Transition and Transposition: Genocide, Land and the British Columbia Treaty Process

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ABSTRACT: This paper situates the British Columbia Treaty Process within a brief discussion of the role of land in genocidal processes and transitional justice. It does so as a means to highlight the potential destructiveness of colonial land appropriation and the dangers of transitional justice processes that seek to forcibly transpose onto Indigenous persons the dispositions and practices of European property regimes.

KEYWORDS: Treaty making; land; transitional justice; transposition; genocide

Introduction

In the genocide studies literature, the relationship between land and genocide is often noted (Bergen 2003; Jones 2010). However, the emphasis tends to be upon land as a source of intergroup competition, whereby a scarcity of arable land, or a desire for group-based control over resource rich lands, can lead to mass violence and even genocide. Such a perspective is in keeping with a tradition of thought that views genocide and colonialism as intimately related (Arendt 1973; Barta 1987; Bischoping and Fingerhut, 1996; Lemkin 1944), as is clear in this passage from Raphael Lemkin’s (1944:79) *Axis Power in Occupied Europe*:

> Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group: the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals.

Here, territory is positioned as an object for control and competition within potentially genocidal intergroup conflicts by a state-driven utilitarian notion of land’s value.

A different emphasis can be found in the literature on colonial genocide in instances where Article II.c of the *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide* (UNGC 1948) is drawn on to support a charge of genocide against a colonial power (Annett 2001; Churchill 1997 and 2000; Davis and Zannis 1973; Neu and Therrien 2002). This Article of the UNGC lists as one of its genocidal acts “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life...
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" and thereby registers the fact that, once deprived of land and resources, a group can experience great difficulty in sustaining itself. Under this interpretation, land is also utilitarian, but in the sense that it is essential to intra-group survival as a source of a group’s physical well-being.

Unfortunately, both of these approaches are founded on a modernist and European “constitution” that assumes the stark separation of culture from nature. Bruno Latour (1993) notes that this act of purification is quickly coming undone as hybridic formations of nature and culture, ranging from HIV/AIDS to bedbugs, are demonstrating the complex braiding of the natural and cultural worlds. And, certainly, Indigenous peoples have long resisted such acts of purification. Taking Latour’s argument as a starting point, and drawing on the understanding of land expressed by Indigenous leaders in interviews I carried out when researching the British Columbia Treaty Process (Woolford 2005), I argue that land is more than simply a resource for inter-group competition or intra-group sustenance when considering Canadian colonial injustices. What is needed when evaluating the injustice of land appropriation is an understanding of land as part of the group; that is, as a key participant in the relationships that allow for the self-reproduction and ongoing negotiation of Canadian Indigenous group identities. Land, in Peter Kulchyński’s (2005:18) terminology, is an “embodied inscription,” which suggests not a mere closeness to nature, but rather the extent to which our natural surroundings are part of a group life that is inculcated into the physical being of group members (see also Monture-Angus 1999). As one of my respondents puts it:

We have so much more connection to this land than any other piece of land in the world. We have been here since time out of mind and we are not going anywhere. We need governments to recognize that that is our connection. [Interview 12/15/02]

Connection here represents the linking of identity and territory and not just a familiarity with place. The speaker is unable to imagine herself as a Coast Salish, Tseil Waututh person in any other territory, since her territory, in her view, is part of who she is, and it is in interaction with this territory that she defines herself. Within such a worldview, I argue, an assault on the territory of the group can be experienced as an assault upon the group itself, and therefore our definitions of genocide must push beyond limiting human-centred notions of groupness.

Based on this reconceptualization of genocide, one can examine land appropriation in a different light. The harm of colonial land appropriation is not simply an illegal seizure of land and resources; it is also potentially an assault on the group as a group. Such an understanding also has consequences for the type of justice we attempt to establish in the aftermath of land appropriation. Today, attempts to move societies beyond a genocidal past are most often addressed through the language of “transitional justice” (e.g., see Teitel 2000 or the International Journal of Transitional Justice) – a broad and loose term intended to capture the various mechanisms that can be implemented to assist a society in forming more peaceable future relations between former antagonists. The remainder of this paper will re-examine the practice of land claims negotiations in British Columbia as a form of transitional justice that seeks to move British Columbia from a period of wrongdoing into one of justice and certainty. It will be argued, however, that contemporary land claims fail to address the deep injustice of colonial land appropriation, and instead offer a conflict resolution process that seeks to forcibly transpose European notions of land and property rather than provide a justice that adequately transitions or transforms Canada’s settler colonial society.

