Spiritual Booze and Freedom: Lenin on Religion

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ABSTRACT: Rather than a doctrinaire atheist who has no time for religion, careful attention to Lenin's explicit statements on religion reveal a far more complex and ambivalent position. This study explores those tensions, beginning with the duality of religion as response to and cause of suffering, moving onto the multi-layered metaphors of booze and the human image, and then analysing the unresolved question of what happens after the revolution when religion persists. As for the vexed issue of ‘freedom of conscience’, Lenin both accepts the standard socialist position and yet seeks to stipulate that in the party religion is not a private affair. Yet even here, believers, even priests, are welcome in the party as long as they do not propagate views contrary to the party platform. Lenin also glimpses the more radical possibilities of religion, especially when it is not mainstream, occasionally (although not often enough) fostering various elements of the religious Left.

KEY WORDS: Lenin; religion; spiritual booze, freedom of conscience, revolution, education, religious left

Introduction

God grant – not God, of course … [Lenin v30:431]

Religion may be an idealist and reactionary curse, a manifestation of and support for oppression, but to oppose it is a red herring; atheism may be a natural position for socialists, but one should embrace a comrade who is a believer; one may oppose religion on class terms, but atheism is not a doctrinaire platform. These are some of the forms in which an intriguing tension is manifested in Lenin's writings on religion. Yet one struggles to find detailed attention to Lenin's thoughts on religion. He has a reputation for doctrinaire formulations that lose the subtlety of Marx’s or Engels's arguments. If they are republished, it is to bolster a staunch and unqualified atheism (Lenin 1969). My project is both to restore these texts to their place in the Marxist tradition of reflection on religion¹ and to assess the importance of their tensions.

The main texts for Lenin's overt statements on religion are relatively few: ‘Socialism and Religion’ (Lenin 1905d); ‘The Attitude of the Workers’ Party Towards Religion’ (Lenin 1909a); ‘Classes and Parties in Their Attitude To Religion and the Church’; (Lenin 1909b); ‘On the Significance of Militant Materialism’ (Lenin 1922a). I analyse these texts logically rather than chronologically, for Lenin loops back to pick up earlier themes, raises

¹ The straws in the wind suggest a revival and reformulation of the debate over ‘Marxism and religion’, to which this study may be seen as a contribution. Recent examples include Roberts (2008a, 2008b), Molyneux (2008), Rehmann (2011), and Boer (2007, 2009a, 2011, 2012).
questions later that may be answered in earlier texts, and draws together complex and overlapping positions that need to be unpicked and critiqued. Based on these texts, one may gain an initial impression of what a ‘textbook’ interpretation. For this Lenin, Marxism ‘is absolutely atheistic and positively hostile to all religion’ (Lenin 1909a:402; see also Lenin 1913d:23). Apart from having, like philosophy, no independent existence (Lenin 1894a:405-6, 418), offering belief in invented beings outside time and space and spurious accounts of the history of the earth (Lenin 1908:185), religion is simply a curse, a diversion of the working class, offering futile hopes of life after death. ‘Religious fog’, ‘medieval mildew’, ‘obscurantism’, ‘humbugging’ (Lenin 1905d:84, 85 and 87) – these terms supposedly express the essence of Lenin’s position.

Response and Cause

Rotten products of a rotten social system. [Lenin 1908:185]

A careful reading reveals a more dense cloth that requires unravelling. Let us begin on the negative register, for which the initial move is that religion is not immediately the cause of human oppression, but rather the indication of such oppression. More specifically, religion is a response to socio-economic exploitation, a way of dealing with an intolerable situation that is revealed in upsurges of religious observance during war (Marx 1844a:175-6; 1844b:378-9; 1845:4; 1845:6; Lenin 1915b). The true source of ‘religious humbugging’ is economic slavery. In contrast to bourgeois radicalism, in which religion is the main issue, for communists the yoke of religion is the ‘product and reflection of the economic yoke within society’ (Lenin 1905d:87 and 86; see also Lenin 1909a:405-6). Religion is thereby a mark of the impotence of the toiling classes in their struggles against exploitation, a situation that is sharply expressed in the belief of a better life after death.

Now we encounter the first of many dialectical turns, for religion is also a cause of suffering. As a system of belief, religion adds to the oppressive woes of the exploited, ‘coarsening and darkening … the spiritual and moral life of the masses’ (Lenin 1905d:83). We may believe that the gods will provide us succour under trial, that our prayers for relief will be answered, that God will punish our enemies at the Judgement Seat, that the grace of God will lead to a life far greater than our present one. Yet we are deluded, for these beliefs merely make us content with our lot (Lenin 1902c:338). As for those who live on the labour of others, religion teaches them to exercise charity, thereby offering a ‘cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters’ (Lenin 1905d:83) and providing a cheap ticket to heaven.

