subjugated knowledge of racialised people as common knowledge of a new regime of truth. Metaphorically speaking: The water-line in Figure 1 would be gone, and the iceberg entirely revealed.

With Beck's analysis, it becomes clear that the question about what is publicly discussed is not about truth. Instead, it is about who is in a dominant position to define what is 'true' (cf. Beck 2016:102). "We all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always 'in context', positioned." (Hall, 1989, p. 68; emphasis in the original) Because of the racial structure and its regime of truth, the knowledge of racialised people can be 'othered' and kept invisible by people with racial privilege (Hall, 1989, p. 70-71). Therefore, as the last step before I build my category system, I also look at how this subjugation of knowledge works in practice.

## Subjugating Knowledge

As illustrated above, the predominant position of white people in deciding what is 'true' about racism leads to an incomplete picture. The common sense of what makes racism overt enough to be addressed is whiteness. White(ness) is "a set of assumptions, beliefs, and practices [in society] that place the interests and perspectives of white people at the center of what is considered normal" (Gillborn, 2018, p. 339). Thus, there is a set of common sense defence strategies that help to (re)produce the racial structure. White people do not even need to be aware of the full extent of it: Perpetuating their perspectives on racism defends and reproduces it. It is a hegemonic form of maintaining the racial structure and keeping racialised minorities and Black people in particular "at the bottom of the well" (Bonilla-Silva, 2018, p. 3).

These various forms of defence strategies are commonly available to belittle and derail discussions about racism. As mentioned above, the focus on overt racism serves as such a strategy in Germany. This creates false syllogisms such as:

(1) Nazi Germany was racist. It was defeated in 1945. Therefore, racism in Germany lies in the past.



(2) Nazis are racist. I am not a Nazi. Therefore, I cannot be racist.

This highlights how debates on racism in Germany tend to be limited to (neo-) nazism. Unlike in Canada, where racism as a general societal issue is at least a topic of discussion, the debate in Germany is linked to history or political fringe groups. This trend has been ongoing ever since the end of the war, to proclaim a new, modern, and different Germany that ‘learned its lesson’. Unfortunately, this picture has not changed significantly during the last 80 years. Neo-nazi and racist attacks on temporary housing units for asylum seekers gained traction in the 1990s and peaked after 2015. Even these overt cases of racial hate were not dealt with appropriately in the media or political spaces. While Canada attempts to keep ongoing discussions about racism (e.g., reconciliation with indigenous people), Germany tries to find out how to stop talking about racism at all. Given that inner-European racial divisions follow lines that are often surprising to North Americans, the ignorance towards racism becomes all the more jarring.

This externalisation of racism as an issue of only specific political ideologies has real consequences, as seen with the German right-wing terrorist organisation NSU<sup>1</sup>. The connections and racist motives behind a series of murders of racialised Germans were only brought to light when the connection to neo-Nazi terrorism was undeniable (Bojadžijev, 2013, p. 146-147). It was only after this political categorisation became clear that severe instances of racist misconduct within the police, secret services, the government, and judiciary institutions in Germany came to light (ibid.).

This externalisation of racism to far-right ideologies connects to the political ideal of centrism that is hegemonic in Germany (Assall, 2013). This way, people can defend the racial structure by claiming to represent the neutral center of political thought, hence the rationale of truth and compromise. In addition, this viewpoint serves as a tool to describe criticising racism as an equivalent to extremism (ibid.). This leads to assumptions that hide the impact of the racial structure as a whole. Gardner (2009) aptly sums this issue up by stating: “The fact that one is confronted with an individual who strongly argues that slavery is wrong and another who argues equally strongly that slavery is perfectly legitimate in no way suggests that the truth must be somewhere in the middle.” (p. 98).

However, externalising racism is not the only way to avoid talking about the impact of the racial structure. Robin DiAngelo (2018), a white scholar researching whiteness, describes one of these emotional defence strategies as white fragility. According to her, white conservatives and liberals alike tend to avoid critically reflecting their dominant position of white privilege in the structure of racism (p. 1-2). Instead, they are eager to

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<sup>1</sup>The NSU (‘Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund’) was a Neonazi terrorist organisation which murdered at least 10 people and is responsible for various bombings between 1998 and 2011. After more than 10 years of denying the existence of a racist motive or even connections behind the murderers, questions regarding an involvement of law enforcement and the secret services remain unanswered until today (von der Behrens, 2018).

deny any own connection to racism (ibid.). Another defence strategy is tokenism, where white people use their dominant position to include racialised people in conversations or the media on their terms (Benshoff & Griffin, 2011, p. 55). However, this is not about addressing racism in society but about not appearing to be racist (ibid.). Both white fragility and tokenism show that avoidance to be 'called a racist' to many white people is more important than acknowledging the existence of racism as a general structure (van Dijk, 1992, p. 90). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva shows that the avoidance to address racism leads to a concept of Racism without Racists (2018). He shows that conservatives, as well as liberals, (re)produce what he calls Color-Blind Racism: a claim to 'not see' or 'not care' about racialized attributes to avoid talking about racism (pp. 1, 154). While these claims rely on the fact that races are no factual biological categories for humans, they ignore the real-life consequences racism has for racialised people (pp. 2-3). This connects to another strategy of denial: Reversal. Since race is considered not to exist at all, people who address racism are labeled 'the actual racists' (van Dijk, 1992, p. 94). Accordingly, while ignoring the racial structure of society, they claim there is a reverse racism targeting white people (Bax, 2018).