In this paper I revisit the research that was the basis for my 2005 book, Between Justice and Certainty: Treaty-Making in British Columbia, re-reading it through the lens of two more recent areas of interest, genocide studies and transitional justice. Between 1998 and 2002 I carried out 55 interviews with participants in the BC Treaty negotiations and made over 200 hours of field observations at negotiation tables and community consultation meetings that were open to the general public, as well as at First Nation Summit (FNS) meetings through the permission of the FNS Executive. The result was
a book that criticized the symbolic violence of the treaty process and its fixation upon achieving legal and economic “certainty” at the expense of a deeper notion of justice. This paper seeks to follow-up these earlier ethnographic findings by contrasting them with some of the more recent outcomes of the BC Treaty Process, but also by taking more seriously the potential destructiveness of the BC Treaty Process. In very bald terms, I view treaty making in BC to be more a continuation of than transition from an earlier colonial genocidal process. I have argued elsewhere for the application of the term genocide to the colonial relations imposed in Indigenous peoples in Canada, which include events of physical destruction, unchecked disease spread, forced assimilation, and land appropriation (see Woolford 2009 and Woolford and Thomas 2010). This paper examines some of the ways in which Canada has failed to correct these injustices, and risks repeating them (albeit in a different form), through the context of treaty making.

The Limitations of Transitional Justice
The language of “transitional justice” appears to be winning the battle for naming the field of reparations politics, a field that is generally concerned with how societies heal and recover from historical injustices (Torpey 2003). More and more, the term is applied to any number of justice mechanisms intended to move a society from an authoritarian or violent present to a future prescribed by some authors to be defined by democratization (Nagy 2008) or liberalization (Teitel 2000). Transitional justice mechanisms are those that help facilitate a new set of more just relations between former antagonists and include truth commissions, compensation, symbolic atonement, lustration, peace and land negotiations, and other efforts directed at encouraging a societal shift away from an unsavoury past. These mechanisms are typically intended both to symbolize a sense of societal atonement and to provide recognition or resource redistribution as means to offset the harm inflicted on a targeted population.

Given the liberal predispositions of many of the authors working in this field of study, one is often forced to justify why land claims negotiations in Canada fit under this rubric. Those skeptical of the need for transitional justice in Canada wonder: Is a liberal democratic society like Canada really exercising a transition when it attempts to address the wrong of land appropriation committed against Indigenous peoples? For Nagy (2008), to make such a claim would be to broaden the concept of transition in an unhelpful manner since processes such as land claims do not involve a dramatic shift in the form or content of government. However, one could instead argue against the tendency in transitional justice studies to view the state as a monolithic entity. Although the state may be liberal-democratic in its general design, it still may possess colonial and authoritarian qualities that are in need of transition, such as in the form of antiquated pieces of legislation like the Indian Act, which continues to assert paternal control over Canadian Indigenous peoples. Similarly, the situation in British Columbia, where very little of the land was formally ceded to non-Aboriginal governments during the late 20th century period of colonial expansion, represents an authoritarian moment in Canadian history where land was removed from Indigenous peoples in British Columbia in violation of the laws of the British Empire. For honest liberals, it should be difficult to argue that Canada has fully shifted toward liberal democracy in terms of Indigenous/settler relations.