Our own beliefs are but part of the problem, for they are perpetrated by clergy and their institutions. These ‘gendarmes in cassocks’ (Lenin 1911:142; see also Lenin 1902c:385, 414; 1902d:259) are hand-in-glove with state powers, from which they receive their stipends, residences, church buildings, and by which the whole ecclesial system is maintained. And the one who pays the bills expects ideological support of the state apparatus. Also expected are constant messages of subservience for the faithful. Respect your rulers, they are told, reverence the church and her ministers, redirect your anger at the evil anarchists and communists, not to mention foreigners attacking holy mother Russia. In short, the clergy are part of the small ruling class, numbering also landowners and capitalists, all of them keen to preserve their privileged status (Lenin 1913d:28). In this light, opposition to religion is a political position. If the ideology of the state is ‘one God in heaven; one Tsar

2 For example, see the introduction to the collection, On Religion (Lenin 1969).
3 This ‘textbook’ Lenin is closer to some contemporaries of Lenin, both his erstwhile comrade, Alexinsky, and the liberal Miliukov (Alexinsky 1913:307-17; Miliukov 1962:60-104).
4 See Lenin’s citation of Marx’s comment that one must pay equal attention to the ‘theoretical existence of man’, which includes ‘religion, science and so forth’ (Lenin 1894b:161-2; Marx 1844b:143; 1844a:344).

5 Or as Lenin puts it with characteristic earthiness: ‘All oppressing classes stand in need of two social functions to safeguard their rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is required to console the oppressed, to depict to them the prospects of their sufferings and sacrifices being mitigated (this is particularly easy to do without guaranteeing that these prospects will be “achieved”), while preserving class rule, and thereby to reconcile them to class rule, win them away from revolutionary action, undermine their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination’ (Lenin 1915a:231-2). See also (Lenin 1917b:336; 1903d:413, 422, 424, 427; 1913a:332; 1915a:228, 229, 231; 1916a:295; 1917d:265; 1916b:128; 1917a:185; 1913e:1920-149; 1913:1001-290-1; 1899a:242; 1905a:87; 1905a:464; 1906b:40; 1907:275; 1913b:260; 1913c:269; 1913d:28).

6 See Lenin’s citations of Marx’s comment that one must pay equal attention to the ‘theoretical existence of man’, which includes ‘religion, science and so forth’ (Lenin 1894b:161-2; Marx 1844b:143; 1844a:344).
on earth’, then to challenge God is to challenge the state (Olgin 1917:58).

How does one respond to religion? Apart from occasional comments that modernisation and economic development will see religion ‘rapidly being swept out as rubbish (Lenin 1905d:87), the response takes two forms. First, systematic education will make workers and peasants see the light. Through the press, word of mouth, republishing the best of old anti-clerical works along with new material (Lenin 1922a:229-30; 1902c:339), through ‘an explanation of the true historical and economic roots of the religious fog’ (Lenin 1905d:86; see also Lenin 1909a:404), will the truth of religion be revealed. Yet, to restrict activities to this level is to engage in abstract ideological preaching like the bourgeoisie. Given that religion is a response to oppression, one focuses attention on that cause. Or rather, workers will come, through their own struggle, to an awareness of that oppression and the role played by religion (Lenin 1905d:86-7).

Thus, the response to religion has two prongs, one educational and the other revolutionary, one secondary and the other primary. However, the obvious question is: what happens after the revolution, when you have deployed your most powerful weapon and religion is still present? One approach is to assume that the revolution has removed all causes of alienation, but that religion also has political and cultural dimensions that persist. This approach is taken by Anatoly Lunacharsky, ‘God-builder’ and first Commissar for Enlightenment after the October Revolution (Lunacharsky 2011:277-8). The appropriate answer is education. Lunacharsky urges that any violent or crude means are counter-productive, producing martyrs and strengthening church and mosque, but that persistent persuasion and education are keys. Given that everyone is fully entitled to preach and profess any religion, the government too is entitled to engage in systematic efforts to reveal the unfounded superstitions of much that passes for religion. By and large, Lenin agrees, urging Skvortsov-Stepanov in 1922 to write a book against religion, which would outline the history of atheism and the connections between religion and bourgeoisie (Lenin 1919:110-11; 1922b:570). Yet, in ‘On the Significance of Militant Materialism’ from the same year, an increasingly impatient Lenin castigates the educational programs for incompetence in their tasks (Lenin 1922a:229-30). As for the persistence of religion, Lenin suggests (half-heartedly, it seems) that the masses still remain half-asleep, not yet having awoken from their religious torpor.

