Our Mandate

This journal represents an attempt to explore issues, ideas, and problems that lie at the intersection between the academic disciplines of social science and the body of thought and political practice that has constituted Marxism over the last 150 years. New Proposals is a journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry that is dedicated to the radical transformation of the contemporary world order. We see our role as providing a platform for research, commentary, and debate of the highest scholarly quality that contributes to the struggle to create a more just and humane world, in which the systematic and continuous exploitation, oppression, and fratricidal struggles that characterize the contemporary sociopolitical order no longer exist.

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Charles R. Menzies

Editorial Collective
Charles R. Menzies, A. Allen Marcus, Katherine McCaffrey, Sharon R. Roseman

Design and Layout
Kenneth Campbell

International Advisory Panel

Contact Us
New Proposals online at http://www.newproposals.ca
New Proposals Blog and Discussion at http://newproposals.blogspot.com
Email info@newproposals.ca

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Introduction

New Hope

Charles Menzies
New Proposals Editorial Collective

This issue of New Proposals takes as its inspiration the wave of revolutionary change that swept Europe in the early years of the 20th century. In the face of massive social ills caused by a radically new form of industrial capitalism, working people the world over took control over their lives, their communities, their workplaces and their countries. From the general strikes of Western Canada and the Western United States of America, through the socialist, popular or communist revolutions from Mexico to Russia, working people were asserting their right to fairness, equity and, in many cases, the basic necessities of life.

Looking back over more than 100 years of revolutionary socialist movements we are able to point to many flaws, setbacks, and disappointments. But we should also be able to draw from the courage and tenacity of people who continue to believe that there is a place, there is a hope, and there is a chance to make the world a better place. We originally had planned to be publishing this issue in conjunction with the anniversary of the Russian Revolution on October 25, 2007. Obviously hope isn’t all that is required to make change or to produce journals. But without hope, without a belief that it is possible and right to struggle for a better world we will all live an impoverished life.

We are pleased to be able to publish an original paper by one of the leading socialist anthropological scholars alive in North America, Professor June Nash. Throughout Professor Nash’s illustrious career she constantly has made the connection between academic scholarship and, very importantly, serving the struggles of working women and men. As we go to press, Professor Nash is yet again in the field working alongside of the people she writes about from Mexico, where a virtual war is going on in the Lacandon jungle. The process that I described in “Development to Unite Us” is erupting in the tourist sites: Palenque and Agua Azul, Montes Azules, and other much frequented sites. The Calderon government is using the Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, the agency set up to preserve natural resources, as their platform for taking over sites from ejido collective communities. They then sell rights to develop the lands and environs with transnational hotels, restaurants, spas. This is a process I mentioned in the article in relation to Huitepec and Lagos Bellas near the Ch’inkultik classic site…. It involves the greatest land takeover to date in the Zapatista territory (personal communication, February 25, 2008).

There is much that has remained the same today and the need for the organized struggle of working people is no less urgent today then it was on the 25th of October, 1917. This journal is one small part of the global struggle for a just and equitable world. We use the means at our disposal; that is the language of the academy and the instruments of scholarship. It is a complement to the sweat and tears and joys of political, social, and civil struggle. As we work in our communities we should be mindful of the struggles in the Lacandon jungle, the streets of Kenya, the hills of Afghanistan, the suburbs of Paris. As you read the papers that follow we ask you—no, we challenge you—to ask how you can make a difference, however small, in your world.
In a leading Marxist academic journal I recently read the sentence: “social performativity and ontological constitutivity of discourse.” I like and respect the journal, don’t get me wrong, but I had to ask myself whatever happened to the goal those on the Left used to have, to try to speak and write in a way ordinary people could understand. The ‘progressive’ argument in defence of such language would probably be that a new ‘radical’ way of speaking or writing is necessary if we want a new society. This may be true (I think it is a bit Trogloodyte), but it still seems rather strange that this ‘new way of speaking’ should be so full of those extra long words used in such quick succession.

What’s true is usually, after all, often quite obvious (as Marx said: because it is true). Reading, say, Marx, or Freud, or Einstein, or Saussure, or Darwin, is actually not difficult because of the language but only sometimes because the science itself is not easy. But then along come the academic ‘interpreters’ of these great figures, who are supposed to mediate between this knowledge and the great unwashed, for their benefit. And what happens? Somehow, peculiarly, everything goes haywire, and especially so with Marx. Personally, I remember how shocked I was to discover it was fairly easy to understand Marx’s own writing (yes, with a bit of normal effort), after finding it so difficult to grasp the academic versions of his work that were supposed to ‘make it more digestible’ for me. The same went for Freud and Darwin, who are both straightforward, clear writers. You soon find out that it is not just a matter of simple interpretation; there is also the politics.

But perhaps too the poor academics are in need of translators into ordinary language, which happens to be, by happy coincidence, also the language of the geniuses. These geniuses were almost all outside the main loop of professional academicism, which has a lot of politics to negotiate, does not like things to upset its status quo and inertia, and is of course a ‘career’ with an almost military concept of rank.

And what is this career? Education is a peculiar thing. We do not really know in capitalist society what it is for. We know it is not apprenticeship for a job. There are lots of theories of course, and much good Marxist work on the subject (I stick with Althusser’s concept that education is the work of Ideological State Apparatuses), but these theories, critical ones, do not seem to have done much to alter the style of academic language (even on the Left), which still seems ‘clerical,’ as if, in taking over from the church to provide ‘instruction’ on the way to live life (as Althusser noted), some of the same theological style was carried over in modern education. It seems obvious that this is the case if we also look at some of the other aesthetic trappings of academia. For example: the traditional celebrations, the gowns and dress, the ‘tone,’ the little mannerisms of academic power.

But the root of the leftward academic’s often convoluted language sits in the politics of its philosophy of relativism, of its ‘super-liberalism.’ There are the usual ‘poststructuralist’ suspects, including Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Butler, and Lyotard, who are the movement’s main references, and they hold this relativist philosophy not simply because it is sincerely ‘its philosophy’ (which it does and they do) but, I suggest, because it is obliged to anyway. It must do so in order to fulfil the requirements of the academy, of the job it has to perform. This philosophy is produced, custom, for the institution (for the ISA). An academic, especially in the field of humanities, must not be seen...
to be 'totalitarian' (whether 'right' or 'left'), they must be in some form or other relativist, and this works out as being either a traditional humanist liberal or a postmodern anti-humanist liberal.

(My academic background is in art/art history. I have professional qualifications in both art practice and art theory/history. Consciously, through my life, I have sought to overcome the division of labour between 'theory and practice' in this domain. Doing so is a kind of taboo, strangely even amongst Marxists in this arena. My background is also from well outside what you might call the British Marxist aristocracy: the 'tweedy,' Fabian, Oxbridge-connected lot. This group has a slightly different way, given its avoidance and dislike of French theory, of dealing with the problem that I refer to here: where it is more a case of its archetype 'Companion of Honour' Eric Hobsbawm's peculiar success. The scission from all that, which by default I am a part of, is the 1960s and particularly 1968. At least in the US such figures as Althusser, Derrida, Foucault, and de Man seem to be part of the theoretical legacy of this scission, while in the UK the establishment is far more traditional and, in a sense, stuck.)

A good example of this academic situation, and the contradictions that stem from it, is the lifetime of the once highly celebrated literary critic Paul de Man, who talked about the 'irreducible interpretive undecidability' of texts. The veritable Heisenberg of writing, at the time of his death he was Sterling Professor of the Humanities at Yale, a close friend of Jacques Derrida, and one of the central figures in the development of literary 'deconstruction.' After his death almost 200 articles, some anti-Semitic, that he wrote during World War II for a collaborationist Belgian newspaper were discovered by a Belgian student researching his early life and work. It caused a furor of course. You may know of it; certainly you will (or you should) if you are an academic in higher education humanities, but you may not if you are outside this milieu (to an extent it is a specialist area). His posthumous 'trial' went on mostly in the learned journals and cultural sections of the mainly US press.

What almost every commentator missed about the de Man affair, however, including the very critical ones, was the factor that made his text “The Jews in Contemporary Literature” really so despicable. It was clever anti-Semitism, not just crude stuff written without thinking following some direct or indirect orders or pressure. I think some guile and effort went into how he could promote his own literary prowess in the context of the general attack on Jews. His attack was therefore insidious and could be seen as an attempt to ‘win over’ even those intelligent enough to be put off by the brutishness of ‘vulgar anti-Semitism,’ which he was, astonishingly, defended for being against.

Afterwards, attitudes to de Man ranged from the rightwing critics saying it proved the destructive leftwing nature of academic relativism, and leftist critics saying it proved the destructive rightwing nature of academic relativism; all pretty confusing stuff. The arguments still go on, although academia now seems to have gone fairly silent about it, embarrassed at least we hope. Yet, note how the two sides become united about de Man.

Set up as a ‘rebel,’ de Man was something of a quack salesman, a chameleon, a survivor, an opportunist able to ride the tide of academic fashion when it was politically expedient, and someone who was also very clever. But what is this really a description of? Is it not a description of the ideal, obedient, policeman of knowledge? A more-or-less ex-criminal authoritarian personality who wishes to forget the past? Not just any past, I would add, but a specific one: the crimes of fascism, World War II, and imperialism. Paul de Man was an individual who performed his job and sought to be ‘the golden boy’ in that role, as we now know, regardless of a lot of the moral consequences. And he practiced from the point of view of an ethical vacuum that derived from a theory of knowledge that exonerated himself in this, and ‘deconstruction’ was for him a logical extension of this.

But, naturally, he did not make up the context (in which he flourished) all by himself. I suggest there is, and especially today, a concerted desire amongst the bourgeoisie to forget about what happened in the last world war. Recently, thus, European news reports have documented how statues and plaques commemorating the extensive Soviet contribution to the victory of the allies in World War II have been removed (in some cases there have been battles over this).
In education a similar move is felt as a kind of institutional pressure. And it seems this pressure gets more intense the more exalted the institution, the more the institution has a ‘reputation’ to defend (it increases in inverse proportion perhaps). Paul de Man’s peculiar circumstance was, I submit, one result of that pressure. It is not usually a conscious desire/pressure, I am sure, but equally I’m certain that it exists. And it wishes not only to forget but also to substitute some ‘sins’ in its mind. (The recent case in the US of Norman Finkelstein’s loss of academic tenure at DePaul—he criticized defenses of Israeli policies presented by Alan Dershowitz and Joan Peters—and his argument with Dershowitz also highlights this pressure but in a slightly different, yet historically related, way).

Its ‘preferred memory’ goes like this: fascism must be the fault of the communists, communists are the fault of themselves, and so of an abstract ‘evil.’ This ‘evil’ is also the current problem in the world, although manifesting itself today in a different way. As an ‘evil’ it seeks power for its own sake, and it uses workers as its stupid pawns. The only force that can stop it is the super-liberal democratic ‘Third Way,’ which itself ‘is forced to’ use power undemocratically (‘Third Reich’). From this it would prefer it if the Nazi’s and the Soviets were imagined/recalled as one entity, that Germany was remembered as actually ‘good’ and representative of ‘the West’ and the communists were never ‘our allies.’ This ‘false memory’ of course neatly changes, inverts, the relationship between the institutional collaborator and the resistance (David Lehman has already pointed this out in his excellent book Signs of the Times, that nevertheless falls back on the classic humanist position). And it is a quite convenient way to think of your job if you are an academic, because it makes a capitulation to the ruling ideology easier in a context where one is at least expected to be critical of common (i.e. vulgar) ideological themes. In fact it enables the appearance of being critical, even downright radical, at the same time.