Furthermore, even when racism is addressed, the voices of racialised people can be either ignored or constantly reframed by white people deciding on the content published (cf. van Dijk, 1992, p. 101). Van Dijk (1992) states that this is due to the indirect assumption that people affected by racism were 'too subjective' and that a white spokesperson was necessary for 'objective' validation. (p. 101).

These defences of the racial structure also have secondary implications. They can support neoliberal assumptions of victim blaming and laissez-faire racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2018, p. 56; van Dijk, 1992, p. 94). This way, economic delusions such as the 'invisible hand' are claimed to erase racial inequalities – if racialised people work hard enough (Bobo, 1999, p. 464). In their hegemonic position, defence strategies can also support overt and organised racism, as these outspoken forms can then rely on commonly accepted points of view (van Dijk, 1992, p. 88).

Henry and Tator (2002) discuss racist discourses of domination in Canada and illustrate how the Canadian press (re)produces racist depictions of racialised people as being 'other'. The authors zero in on the extent and characteristics of these racist discourses and analyse racist statements and depictions in the media. However, I analyse racism as a topic of discussion in the press and focus specifically on how the media reacts to anti-racist voices of colour. This way, I acknowledge that subjugated knowledge is part of discourse as well, even if it has a different position in it. Thus, my focus lies on identifying how this knowledge is discussed, dismissed or denied within discourse. This approach allows me to decenter racism and center the fight against racism in society.

## Hypotheses

As this review suggests, GVP activism is often fraught with racial inequities, and the relationship between the media and movement actors is complex. Keeping these realities in mind, I return to the case of MFOL and the protest to propose hypotheses for my research: Hypothesis 1: As Benford and Snow (2000) suggest that diagnostic frames differentiate a movement, I hypothesize that due to their positionality and lived experience, the diagnostic frames forwarded by MFOL actors will define the problem in way that is not inclusive of urban gun violence. Hypothesis 2: In line with Merry (2018), I hypothesize that MFOL actors will privilege forms of gun violence such as mass shootings or those involving child victims and will not make mention of race. Hypothesis 3: Following Rohlinger (2000), I hypothesize that despite the protest paradigm, MFOL actors will have their frames mentioned in more than a third of the sampled articles as media attention is among their organization's central goals.

## Methods

### Qualitative Approach

I use an exclusively qualitative content analysis based on my category system (see Appendix 1). This means I do not apply quantitative or statistical approaches but use the category system as a blueprint and guide to describe the discourses about racialised people in the German press. I analysed newspaper articles applying the category system and determined how the subcategories and manifestations were visible/present or invisible/absent in each article. I also looked at who was the speaker/journalist speaking and how this may connect to their statements.

Acknowledging that we all speak from specific perspectives (cf. Hall, 1989), a qualitative approach allows raising questions that could not be asked that way within quantitative approaches (cf. *ibid.*). Therefore, a theoretically guided sampling was employed to illustrate and apply the theoretical framework developed above. Even though this method is often dismissed as subjective, it actually gets its strength by reflecting on subjectivity and making the analyses intersubjectivity comprehensible (cf. Meyen et al. 2011:34-35).

In the case of racism, focuses on objectivity can even (re)produce racist assumptions instead of questioning them (Balibar, 2018; Hall, 2016; cf. Hund, 2006). My theoretical framework questions these rationales and the common sense behind them. Going beyond such frameworks and applying a qualitative analysis allows me to analyse the hidden parts of the iceberg. I can analyse if the experiences of racialised people are depicted in

the media and also how exactly this is done or not done.

Therefore, a qualitative approach also allows me to both include and reflect on my personal position towards racism. The topic of this paper, the questions I raised, and the theories I have chosen, reflect who I am and what I am interested in (cf. Meyen, Löblich, Pfaff-Rüdiger, & Riesmeyer, 2011, p. 35). I have an ambivalent position in the racialized society. I am a person of color myself and I know what it means to experience racism, what it means to be ignored, and how it can impact one's biography. My father came from India to Germany as an asylum seeker, hoping to have a safer and more promising future here. After I was born, his deportation was only avoided by a pre-scheduled marriage of my parents. However, even with this background, growing up within this society leaves traces. This means that I also catch myself (re)producing racism. The reflection of this ambivalent role is why it is important to me to acknowledge the perspective of racism being predominant in society and often hidden from plain sight.