But this still does not answer the question why religion persists after the revolution. Lenin does not answer directly, although one approach is that the oppressive conditions producing religion have not yet passed. Lenin’s frequent post-revolutionary discussions of both the continuation of the class struggle, in which the dictatorship of the proletariat is crucial, and the international situation in which the bourgeoisie is hell-bent on thwarting the Russian revolution, may support the contention that the vale of tears has not yet been overcome. But that suggests the revolution made no difference at all, in respect to religion, class conflict and conditions of oppression. A more satisfactory answer is to identify revolutionary possibilities within a religion like Christianity, incentives that feed into the revolution and thereby persist after its initial moment. But does Lenin admit – even in passing – that religion may also have a revolutionary dimension? The answer to that question involves a long but necessary search.

**Spiritual Booze and Image of Man**

*Opium is for us a treasure that keeps on giving, drop by drop.* [Vvedensky 2011:223]

We have reached a turning point in Lenin’s arguments, marked by an unanswered question. Let me recap: thus far Lenin remains within a conventional paradigm concerning religion: it may be both result of and cause of suffering; the reply is a combination of patient education and agitation for overthrowing the economic basis of oppression. But how to respond to religion when it persists after revolution?

The first hint appears in one his most famous comments on religion:

Religion is opium of the people [opium naroda]. Religion is a sort of spiritual booze, everboin which the slaves of capital drown their human image [obraz], their demand for a life more or less worthy of man. [Lenin 1905d:83-4]
This text is a direct allusion to Marx:

Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people [das Opium des Völkes]. [Marx 1844a:175-6; 1844b:373-9]

An initial reading may attribute to Marx a subtler appreciation of religion – as both expression and protest, as the sigh, heart and soul of oppressed creatures in a heartless, soulless world. A closer study of the key term, opium, reveals a profound multivalence in Marx’s usage (McKinnon 2006; Boer 2012). For opium was both cheap curse of the poor and vital medicine, source of addiction and of inspiration for writers and artists, the basis of colonial exploitation (in the British Empire) and of the economic conditions that allowed Marx and Engels to continue work relatively unmolested; in short, it ranged all the way from blessed medicine to recreational curse. As the left-leaning theologian, Metropolitan Vvedensky said already in 1925, opium is not merely a drug that dulls the senses, but also a medicine that ‘reduces pain in life and, from this point of view, opium is for us a treasure that keeps on giving, drop by drop’ (Vvedensky 2011:223).6 That Marx himself was a regular user of opium increases the complexity of the term. Along with ‘medicines’ such as arsenic and creosote, Marx imbibed opium to deal with his carbuncles, liver problems, toothaches, eye pain, ear aches, bronchial coughs and so on – the multitude of ailments that came with chronic overwork, lack of sleep, chain smoking and endless pots of coffee (Marx (senior) 1857:563; 1857:643).

Do we find this multivalence in Lenin’s recasting of the opium metaphor? Marx’s ‘opium of the people [das Opium des Volkes] is directly translated as ‘opium of the people’ [opium naroda]. The usage is the same, with a genitive in Russian. Unfortunately, the English translation in Lenin’s Collected Works renders the phrase in this text with the dative,7 ‘opium for the people’, with the sense that religious beliefs are imposed upon people rather than emerging as their own response: religion is no longer of themselves, but has become something devised for them. Such a translation may have been preferred due to Lenin’s swift gloss, ‘a sort of spiritual booze’ [od duhovnoi sivuhii], which seems to reinforce this impression.8 And does not the next phrase – ‘in which the slaves of capital drown their human image’ – deploy the conventional role of alcohol in which sorrows are drowned? Religion becomes a bottle of wine, a carton of beer, a flask of vodka, with which one dulls the pain of everyday life.

It is worth noting that even if Lenin did use the genitive construction (following Marx), in the USSR the dative construction came to dominate. Thus people mostly used the phrase ‘opium for the people’ rather than ‘opium of the people’ as the standard definition of religion.9 Perhaps the most famous example is the line from the movie, Twelve Chairs (based on Ilf and Petrov’s satirical novel from 1928) where the main character keeps greeting his competitor, the Orthodox priest, with the line: ‘How much do you charge for the opium for the people?’