Being, for my sins, sometimes an academic myself, I have had to negotiate this ‘forgetting.’ I was once told by my Dean not to teach too ‘scientifically.’ It was given as ‘friendly’ advice, but it is strange advice in the context of a university, don’t you think? Given what a university is supposed to do? If I had any scientific knowledge about contemporary art history (then my subject) clearly at least some of it would have to be forgotten. The context, a relatively new Italian university that spoke German and Italian because it was situated in a town near the mountain border with Austria that had a history of being occupied, and was therefore involved with two forms of fascism during World War II (German and Italian), might be of only small relevance, but it added some poignancy to how to negotiate the problem. I laughed and, rather big-headedly, thought of Galileo. But there was a definite moment when I felt that coverage of the modern period (from 1900) might not be meant to include the condition of art during the last War, and my reference to Rachel Whiteread’s Austrian holocaust monument excited no discussion at all, no matter how hard I tried. Admittedly for the students it might have been awkward, but the weight of the institution was there, and I could feel it palpably.

Art history is probably the most ideologically backward area in academia, I think, and that is the area I have ended up in as my chief form of ‘remunerative employment.’ My contract was not renewed recently and I’m not entitled to an explanation why. It is a familiar situation for me though. I am one of those people who have never had a permanent ‘career’ job in my life. I am the veritable ‘flexible citizen,’ born into the era of ‘hot desking’ and so on. I sometimes wonder if this lack of a proper career path is because I am a communist, or just because of the general exploitation of lecturers on the low rungs. Yes, it is an unanswerable question. My guess is that it is a mixture of these things.
Paulo Freire strongly believed through cultural and political literacy it is possible for communities collectively to empower the powerless democratically within their own communities. History out of context is not history. The separations of History, Sociology and Anthropology into separate departments leads to a corrosion of an awareness of the connections between human suffering and power. We professors must engage in seditious sabotage within the ranks of the university and call everything into question, including higher education. We must explore the historical and sociological roots of all academic departments. We must examine who benefits and who doesn’t by the underlying assumptions about how we teach sociology, anthropology and history of America. We must ask, “How does what we teach fit into the ideology of hegemony?” Education that is not subversive is not education. Thus by embracing Critical Pedagogy, built upon an activist model, we can begin to fight back.

We can do this by creating a sociology that re-examines a science of society that carefully scrutinizes what in fact is the social reality in a changing historical context. Then we use this knowledge to help the powerless to empower themselves. Political sociology that embraces anthropology and history can be used as a tool to further the ongoing struggle for democracy. Below is offered a brief review of Marxist Political Sociology. The uses of this tool will help a community understand the origins of its social malady.

Political Sociology is the study of power in a social setting. Power is the use of political capabilities to achieve particular goals. This political contest is carried out in a competition between diverse groups, over things like economic resources. Power is used to pursue a course of action against the interests of others. In doing this, cultural symbols charged with emotional significance are central. Political sociology explores the everyday experiences of people and the shaping of their economic position in a particular society, and the world economy that molds most political issues. The state is the tool of the dominant class or classes. Under capitalism, the class that owns and controls corporate capital clearly dominates; either directly by providing leadership, or indirectly by defining the issues.

Sociology analyzes the historical juncture between worldwide trends and local issues. Anthropology gives this analysis a historical and cross-cultural reference point, supplementing sociology. Social movements are domestic affairs of local or national substance,
created out of national manifestations of international trends. The fate of a social movement must resonate with the local situation, but is ultimately determined by global events. The capitalists and their supporters gain the means of support for their economic and political dominance by maximizing the illusion that their narrow interests are the same as the national interests as a whole. This is done not only by control over economic production and distribution, but through the physical means of coercion and education. Thus, capitalism betrays its democratic justification.

Because class is the relationship between the means of production and distribution, competing classes have competing interests. Competition between capitalists is minimized through the state. The state is able to have a long-range view, not limited by short-term profits of the individual capitalist. The state can make concessions to rebellious sections of the working class to preserve capitalism, even when many capitalists may disagree.

Control over the labour of direct producers by the elite leads to resistance of domination. Ideologies of legitimacy lessen the problem, but imperfectly, because suffering is real. People create their lives through conscious action. Insight into inequalities and oppression may exist, while knowledge of possible solutions is often hidden.

Social equilibrium is always threatened. While the dominant ideology legitimates existing inequalities, different classes will develop different interpretations of this ideology. These diverse interpretations of traditional dogma develop into rival opinions.

The state is the organized control over the classes, class factions or ethnic groups. In this contest, competing groups do not have equal power. The dominant group controls the resources necessary for production, and they define the logic of stability. The rules of political behaviour are agreed upon, and to go beyond the rules is to undermine the security of the whole society. All institutions within the state including education are marshalled to limit dissent.

Market relations are taken for granted, in most economics courses. The social and behavioural sciences help create a national identity of mythic proportions, of democratic equality and economic advancement toward the end of want within the borders of the United States, while defending these same attributes around the world, only masking a relationship of dependency and privilege. This allows educators and researchers to carry out studies that strengthen and not undermine inequality.

Any collective action by the masses, short of social revolution, requires strengthening the existing state institution and the economy upon which it rests. Every government strives for social, political and economic order. The rules that protect the ruling class are the only acceptable political behaviour, to that end.

The claim is that the state is erected, outside of the daily needs of any element within society, to protect the social whole. In fact, it is the capitalist class that is protected from individual capitalists and other classes antagonistic to capitalism. Laws reflect these relationships. This is what gives the states its measure of autonomy.

Through the control of the popular media, schools and churches, the capitalists make their interests appear to be that of all society. Popular culture supports much of the upper class values. Morality is culturally defined in this way. When education fails, coercion will be used to maintain order.

Capitalism incorporates other economies to meet its needs. The logic of capitalism redefines other moral traditions to support private property and production for profit. Alternative visions are neutralized, incorporated, or defined as subversive. Through hegemony all other ideologies seem frivolous. At present, those who would challenge the logic of capitalism are weak and poorly organized.

The political and economic institutions supporting capitalism ultimately control the universities, for the benefit of capital. The anti-government and anti-intellectual business leaders mask the fact that the university, like government, exists for the benefit of big business. Dissent among government employees or university intellectuals have, at times, been defined as irresponsible and unprofessional.

There is a resistance, by people in authority, to real emancipation of the oppressed classes. In modern society, continual use of power combines ideology with concentrated and organized use of force, to a point where citizens do not always know where one
begins and the other stops. The state creates the
government to establish policies, the administra-
tion to carry out policies, and the military or police
to ensure conformity. Because of the monopoly on
the legitimate use of force controlled by the state,
any revolution would require the elimination of the
existing state. The old state would reflect certain rela-
tionships of exploitation; when these relations change,
the old state could no longer function properly.

In US history, immigration laws have been en-
acted and employed to keep out or expel dissidents.
During the Red Scare after World War I and the
Cold War following the World War II, immigrant
groups were particularly targeted, patterns very sim-
ilar to what is happening today. The extensive denial
of due process and exaggerated use of police powers
were widespread. Trials by exhibiting rumour, at the
expense of legal procedures, were common through-
out the 20th century. Public hearings to ruin the
reputations of either the defendant or witnesses who
failed to provide what the government expected, were
a major strategy. The use of covert police surveillance
is still common. Every time working people in the
US gain more control over parts of the state, capitalist
control becomes despotic over all parts of the state.

The totalitarian power of capital flourishes in
bourgeois democracy. Capital becomes more polit-
ically powerful than government, and somewhat
independent of the state. Capital is free to move
anywhere, but the state is limited by geography. The
needs of the bourgeoisie in a capitalist state deform
and limit political democracy. Hostility and vio-
lence, supported by liberals who espouse democracy,
are directed against anyone who, in reality, defends
authentic democracy. Liberals played a vital role in
the suppression of civil liberties in both the Red Scare
of the 1920s and the Cold War, and continuing to
the present. Institutional violence, used against dem-
ocratic movements in the US, has been central to the
formation of “American” political culture. Political
parties and elections become the sum total of democ-
ropy. To move beyond the two party electoral process
is considered subversive.

Law and order have become the main justifica-
tion for violating basic human rights in the US. Any
group that is perceived as a threat to private property,
or questions the assumptions of a capitalist econ-
yomy, is treated as seditious. Mass culture has been
manipulated to create popular demand for the sup-
pression of alternative views of life. The open support
for neo-colonialism around the world, with violence
as the official policy to preserve a world empire, is
one example. Life in liberal society is mystified in a
way that creates a total culture of support for a cap-
italist economy.

Ignorance is the main goal of liberal education.
Education, at its core, is a lie. Liberal education is
designed to limit debate. Education supports the eth-
ics of private property, market economy and an elite
hierarchy. Education is mis-education. The moral
foundations of the core values of “American” soci-
ety need to be openly questioned and debated in
the classroom. Professors must join the intellectual
struggle against the highbrow millstone around every
student’s neck. If education is to become a medium
of liberation, the university must be exposed as an
agent for class oppression.

Giroux points out in Fugitive Cultures the role
of education is to maintain the power elite, and it is
this we must challenge. A siege mentality is fostered,
in the name of patriotism, against the poor, unions,
non-Anglo citizens, non-white people, and anything
not defined as “American” culture. Giroux asks, what
is the educators’ role in empowering those victim-
ized by the dominant ideology? National identity is
founded upon the false need to embrace the com-
mon similarity. This shared identity is not only one
of forced assimilation, but where that fails, of trivi-
alizing the deep cultural differences between diverse
groups within any larger nation state like the US. This
is done with multi-cultural studies that do not deal
with economic, social or political inequality between
these different groups.

The cooperation of many university professors
with policy-makers, during the cold war, seriously
compromised the moral justification of higher educa-
tion. The university participated directly and indirectly
in worldwide aggression and state-supported terror-
ism. The primary concern of many administrators was
to protect the university’s source of income, thus
maintaining a loyal slave of the empire. Early Civil
Rights of the 1960s began as a utopian dream that
America should honour its commitment to freedom for all. The realization that groups were left out of the American dream and the violence of those in authority left many struggling with the question why in the freest country on the planet were the youth who questioned authority treated like criminals. With the war in Vietnam, to many Americans the conflict looked like just another Colonial Power bullying its control over its commonplace subjects in a foreign dependency. The moral mask of America was ripped off the face of empire.

Because government and the international business community support the university financially, we professors are expected to become the shock troops of the international capitalist economy. The thought control of the 1950s and 60s black listed innovators. Today between tenure review and the pressure for grant writing the breath of the debate is continuously being limited.

Community colleges were created at the other end of the system, to “cool out” working aspirants, who received an education that did not threaten the elite. The facts are, simply, that good paying jobs have been declining over the past few decades. Most jobs created since the mid-1970s have been unskilled jobs requiring little or no education. Education has taken on the role of helping us “cool out.” Education now helps us adjust to the powerless the working class faces in a market economy that sees workers, educated or not, as labour costs to be lowered by either eliminating jobs, or lowering the wage costs as much as possible.