## Category System

In Michel Foucault's (2002) work *The Archeology of Knowledge*, he introduces four rules of discursive formation to explain his understanding of discourses (p. 34-35). Meyen (2013) states that these formation rules make it possible to connect Foucault's theory with empirical research on the media (p. 30). I will not explicitly repeat each of the categories in this paper. However, by applying the formation rules to a category system, the theoretical interests of my study become clearer for myself and others (cf. Meyen et al., 2011, p. 35-36). It allows me to operationalise the discourses, power and knowledges in the formation of racism in an intersubjective and replicable way (cf. Meyen et al., 2011).

Applying my literature review and Foucault's discursive formations, I created a category system (see Appendix 1) to analyse the coverage of the topic of racism in the German media. This category system is based on the structure introduced by Meyen (2013, p. 30) and expanded by some subcategories introduced by Sittenauer (2018, p. 15). Even though these subcategories concern the discourses of feminism, most can be applied to the analysis of racism.

The first rule is the formation of objects (Foucault, 2002, p. 44). This rule focuses on the topics and contexts a discourse creates, addresses, connects, and shapes directly or indirectly (p. 51, 54). Regarding racism, this relates to overt and covert manifestations that are discursively available to talk about racism. Regardless of them being explicitly communicated to form a unit or not – on the level of discourse they are objectifications of the racial structure in society (p. 35).

The second rule is the formation of enunciative modalities (Foucault, 2002, p. 55). This rule revolves around the questions of who communicates the discourse, who speaks about a topic, and who is considered valid in doing so (ibid.). It includes the institution, the perspective of the speakers as well as the positioning of the content (p. 56). Thus, the enunciative modalities connect to Beck's focus on the speakers: are they an advocate for politics of invisibility or visibility? A white person or a person of color? A journalist in a dominant position or a person of color speaking up?

The third rule is the formation of concepts (Foucault, 2002, p. 62). This rule is concerned with the communicated content: the rhetoric and argumentative structures through which a topic is discussed (p. 63). This includes the type of medium and references towards other content (ibid.). Therefore, this rule connects to the way someone frames racism: How do people within the media deal with the voices of people of colour (cf. Hall, 1997, p. 46)? Are defence strategies applied, or is an acknowledgment of racism demanded (cf. p. 45)? Are there references aiming to shift the focus towards overt racism or towards the voices of people affected by covert racism? Are there references to common sense or subjugated knowledge?

Finally, the fourth rule is the formation of strategies (Foucault, 2002, p. 71). It is concerned with the way discourses create themes, theories, assumptions, and conclusions (ibid.). This builds on questions concerning common sense, the regime of truth and defence strategies, as well as the acknowledgement of subjugated knowledge. Therefore, this category includes to what extent the racial structure is made visible and whether there are connections to neighbouring discourses (such as integration, migration or intersectionality). Is the racial structure kept invisible in a progress publicness, or is it made visible in a risk publicness? Thus, one central question is whether the discourse implies a change or a conservation of the status quo (cf. Hall, 1997, p. 46).

## Material

On 24. July 2018, Ali Can coined MeTwo and animated racialised people to share their experiences with racism (Can, 2018; Perspective Daily, 2018). Leading up to this was the debate regarding racism experienced by soccer player Mesut Özil as well as the success of the anti-sexist hashtag MeToo. Ali Can wanted it to help racialised people to connect and recognise the similarities between their experiences (Perspective Daily 2018).

MeTwo indeed animated thousands of racialised people to share speak up against the limited depiction of racism in Germany. Even though it does not represent the complete subjugated knowledge, MeTwo serves as a good example of circulation of knowledge. Due to its impact, the media had no choice but to address the experiences of racism and racism in general. The hashtag serves as a key event to analyse the discursive for-

mations of the racial structure. It is an indicator of how journalists, who are dominant in defining racism in public, react to these parts of subjugated knowledge and the demands for visibility of structural racism in society.

Since it is not possible to analyse the entire discourse and media coverage of racism in Germany (Meyen, 2013, p. 32-33), I will consider a sample of selected German newspapers. This is because I assume that the press has a dominant position in talking about racism and (re)producing the public knowledge around it. While most journalists in Germany are white, the press coverage tends to perpetuate the common sense of its recipients (van Dijk, 1992, p. 100-103).

To analyse a wide range of the press, I selected four nationwide German newspapers that, due to their prominence, shape and represent public discussions about racism. My selection is based on differences in the political overtones and the editorial stances of the newspapers (Löblich, 2012, p. 92). Thus, I decided to analyse articles from the liberal newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), the liberal-leftwing *Die Tageszeitung* (taz), the liberal-conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and the conservative newspaper *Die Welt* (cf. Löblich, 2012, p. 92). These newspapers are emblematically connected to not only their political overtones but also their assumed readership. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) is one of the biggest newspapers in Germany. It proclaims critical journalism and is considered to have liberal political overtones (cf. Löblich 2012:95, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* GmbH 2018b) The editorial team mainly consists of White journalists with some exceptions (see *Süddeutsche Zeitung* GmbH 2018a).