In order to return to the ambivalence of ‘opium of the people’, let us consider the rest of Lenin’s description. He introduces two items: ‘human image’ (chelovecheskii obraz) and ‘their demand for a life more or less worthy of human beings’ (svoi trebovania na svoi trebovania na skolko-nibud’ dostoinuiu cheloveka zhizni). Both items wrench the text away from a simple drowning of sorrows. Although they appear to say the same thing, the fact that they sit side by side introduces a minimal difference between them, one exacerbated by biblical and theological echoes. Recall Genesis 1:26, where human beings are created in the ‘image of God’: ‘Let us make humankind in our image [tselem], according to our likeness [demuth]’. Here too is a minimal dif-

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6 Vvedensky was engaged in a very popular debate over two nights with Anatoly Lunacharsky on 20-1 September in 1925. This observation, which Vvedensky had gained from doctors who used opium to treat melancholy and other ailments even in the twentieth century, is, to my knowledge, the first observation concerning the ambivalence of the opium image.

7 Exactly the same phrase is translated with the genitive elsewhere: ‘Religion is the opium of the people’ – this dictum by Marx is the cornerstone of the whole Marxist outlook on religion’ (Lenin 1909a:402-3).

8 As does the influential shift in phraseology from The State and Revolution: ‘the opium of religion which stupefies the people’ (Lenin 1917c:455). See also (Lenin 1909b:422-3).

9 Personal communication from Sergey Kozin.
ference, between image and likeness; here too they seem to speak of the same thing, yet they are different.

Lenin's Orthodox theological context exploits the distinction between the two terms. While Adam and Eve may have been created in the image of God, thereby able to participate in divine life and be fully human, sin has fractured the divine-human union, resulting in a less than human condition, with the unnatural result of death. However, in Orthodox theology after St. Maximus, what went 'missing' after enjoying the tree's fruit was not the 'image' but the 'likeness'. Christ's saving task is thereby not a process of restoring the prelapsarian state, but rather a new state achieved uniquely in Christ, which was not there with Adam and Eve. That is, beyond the image, one becomes a likeness of God – *theosis*, or deification. *Theosis* designates a closer fellowship with God than even the first human beings experienced. Christ may be the second Adam, but he goes beyond Adam in enabling a far greater communion that was initially the case – so much so that Christ may have been incarnated for that reason, without the first stumble.

Is it possible that Lenin alludes to this complex interplay between image and likeness, with his usage of ‘human image’ and ‘worthy human life’? Our human image may be obscured, inebriated, blurred – as though blind drunk – but the demand for decent life persists. A life worthy of human beings echoes not merely Orthodoxy’s broken image, but especially restoration to God’s likeness through Christ (see here Lunacharsky 1981:45-6).

Yet, Lenin turns this theological heritage of image and likeness on its head. Rather than staying within the theological framework and asking why human beings are sinful, he accuses the framework itself with creating the problem. The issue is neither human culpability nor deception by a third party, but religion itself. That is, Lenin unwittingly parleys one tradition of interpretation against another, in what may be called a Reformed sense: 10 Genesis 1-3 opens up a third, rarely travelled path of interpretation, in which the one responsible for the Garden of Eden with its two trees – of the knowledge of good and evil and of life – is also thereby responsible for the act that sends the likeness into exile. If God had not created the flawed crystal of the Garden, the Fall would not have happened. This charge the deity refuses to answer, so keen is he to lay the blame on human beings and serpent. By contrast, Lenin does lay the blame precisely here. Only when that has been addressed may a worthy human life – now a very human ‘likeness’ – be attained.