However, the movement personified by Paulo Freire called Critical Pedagogy uses the concept of “Boring from Within” to create a beachhead of liberation through our schools. With the tool of Political Sociology we are better equipped to help people to take control of their communities and their lives.
Development To Unite Us: Autonomy and Multicultural Coexistence in Chiapas and Guatemala

June Nash

Distinguished Professor Emerita, Graduate Center, The City University of New York

ABSTRACT. Development was the buzz word in United States policy when I began my first field work as a student in Cantel, Guatemala, in 1953. The people of that much beleaguered country were still enjoying the “springtime of democracy” brought by the 1944 revolution that introduced land reform and education to the western highlands indigenous towns. I witnessed the U.S. instigated coup of 1954 that toppled the government of Arbenz and installed the puppet government of Colonel Castillo Armas. Thousands of union leaders and political activists were imprisoned or exiled, cattle owners released their herds into the lands taken over by peasants, a reinvigorated and militarized agro-industrial elite installed in power claimed to bring prosperity and trade in the coming years. I went on to work in Chiapas in 1957 where the Mexican government was just beginning to introduce National Indigenist Institute programs for the integration of highland Mayas into the nation. These experiences shaped my understanding of what development from above meant in two countries that spanned the Mayan territory. In this article I sum up the results of development in each country, one culminating in genocide and the other in ethnocide of the indigenous populations. The opening up of trade and enterprise in both countries has spawned megaprojects to facilitate free trade agreements with the U.S. and Canada. These neoliberal policies accelerate the export of resources that now include human labour power. I contrast this development with local initiatives now proposed by Mayas on both sides of the border.

Keywords: development compared, Maya, Mexico, Guatemala, militarization, neoliberal trade, alternative, local autonomy

Introduction

Development models in the dominant global economies are failing to address the errors of past disasters or generate new sustainable programs. The development credos of the 1960s calling for an opening up of trade and privatization of resources succeeded in burdening the countries with debt that culminated in the devastating reconstruction programs levied on debtor countries by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The current trends in development theory admit to past errors but often call upon world leaders to pick up the White Man’s Burden as they feign compassion for those who are impoverished by past development schemes.1

Alternatives are emerging in the periphery of global production and trade to counter the growing environmental and social destruction brought about by five decades of neoliberal trade policies. Mobilizations to reject International Monetary Fund conditions for debt restructuring by factory workers seeking self management over the production process in Argentina, protests against foreign corporations’ control of water in Bolivia, rejection of “terminator seeds” (genetically altered seeds that cannot self reproduce) by Andean farmers, road blocks to protest 1980s, calls for a global giveaway of capital to end poverty (Sachs 2005). William Easterly (2006) warns us about the traps in taking up the White Man’s Burden of NGO assistance and fair trade palliatives while blaming poverty on the corruption and incompetence of native leaders. Neither they nor other leading economists offer clear alternatives to western models of development.

1 Jeffrey Sachs, who spearheaded the IMF immolation of the Bolivian economy in the debt crisis of the
the Central American Free Trade Act in Guatemala, claims made by colonizers to dividends from water and oil resources in the Lacandón rainforest of Chiapas—all attest to the protest in the periphery against the control of the global economy exercised by financial industrial centres. Mayas of Guatemala and of the southernmost state of Chiapas in Mexico are in the forefront of this cultural resurgence among local populations as they promote collective development strategies to overcome global control systems that threaten their environment. As semi-subsistence cultivators and artisans, Mayas are aware of environmental devastation caused by neoliberal trade policies. In Mexico the passage of the Free Trade Act (Tratado de Libre Comercio or North American Free trade Agreement NAFTA) triggered the January 1, 1994 Zapatista uprising that now practices autonomy in daily confrontations with an occupying army in the Lacandón rainforest. In Guatemala, Mayas throughout the western highland and the Petén are opposing the enactment of the Central American Free Trade Act (CAFTA). Working with international organizations to develop production and marketing policies that preserve their lands and promote collective enterprises, Mayas on both sides of the border have developed a critique of the divisive impact of government development policies based on co-optation by centralized control hierarchies. They have not yet bridged the frontier that divides them, but they look to a shared past as they invent future policies stressing autonomy and self control of productive enterprises, eschewing state development schemes that served to divide them.

In 2005 I returned to Cantel, Guatemala, where I had undertaken field research some fifty years before. In the dilapidated town offices that had somehow survived the 36 years of civil war and attack on indigenous populations I met the director of the Municipal Development Commission, a young woman wearing the regional tie dyed skirt and embroidered blouse typical of the Quetzaltenango region. She told us about the town’s attempts to overcome decades of imposed “development” after the 1954 U.S. instigated coup upset a democratically elected government. A tapestry on the wall behind her desk that she had woven with the message “Desarrollo para unir todos nosotros!” (Development to unite all of us!) suggested the way she and the other young officials intended to overcome the cooptive policies of past governments. Her very presence in the town hall where only men had presided during my fieldwork in 1953-54 suggested the change in direction promised by the newly elected President Berger.

Even before I interviewed the young municipal officers I was aware of the mounting environmental deterioration in a town that was host to the Cantel cotton fabric plant. The Samalá River where the Spanish conqueror Alvarado had fought the last battle with the Quiches in 1524 was no longer the rippling blue waterway that I had crossed each day on a hammock bridge to interview and census the factory population during my field stay in 1953 and 1954. Now the stench from biological and chemical refuse flushed into the river permeated the air even before I descended from the town centre to the factory community five hundred feet below.

Yet plans for restoring the environment were in progress in Cantel. Ramón Rixquicaché Satey, an ecologist working in the municipality of Cantel, said that the Quetzaltenango regional office had already received trees to reforest 1560 hectares of woodland that would be under the control of the pueblos in the region. Health clinics with a small but dedicated staff attended patients in the centre and visited hamlets where not even emergency services were available in 1953.

Each year I revisit the central highlands of Chiapas where I carried out research in a Tz’eltal-speaking village in the 1950s and 60s. Amatenango del Valle was one of the more favoured highland villages since it had won back communal lands seized by large landholders during the liberal period. Each household was allotted two hectares of land and the rights to communal pasture when the Agrarian Reform took effect. The household budget was tightly balanced throughout the growing season, but with women’s pottery production bringing in needed cash until crop time the small plot cultivators were able to subsist and carry out the annual ceremonial cycle without debt throughout the year.

This relative autonomy changed in following decades when Green Revolution techniques with
petrochemical fertilizers and pesticides were introduced by government agents. Population growth along with exhaustion of land fertility reduced the subsistence capacity. In recent years, the grandchildren of the men and women I knew in the 1960s are often migrating to the cities or to the United States. Thousands of indigenous people migrated to the Lacandón rain forest in the 1970s with the hope of gaining title to the lands they colonized. When this hope was crushed in 1992 by Salinas Gortari’s “reform” of article 27 of the Constitution, ending further ejido (communal land grants) and opening communal lands for sale, the settlers organized the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) that burst into international view on New Year’s day of 1994.

These sites are the anchors to the regions in which I shall compare the impact of state policies on Mayas on each side of the Guatemalan-Mexican border. Transformations in the relations between indigenous populations and the state are occurring throughout the hemisphere, with two indigenous presidents elected in South America and the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and Nicaragua amending their constitutions to include indigenous rights contained in United Nations covenants. Since the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Ecology Summit, indigenous people have been recognized in national and international arenas as custodians of the environments and innovators in development policies for the future. Yet this public recognition at an international conference has not been translated into practices within or between nations. Comparison of Mayan peoples in two nations that are differentially positioned in the global economy may help us assess the prospects for achieving sustainable development policies that take indigenous peoples concerns for collective enterprises into account.

**Development Trends South of the Border**

Mayas in both countries have experienced three major trends in development economics since the decade after World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, development efforts focused on indigenous areas in order to “modernize” and integrate them into dominant economies. Schools, potable water, sewage facilities, and credit sources were the visible signs of attempts to draw indigenous people into the market system. By the mid-1960s, “Green Revolution” technology advocated by the Rockefeller Institution was being introduced as a solution to land shortages and rising populations. Irrigation and petrochemical fertilizers with the introduction of cash crops drew peasants into a growing dependency on global financial and market centres. Export oriented growth enriched local elites, impoverished indigenous and poor peasants, and promoted military repression.

These capital-intensive development programs fostered the indebtedness of Latin American nations that reached a crisis in the mid-1980s when the economies of Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico were on the edge of bankruptcy. A new trend in development economics emerged as development agencies and the institutional supports provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank promoted restructuring programs that shifted the burden of debt from investors to low income producers and service suppliers in the developing economies. Bolivia became a testing ground for crippling reconstruction polices set by the International Monetary Fund in 1986, and nations that carried a large debt such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were soon forced to privatize national industries and cut welfare policies that changed their relations with civil society. For the first time in history there was a reversal in the flow of capital from the Third World to metropolitan centres, as countries paid back debts in dollars at a time when the IMF had debased the value of their currencies in world markets. Indebtedness had become a new imperial tool to control the economic agenda of nations.

It was in this hostile environment that indigenous social movements mobilized in the decade of the 1990s as they tried to defend their lands, resources, and ways of life. In their search for collective rather than individual enrichment, they became protagonists of alternative development programs, promoting claims for cultural recognition that became defined in the United Nations ILO Convention 169 in 1989. Mobilizations of indigenous peoples throughout the hemisphere for the Celebration of 500 Years of Resistance entered into the 1992 Rio de Janeiro con-
ference on ecology and environment. There the Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests with the help of non-governmental organizations adopted a charter that supports the right to autonomy of indigenous peoples in those areas where they constitute a majority.

Proponents of sustainable development policies assert that autonomy can only be achieved in the context of collective participation of distinct cultures within the nation states in which they are situated. Many have pointed out that top-down development programs have alienated indigenous people from their lifeways and environment, often destroying household subsistence practices that ensure the survival of families and life itself.² I will bring this critique into perspectives raised by programs that indigenous women and men generate, often with the assistance of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Paradoxically the degree of success in confronting the destructive consequences of neoliberal globalization in each setting depends on indigenous peoples’ ties with transnational civil society and the communications networks put in place by processes of globalization.

Development, Neoliberalism, and EZLN Alternative in Mexico

Indigenous supporters of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Mexico present their struggle as one for life and against death. The phrase encodes the negative experiences of five decades of development that attempted to break the collective spirit embodied in their tradition. In the intervening decades from my first field stay in Amatenango del Valle in the late 1950s and 1960s, highland pueblos in Chiapas adopted some of the benefits of development that they had shunned earlier. The young indigenous officials who were the first graduates of boarding schools established during Lázaro Cárdenas presidency (1934-40) were able to reach agreements with traditional elders and government engineers that modified plans from the federal district. As a result of the negotiations, the government agreed to cap the spring water which was piped into town, leaving a stream to flow free of the pipes for curers to bathe their patients. As the population grew in the 1960s, farmers began to use chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Cooperatives introduced by the National Indigenous Institute (INI) became a means for raising capital. The first one organized by indigenous people enabled them to buy a truck and market pottery made by women independent of the ladino truck drivers in neighbouring towns. When women organized a cooperative to market the pottery that men had always sold, officials of the town hired a man who killed the leader. When I returned on a brief visit I asked the mayor why she was killed—not knowing that I was speaking to the intellectual author who had authorized the killing—and he replied that she was upsetting the household organization of production. It seemed a mimicry of the functionalist analysis we once relied on in field research.