*Die Tageszeitung* (taz) is also distributed nationwide, but it is smaller than the other newspapers. However, as Löblich (2012) shows, including taz allows considering coverage independent from economic pressures and advertisement (p. 92). Additionally, the editorial stance of taz is explicitly against oppression and open towards the voices of marginalised people (see *Die Tageszeitung*, 2008). Columns written by journalists of colour such as *Minority Report* and *Habitus* are recurring features of taz. Therefore, for both SZ and taz my analysis will check whether these liberal to left-wing stances are reflected in their coverage of racism.

*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) also counts as one of the most prominent national newspapers in Germany. The editorial stance is explicitly liberal-conservative and addressed towards the elites of Germany (see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* GmbH 2015). The editorial team consists of White journalists with almost no exceptions (see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* GmbH 2018).

Unlike SZ, taz and FAZ, *Die Welt* (Welt) does not publicly declare their editorial stance. However, it is part of the largest publishing house of Germany, Axel Springer SE. This does not only highlight why I decided to include Welt, but also indicates its political stance, as Axel Springer SE has been criticized for its conservative to nationalist overtones

for decades (see Adorno, Bahrdt, Boll et al. 1969). The editorial team is predominately White with almost no exceptions (see Axel Springer SE 2018).

The timespan of the articles in my sample reaches from 24.07.2018 until 01.10.2018. The first date marks the day the hashtag was introduced by Ali Can, while the last day is a date after which the search requests in the database I consulted (wiso) suggest almost no specific press coverage anymore. The keywords of my searches were (in German): metwo; racism; skin color; hostility against foreigners; hate against foreigners; xenophobia<sup>2</sup>. I selected articles that addressed MeTwo, experiences of racialised people, or statements about racism in the society as a whole and went beyond just mentioning such cases but give an explicit or implicit judgment. Unfortunately, I cannot guarantee that the databases provide all relevant information for my analysis (Meyen et al., 2011, p. 151). I selected editorial comments and interviews, as they tend to include affected people and give implicit or explicit statements. They also show how the media depict the topic. My sample is shaped by both the theories I introduced as well as the focus on subjugated knowledge.

This sample encompasses 102 articles. It consists of more articles from the taz and the Welt since they covered the topic of racism in many instances. I analysed all 102 articles applying the category system (see Appendix 1). In the end, the articles led me to three overall trends that I identify as the three discourses: explicit denial, implicit denial, and approaching subjugated knowledge. In the following I discuss these discourses guided by emblematic examples.

## Results

I identify three discourses, one of which explicitly denies the racial structure, one implicitly denies it by focusing only on certain aspects, while the third discourse consists of aims to approach subjugated knowledge. The speakers of the two discourses of denial are predominantly white journalists who hide different aspects of racism. This suggests that both discourses are based on common sense and (re)produce the established regime of truth of the racial structure. By approaching subjugated knowledge, the third discourse is closest to the experiences of racialised people. The speakers are mainly people of colour and some white allies. They acknowledge racism as a structure within society and are interested in establishing a risk publicness. However, focusing on who exactly speaks from which perspective reveals that it cannot entirely represent subjugated knowledge, because Black knowledge respectively is rarely included.

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<sup>2</sup>metwo”; “rassismus”; “hautfarbe”; “fremdenfeindlichkeit”; “fremdenhass”; “ausländerfeindlichkeit”; “ausländerhass”; “xenophobie”

The following descriptions are summaries of my deeper analysis. Instead of describing each individual article I analysed, I introduce prominent examples. I chose these examples because they are emblematic of the discourses, showcase their characteristics and describe the overall implications of each discourse.

### **“Racism Is When a Black Woman Isn’t Allowed to Ride a Bus Which Is Reserved for White People.”**

The discourse of explicit denial is (re)produced by speakers who bluntly apply common defence strategies to deny that racism is a societal structure. It builds on the stable history behind the regime of truth, while it only refers to subjugated knowledge to directly deny its validity. The speakers of this discourse are predominantly white journalists who use their white privilege and consider themselves advocates for common sense and German identity. Because the subjugated knowledge questions their privilege, acknowledging racism would undermine these speakers own dominant positions, which results in facets of white fragility coming into play.

This discourse is most prevalent in *Welt*, in which some articles only mentioned “racism” (in scare quotes) while an ongoing bigger discussion about the existence of reverse racism was continuously held over a number of newspaper issues. In *FAZ*, the discourse manifests mainly in connection to national identity, political centrism, and hence the externalisation of racism to either the past or fringe-groups. In *SZ* the discourse exists to a lesser extent but also manifests in externalisations and equations through political centrism and common defence strategies, such as victim blaming and reverse racism. The discourse of explicit denial almost does not appear in *taz*, as it only manifests in very few articles which are also directly deconstructed or less prominently featured.