But what about spiritual booze? Might that not also be a richer metaphor? To begin with, in 1925 Metropolitan Vvedensky pointed out that ‘booze’ (*sivuhoi*) is a good translation of ‘opium’ (Vvedensky 2011:223), which opens further ambiguity. Add to that the role of alcohol in Russian culture: even today, beer has only recently (2011) been designated an alcoholic drink, although most continue to think it is not. After this legislation, not much has changed in Russia’s beer-drinking culture except that Putin’s ‘police’ increasingly fine youngsters for drinking in public. Two-liter bottles are still available in shops. And the famed vodka may be bought in bottles that fit comfortably in one’s hand, a necessary feature due to that great Russian tradition in which an opened bottle must be emptied. Russians may be admired for their fabled drinking prowess, vodka may be a necessary complement to any long-distance rail travel, it may be offered to guests at the moment of arrival, it may be an inseparable element of the celebration of life, but it is also the focus of age-long concern. One may trace continued efforts to curtail excessive consumption back to Lenin. Then Khrushchev and Brezhnev sought in turn to restrict access to vodka, although their efforts pale by comparison to the massive campaign launched by Gorbachev in 1985. Lenin himself fumed at troops and grain handlers getting drunk, molesting peasants and stealing grain during the dreadful famines (due to lack of means to transport grain) during the foreign intervention after the Revolution. Nonetheless, vodka was a vital economic product. Already in his painstakingly detailed *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Lenin provides graphs and data concerning the rapid growth of distilling industry (Lenin 1899a:288-91).
Alcohol is as complex a metaphor as opium, if not more so. It is both spiritual booze and divine vodka: relief for the weary, succour to the oppressed, inescapable social mediator, it is also a source of addiction, dulling of the senses and dissipater of strength and resolve. Religion-as-grog\textsuperscript{11} thereby opens up far greater complexity concerning religion in Lenin's thought.

**Freedom of Conscience**

*Where's your fear of God?* (Lenin 1910:168)

The multiple layers enclosed in Lenin's image of religion-as-alcohol come to the fore in his argument concerning freedom of conscience. He pays close attention to this phrase for a number of contextual reasons, especially in 1909: the rise of the 'God-builders' among the Bolsheviks; the Western European legacy – particularly the powerful German Social Democrats – of invoking 'freedom of conscience'; and a statement in the Duma by the Social-Democratic representatives concerning religion (Lenin 1909a:402). While the God-builders advocated their position strongly within the party, the statement of the Duma representatives, although excellent in outlining a materialist position and the class allegiances of the clergy, was felt to fall short precisely on the issue of freedom of conscience. As for Western Social Democrats, freedom of conscience was a standard position, applying to all spheres and embodied in the *Erfurt Program of 1891: ‘Declaration that religion is a private matter [Erklärung der Religion zur Privatsache]’* (SPD 1891a:3; 1891b:3; see also Lenin 1909a:404). This was so even in the Spartacus Group, as we see with Rosa Luxemburg (Luxemburg 1970, 1982; 2004:2; 1903:28). For Luxemburg, the reasons for such a position were self-evident: opposition to the state's efforts to control one's political aspirations, let alone religious affiliations (the tsarist autocracy persecuted Roman Catholics, Jews, heretics and freethinkers), and resistance to the church's attempt to demand allegiance, especially by using a judicial system saturated with religious laws, means that one does not seek to impose the same type of control as a socialist.

While Lenin adheres to this position in many statements of the Social Democratic platform (Lenin 1899b:239; 1902a:28; 1905b:92; 1907:296; 1903d:402; 1903c:79), in both 'Socialism and Religion' and 'The Attitude of the Workers' Party Towards Religion', he makes a few qualifications.\textsuperscript{12} He distinguishes between two levels of analysis, between state and party: religion must be a purely private affair, separated in all respects from the state; the party must not make religion a private affair yet atheism is not a prerequisite for membership. The former position might be expected, but the latter less so. As for the state, the properly communist position is a radical separation of church and state, along with separation of church and school (Lenin 1906:194-5; 1906a:35). Here the reasons overlap closely with Luxemburg: given the sad history of the church's dirty little relationship with the state, the removal of the church from all influence was necessary. An end to state support of the church, to the possession of lands, state-derived incomes, government positions for clergy, were minimum requirements (Lenin 1905d:84-5; 1902a:28, 30; 1903d:402; 1903a:347-8). In this respect, however, the socialists shared the same platform with the radical bourgeoisie. Thus, 'Everybody must be perfectly free, not only to profess whatever religion he pleases, but also to spread or change his religion' (Lenin 1903d:402).

Now comes the intriguing twist, for Lenin argues that the party must not make religion a private affair. Contextually, he sought to counter the Western European application of freedom of conscience to all spheres, as well as (later) the God-builders who deployed the same position to propose that socialism should draw upon the best resources of religion. For Lenin, this is mistaken. Given that religion is both symptom of economic oppression and a contributing factor to its perpetuation, socialists should fight, publicly, against such oppression. Advanced fighters 'must not be indifferent to lack of class-consciousness, ignorance or obscurantism in the shape of religious

\textsuperscript{11} English captures the metaphoric elision in the very word ‘spirit’, as both a distilled drink and what pertains to the higher realms of the gods.