But it is more important that we challenge the teleology of transitional justice, which holds such notions of liberalization to be the ideal end goals for transitional processes rather than an alternative goal that may be equally valued, such as decolonization. Moreover, the moral certainty that comes with the conviction that liberalism is the right way to govern has proven quite destructive to Indigenous peoples. In Canada, the liberal approach to colonial settlement followed Locke’s (1970 [1689]) notion that property ownership is derived from the ways in which human labour transforms the land, such as through agriculture or mining, which has long been the basis for expropriations from Indigenous territories. Because Indigenous peoples in Canada were viewed to be unproductive in their relationships to land, the liberal response was to either obtain from them their land or to teach them to make “effective” use of land-based resources. Even today, contemporary treaty-making
occurs through a liberal discourse of property in which Indigenous ecologies are translated to complement European understandings of land ownership so that Indigenous title and jurisdiction can be reformed to fit under a Canadian land regime (Nadasdy 2002). As Nadasdy notes,

There is also a serious political danger inherent in the attempt to universalize the concept of property. In our desire to legitimize certain types of non-European social relations by calling them “property,” anthropologists and others are helping to subject those very social relations to new and powerful forms of social change. After all, the term property does have a very specific set of meanings in European legal and political discourse, and these meanings are both created by and reflected in the complex legal and political institutions of the state. We may claim that some specific set of non-European social relations in fact constitutes a set of “property relations,” but the moment we do so, we authorize politicians, judges, and other agents of the state to act on them as they would other more familiar forms of property. It gives them the conceptual tools and justification for imposing (yet again) their view of the world on aboriginal people. To translate the ways in which aboriginal people relate to one another and to the land into the language of property is, in essence, a tacit agreement to play by the rules of the game as set out by the state.” [Nadasdy 2002:251]

Thus, a liberal notion of property imposes its meaning on Indigenous understandings of the landsociety relation. Here, and elsewhere in Indigenous experiences of injustice, liberalization cannot be a viable goal of transition, since a specific modality of liberalization has been, and continues to be, experienced by Indigenous peoples as an injustice that calls for transition.

In sum, if the notion of transitional justice is to reach past a Eurocentric emphasis on liberalization and take seriously the harms of land appropriation experienced by Indigenous peoples, it must avoid prescribing a set of desired outcomes without regard for the specific nature of the conflict at hand. What is at the core of transitional justice thinking is the idea that societies burdened by a set of unjust relations must address the claims of those violated by these relations in order to secure a just future. The justice claims advanced by Indigenous participants in the treaty process, as well as those First Nations that remain outside the process, clearly ask for a form of “transition” in the sense that they seek both recognition of Indigenous autonomy and the redistribution of land and resources (Woolford 2005). Therefore, one can argue that, in a most basic sense, a grave injustice has been perpetrated against the Indigenous peoples through the illegal seizure of their territories, thereby requiring a justice remedy that will help transition British Columbia toward new relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. The question of what these future relations might look like is what is most at stake in this case of transitional justice in British Columbia.

From Transition to Forcible Transposition

Given that transitional justice mechanisms place great emphasis on the future, one must be wary of the constitutive force of transitional justice, which is its power to fashion new forms or reinforce old forms of unjust social relations. Nadasdy’s statement above alerts us to the problem of forcible transposition, which threatens to impose a form of transition that makes only minimal change to the cultural and economic patterns that first led to the initial injustices. The term transposition is drawn here from a Bourdieusian lexicon in which the habitus provides the dispositional material that allows an individual to both participate in the collective life of the group and to stand out and earn distinction in relation to other group members. Habitus are systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of
the orchestrating action of a conductor. [Bourdieu 1981:94]

The dispositions of habitus operate akin to a toolset that practitioners can automatically draw upon to seek success within their appointed terrain. They allow us to fit into a social context, but also to stand out and differentiate ourselves through the competent and creative application of available dispositions. These may be dispositions developed through long involvement in the field, which can be subsequently adapted to new challenges, or they may be “transposed” or imported from other fields of activity when it is recognized that they are potentially useful within a separate field. It is the habitus that provides the actor with a “feel for the game” and allows him or her to function in a meaningful and competent manner (Bourdieu 1990). For example, the educational field in which universities operate has long been an arena where individuals possessing cultural capital, which is a form of power derived from one’s store of cultural values and knowledge, are better able to manifest the dispositions valued in the educational field. Their ability to demonstrate both broad and specific knowledge and communicate this knowledge in a competent and articulate manner allows such individuals to distinguish themselves in the academic milieu. Yet, with neoliberal restructuring of the academy afoot, we also see the transposition of values more strongly associated with the economic field into the educational field, so that academics more and more pride themselves on being effective and efficient managers of a student’s educational experience.