“Racism is when a Black woman isn’t allowed to ride a bus reserved for white people. By contrast, if someone refuses to stand up so she can sit down, that is not racism but rudeness. Racism exists in every society to a certain extent. Is it racist to joke about the alleged stupidity of people from the German region of East Frisia? Wasn’t the title page (...) on which Saxony was labeled a fascist ‘blemish’ in Southeast Germany also a manifestation of Intra-German racism?” (Journalist of color in the *Welt*, see Appendix 2.1)

“The collective of hipster-columnists discusses the question of whether the word [...] ‘alman’ is a racist description for biographic Germans (in the following ‘Biogermans’). Spoiler alert: it is.” (White journalist in the *Welt*, see Appendix 2.1)

“[A] case which, beyond political debates about right-wing agitation and al-



leged racism within social institutions, stands as an example of how hard and partly impossible it is to integrate young people from entirely different cultures into our society.” (White journalist in the *Welt*, see Appendix 2.1)

Overall, this discourse keeps racism in society actively invisible by externalising and denying it. The discourse of explicit denial does not aim to establish a risk publicness but instead maintains a progress publicness. Based on white privilege, the predominantly white speakers of this discourse profit from the invisibility of racism. Thus, they use and justify defence strategies and, in many cases, refer to concepts of political centrism and common sense. Instead of making the racial structure visible, the speakers emphasise overt racism, while dismissing experiences of covert racism and the structure behind it.

Since this discourse is heavily linked to the existing regime of truth and its relations of domination, I assume it is the oldest discourse of the three I can identify. It includes a ‘necessity’ of white spokespersons who are conceived to be more rational concerning racism. Thus, this discourse could remain dominant if the defence strategies continue to work. However, the prevalence of defences indicates that despite its dominant position, this discourse is trapped within relations of circulating power: It must defend itself to stay relevant - an issue the discourse of implicit denial appears to circumvent.

### **“Who Is a Victim, Who Is a Perpetrator and Are People Oversensitive?”**

The discourse of implicit denial lies ‘in between’ the two other discourses. The speakers selectively address, include, and sometimes even promote specific parts of subjugated knowledge to support a specific and limited definition of racism. These speakers are white journalists, or in some cases, racialised people. In this discourse, racism is acknowledged beyond the most overt cases but still limited by a flexible use of defence strategies, externalisations, and common sense.

In *Welt*, the discourse of implicit denial manifests in forms of tokenism and condescending statements about racialised people and links to Germany’s ideals and identity. In *FAZ*, it is directly linked to political centrism and the concept of white spokespersons. This way *MeTwo* and experiences of racism are included, but they are taken less seriously and are often linked to right-wing extremism only. In *SZ*, the implicit denial is mainly represented by including the experiences of racialised people while at the same time externalising the issue of racism or depicting it to have just a limited impact. This happens in relation to liberal, multicultural and anti-racist ideals, while concepts like political centrism, white spokesperson, and neoliberal depictions of racism are (re)produced (e.g., racism is reframed as an issue of right-wing extremists pushing their agenda into our society). In *taz*, the discourse of implicit denial functions differently than in the other

newspapers. Some writers shift the focus away from racism as a structure to look at specific aspects and experiences of racism or other global risks, such as climate change.

“Racists are other people. The “MeTwo-debate” is also heatedly discussed in the multicultural city of Frankfurt. A discussion about racism in everyday life about the question who is a victim, who is a perpetrator and whether people are simply oversensitive.” (White journalists citing people of colour and white people in FAZ, see Appendix 2.2.)

“As if ethnic nationalism, racism and the disregard of the rule of law only existed at the periphery. As if this were still a thing: a sharply defined margin that can be kept at bay and observed from afar. Extremism crept closer. Hatred and resentment may be acted out by right-wing forces and pathologic rowdies who don’t even need an ideology.” (White journalist in SZ, see Appendix 2.2)

“It’s high-level whining. Our author didn’t tweet along with meTwo. For him, it is an elitist discourse, conducted out of a privileged position.” (Journalist of color in taz, see Appendix 2.2)

The quotes above show that the discourse of implicit denial is inconsistent because it depends on which aspects of racism a speaker displays or dismisses. This indicates that these speakers might profit from the visibility of specific forms of racism, while other aspects could harm their position of definition. Furthermore, they can, but do not need to, openly address an intent to keep racism visible. Because they differ from the older discourse of explicit denial, the speakers can use this contrast to promote their position as being new or revolutionary, without having to change relations of domination and definition. Overall, this implicit denial stands for including parts of subjugated knowledge while neither fully acknowledging the experiences nor the racial structure of society. It reflects the stability of white privilege and how the racial regime of truth is maintained in practice. The failure to acknowledge racism as a structure simultaneously maintains the structure itself and thus keeps it invisible. The speakers still build on concepts that maintain the racial regime of truth. Hence, this discourse also stands for politics of invisibility: It (re)produces and maintains a progress publicness instead of a risk publicness of racism.

The level of ambiguity suggests a firm and stable position of this discourse. It is harder to attack, counter or even address it. Due to its implicitness and foundation in the depths of covert racism, it was harder to identify articles that belong to it. Bonilla-Silva (2018) argues that it is precisely such “now you see it, now you don’t” structures that stabilise contemporary manifestations of racism (p. 3). The discourse of implicit denial connects to defence strategies, while the speakers do not directly apply but implicitly build on what is available through common sense. This suggests that it has a hegemonic position because, in contrast to the other two discourses, it does not need to constantly deconstruct counter-narratives to have validity. Lying ‘in between’ does not even have a

clear counterpart. Instead, its establishment and existence are not threatened or dependent on reacting to every counter-argument. The speakers can focus on extensive communication of their own positions instead of dealing with clear opponents. This ambiguity keeps it stable since it can shape-shift to appear open-minded while hiding racism as an overall structure.