By the 1980s highland indigenous people began to resist the assault on the domestic economy caused by development policies. They joined campesino groups that had broken away from the National Confederation of Campesinos (CNC) a corporatist group controlled by the government. Their disillusionment with the long term effect of chemical additives on their lands added to the high risks in growing cash crops for global markets rose during the debt crisis of the 1980s. When the Salinas government (1988-1994) aggravated the crisis for small farmers by introducing neoliberal policies of privatization of communal lands in the “reform” of the agrarian reform in 1992, and by opening up the national market with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, small plot producers moved from resistance to protest against the government (Collier with Quaratiello 1994, Harvey 1994, Nash 2001). The triple threat of the loss of communal lands, the competition of imported U.S. subsidized crops sold at prices below the cost of production, and the loss of government assistance in the production and marketing of commercial crops such as coffee and sugar precipitated the uprising.

In the Lacandón rainforest where over 200,000 indigenous and mestizo (mixed blood or acculturated) migrants from highland villages and coastal plantations had migrated in the 1970s and 1980s, settlers were feeling even greater pain from these same prob-

² Christine Kovic and I have summarized this critique in an article (Nash and Kovic 1996).
lems. They became active participants in *campesino* or small plot cultivator organizations that had split from the National Confederation of Campesinos, such as the Rural Association of Collective Interest (ARIC), and the Independent Center of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC). In the encounter between these increasingly politicized *campesinos* and guerrillas who were training and politicizing settlers for a decade prior to the uprising, the EZLN was born. The insurgents, an estimated two thousand women and men, masked and poorly armed, chose the advent of the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement on New Year’s day 1994 to signal the reason for their struggle. They engaged in twelve days of armed conflict with 37,000 federal troops sent in by President Salinas de Gortari. He responded to the urging of civil society groups mobilizing in Mexico City not to stage a massacre by signing a truce with the insurgents.

In their initial statement of ten basic demands distributed in a leaflet that first New Year’s morning—roofs over our heads, food, education, medical services, justice, title to the lands we cultivate, the right to vote, independence, peace and justice—the EZLN had not yet formulated the underlying roots of their uprising. This became the desire for autonomy in cultural expressions, governance, and the management of economic development programs. Forty percent of the active participants in the EZLN are women, and they often constitute the majority of the thousands of supporters in Catholic Base Communities. Shortly after the EZLN uprising, the State Council of Indigenous and Campesino Workers (CEOIC) organized to protest fraudulent elections in indigenous towns and to demand titles to land. Throughout 1994, *campesino* and indigenous groups converged repeatedly in San Cristóbal and the departmental capital of Tuxtla Gutierrez, calling for settlement of their land claims and relief from paramilitary assaults promoted by cattle ranchers. As the movement gained support in Chiapas it lighted a spark among indigenous people of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and other states with large indigenous populations, as the demand for autonomy became the basic principle in their development programs.

Zapatistas focused their attack on neoliberal policies pursued by the Mexican government in the past twenty years. In her welcoming speech to the 1996 Intercontinental Encounter Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity held in Oventic, EZLN commander Ana Maria announced that, “As for the power, known worldwide as neoliberalism, we do not count, we do not produce, we do not buy, we do not sell. We are useless in the accounts of big capital” (Nash 2001:224). Ana Maria captures the inner reality of being part of “simple reproduction” of non-capitalist society coexisting with “expanded reproduction” that was central to Rosa Luxemburg’s critique of capitalism in the early twentieth century (Luxemburg 1971).

Luxemburg’s prediction in the early twentieth century (1913, translated 1951) that it would require military force to break the independence of people from what she called the “natural economy” was played out in the Lacandón throughout Zedillo’s presidency (1994-2000). Although the Zapatistas had not violated the terms of the ceasefire agreed upon shortly after the uprising, Zedillo invaded the Lacandón settlements on February 9, 1995. After a week of terrorizing the Zapatista supporters, destroying their houses, killing animals, and spraying pesticides on their crops, they added at least 20,000 more troops to the 40,000 deployed by Salinas, setting up barracks near settlements where militants of the EZLN were concentrated. The harassment of Lacandón villages by federal troops and paramilitaries intensified in June 1998 with the process of “remunicipalization” that Zedillo initiated in order to redefine municipal boundaries favouring those who were loyal to the PRI. The Zapatistas called for abstention by members of the base communities in the fall elections, resulting in a clear majority for the PRI in 82 of the 102 municipalities. This led to continued conflict in villages that found themselves represented by PRI mayors.

Because of the failure to implement the San Andrés Agreement, the Zapatistas withdrew from
further negotiations with the government, attempting to put into practice the autonomy they sought. Among the most significant cultural initiatives relating to this is the practice of egalitarian gender relations in the home and in the community. Women who had participated in the armed uprising issued their own bill of rights shortly after the uprising, calling for the right to marry the man of their choice, to have the number of children they could take care of, and the right to choose from what was loosely termed tradition the customs that they valued. This changed gender relation has the power of upsetting the hierarchical order in the public realm institutionalized by the ruling PRI granting male priority in voting, in agrarian reform grants, and in credit. The women called for an end to the cooption by *caciques*—elite males claiming authority as the arbiters of tradition—who had ensured the PRI hegemony of indigenous communities.

Zapatista communities try to put these claims for egalitarian relations into practice. In their national appearances, the Zapatistas always maintain an equal number of men and women. We observed this as the caravan congregated in the cathedral plaza in February 2001 and found it affirmed in the hearings in the federal congress in March, 2001. Men will often pick up a crying child or stir a cooking pot, but it is not the sustained help offered by women as they participate in coffee cultivation and picking beans. The Zapatistas seek ways of overcoming any cult of personality, by featuring new speakers, both women and of men. These are the conditions that they want to cultivate in development enterprises, just as they are trying to put them into practice in their daily lives. Excluded from local as well as national politics, women often became the most committed champions of the Zapatista call for gender equality.

Yet women have been the most persistent in challenging the presence of the army which has invaded their living spaces in the Lacandón. Olivera (2004) quotes a woman of Unión Progreso when eight youths were delivered dead after they had resisted soldiers entering the community in 1998:

> We women who give life cannot pardon any more the crimes of the government troops against us dur-

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4 See Earle and Simonelli (2005) for ethnographic descriptions of life in a Zapatista village.

5 See Rojas (1995) and Earl and Simonelli (2005) for accounts of women's protests against the military and attempts by women to counter domestic abuse.
ing the more than five hundred years. They must remove those who have killed our children. They think that we are going to be afraid and stop fighting.”

The reconciliation process initiated by the coalition government of Pablo Salazar who took office as Governor of Chiapas in January 2001, led to new power alliances. In March 2001 the Zapatistas organized a caravan from the southern states to go to the Federal District and promote the ratification in Congress of the San Andrés Agreement. Despite overwhelming support from Mexican civil society, negotiations between the Zapatistas and the government broke down when the Federal Congress voted for a substitute New Indian Law that limited autonomy to the level of the township in the spring of 2001. This was a rejection of regional representation and governance in areas with a majority of indigenous people. In the wake of this defeat, autonomous villages in the Lacandón and highland municipalities are developing their own programs in education and health at the local level, in effect practicing the autonomy they failed to achieve in constitutional changes.

The economic base of Mayas in the Lacandón and highland Chiapas villages, premised on small plot cultivation of corn, cattle herding, and coffee, can scarcely guarantee subsistence, let alone generate enough cash to stabilize subsistence production. Government programs to expand the cultivation of commercial crops have often increased the vulnerability of the settlers: of the 200 million dollars invested in Chiapas coffee, only 100 million dollars was earned in the 2002-2003 period (Villafuerte Solis 2003). Yet Zapatista cooperatives, often including entire villages in the production of organic coffee and honey, have gained an export market with the assistance of NGOs.

These developments within Zapatista villages are on a collision course with the development policies of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the ruling party’s development program. During his first year in office in 2001 Vicente Fox launched a major hemispheric development scheme, called Plan Puebla Panama projecting a new vision of Mexico’s place in the hemisphere by directing attention to the southern border with its Central American neighbors and away from the increasingly hostile northern border. Unlike earlier development programs, Fox’s Plan Puebla Panama (President’s Office 2001) begins with a disarming analysis of the dangers of the growing inequality between rich and poor and the importance of addressing the human needs of people in the macro-region of southern Mexico and Central America. Specifically it claims to promote development in indigenous communities of the southern states of Mexico in the fight against poverty (Presidential Office 2001:3). Assets listed are the abundant labour supply available at “competitive costs in the global level,” a privileged geographic position, political democracy and commercial agreements already in place. It waxes eloquently about the abundant natural resources, tourist attractions, and “biological richness” available.

The Plan touches on all the buzz words of the new development perspectives: the objectives of human and social advancement, the participation of society in planning, structural change to promote equality, productive careers and investments, sustainable growth, and environmental responsibility, occasionally slipping into retro terms like “institutional modernization.” Using the rhetoric learned from the critique of past development by NGOs the Plan insists that the government will consult the pueblo while failing to address the mechanisms for implementing the San Andrés Accords as an institutional base for achieving a changed relation with the state. Praising the “wealth of traditions” and “rich multiculturalism” that will contribute to a lucrative tourist industry, the Plan fails to show how it will incorporate the bearers of that cultural tradition. Little is said of the conflicts that must be solved for this to be realized.

Each year since the Plan was announced, these conflicts have proliferated. Among the flashpoints are the areas where most government planning is concentrated, particularly the Montes Azules bio-reserve. An elder of Esperanza, one of the Montes
Azules villages that was relocated after 18 or 19 years of being bases of support for the EZLN, reveals the divisiveness promoted by government intervention (La Jornada, February 14, 2005:16):

In Esperanza we were pure Zapatistas, but in 1996 a group sold themselves with the government and became PRlistas. In that moment they began forceful hostilities, to the extent that they burned our houses and, avoiding confrontation, we went to a place next to the community La Pimienta, where we have been for two years.7

The government excuses their forced uprooting of long established villages, such as La Esperanza, colonized since 1982, on the basis that the Indians are resisting their attempts to protect the environment. Yet shortly after expelling the Indians, the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMERNAT), the government agency concerned with conservation, approved the sale of Seminis, a bioprospecting research facility located nearby in Yax Nah, to Monsanto, the giant biotechnology firm with headquarters in Saint Louis, Missouri. Monsanto, which has often been charged with violating environmental laws in the U.S. (Nash and Kirsch 1988), will enjoy a favoured position in promoting bioge netic resources with its purchase of Seminis which already has extensive greenhouses next to the reserve that may provide new genetic resources for commercial exploitation. Because of the continuing conflicts with campesinos who had been uprooted from the bioreserve two days before the sale on February 14, 2005, the government increased the allocation to SEMERNAT by 400 million pesos (about 40 million dollars) for “security forces to protect natural resources in this area.” The government dispersed another 200 million pesos for “sustainable tourism” projects, at the same time allocating only 27 million pesos for social welfare projects for women and children of the area (La Jornada February 16, 2005:15).