\textsuperscript{12} Here he cites Engels as his authority (Lenin 1909a:404; 1917c:455-6). Note also a comment to Plekhanov in 1902, in which he mentions attacking ‘freedom of conscience’ (Lenin 1902:94).
beliefs’ (Lenin 1905d:85). Thus, separation of church and state enables the party to undertake its ideological struggle against religion without hindrance. Religion is therefore a very public matter for the party.

Does this mean one ticks the ‘atheist’ box in order to become a member? Not at all: even though socialists may espouse a materialist worldview, undertake education programs against the church and hope that the historical materialist position will persuade all (Lenin 1905b:509-10; 1905b:23; 1905c:47-8), the party still does not stipulate atheism as prerequisite for membership. Further, no-one will be excluded from party membership if he or she is religious. As Lenin put it forcefully in response to the Bund, ‘Organisations belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. have never distinguished their members according to religion, never asked them about their religion and never will’ (Lenin 1903b:331 fn; see also Lenin 1909a:408).

The right, let alone the workers and socialists themselves, was astounded at such a position, asking ‘Why do we not declare in our Programme that we are atheists? Why do we not forbid Christians and other believers in God to join our Party?’ (Lenin 1905d:86)

Three reasons appear. First, opposition to religion strengthens reactionary elements within religious organisations, as was seen with Bismarck’s Kulturkampf against the German Roman Catholic Party in the 1870s (Lenin 1909a:403). Further, attacking religion is a red herring, for it diverts attention from resistance to economic subjugation. Now we return to our starting point: if the yoke of religion is the product of the economic yoke, that is, if religion is a secondary, idealist phenomenon, then an attack on religion misses the mark.

Should one achieve the aim of abolishing religion, then nothing would change, for bosses would still oppress workers. Third, a focus on religion splits the united front of the proletariat (Lenin 1909a:407-8). The Right knows this full well, attempting to break up the proletariat on religious lines, urging allegiance to the church and claiming that socialism has a program of godless atheism, fomenting anti-Semitic pogroms. So also does the bourgeoisie, which wavers between anti-clericalism in its struggle with the old order and reconciliation with religion. For these reasons, the party does ‘not and should not set forth’ atheism in its program (Lenin 1905d:87). Or, in one of Lenin’s characteristic images: ‘Unity in this really revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of a paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of proletarian opinion on paradise in heaven’ (Lenin 1905d:87).

A united front is needed, drawing the line not between believer and atheist, but between workers and owners of capital. People who are still religious are welcome in the party, insofar as they join the struggle:

Jews and Christians, Armenians and Tatars, Poles and Russians, Finns and Swedes, Letts and Germans – all, all of them march together under the one common banner of socialism. All workers are brothers, and their solid union is the only guarantee of the well-being and happiness of all working and oppressed mankind. [Lenin 1905a:348; see also Lenin 1905b:509-10; 1905b:23; 1905c:47-8]

This is the first moment when Lenin recognises a revolutionary potential within religion, a moment that suddenly intensifies his awareness of religion’s political ambivalence. I return to that question in a moment, but first I would like to ask: was Lenin consistent in his dealings with religion? At first sight, he appears remarkably inconsistent: religion may be both response to and perpetuator of a basic economic exploitation, yet it also offers the possibility of resistance to injustice. It may be no better than primitive beliefs in response to nature, yet it is an ongoing reality. The party may seek to educate concerning the deleterious effects of religion, yet it refuses to make atheism a platform, accepting religious believers in a united front against capitalists and landowners.

Did Lenin wage a revolutionary war against God and yet offer sops to religion, playing up to workers in

13 Here Lenin has listened carefully to the position of Marx and Engels in relation to the First International (Marx 1868:208; see also Marx 1872:142; Engels 1872:275-6; 1872:169-70; 1870, 1870; Marx and Engels 1873:460; 1873:335).

14 Lenin would find the attack on religion by the ‘new atheists’ a typical idealist and bourgeois program, for it makes religion the primary cause of all the world’s ills (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2001, 2007; Harris 2005, 2006; Dennett 2007; see Boer 2009b).

15 Or in the different situation of Western Europe, where the bourgeois revolution had already achieved its anti-clerical program, the bourgeoisie may deploy anti-clericalism as a way to split the united front of the working class (Lenin 1909a:411).
a cowardly fashion so as not to alienate new members? Critics thought so, particularly among the anarchists, who wanted a more consistent line (Lenin 1909a:404). As may be expected, Lenin argues that the position is entirely consistent, invoking both the dialectic and the pedigree of Marx and Engels. In some respects, one may agree, especially in terms of the (apparent) contradiction between consistent education against religion and the need to make religion an issue secondary to class struggle. I would add the reasoning that religion is both response to and cause of suffering, as well as the complex party platform – both a firm position against religion and refusal to require atheism as a pre-requisite to party membership. Once we acknowledge the primacy of the struggle against economic oppression, these positions make sense.