### **“Finally There’s an Outlet for the Inordinate Emotions and Thoughts”**

The third discourse I identify is approaching subjugated knowledge. Accordingly, this discourse promotes ethical responsibilities and implies politics of visibility and an interest in establishing a risk publicness. It is closest to the experiences of racialised people with speakers that are journalists of color, some white allies, and scientists supporting MeTwo. Thus, there are also white speakers who want racism in society to be publicly discussed as well. This means that while racialised speakers of this discourse profit from making racism visible, the white speakers try to question their own privileges. The discourse includes critiques of dealing with overt and covert cases of racism in society. It is also open to critical discussions regarding integration, migration, and intersectionality.

Focusing on who exactly speaks in which context also reveals that some subjugated knowledge remains invisible. Black people’s knowledge was addressed or included only in very few instances and was only peripheral. The specific experiences were never mentioned. This suggests that Black voices are invisible on additional layers. In acts of tokenism, Black people can be more often used as passive tokens than other racialised groups to claim a ‘clear anti-racist’ point of view (Niemann, 1999). This could indicate that Black people are included when they can be reduced to peripheral roles, but they remain excluded from platforms of active knowledge (re)production. Therefore, while this discourse approaches subjugated knowledge for some racialised people, it excludes the specific experiences of Black people. This discourse mirrors some patterns of the two discourses of denial.

The discourse of approaching subjugated knowledge is prominent in taz. The way some writers approach it tends to reflect the editorial stance of including the voices of oppressed people. For instance, the paper has a designated column called Minority Report, in which MeTwo, white privilege, and common strategies of defence and denial are regularly discussed. In SZ, the extent and depth of acknowledgment and references were lower than in taz. Here, it is predominantly a handful of white journalists who aim to make racism visible from a self-critical perspective (e.g., citing the concept of white fragility). Unlike in taz, the speakers in SZ are not racialised journalists. Instead, struggles by racialised people who are not part of SZ’s editorial team are quoted. This leaves open whether the concept of a white spokesperson is still (re)produced here. The discourse of subjugated knowledge in FAZ is different to both taz and SZ. All but one article

are focused on white perspectives that examine privileges critically. In this way, topics like racial profiling, intersectionality, and research about racism are described. Since the experiences of racialised people were more marginalised than in taz and SZ, in FAZ the concept of a white spokesperson and a dominant position of definition becomes much clearer. In the articles of Welt, subjugated knowledge is less often included. If so, it is in a limited space or within a context of reframing this knowledge. This means that in Welt this discourse partially overlaps with the discourse of implicit denial. Even though some content is in favour of subjugated knowledge, contextual and editorial factors around the articles reframe it, for example, by only including such voices within the context of a pro/con discussion with a white counterpart.

“Some things are simply long-overdue. As if one were busy hitting one’s head with a hammer until Ali Can creates metwo and, suddenly, the headaches stop. Finally there’s an outlet for the inordinate emotions and thoughts. I don’t even know what to tweet about first: the most brutal racism or the latest racism I’ve experienced or about what racism even means?” (Journalist of color in taz, see Appendix 2.3)

“It doesn’t even always have to be fully-fledged racism. “The Germans” aren’t racist. Germans are racist. Too many. The NSU proved that even murderous [Nazi] terrorism fuelled by racism is possible within Germany. But many MeTwo-descriptions also show that non-migrants encounter migrants frighteningly often with sloppiness, thoughtlessness, uncertainty and prejudice.” (White journalist in FAZ, see Appendix 2.3)

“Our author, himself an old white man, explains why by definition »reverse racism« does not exist. [...] Sociologist Robin DiAngelo has written a wonderful book about this topic, which unfortunately has not been translated into German yet: It is called White Fragility.” (White journalist in SZ, see Appendix 2.3)

Compared to the other discourses, the discourse of approaching subjugated knowledge appears to be new within the public eye since it connects to contemporary developments such as MeTwo. The speakers of this discourse tend to criticise the status quo and aim to shift towards a progress publicness. However, in all newspapers I analysed, the racial structure both within society and the media remains dominant in the background even when racialised people speak. While there are a few white journalists acknowledging racism, they sometimes indirectly reproduce or are embedded in the racial structure (e.g., white spokesperson). In addition, other white journalists who are able to frame the context around articles can do so to their advantage. Focusing on white positions regarding racism is still a limited picture. Thus, white dominance can remain untouched. On top of that, even if subjugated knowledge is included, it is strikingly rare that the knowledge comes from a Black perspective, revealing hierarchies in between racialised communities.