The Plan denies the central concerns of the indigenous movement, which are posited as endogenous development for the advance of human subjects who are agents of their own enterprises. The ultimate objectives as revealed in deeds that contradict the expressed concerns of the government are the promotion of direct foreign investment in enterprises exploiting the rich resources of the region including oil, hydroelectric power, “biodiversity” of fauna and flora—including its multicultural population as tourist attractions.8 The planners intend to facilitate trade and commerce to distant markets of North America, Europe, and Central America, devoting pages to the improvement of roads, communication and port facilities, encompassing the highway, rail and canal developments already undertaken through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The budget calls for 3.5 billion dollars for 3,750 miles of highway, or 84 percent of the total funds committed. Yet nothing is said of the institutional means to draw indigenous people into the planning process nor to provide them with the education and training needed to prepare them to participate in the enterprises.9

In the last year of the Fox presidency, the Plan provided a reinvigorated formula for the concentration of wealth. Leaders of the PAN and their allies in Mexico City are yielding strategic sectors of its economy to foreign investors in production, whether

7 “En Esperanza éramos puros zapatistas, pero en 1996 un grupo se vendió con el gobierno y se hicieron priistas. En esos momentos empezaron las agresiones fuertes, al grado de que quemaron nuestras casas y, evitando el enfrentamiento, salimos del lugar rumbo a la comunidad La Pimienta, donde estuvimos otros dos años (La Jornada February 14, 2006:6)

8 On his campaign trail to indigenous pueblos throughout Mexico, Marcos heard complaints of the loss of fish, lands and other sources of employment with the construction of hydroelectric dams. El Cajun dam, constructed in the Fox presidency, caused the displacement of an entire community in Nayarit (La Jornada March 29, 2006:20). In Tuxpan, Jalisco Marcos heard that Nahua lost access to water (La Jornada 24 March, 2006:20). In Querétaro, Otomi objected to the intrusion of a Telemex antenna on a sacred mountain, Pina de Zamorano (La Jornada 12 March, 2006:10).

9 Clearly the government has given the go-ahead to Carlos Slim, one of the richest men in the world, who has received the concession to construct, operate, conserve, and maintain the highway between Tepic-Villa Unión for a period of 30 years, despite strong indigenous objections to highway construction through their lands. The government will invest 612 million pesos with the expectation that the private sector will invest 2 for every 1 peso (El Financiero March 2, 2005).
extraction of oil and lumber or assembly production, with a trickle down going to local elites. The Fox government has installed more maquiladoras, or export-oriented assembly plants, than the neoliberal PRI governments that preceded it: Comitán, the gateway municipality on the eastern perimeter of the Lacandón has become an emporium for foreign owned maquiladoras, with San Cristóbal de Las Casas following. The clothing manufacturing plant there is subsidized by government “training scholarships” to indigenous women for the dead-end, low skill jobs they provide. The installation of a tourist train called Expreso Maya, the construction of a tourist highway, the modernization of Puerto Madero and reconstruction of a new airport in the state capital will promote a capital intensive tourism benefiting foreign investors rather than the Mayan population for which the project cunningly called Riviera Maya is named (Villafuerte 2003).

Speaking for the Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena (EZLN-CCRI 2005), the General Command of the EZLN tried to break the stalemate by issuing the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón. Testifying that “we see merchandise in the markets, but we do not see the exploitation of those that make goods,” the EZLN Commanders (EZLN-CCRI 2005) echo Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism—the reduction of all social relations to the relations between things. Neoliberal capitalism differs from earlier phases, they note, because while earlier capitalists were content exploiting workers in their own countries, now capitalists dominate workers on a world scale. They conclude the June 2005 declaration with a call to expand their resistance movements in other nations with high percentages of indigenous people, at the same time initiating a red alert warning all who support them in the peace and human rights NGOs not to come because of the danger they might face.10 Their expectation of future

10 The text, which I translate here, reads as follows: “Therefore, in neoliberal globalization, the big capitalists that live in powerful countries, like the United States, want the whole world to become like one large enterprise where products are produced and like one great market. A world market, a market to buy and sell all there is in the world and to hide all the exploitation of all the world. Then the globalized capitalists will penetrate on all sides, or let’s say, in all countries, to carry out their grand sales or let’s say, their grand exploitations. And then they will not respect anything and they will penetrate wherever they want. Or let’s say they will conquer other countries. Therefore we Zapatistas say that neoliberal globalization is a war of conquest of the whole world, a world war, a war that capitalism wages to dominate worldwide. And this conquest is sometimes with armies that invade a country and conquer it by force. But sometimes it is with the economy, or let’s say, the great capitalists put their money in another country and lends the money, but on the conditions that the borrowers obey what they say. They also penetrate with their ideas, or let’s call it with the capitalist culture that is the culture of commodities. Then once capitalism makes a conquest, it does what it wishes, or let’s say that it destroys and changes what it does not like and eliminates whatever is in the way. People like us, those who do not produce nor buy nor sell the merchandise of modernity, those who rebel against that order. (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena, Comandancia General del EZLN, June 2005).
This drive by the General Command of the EZLN to reinforce and extend civilian support groups took its most forceful position with the campaign of Delegado Zero (former sub-comandante Marcos in his guise as agent of the reinvigorated Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (FZLN). In the election year 2006 Delegado Zero began his non-campaign along with the three main contenders of the PRD, PAN, and PRI, in the form of a dialogue with indigenous campesinos, workers (including sex workers) and the poor throughout Mexico. Eschewing encounters with the agents of the government or political parties, Delegado Zero began his tour in the ruins of Chichenitza and travelled principally to regions with major indigenous populations. The electoral process allowed the new face of Zapatism personified by Delegado Zero, the EZLN’s non-candidate Subcomandante Marcos, to gain adherents throughout the nation and abroad but failed to build political alliances.

The critique of the program of the EZLN is ongoing. Those who emphasize the persistent structural problems, such as Roger Bartra (2001) disclaim the potential for transformation inscribed in the San Andrés Agreement and the practice of autonomy in Zapatista villages. Echoing the same arguments that he presented in the 1980s when he denied the potential for sustainable small plot cultivation and proclaimed the inexorable transformation to des-campesinistas, or proletarianization, Bartra claims that the championing of rights based on indigenous identity is reactionary and that autonomy leads to the stagnation economically found on U.S. Indian reservations. He envisions that the results will be exclusion from political parties and the new institutions that contain the seeds of change. Others like Pablo Gonzalez Cassanova, a sociologist and former rector of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), reassert the vitality of an autonomous indigenous movement. He participated as a negotiator in the National Commission of Intermediation (CONAI) that formulated the San Andrés Agreement, which he calls a unique alternative to global neoliberalism. Both intellectuals represent large segments of civil society, and it is among participants of the massive mobilizations they organized throughout the decade of provocation, intimidation, and imprisonment that the outcome may depend.

Delegado Zero’s encounters with indigenous peoples and supporters in his campaign have aired common issues uniting indigenous peoples, conservationists, wage workers who have felt increasing attacks on their subsistence security. But the rejection by the CCRI of any negotiation with the major political parties may undercut the possibility of needed alliances. These alliances have enabled indigenous movements of South America to gain supporters among non-indigenous and workers movements for a nationalist popularity agenda, as in Bolivia, and in nations such as Ecuador and Colombia where indigenous people are a minority.

Felipe Calderón has shown no more interest in fulfilling the San Andrés Peace Accord in the Lacandón than his predecessor. In his first four months of office, Calderón has utilized the same strategy of declaring indigenous held territories as environmental reserves, followed by granting concessions to private construction companies to build tourist hotels. Six pueblos in the Montes Azules reserve in the Lacandón have been declared illegal at a time when these settlers were seeking to regularize their occupation of promised lands (La Jornada April 4, 2007:26). The volcanic mountain peak of Huitepec, venerated as a sacred site by Chamulans for the deep springs that have provided the municipality with water for hundreds of years, is now under siege following its designation as a bioreserve. During Fox’s presidency, the federal government granted rights to Coca Cola to exploit water from these springs with no fees granted to the municipality. His successor has now declared the mountain peak with its strategic resources a bioreserve. The federal government is supporting paramilitary troops that threaten to evict Chamula cultivators and sheepherders. In March 2007 the Center for Human Rights Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas called for volunteers to support the indigenous people who were increasingly harassed by members of the newly formed Organization for the Defense of Indigenous and Campesino Rights (Organización para la Defensa de los Derechos
Indígenas y campesinas OPDDIC). In April, 2007, I visited the campsites of volunteers from all over the world who had come in response to an alert from the EZLN. Maderas del Pueblo, an ecological NGO, had joined the settlers to defend their rights to the land and water, protecting the trees from paramilitaries who cut them down and then blamed the native settlers for destruction of the bioreserve.

The confrontations emerging out of the stalemate in Chiapas are a result of the government’s failure to regularize titles for the promised land in the Lacandón and to implement the San Andrés Agreement signed by Zedillo over a decade ago. The EZLN is now launching a worldwide campaign in defense of indigenous territories, announced on March 26, 2007 (La Jornada March 26, 2007:13). I joined the group of Zapatistas in San Cristóbal on March 25 when Marcos announced that “another world would be possible only over the dead body of capitalism.” He joined Rafael Alegria, coordinator of the Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform of the International Campesino Path (Via Campesina Internacional) calling for an international campaign for the defense of the environment and the indigenous resources that are being invaded (La Jornada, March 26, 2007:12, 13; Cuarto Poder, March 26, 2007:38). The meeting in San Cristóbal’s new centre for civil society reunions, Tierra Adentro, marks a new stage in the indigenous movement as they declared a world campaign to protect the environment against predatory capitalist invasion.

These attacks on Zapatista communities and those who support them are overt expressions of systemic assaults on the subsistence base of communities, both indigenous and mestizo. Privatization of basic resources, such as water, through granting of permits for exploitation of deep ground water supplies, and of resources that once financed much of the government’s fiscal expenditure, such as private contracts for the exploration and extraction of oil reserves, has accelerated with the Calderón administration. The latest tactic to engage producers in commercial development enterprises is the credit plan for producers promoted by the federal government’s National Mutual Fund of Producers of Corn and Beans (Fonda Nacional Mutualista de Productores de maíz y frijol). The government is now acting as an agent for private banks to float loans to small producers with ten hectares or less to enhance production with chemical inputs. Interest rates of 2 to 8 percent monthly, or 96 percent per year, will be charged. The program will, according to Enrique Castillo Sánchez, President of the Association of Banks of Mexico, demonstrate the commitment of the banks “to support productive sectors” (Diario de Yucatan June 12, 2007). With such exorbitant interest rates, the plan could spell the end of land reform.

Guatemalan Development and the Military Industrial Complex

The deeply imbedded roots of racism in Guatemalan colonial history are nourished by the persistent fears of a majority indigenous population rising to overcome the oppressive rule of a narrow elite (Carmack 1983). The revolution brought about in Guatemala by the democratic election of Juan José Arévalo in 1944 provided a decade of democratic experimentation in indigenous relations with the state. The advances made in land reform and greater local autonomy were cut short in a U.S. engineered coup in July 1954. Following the coup foreign missionaries flooded the area (Calder 2004:95) as Guatemala became an arena for fighting the cold war against communism, with ever-increasing repression of agricultural and industrial unions (Smith 1990, Jonas 1991). Protestant evangelizing and Catholic Action groups contested the power of traditionalists who held offices in the civil religious hierarchy, providing ideological formulations for a war between ethnic groups, political parties, and

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11 Carlos Fazio (La Jornada 26 March, 2007) relates the new paramilitars such as OPDDIC and the Unión Regional Campesina Indígena (URCI) to the infamous groups called Los Chinchulines, Paz y Justicia and others patronized by state governor Patrocinio González Garrido and interim governors during Zedillo’s military campaigns throughout the 1990s. He attributes the ability of the military to gain recruits from among campesinos in Calderón’s first year as president to the growing impoverishment of the campesinos administration. In Chiapas these groups are invading lands taken by the EZLN from former governor of Chiapas Castellanos during the uprising, and other large landholders during the first campaign.
social classes. At the same time Catholic Action fostered advanced education for Mayas in areas where the government limited indigenous schools to elementary levels (Calder 2004: 103). This promoted a process of consciousness-raising among an increasingly educated indigenous base, especially in those communities where Maryknoll priests were active.