The transpositional efforts of treaty making in British Columbia involve attempts to familiarize and invest Indigenous groups in the *illusio*, or taken-for-granted rules, of the economic field and its specific forms of property use. The process fosters, in this sense, a forcible or coercive transposition, in that it compels Indigenous persons to adopt and bring into treaty processes the habits and dispositions of actors in the non-Indigenous economic field. In my earlier book, I described this forcible transposition as part of a system of symbolic violence within treaty making, whereby the normative requirements of treaty negotiation (e.g., a focus on future relations rather than past wrongs) tended to impose an outcome of “affirmative repair” on the treaty process, and treaty tables were hamstrung from the beginning so that they could press toward only those resolutions that allowed for the affirmation and continuation of existing economic and political relations (Woolford 2005; see also Fraser 1997). But it is worthwhile to look more closely at those practices of forcible transposition through which, under the guise of helping Indigenous groups ready themselves for treaty, an attempt is made to foist upon Indigenous leaders economic and political dispositions oriented toward better fitting Indigenous groups to dominant societal and economic conditions rather than transforming these conditions.

**Transpositions in the BC Treaty Process**

The “land question” in British Columbia has been a long-standing source of discontent for Indigenous groups in the province. It has been the source of petitions, commissions and court cases since the beginning of colonial settlement; however, the political will to seriously address Indigenous grievances did not manifest itself until the latter part of the 21st Century. In December 1990, under growing economic, social and political pressures, the federal and provincial governments at last heeded the requests of Indigenous groups and the tri-partite (Canada, British Columbia, and Indigenous groups) British Columbia Claims Task Force was formed.

On the basis of the Task Force’s report, the *British Columbia Treaty Commission Agreement* was signed on 21 September 1992, which enabled the British Columbia Treaty Process to begin its work in December 1993. The British Columbia Treaty Commission, as the “keeper of the process,” was charged with the task of ensuring that the three parties obey the 19 recommendations of the Task Force. It was required to do so, however, without any adjudicatory power, relying solely on moral suasion to ensure fidelity to the Task Force’s recommendations.

This new era of treaty making was heralded as a source of both justice and certainty for British Columbia. Justice would arrive in the form of land redistribution, resource rights, self-governance, and a “fiscal component” or “capital transfer”. Certainty, in contrast, would be the product of a “legal technique
that is intended to define with a high degree of specificity all of the rights and obligations that flow from a treaty and ensure that there remain no undefined rights outside of a treaty” (Stevenson 2000:114).

As the treaty process progressed, however, the justice component became more and more secondary to the desire for certainty (Woolford 2005). Indeed, in the interests of jurisdictional clarity and economic productivity, the justice afforded by the BC Treaty Process sought to achieve greater certainty by attempting to coercively transpose a specific set of property relations and approaches to land ownership to Indigenous peoples in the province. The driving rationale for the treaty process, that of creating new boundaries and land dispensations in British Columbia, was itself the transposition of a vision of land that was inimical to that possessed by some Indigenous groups. As Thom (2006:21-22) notes, Coast Salish members see boundaries and borders as arbitrary and artificial at best, and at worst a part of a recurring colonial mechanism of government to create a division between communities and kin and weaken the potential strength of the Coast Salish people as a Nation. These people are concerned that the power of such maps and terms will have the effect of severing their connections to place, framing the future of engagements with the land exercised as rights negotiated under land claims settlements firmly in western ontological terms.

This sentiment was captured in one of my interviews, where a member of the Tseil-Waututh First Nation complained about the rigidity of non-Indigenous government negotiation mandates and their inability to permit a more fluid conception of land ownership. She noted that the government wants to be able to put a nice strong fence around what a First Nation is. An approach that we have taken is that there would be an opportunity for the Tseil-Waututh to participate in different ways throughout the whole of the traditional territory, whether it be management of the resource, participating in development, or co-managing a park, or in fact looking after the smaller parcels of First Nation land. And the response to that was that we could only deal with settlement lands and all of the rest of it would fall outside of treaty. [Interview 10/24/00]

In this manner, a Tseil-Waututh proposal to transform property relations in British Columbia to allow the First Nation to remain connected with its broader traditional territory and to enter the mainstream economy on their own terms was rejected outright by the non-Indigenous government negotiators. The proposal failed to meet their rigid mandates and notions of certainty, because it failed to address itself to dominant Canadian property relations. By seeking to find ways for a broader community connection to its traditional territory, the proposal violated non-Indigenous goals of, among other things, creating jurisdictional clarity to ease corporate access to desired resources.