Yet Lenin falls short on two counts, one regarding the dialectic of collectives and the other the political ambivalence of Christianity. On the first matter, he is not dialectical enough. The issue is party membership for a Christian believer and Lenin, as we saw, has already stated that the party does not require subscription to atheism, that all who share the party's program are welcome. At this point, he invokes the distinction between collective and individual approaches to religion and party. In effect, he asks: do we operate from the basis of the private individual, allowing full reign to individual freedom of conscience within the party, or do we begin with the collective and explore the ramifications? This question lies behind the statement, ‘We allow freedom of opinion within the Party, but to certain limits, determined by freedom of grouping’ (Lenin 1909a:409). If the collective has come to agreed-upon positions, through open debate (he was a great proponent of arguing vehemently and openly, for this produced a healthy party) and congresses, then those who join must abide by those positions. At various times, he attacked Mensheviks, liquidators, the Bund, and many other opponents because they did not abide by collectively-agreed positions. The same applied to religion.

Lenin provides two examples, concerning a priest and a worker (Lenin 1909a:408-9). The choice of the priest is not arbitrary, for it was a common question at the time, especially in Western Europe. In contrast to the unqualified affirmative usually given, Lenin states: if a priest shares the aims of the party and works actively to achieve them, then of course he may join. And if there is a tension between his religious belief and communism, then that is a matter for him alone. But if the priest proselytises within the party, persuading others to his religious view and thereby not abiding by the party's collective position, then he will be stripped of his membership. The same principle applies to a believing worker, who should be actively recruited. But should he attempt to persuade others of his views, he will be expelled.

At first sight, this argument seems reasonable, since anyone who joins a political organisation should subscribe to its platform. But is this a fully collective position? If we stay with the minimal notion that a democratically agreed platform is binding on the minority who disagrees, then it may be regarded as collective. Yet this approach hardly distinguishes communists from any other political party in (capitalist) parliamentary democracies. For this reason, we may go a step further: within a collective movement such as socialism, imposing one will over another is anathema. A collective will is not the assertion of uniformity from above, not even the vote of a majority over minority, but a collective agreement that arises from the complex overlaps of beliefs, aspirations, even foibles that are given full and open expression. Only when these many-coloured expressions are allowed full rein, pursuing all manner of possibilities until they collapse in dialectical exhaustion, does a collective will emerge. Or rather, the very act of enabling such free expression and freedom of conscience is the embodiment of such collectivity, the result of which turns out to be a collective will. In short, a completely collective approach is the best guarantee for full freedom of conscience.

The Ambivalence of Religion

In the old days they used to say, ‘Each for himself, and God for all.’ And how much misery resulted from it. We say, ‘Each for all, and we’ll somehow manage without God.’ [Lenin 1920a:305]

The second moment in which Lenin is less consistent concerns the political ambivalence of religion. In part,
this inconsistency is due to the profound ambivalence of Christianity itself, which has and continues to support oppressive and reactionary regimes, while also inspiring countless revolutionary movements. We have seen that Lenin often emphasises the former element, but does he also glimpse the latter? I present three examples out of a wider collection.

The first concerns a speech in the Duma from 1909 by Rozhkov, a Trudovik representative of peasant background. Responding to priestly, right-wing and even liberal defences of the church, Rozhkov debunks these lofty claims by listing extortions collected by clergy for services that should have been part of the job description, not to mention additional demands, such as “‘a bottle of vodka, snacks, and a pound of tea, and sometimes things that I am even afraid to talk about from this rostrum’” (Lenin 1909b:421). For Lenin, this speech is pure gold, more likely to revolutionise peasants than sophisticated attacks on religion. The outrage from the right-wing majority reinforces the point. But Lenin goes further, noting ‘the primitive, unconscious, matter-of-fact religiousness of the peasant, whose living conditions give rise – against his will and unconsciously – to a truly revolutionary resentment against extortions’ (Lenin 1909b:422). We should be careful here, for Lenin does not quite yet say that the matter-of-fact religiousness gives rise to revolutionary sentiment, for that is generated by living conditions. Yet the close connection between religiousness and living conditions opens up the possibility religion and revolution connecting with each other.