In the early 1970s, landless cultivators of the western highlands of Guatemala migrated to the Ixcan jungle areas south of the Ixlí mountains in the northern part of El Quiché and just south of the Lacandón rainforest. Practicing a communal form of life, they cultivated land to which they were promised title. Like the colonies of the Lacandón, settlements in the Quiché and Alta Verapaz rainforests were invaded by oil explorers and government troops. This happened first in Guatemala in the mid 1970s when oil companies—Getty Oil, Texaco, Amoco and Shenadoah Oil—extended their drilling into the Ixil area where colonizers had settled far from the locus of guerrillas. Called the “Zone of the Generals,” it was the site where General Lucas and other army generals were grabbing land where transnational oil explorers had discovered oil (Jonas 1991:128). The attack on Panzos settlers in 1978 was the first of a series of massacres committed by the army in broad daylight, when an estimated 100 to 200 victims were killed, perhaps to inspire fear and withdrawal (Sanford 2003:83).

As the conflict intensified in the 1980s, the army and paramilitary forces backed up the oil companies against the settlers when they tried to defend their lands (Sinclair 1995:85 et seq.). Some joined the Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC), a broadly based community action organization of indígenes and mestizos. Others joined the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), especially after the 1982 Rio Negro massacre when the Guatemalan Army killed over half the villagers because they opposed the damming of a river for an international hydroelectric company (Alecio 1985:26).

Beatriz Manz (2004) chronicles the origins and development of one of these communities in the Ixcan rainforest, Santa María Tzejá, during three decades from the 1970s when the settlers arrived until the massacres of 1980s and her return for the peace process in the 1990s, during which she was in contact with and participated in their lives. When the army stepped up the massacres in 1982 and 1983 the people began to flee into exile across the border in Chiapas. There they were helped by the Catholic Base Communities in the diocese of Bishop Samuel Ruiz, who helped them gain United Nations status as refugees. Those who remained organized cooperatives linked in a loose network called Communities of Populations in Resistance (CPRs) (Manz 2004:126; Sinclair 1995:75). According to Manz’s account (2004:129) most of the people in the CPRs were Mayas, and they, along with a few ladinos, moved in and out of the Mexican army and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor. As Sanford (2003:131 et seq.) notes, in the harsh realities of everyday living under threat, these communities were often lacking in humane and dignified treatment of exiles fleeing from the army.

Following the 1980-83 phase of massive massacres and institutionalized terror, the forced concentration of Mayan survivors in army-controlled work camps they called “model villages” introduced a new phase of militarization in the guise of development. Through a “pacification program” that masked the army’s drive to exert military control over the population, over a million males between 16 to 60 years were forced to serve unpaid in “civilian defense patrols.” Indigenous youths were forced to join these patrols in search of dissidents, and their complicity out of fear for their own lives reinforced the militarization of society.

Through their “model villages,” a program in which the army resettled thousands of people in alien territories, the military perfected their control over the indigenous population. Fear and intimidation cultivated by the presence of military force enabled the army to infuse all institutions of the villages. Citing the intellectual authors of the program, Schirmer (1998: 59) states the army planned “a cultural transformation of an Indígena not tied to cultural tradition.” In her interviews with present and retired army officers, she shows the link between “Beans and Bullets”

12 Victoria Sanford (2003) did her fieldwork in this area where exhumations for the Commission for Historical Clarification regarding seventy-seven massacres carried out by Guatemalan Army occurred between March 1981 and March 1983.
(30% beans and 70% bullets) development policies fashioned by Guatemalan generals, often trained in U.S. centres of military formation, and with the help of USAID and counterinsurgency experts trained in Vietnam (Schirmer 1998:33-38). Given the impoverishment of the villages which since their settlement have lacked schools or other public services, there were few intervening agencies for the army to compete with. The population was divided by the introduction of new settlers hungry for land in 1983, and they were left to fight for their claims with settlers (Manz 2004:155 et seq.) Thus the development program instituted by the army created a dependent population fighting amongst themselves for land and ready to work for low wages in export oriented industries (Smith 1988). Smith (1990:33) concluded that, “The long term effect of economic restructuring in the highlands will be the creation of a large reserve of unemployed who, for both security and development reasons, will have to be controlled by an ever-expanding state apparatus.”

The economic restructuring brought about by the army has weakened the social and political autonomy of indigenous communities throughout the western highlands beyond the militarized zone. With little land to cultivate and markets for artisan production diminished by the war, the basic economy of the region was disrupted, forcing the population into dependency on army supplies. Military bases in 20 of the 22 departments of the country and garrisons in almost every town were the major economic force. Each year the army recruited eight thousand new soldiers from indigenous communities for two-year stints, and in addition commandeered the labour of men and women building roads, provisioning soldiers, and caring for their laundry and other tasks without compensation (Smith 1990).

Beatriz Manz (2004: 156 et seq.) found a weary and dispirited population in Ixcán when she returned to her field station in the 1980s. Divided linguistically and coming from distinct areas of the country and their refugee camps in Mexico, the displaced population lived with suspicion and dread of their own neighbours. With the return of the exiles from Guatemala beginning in January 1993, the former colonizers were again forced into intense conflict with new residents for the land and villages (Manz 1988, 2004, especially chapter 5; Sanford 2003).

Yet these attempts by the military to destroy the spatial and symbolic boundaries in the church, community, and home through state terror have failed to eradicate the identity maintained by indigenous people to these sanctuaries (Green 1998:9). The net effect of these “signature events,” as Carey (2005) calls the Patzía massacre in the Department of Quetzaltenango, was for indigenous people to reject the hegemony of a racially biased state.

Guatemala’s development plan of export oriented industrialization imposed in the 1990s did not help unemployment, especially of males, since most of the very low wage jobs went to women. Women who remained in their villages combined craft production with other services for tourists (Ehlers 1989).

Women who were widowed in the 36 years of civil war became the most organized segment of the population in demanding remunerative employment, a population that was targeted by government and international organizations. The government sponsored Program of Assistance to Widows and Orphans of the Highlands (PAVYH) and the national Organization of Guatemala Widows (CONAVIGUA), along with the Catholic sisters organization assisted rural indigenous women widowed by the violence. The small-scale projects sponsored by these organizations, such as raising chickens and making soap, netted low returns for the enormous input of labour, but did promote collective activities that politicized the women (Green 1998: 103-105).

A shift in world trade during this same period led to a decline in outsourcing to newly developing countries of southeast Asia and a reconsideration of priorities with trade in Central America and the Caribbean. When unionization in Mexico began to threaten the high returns to capital investment they had enjoyed during the 1970s and 1980s (Fernandez-Kelly 1983), maquiladoras, or export oriented assembly plants, transferred their operations

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13 The U.S. Military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance projects in Central America became an important support for troops attacking indigenous villages driven by the ideology of combating communism during the cold war of the 1980s. See Jonas (2005).
into Central America and the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these same *maquiladoras* opened in Guatemala in 1991 when the country anticipated the peace process. Given the desperate situation of the country and the corruption in high offices, Guatemala accepted contracts with *maquilas* that offered the lowest wages and the least security and potential for growth in the entire Caribbean and Central America. (AV ANCSO 1994a:28). Korean-owned firms dominated the cohort that entered Guatemala, and their presence is still remembered for the cruelty of their labour practices. The *maquila* that came briefly to operate in San Francisco el Alto was driven out by the same conditions that, as Carol Smith noted (1988), promoted the continuity of hand-operated bed looms in the production of the tie-dyed skirts worn by most indigenous women to this day: low operating costs, ample labour supply in family operated firms, as well as a home market for the product. The *maquiladora* operators never found a national market for their mass-produced goods that could stabilize production when quotas to the U.S. were filled.

The peace process that began with the negotiations between the Guatemalan army and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca in 1991 culminating in the Peace Accords of 1996 introduced many new international agencies in a country that was still polarized by the 36 years of civil wars. Attempts to reconstruct the country and provide a base for sustainable development were countered by the Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF), who rejected efforts to impose taxation and legitimate governmental intervention by ensuring social justice (Jonas 2000, Ch. 7). The IMF, Bank for Interamerican Development, World Bank, and a host of NGOs brought agendas that often ignored the interests of the peasants and workers who had survived the genocidal wars.

In countering the worst effect of these exogenous operations, the Guatemalan government devised a megaproject, Desarrollo para Integración de Comunidades Rurales (Development for the Integration of Rural Communities), presumably aimed at assisting 77 municipalities in the poorest part of Guatemala using private capital for their top-down development plans (AVANCSO 1994b). This project, like Plan Pueblo Panama, clearly follows a neoliberal outlook emphasizing privatization of assets and individual gain as the spur and carrot for a game that exceeds peasant collective enterprises that set modest goals for assured gains. But as Fischer and Benson (2005) discovered in their study of farmers who venture into export crop commercializing fostered by the plan, indigenous farmers are not without hope. Although the export business has left farmers shortchanged, earning low margins for high-risk crops, many continue to take on the challenge even after successive years of loss (Fischer and Benson 2005). The persistence of what seems to be irrational economic behaviour is, they argue, the ability of unrestrained capitalism to tap into desire to gain cash returns. Given the unfavourable returns for conventional crops, it is not unlike the turn to gambling worldwide. I would hypothesize that, as ordinary economic ventures fail to yield even the expected low returns, a casino mentality develops that taps into the unrealistic dreams of luck that defies the odds.

After a quarter of a century of army control in alliance with compliant elected presidents, economic activity in rural areas and in industry declined to pre-1980 levels, and under-employment reached 63 percent (AVANCSO 1994a:33-35). Guatemalan society is counted among the three poorest countries of the hemisphere, its economy shattered by the parasitical force of the army and its people reduced to theft, internecine violence, and despair (Schirmer 1998: 262 et seq.). Guatemala’s peace agreement signed in December 1996 came at a time when there were few resources left for the army to plunder and even the propertied classes of Guatemala were beginning to object to the taxation and the continued reliance on violence. Attempts by civil society to get the army back to the barracks and restore the institutions of government are undermined by lack of fiscal resources. Unemployment remains high long after the peace agreements, and Guatemalan *campesinos* were paid so low that they risked imprisonment migrating illegally to work in Mexico or to the United States.

The decades of civil war in which Guatemalan Mayas were entangled as combatants or victims served
DEVELOPMENT TO UNITE US • 23

the purpose of elites in promoting economic growth without social progress. The economy multiplied 4.5 times in GNP between 1950 and 1980 without reducing the poverty of the country or responding to the minimal needs of the people (AVANCSO 1994a:25). Much of this growth was due to the fact that formerly subsistence activities were forced into the market, where economic transactions get counted. During these years, U.S. AID went into the purchase of armaments and security measures rather than productive growth in national industries. U.S. AID also promoted the growth of high-tech private enterprises, especially in textile production, with training of mechanics and promotion of markets. Yet this kind of development promoted growth without increased employment and curbed the possibilities for development in succeeding decades. Cantel’s decline in employment in 2005 exemplifies the counterproductive policies pursued by industries investing in high technology. This meant an ever-increasing wealth gap with the social consequences of unemployment, impoverishment and criminality, adding to the burden of debt for future generations.