Indigenous resistance to these negotiation mandates has resulted in the deployment of a host of measures re-deployed to coercively transpose the habits of property ownership to Indigenous leadership. These techniques go by various names: for example, capacity building and interim and treaty-related measures. Their original purpose was to prepare Indigenous leaders and communities for the new wealth to be distributed through treaties and to provide protection of and access to resources prior to treaty settlement. But they can also be redirected toward spreading the neoliberal message that “there is no alternative” to current patterns of property ownership and economic participation.

Interim measures, for example, were sought by Indigenous groups involved in treaty making as a protective measure to ensure resources on Indigenous traditional territories were not exploited in full prior to the signing of a treaty. Treaty-related measures were developed as a more specific form of interim measure that would be tied directly to items under negotiation at the treaty table. However, the non-Indigenous governments were slow to introduce such policies, and when they did, these measures tended to be small-scale, piecemeal agreements that were directed toward immersing First Nations in land, resource, and park planning and management in a manner consistent with existing federal legislation and dominant economic practices (see, generally, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2009). For First
Nations groups struggling economically and facing large debt repayment for their involvement in the treaty process, there is an obvious attraction and necessity to participating in such deals to provide some immediate economic relief for their communities and to ensure that resources are not fully developed on potential treaty lands prior to settlement. But many did so with the realization that this compromise was not without negative repercussions. Indeed, one respondent spoke of the “Catch-22” of treaty making:

In recognition of the non-Aboriginal people not going away, in recognition of the resources being exploited right in front of our eyes and not having access to the benefits of those natural resources, we have involved ourselves in a treaty process with the respective governments to make sure that we have access to some benefits of those natural resources of that traditional territory for future generations. [Interview 12/20/99]

The respondent earlier in the interview contrasted this involvement with the goals of Aboriginal title and sovereignty, which he felt to be most crucial for Indigenous peoples, but unlikely to be realized in the Canadian colonial context, thus making the treaty process and its interim and treaty-related measures the “lesser of two evils” in his eyes, since it at least allowed some modicum of protection for Indigenous territories, albeit still under the sovereignty of the Crown and with specific expectations of how these measures will be implemented. It is a compromise made by such Indigenous leaders, because the alternative is the uncompensated exploitation and development of their traditional territories.

If the Nisg’a’s treaty, negotiated outside of the BC Treaty Process, but referred to by former Premier of British Columbia Glen Clark as a “template” for the process, is any indication, the transposition of the economic dispositions of property ownership will not end through the signing of a treaty. The treaty between the government of Canada and the Nisg’a First Nation, which was implemented in May 2000, has given the Nisg’a control over a vast territory and opened Nisg’a members to taxation — a burden they were spared prior to treaty settlement. As well, reservation lands, previously under government control and collectively owned by the First Nation, were transferred to the Nisg’a Nation, thereby allowing them to implement fee simple land ownership for individual Nisg’a (Findlay 2010). The transition from collective to fee simple ownership has long been a goal for Canadian government, the rationale for which is to provide individual Indigenous persons with a source of equity so they can access loans. However, in tough economic times, and in a context where the Nisg’a are struggling financially, this transition also leads to fears that desperate Nisg’a members, burdened by debt, will be compelled to sell their territory, resulting in more Indigenous peoples leaving their traditional territories, and more Indigenous territory falling into the hands of developers and resource extraction industries (e.g., logging, hydro-electricity, and mining).

This pattern persists in the BC Treaty Process. To date, after nearly two decades of activity, the BC Treaty Process has only managed to produce two final agreements. One of these was with the Tsawwassen First Nation, a group whose treaty table I observed regularly. When the Tsawwassen spoke at the table about the impact colonial land appropriation had had on their community — for example, the destruction of their longhouse to build Highway 17 and of their foreshore due to the construction of a ferry terminal and coal port — they were reminded by the non-Indigenous governments that treaty making is a “forward-looking” process and not one focused on the past.