In relation to the other discourses, the discourse of approaching subjugated knowledge is constantly focused on defending the discourse itself, even though its speakers try to promote confidence and visibility. The two counter-discourses do not have to fight the dominant racial structure because they are spoken mainly through white journalists. Since they are based on common sense, the current regime of truth, and existing relations of domination, they are also more dominant than the discourse of approaching subjugated knowledge.

## Conclusion

MeTwo continues to be used online until today. Berg et al. (2020) argue that hashtags like MeTwo can serve as a tool to display public opinion online. However, they also highlight that public news media play an 'objectifying' role in forming public opinion and discourses. Even though the demand to fully acknowledge racism lives on, the oppression igniting this spark of revolt remains stable and untouched. In my analysis, all newspapers addressed the experiences of racialised people and racism in society. However, the partial and limiting depictions link to the established and white relations of definition and domination. Striking events and racist violence are connected to racism across the media landscape, while acknowledging racism as a structure in society is less dominant. Thus, it remains invisible that overt and covert racism refer to the same concepts and do not function independently but are interconnected with each other.

Even when people of colour manage to push the public to pay attention to them, this does not mean the knowledge of racial oppression is acknowledged. The discourse of approaching subjugated knowledge has speakers who show a willingness to make the racial structure visible and establish a risk publicness. However, I have to note that this was the case with MeTwo in 2018. It remains to be analysed, whether and how the exclusion of Black knowledge in German discussions about racism changed in 2020, as BlackLivesMatter also had a larger impact there.

The other two discourses are more dominant since they can conserve the limited progress publicness by relating to the racial regime of truth and its common sense. It offers them a plethora of defence strategies to build on. While the discourse of explicit denial bluntly uses these defences, the other implicitly connects to the same strategies. This way, concepts such as white privilege, color-blind racism, reverse racism, and political centrism can be explicitly or implicitly used to keep racism as a structure invisible. The racial structure works circular via this (re)production of its own rules. It remains stable enough to either manifest in outright defence or ambiguous and implicit flexibility. In some instances, even some racialised people can hide aspects of racism when some of their own privileges are at stake.

Looking specifically at the two dominant discourses, it appears that the discourse of explicit denial is the oldest since it is directly linked to common sense concepts. However, the speakers are oftentimes defensive and cannot fully rely on 'self-explanatory' concepts. Connecting to Foucault's understanding of power, this implies circulation of power against this still dominant discourse. Unlike the discourse of explicit denial, the discourse of implicit denial is more stable since the speakers do not need to constantly justify their position. It does not have a clear opposition as it both differs and connects to the two other discourses. The stability, covertness, and ambiguity make the discourse of implicit denial hegemonic. It shows how flexible the racial structure of society is, while the underlying racial regime of truth remains fossilised and untouched.

Furthermore, contemporary developments regarding organised racism show that even overt racism is insufficiently dealt with in the German public and oftentimes kept invisible. This means that the path leading towards a risk publicness concerning the visibility of the racial structure is not only blocked by one policy but by an accumulation of various politics of invisibility. If racism is only talked about concerning overt cases but even these cases tend to be ignored, the outlook for racialised people to successfully establish a risk publicness in the future is uncertain.

When I prepared my analysis, I stated that racism could only be made visible if white people in dominant and privileged positions entirely replace their bystander definitions with the lived experiences of racialised people. The results show that this shift in perspective is rare, and even if there is an intent to change, structures can be reproduced. As long as people with racial privilege define racism and do not fully embrace all subjugated knowledge of racial oppression, the racial structure of society will not waver. Furthermore, racialised people themselves should also reflect on hierarchies in between communities of people affected by racism.

"The true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of us." (Lorde, 1984, p. 123)

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## Appendix 1: Category System

Formation of	Subcategories	Manifestations
Objects	Topics of racism	<i>overt</i> and <i>covert</i> racism; every day or singular experiences and hostilities; policies and practices; neo-fascist/right-wing agents
	Relations of racism	society; justice; morals/norms; politics; nation
	Context of racism	anti_racism; activism/inactiveness; migration; inclusion/integration/exclusion; difference/equality/equity
Enunciative Modalities	Speaker	White or racialized (person of color, Black person of color); journalists; politicians; scientists; activists; citizens
	Speaker's Perspective	affected or not affected by racism privileged or not privileged by the racial structure in society supporter of the victims or of the status-quo
	Medium	<i>Die Tageszeitung</i> ; <i>Die Süddeutsche Zeitung</i> ; <i>Die Welt</i> ; <i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>
	Positioning	front page; illustrations; size; space covered
Concepts	Type of Content	comment; report; interview
	Argument Structure	historical arguments; comparisons; morals/norms; own experiences; defense mechanisms
	Rhetoric	linguistic or visual emphasis: exclamations; exaggerations; understatements; demands; <i>White Fragility</i>
	References	focus on <i>overt</i> racism; <i>Common Sense</i> ; defense strategies focus on <i>covert</i> racism; <i>Subjugated Knowledge</i> ; acknowledgement references towards same or opposing positions in: other media; other articles; other people; other incidents
Strategies	Theories	racism is a structure in society as a whole racism is a structure in parts of society racism is no structure in society
	Neighboring Discourses	right-wing/neo_facists agents; racist violence and homicides German past (reunification; Nazi Germany) intersectionality (feminism, heterosexism, LGBTQI*, classism) migration (victims of closed borders, national isolation, openness) integration (national identity, assimilation demands)
	Function of the Discourse in Society	<i>Progress Publicness</i> or <i>Risk Publicness</i> : supporting invisibility or visibility of racism; including the experiences of racialized people or not justifying or changing the structure of White dominance