The emergent civil society that coalesced during the peace initiatives in the 1990s objects to the sham of elected governments put in place after the violence subsided. During our visit to the industrialized department of Quetzaltenango shortly after the inauguration of President Berger in March, 2005, we heard the anguished stories of health workers and environmentalists hired to bring order in communities still devastated by the war and its aftermath, often working in agencies that were poorly funded. Disenchanted by the government’s appropriation of the imagery of the rule of law and of the procedures of electoral democracy, they realize that the human rights of Guatemalans are still violated with impunity.

Yet protest and resistance are not ended; daily newspaper accounts of indigenous people opposing the gold mining operation in San Miguel Ixtahuacan and Sipakapa indicate that the military model has not succeeded in obliterating cultural commitment to alternative paths. On our return at the Guatemalan-Mexican border we were stopped for over an hour by a protest demonstration of campesinos against the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) then being considered in Congress in 2005. Although the movement is organized primarily by ladinos linked to political parties, the issues affecting indigenous cultivators concerned with genetic engineering of crops and foreign ownership of resources may ignite the kind of resistance that Mayas on the Mexican side of the border engage in.

Development to Unite All of Us

Mayas both in Guatemala and Mexico look to their past as they construct plans for the future. Mayas of both countries still maintain a cosmogony combining pre-conquest powers with saints and spirits from the Christian religion that holds humans responsible for the balance in the universe. This has profound consequences for their preference for collective projects in development and for their daily behaviour. During the 1990s as Guatemalan Mayas entered into peace negotiations with their government, they focused increasingly on issues of indigenous land claims, evoking Ruwach’ulew (The Earth/the World), or Quate’ Ruwach’ulew (Our Mother the Earth) in what Kay Warren calls “an indigenous ecological discourse in overlapping ways to interconnect Maya cosmology, agricultural rituals, strategies for socioeconomic change, land issues, and rights struggles” (Warren 1998:65). And if Maximón figures, which some say represent Judas, or the Anti-Christ, appear to be more ubiquitous than more benign figures of Christianity, he represents both the toughness, meanness, and flexibility to confront the enormous challenges faced by Mayas in a country still dominated by their oppressors.

Chiapas Mayas still invoke preconquest cosmic powers as they try to achieve a balance with nature. Zapatistas often contrast this reverence for nature in opposition to neoliberal policies of death, as during the Intercontinental Convention for Life and Against Neoliberalism in late July and early August 1996. When many fires blew out of control during the planting season in March, 1998, Tzeltal-speaking Zapatista supporters in the highland pueblo of Amatenango wondered if the loss of forest lands in the Lacandón was due to an upset in the balance between the Tatik Sol (Father Sun) and the
Metkichich U (Grandmother Moon) caused by the raping and pillage carried out by the army and paramilitary troops in full view of these cosmic deities. In the Lacandón rain forest, the more politicized Tojolobal residents of towns hard-hit by the fires asserted that they were lit by the army as a means of clearing the forest cover to improve their visibility in free fire zones.

This contested knowledge drawn from the past and related to present conditions is captured by the emergent leaders in both countries. When the Zapatistas became the first indigenous people to speak in the Mexican Congress in 2001, Commander Tacho’s message was a prophetic address to the nation:

We fled far to defend ourselves from the great oppressor in order not to be exterminated unjustly. Given their intelligence and knowledge, our first grandparents thought that they would find refuge in the farthest mountains where they could promote their resistance and where they could survive with their own forms of government politically, socially, economically and culturally, so that our roots would not be ended, so that our mother land would never die, nor our mother moon, nor our father sun. And so our roots could never be torn out and die, these deep roots that survive in the deepest heart of these lands that take on the color that we are, the color of earth. (EZLN-CCRI March 17, 2001).

What is consistent in Mayan attention to a sacred past while moving into an uncertain future is that the past itself lives on and sprouts new growth with each death and regeneration.14

Victor Montejo, an intellectual, cultural, and political leader in the Guatemalan indigenous movement who recognizes the great diversity of Mayan identity representations, cites the words of a Mayan elder as his guiding principle in development: “Don’t forget the teachings of the ancestors. In their paths we will find hope for the future” (Montejo 2002:143). He insists that Mayan identity be historically based and continually recreated as they write and re-write their own histories.

Conclusion

The resurgence of ethnic identification challenges assumptions about the inevitability of cultural homogenization and the loss of local control.15 They have done this in distinct ways that conform to different levels of indigenous autonomy in each country. In Mexico, following the Revolution of 1910 and its belated realization in Chiapas in 1930s, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) pursued policies designed to integrate highland pueblos in a national project premised on mestizo identity. Debilitating as these indigenista policies were to autonomous development, they provided a context for mobilization with class-based organizations. Although Guatemalan intellectuals such as Antonio Goubaud Carrera expressed the need for indigenist participation in a pluri-cultural nation during the democratic period prior to the 1954, (Adams 2005) this was never institutionalized in programs that attempted to integrate Mayas in the national or political economy. Genocidal attacks on Mayan villages in the 1970s to 1980s caused most indigenous people to distance themselves from a racist government.

Mexico grew as a nation after its Revolution of 1910-17, retaining greater independence of its northern neighbours than Guatemala. This allowed a space for the nation to promote integration of mestizos and acculturated indigenous peoples in the policies of indigenism. While these policies had ethnical outcomes in Mexico, the government promoted integrationist programs of education, health services and agricultural outreach that enabled Mayas to gain a position in the commercial economy. These advances were interrupted in the 1970s, and particularly after the PRI abandoned its nationalist policies for development during Salinas’ neoliberal presidency. The trend in Chiapas toward military repression following

14 Carlsen (1997:65-66) evokes the poetic imagery of Mayan conceptions of circular time revealed in their contemporary expressions in Santiago Atitlan, a town that has survived the beastial attacks of an army out of control. The persistence of the Jaloj-Kexoj World Tree throughout the conquest and post-conquest period sustains the strength of Atitecos in the present to achieve regeneration.

15 These assumptions have been refuted by Carmack 1983, Fischer and Brown 1996, Nash 1995, 2001; Warren 1998 among others.
the Zapatista uprising casts the shadow of genocidal strategies that were once contained in Guatemala across the border. In his new role as Delegado Zero, Subcomandante Marcos expresses increasing pessimism about negotiated change in his campaign speeches. In his call for a national movement, he told his audience of Huastecas in Vera Cruz, “Either we change everything or there will be nothing left to change” (La Jornada February 2, 2006:14).

Guatemalan Mayas fared worse after the U.S.-instigated coup in 1954 when the Arbenz program of transforming the economy from dependent capitalism to national, independent capitalism was interrupted and a genocidal attack on indigenous people became state policy. The military control of highland Guatemalan villages prevailed after the overt attacks subsided, with indigenous people forced to patrol their villages and summarily imprison any dissenters. Further distortion of the domestic economy occurred when elected governments opened the door to maquiladoras without conditions to protect the rights of workers. Schemes to market cash crops grown by indigenous farmers provide little margin for profit while increasing the risks of production. The flagging economy has promoted a casino mentality in producers willing to engage in high-risk ventures since they cannot count on subsistence margins even with traditional crops.

Given the ethnocidal and genocidal course pursued by unconditional neoliberal policies that allow private foreign capital to pursue profit at any cost, it is clear that alternative development policies are needed. As custodians of their territories, indigenous peoples have proven their knowledge and skill in their continuous residence in environments that are havens for a rich diversity of faunal and floral organisms. This knowledge, and the genetic diversity that women and men have preserved in their own survival and in the environment, are being exploited by drug companies, geologists and agronomists for private profit.

The alternative goals of the indigenous people with whom I have worked in Mexico and Guatemala have shown that Mayas are demonstrating not only a viable but also a necessary alternative path in the face of global encirclement. Despite the violence, indigenous organizations are reinforcing their ranks, as they demonstrated in 2005 in the celebration of October 12 as a Day of Indigenous Resistance. Organized by the Congress of the Latin American Coalition of Rural Organizations, the organization promises to become “a permanent mobilization against the rulings of the World Trade Organization and all the instruments of economic domination imposed by the United States and the European Union. (Indymedia 2005).”

Opposition to indigenous claims, and even to their survival as distinctive populations in this world, is rising along with their signal successes in reaching a global audience. A military front masked as an anti-drug war in Colombia, the Lacandón rain forest, and other “trouble spots;” paramilitary operations posing as revolutionaries as they intimidate and murder indigenous leaders of confederations in Mexico, Colombia and Central American countries; and armies of unemployed youths sprung out of indigenous cultures that can no longer contain their ambitions for a future in their world, all contribute to the growing incidence of violence in the hemisphere.

Using common cultural reference points such as “We are made of corn, but also of water,” Mayas on both sides of the Mexico-Guatemalan border are mobilizing transnational opposition to the megaprojects affecting the Usumacinta River in 2006 (Kalny 2006). With the weakening of U.S. hegemony, and the democratic elections of socialist and left-wing heads of state in the Southern Cone, there may be a turning point in the hemisphere that we can only perceive as smoke on the mirror.
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Social Class: The Forgotten Identity Marker in Social Studies Education

Paul Orlowski
Teacher Education Program, University College of the Fraser Valley

Abstract
This paper describes a study that took place from 2002–2004 in which I critically examined the discourses pertaining to social class in two sources: first, the state-sanctioned social studies curriculum used in British Columbia high schools from the first version published in 1941 to the 1997 version; second, interview transcripts with ten social studies department head teachers in Vancouver British Columbia that focussed specifically on working-class issues in social studies. The ideologies that emanated out of modernity—liberalism, socialism and conservatism—form the basis of the analysis. The evolution of the BC social studies curriculum has undergone an ideological shift in terms of social class represented from conservatism to liberalism. References to social class have almost completely disappeared. The majority of the teacher discourse about class incorporated ideas from both conservatism and liberalism. There were some occasional remarks that demonstrated a radical influence on the thinking and teaching of a few teachers. The most important conclusion is that there is a clear mirroring of the political ideology underlying the formal curriculum with the attitudes of the teachers: issues of social class were almost completely absent from both data sources. Some suggestions for social studies teachers to address this are offered.

Key Words: ideology critique, discourse analysis, social class, social studies curriculum, teacher education

In North America, discussions of social class are considered to be in questionable taste, indeed are surrounded by formidable taboos. It is less outre to converse graphically about kinky sex than to suggest that social classes exist, or that their existence has important consequences.


A prevailing assumption in our time is that class awareness is a thing of the past, that anyone who engages with it is either misguided, revels in mischief-making, or mistakenly blames others for their own ineptitude or low station in life. Indeed, the meritocratic notion that anyone can make it through hard work seems to be as deeply embedded in North American consciousness as the Christian idea that there is a beautiful afterlife for those who simply grin and bear their lot in this life. Yet, there are several extremely important reasons to discuss social class in both the Canadian and American contexts today.