The forward-looking treaty arrived at through these negotiations seeks to redress this past without directly referring to the colonial harms noted by the Tsawwassen. The treaty does so by providing the Tsawwassen with, among other things, greater control over their lands. But as was the case for the Nisg’a, this control includes the power to sell, dispose of, or partition their remaining territories:

Under this Agreement, the Tsawwassen Constitution and Tsawwassen Law, Tsawwassen First Nation may:
a. Dispose of the whole of its estate in fee simple in any parcel of Tsawwassen Lands to any Person; and
b. from the whole of its estate in fee simple, or its interest, in any parcel of Tsawwassen Lands, create or Dispose of any lesser estate or interest to any Person, including rights of way and covenants similar to those in sections 218 and 219 of the Land Title Act, without the consent of Canada or British Columbia. [Tsawwassen Final Agreement 2006]

Lands disposed of or partitioned in fee simple remain under Tsawwassen legal jurisdiction, but a separation of group from territory is still effected, since territory becomes real estate and something to be governed rather than an essential component of group life. Thus, a governmental relationship to land is transposed through the treaty process, requiring the Tsawwassen to adjust their approach to land, thereby achieving the long-held government goal of transforming the Indigenous land/culture worldview in this region.

With respect to the specific injustices voiced at the treaty table – the destruction of the longhouse to build Highway 17 to the ferry terminal and the loss of shellfish life because of the construction of the ferry terminal and coal port – the legalistic language of the treaty is mute. Highway 17 remains under provincial jurisdiction and reverts to the Tsawwassen only if the province opts to no longer use it. With respect to their seashore, the Tsawwassen did gain the right to harvest aquatic plants, fish, and intertidal bivalves, subject to the allocations set by the Minister of the Department of Fisheries. The Tsawwassen harvest will, however, need to be expressed in a yearly fishing plan and fully documented. As well, a “capital transfer” of $1,000,000 will be made to the Tsawwassen for purposes of fisheries conservation, management and stewardship. Through these mechanisms an effort is made to responsibilize the Tsawwassen to treat aquatic life in their territory as a resource to be managed in accordance with a federal management scheme. But unacknowledged here is any reference to the harmful past and its impact on the Tsawwassen and their territory.

Conclusion
In Bourdieusian theory, the habitus is what bonds the group. It is the dispositional material that allows an individual to assert his or her distinctiveness, yet also to contribute to the structural reproduction of group life. By embodying the inherited, malleable dispositions of group life, the individual participates in both the dynamism and regularity of group life. Efforts that seek to shift the habitus and to transpose new dispositions, can thus be perceived as harmful to the group’s power to self-determine its sense of identity. In the case of Indigenous land claims in British Columbia, where forcible transpositions are used to alter an “essential foundation” (Lemkin 1944) of group life, namely the group’s relationship to its territory, such efforts can reflect a continuation of a destructive pattern of land appropriation initiated under settler colonialism. What we see then is transitional justice deployed for purposes of forcible transposition, and this forcible transposition represents the mutation and re-articulation of a genocidal logic rather than its correction.

It is worthwhile to consider these matters of genocide and transition not only in the light of the BC Treaty Process, but also the global push to transform Indigenous property relations. As the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, joined locally by Manny Jules of the First Nations Tax Commission, pushes Indigenous communities to unleash the “dead capital” tied up in their lands so that they may access the equity contained therein, there exists great risk that these efforts to provide Indigenous peoples more access to mainstream economies will also threaten the ways in which they constitute themselves as groups. And, although one must remember that groups have long changed themselves and adapted in the face of shifting historical conditions, if these changes are the result of a forcible transposition, one is required to examine the intentional or neglectful destructive consequences of these actions. We have not yet created a transitional strategy for British Columbia that is designed to maximally foster creative forms of intercultural communication that open space in which ontologically different approaches to economics and land can thrive and coexist. Quite the opposite, we have built into our treaty process forcible transpositions that threaten to limit or even destroy alternate ways of knowing and being in the world.
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