A second and clearer example concerns Russian Orthodox clergymen dissatisfied with the church’s corruption and power. Despite the church’s efforts to reassert medieval privileges through the ‘priestly bloc’ during the period of the Dumas between 1905-17 (Lenin 1909b; 1912:227-8; 1912c:341-4; 1912a:347; 1912b:310-11), Lenin stresses that some clergy ‘are joining in the demand for freedom, are protesting against bureaucratic practices and officialism, against the spying for the police imposed on the “servants of God”’ (Lenin 1905d:85; see also Lenin 1905c:448; 1902e:469, fn; 1902b:296-7; Walling 1908:392-401). Noting such a development is not enough, for socialists must fully support this groundswell, urging clergy in every way to realise their desire for breaking the debilitating ties between church and police and state. After all, suggests Lenin, you priests should believe in ‘the spiritual power of your weapon’ (Lenin 1905d:85). But if you cave into inducements from the state, then woe to you, for Russian workers will be your enemies. Note that Lenin speaks not of the odd renegade breaking ranks, but of the clergy as a group.

A third moment of deeper awareness comes after the October Revolution. On 1 March, 1921, Lenin wrote to N. Osinsky (V. V. Obolensky), chair of the State Bank and of the Supreme Economic Council. Lenin mentions a certain Ivan Afanasyevich Chekunov, a peasant keen on improving the lot of toiling peasants. Having improved his own farm, he had toured other areas (around Novgorod and Simbirsk) and tells Lenin that the peasants had lost confidence in Soviet power. Knowing full well the vital role of peasants in building a new society and sensing Chekunov’s enthusiasm, Lenin urges Osinsky to appoint Chekunov to the role of representative of the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture, with a view to establishing a non-Party Peasant Council. Now comes the vital point: Chekunov ‘sympathises with the Communists, but will not join the Party, because he goes to church and is a Christian (he says he rejects the ritual but is a believer)’ (Lenin 1921:91). Standing before him is a Christian peasant with communist leanings who may possibly be enlisted in the broad front of communist reconstruction. Even more, Lenin suggests a Non-Party Peasant Council, beginning with an old farmer, along with another person from an area not producing grain. Crucially, not only should they be experienced, but ‘it would be good for all of them to be both non-Party men and Christians’ (Lenin 1921:91). The reason is not given, but clearly such an organisation would gain the confidence of peasants, showing both support for the communist government from outside its own ranks and revealing that Christians too may have communist preferences, indeed, that being a Christian and communist peasant is not a contradiction in terms.

**Conclusion**

With each twist and turn, each explicitly stated and curiously half-said argument, Lenin’s position
has become ever more complex. The simplistic and polemical Lenin who dismisses religion as fiction and curse is far away. Instead, there are arguments for the duality of religion as response to and cause of suffering, multi-layered metaphors of booze and the human image, and the dilemma of what happens after the revolution when religion persists. But when it comes to the ‘freedom of conscience’ clause, Lenin both accepts the standard socialist position and yet seeks to stipulate that in the party religion is not a private affair. Or rather, he shifts the boundary of what the private nature of religious belief may be. Religion may be a very public question and the party must have a clear position. Yet atheism is not a requirement for party membership and believers are encouraged to join. Now the identity of what remains private appears: the tension between the party platform and a religious person’s beliefs is for them to resolve. One caveat remains: they must not seek to propagate their beliefs in the party.

Yet this still assumes that religion is largely negative and reactionary. But now a different picture of Lenin’s approach emerges, picking up the ambivalence of the opium–booze image noted a little earlier. It begins with Lenin’s argument for a united front of believers, atheists and others. From here, a number of other instances emerged in which Lenin recognises the revolutionary possibilities of Christianity. All of which leads to the conclusion that Lenin, no matter how much he may have lashed religion, also reveals an occasional awareness of its deep political ambivalence.

Yet two regrets remain in light of this complexity. To begin with, I regret that Lenin did not realise the full potential of radical freedom of conscience. As noted earlier, I mean this not in a liberal sense of letting all the flowers bloom, but in a radically collective sense in which all of the possibilities are release through real freedom, the result of which is that a deeper collective identity emerges. This point opens out to another discussion that cannot be pursued here concerning Leninist freedom, which is fully partisan, open and collective. A further regret is that although he did notice occasionally the revolutionary possibilities of the religious Left, those moments were fewer than those when he attacked religion. That is, one may regret that fact that he was not as clearly aware of these possibilities than he might have been. Perhaps the Russian Revolution may have found matters a little easier if he had.

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