## Appendix 2: Original German Examples

### 2.1 Discourse of Explicit Denial

“Rassismus liegt vor, wenn eine schwarze Frau nicht in einem Bus mitfahren darf, der für weiße Menschen reserviert ist. Wenn dagegen niemand aufsteht, damit sie sich setzen kann, ist das kein Rassismus, sondern Unhöflichkeit. Ein gewisses Maß an Rassismus gibt es in jeder Gesellschaft. Sind Witze über die dummen Friesen nicht rassistisch? War die Titelseite der „Hamburger Morgenpost“ im Juni 2016, auf der ganz Sachsen als ein brauner „Schandfleck“ im Südosten der Bundesrepublik zu sehen war, nicht auch Ausdruck eines innerdeutschen Rassismus?” (Henryk M. Broder in: Die Welt, 07.08.18, 3).

“Das versammelte Hipster-Feuilleton diskutiert die Frage, ob das Wort – oder wahlweise der Begriff „Alman“ – gemünzt auf Biografiedeutsche (im Folgenden „Biodeutsche“) rassistisch sei. Um es schon einmal vorwegzunehmen: Ja, ist er.” (Martin Niewendick in: Die Welt, 27.07.18, 22).

“[Ein] Fall, der jenseits der politischen Debatte über rechtsradikale Hetze und angeblichen Rassismus in den Institutionen und in der Gesellschaft exemplarisch zeigt, wie schwierig und zum Teil unmöglich es ist, junge Menschen aus völlig anderen Kulturen in unsere Gesellschaft einzugliedern.” (Gisela Friedrichsen in: Die Welt, 04.09.18, 23).

### 2.2 Discourse of Implicit Denial

“Rassisten sind immer die anderen. Die „MeTwo-Debatte“ wird auch im multikulturellen Frankfurt hitzig geführt. Eine Diskussion über Rassismus im Alltag, über die Frage, wer eigentlich Opfer, wer Täter ist, und ob nicht doch alle mittlerweile überempfindlich geworden sind.” (Marie Lisa Kehler & Armin Ferris Wagner in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 08.08.18, 31).

“Als gäbe es völkischen Nationalismus, als gäbe es Rassismus, als gäbe es Missachtung des Rechtsstaats nur in der Peripherie. Als gäbe es das noch: einen scharf konturierten Rand, der sich auf Abstand halten und distanziert beobachten lässt. Der Extremismus ist in die Nähe gerückt. Hass und Ressentiment mögen ausagiert werden von rechten Kadern und pathologischen Schlägern, die nicht einmal eine Ideologie brauchen.” (Carolin Emcke in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 01.09.18, 5).

“Jammern auf hohem Niveau. Unser Autor hat bei meTwo nicht mitgetwittert. Weil es für ihn ein Elitendiskurs ist, geführt aus einer privilegierten Position heraus.” (Jörg

Wimalasena in: Die Tageszeitung, 09.08.18, 13).

## 2.3 Discourse of Approaching Subjugated Knowledge

“Es gibt Dinge, die so überfällig sind. Als würde man sich die ganze Zeit mit einem Hammer auf den Kopf hauen und dann ruft Ali Can metwo ins Leben, und plötzlich hören die Kopfschmerzen auf. Endlich gibt es für all die ungeordneten Gefühle und Gedanken ein Ventil. Ich weiß gar nicht, was ich zuerst tweeten soll: den schlimmsten Rassismus oder den letzten Rassismus oder was ist überhaupt Rassismus?” (Mithu Sanyal in: Die Tageszeitung, 30.07.18, 14).

“Es muss auch nicht immer der vollausgeprägte Rassismus sein, der da zutage tritt. “Die Deutschen” sind nicht rassistisch. Deutsche sind rassistisch. Zu viele. Wie der NSU vorgeführt hat, ist in Deutschland sogar ein mörderischer Terrorismus möglich, der sich aus dem Rassismus speist. Aber viele MeTwo-Berichte zeigen auch, dass Nichtmigranten Migranten erschreckend oft einfach mit Schludrigkeit, Gedankenlosigkeit, Unsicherheit, Vorurteil begegnen.” (Bertram Eisenhower in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.08.18, 9).

“Unser Autor, übrigens selbst ein alter weißer Mann, erklärt, warum es per Definition keinen »umgekehrten Rassismus« geben kann. [. . .] Die Soziologin Robin DiAngelo hat ein wunderbares Buch über dieses Thema geschrieben, das es leider noch nicht auf Deutsch gibt: Es heißt White Fragility.” (Till Raether in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09.08.18, Online Version).