Child poverty is greatly increasing at the same time that provincial governments across Canada are reducing funding for public education (Maynes and Foster 2000:56). Free trade deals like NAFTA are lowering the wages, job security and working conditions for vast numbers of the working class in both Canada and the United States (Laxer 1998:17–18). One of the greatest accomplishments of all western societies (except the United States) took place in the post-war decades when state-financed health care systems made available for all citizens high-quality health care. This is undoubtedly an egalitarian transforming achievement in which liberals and social
democrats can take pride. Yet, in Canada and Britain today there is increasing pressure to create two-tiered health care systems to more closely resemble the American system (Laxer 1998). Moreover, social scientists who study life expectancy have known for a long time that the biggest single factor in elongating life is social class (Laxer 1998). With the current dismantling of the social welfare state, an increase in this longevity gap can be expected. Just as ideology was instrumental in helping to build the social welfare state, it is also involved with its current dismantling.

Yet, how well understood is the role of ideology in our day-to-day lives? If one were to examine the ways the mainstream media portray social, economic, and political debates and struggles, they would discover that the entire notion of ideology is rarely mentioned. Even in public education circles, despite the myriad examples of ideology-influenced reform, the role of ideology is excluded. As Leonardo explains, “there is a general tendency for educators to avoid talk of ideology. It is not uncommon that one is labeled ‘ideological’ when confronted by someone whose opinions differ from his own” (2003:204).

Despite the obvious role that ideology plays in almost all aspects of public education—including debates about curricular content, teacher neutrality, and the role of the school itself—Leonardo points out that the term most often has negative connotations. Schools attempt to inculcate students with a set of diverse and sometimes contradictory values in myriad ways. Social studies is an obvious source of values, something I can personally attest to because I have taught in high schools in British Columbia for the past 19 years. Even within this discipline, however, there are debates about its purposes (Ross and Marker 2005).

This paper describes research that is part of a much larger project, one that explores the ways in which political ideology has influenced discourses of race and class in both the formal curriculum and teacher attitudes in B.C. social studies education. Social studies teachers have developed numerous and diverse ways in which young people are taught to perceive the world. These values and ways of seeing are influenced by political ideology, whether the public, the teachers, or the students are aware of it. Indeed, Leming (1994) argues in support of the traditional form of social studies instruction that attempts to transmit knowledge as facts and eschew critical thinking, Ross counters that this conservative approach to social studies is tantamount to training students to support the “arrangements of the social, economic, and political order” (2000:57).

To determine the political ideologies involved, I looked for discourses, either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, that work to entrench or destabilize ideologies pertaining to social class. In order to accomplish this, I have drawn on my textual analysis of the British Columbia high school social studies curriculum, from the original document in 1941 through to the one used today, and on my analysis of interviews I conducted in 2002-2003 with ten social studies department head teachers in Vancouver, B.C.1 This critical examination of class discourses in the formal curriculum and teacher attitudes positions the paper within a progressive paradigm. Before the analysis, however, it is prudent to describe the ways in which I am using the term ideology and the accompanying three ideologies of modernism: liberalism, socialism, and conservatism.

The Ideologies of Modernity

Karl Marx was the first to use the term ideology to critique social relations of domination. According to Giroux, Marx conceptualized ideology in political terms both as “a critique of consciousness” and as “possibilities within consciousness” (1981:19). Schwarzmantel re-states Marx’s conceptualizations in a clear manner by explaining that each political ideology consists of three elements: a critique, an ideal, and agency (1998:2). In other words, each ideology has a response to the prevailing social conditions, either favourable or not, depending on the degree to which an individual’s perspective agrees

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1 Vancouver is a large, multi-racial/ethnic school district in which more than two-thirds of the students come from homes in which a language other than English is spoken. The district enrolls almost 60,000 students (K-12 and adult education), making it the second largest school district in British Columbia, after Surrey. There are 18 secondary schools and over 100 elementary schools in the Vancouver School District.
with the dominant ideology. The ideologies that arose out of modernity—liberalism, socialism, and conservatism—form the basis of the analysis for this paper. Each has its own articulation of the ideal society.

Liberalism is the direct progeny of the Enlightenment. The two social cornerstones of liberalism in its classic form were “the supreme value of the individual and the need for a political system that was suitable for an emancipated and rational population” (Schwarzmantel 1998:68). Hence, it can be argued that the concepts of emancipation and democracy are the progeny of liberalism. Economic freedom, in the form of capitalism, also formed the basis of liberalism. Yet, at that point in history, there was very little thought given to the emancipation for those who had been colonized or enslaved.

Socialism can be seen as a spin-off ideology from liberalism, another attempt to realize the same emancipatory goal. The original socialist tradition was in agreement with the liberal idea that a rationally controlled society could be made even better; that is, progress through conscious human action. Both ideologies agreed that the notion of divine guidance was simply not credible. The major difference was that liberalism identified the individual as the prime social unit whereas for socialism it was social class.

It is paramount to my argument that the original socialist ideology also articulated a vision for a socially just world in the same vein as its liberal predecessor. The liberal conception of freedom fits perfectly with the economic theories of capitalism, and on its own terms appears coherent. Yet, as Marx pointed out in the first volume of Capital (1961), from a broader, historical perspective, the liberal idea of freedom is unattainable for most people within capitalism. This is because of the basic contradiction that workers cannot be free when they are vulnerable to the capitalist tendency to exploit them and sell products at exorbitant prices. Marx gained few allies from opposing ideologies, given his view of the inevitable clash between social classes.

The conservative ideology developed as a reaction to modernity and the revolutionary fervour it spawned. The commercial forces unleashed by the liberal project were tearing apart the bonds needed for social cohesion. Moreover, conservatives considered the notion of progress, central to both liberalism and socialism, as unsettling and threatening to tradition and community. For them, tradition gains strength from the long held views inherent in the common sense of the community. Conservative theorists believed in “the idea of an organic and hierarchical society, in which people knew their place yet are related to each other as part of a totality” (Schwarzmantel 1998:110). A central tenet of conservatism is that society should be led by a stable group of people who, through past experience, would have the ability to do so wisely. In other words, tradition and progress are directly at odds with one another; conservatives cherish the former while fearing the latter.

The critiques of conservatism from both the liberal and socialist camps are clear and succinct and based on several principles of social justice. To begin, traditional communities are most often non-egalitarian with entrenched social hierarchies and therefore clearly anti-democratic. Traditional hierarchies by definition take exception with the discourse for the emancipation of the masses, a situation that can lead to the oppression of many for the benefit of the few. Lastly, the focus on tradition and the past often seems to lead to the exclusion of certain groups from attaining equal rights and citizenship. Even more disturbing, extreme conservatism in the form of right-wing nationalism often scapegoats vulnerable groups of people.

From the taxonomy of political ideologies I have described, it is clear that, by calling for the emancipation of all, both liberalism and socialism include progressive principles of social justice. Both couplings, liberalism/socialism and conservatism/nationalism, work, to a large extent, in opposition to each other. Ideology is involved in all aspects of our social, political, and economic lives to such an extent that it is located everywhere. It affects the ways we view each other and all of the institutions we have created, including the public education system. Ross succinctly defines ideology as “the frame in which people fit their understanding of how the world works” (2000:50). All of these ideologies have changed over time to adapt to changing conditions, and adherents alter their frame as well. Similar processes occur over time with the social studies curriculum.
Ideology and the B.C. Social Studies Curriculum

Those who tell the stories also hold the power.

This quote attributed to Plato has never been lost on the privileged groups of any society. The elites have long recognized the potential of the school curriculum to be used as a hegemonic device (Osborne, 1995). Consequently, the school curriculum is created by curriculum developers who are themselves influenced by the dominant political ideologies; indeed, they are aware of the political stakes involved, the political sensitivity required, and the power of the state to grant approval to their work (Manicom, 1995). Stated more bluntly, the official knowledge in the formal curriculum or Integrated Resource Packages (IRPs) is political and most often serves the interests of those with the power to decide what gets into these documents. The curriculum is not an apolitical or neutral document (Ross 2000). Indeed, I maintain that the formal social studies curriculum can be viewed as a set of discourses, or discursive formations, connected to power. Epistemologically, this notion assumes that knowledge is socially constructed, of course, and that school knowledge has a political dimension. So who actually develops the IRPs? In British Columbia today, a team of curriculum developers is composed of teachers, all of whom are union members, and Ministry personnel, who also oversee the process and have the final say on the completed document. (See www.bctf.ca/ministrycommittees.) Whether it is conscious or not, as Manicom reminds us, ideology is still at the root of what becomes official knowledge. A study of several versions of the B.C. social studies curriculum from 1941 until 1997 attests to this assertion.

The first published B.C. social studies curriculum came out during the Second World War in 1941. Not surprisingly, much of the curriculum is centered on issues concerning aspects of war and nationalism. Yet, there is no mention that the hellish trenches were filled by legions of working-class young men. The curriculum does include a section in a unit on “troubles arising from the [first] world war,” however, entitled “The Disruption of the Economic Structure” (1941:168). Two of the Specific Objectives that teachers are expected to cover are clearly in support of business interests. The first objective contains the phrase “increased tariffs and the strangulation of world trade” (168), clearly in support of free trade. The second objective refers to “unemployment and heavy taxation” (168) in a way that clearly links the two as problematic. Although both twentieth-century conservatism and liberalism support large-scale capitalism, the 1941 curriculum developers were conservative in their overall outlook. It is clear that the discourse of capitalism is supported by this document. The rights of workers were very much in the background in the 1941 curriculum.

With the publication of the 1949 curriculum, the rights of workers had completely disappeared. This may be a consequence of the growing negative attitudes toward Bolshevism and the communist movements within North America at the time. American anti-communist crusader Joseph McCarthy was beginning his rise to fame. In Canada, Cold War hostilities were evident but not at the same level as in the United States. This is reflected in the rise of the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a socialist-based populist movement that rose to power in Saskatchewan in this era. Almost immediately after forming government in 1940, the CCF opened a public debate on the merits of a publicly-funded healthcare system versus the private system that was the only option at the time (McLeod and McLeod 1987). Yet, there is no mention of this very important debate in the 1949 curriculum.

By the time the 1956 version of the B.C. social studies curriculum was published, it was generally acknowledged that the economy was robust, healthy and growing across the continent (Laxer 1998). Significantly, and consistent with the liberal ideology, the conflict between labour and capital, which is especially a part of British Columbia’s history (Palmer 1992; Leier 1990), does not appear at all. The learning objectives are worded in such a way that a student might be inclined to believe that the legalization of trade unions, for instance, came about out of the benevolence of capitalists and right-wing provincial governments. In terms of social class, the 1956 curriculum appears to have been written from a com-
combination of conservative and liberal perspectives.

With the publication of the 1968 curriculum, however, all of the learning objectives about trade unions and labour legislation were completely removed. There was some coverage of the life of the common labourer before and during the Industrial Revolution in the grade 9 social studies course (1968:28). Yet, the representation of conflict so long ago is a safe way to maintain power and privilege for the capitalist classes. This approach is hegemonic in insidious ways. It appears to acknowledge some strife between workers and owners, but because the events described are in the distant past, it tacitly implies that life has improved for current labourers and their families. This may very likely be the case, at least for those living in western nations. Yet, problems of representation remain.

The 1968 curriculum is noteworthy in another respect. In Canada, the CCF evolved from a socialist party to a social democratic one, renaming itself the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961. One of the greatest achievements of the CCF-NDP occurred in 1962 in Saskatchewan when the NDP implemented the first public health-care system in North America (Whitehorn 1992). Even though the federal Liberals implemented the same service across the country a few years later, this pillar of the Canadian social welfare state is not mentioned at all in the 1968 document. This was also the case with its successor, published in 1980, although corporations and unions made their way back.

In a unit entitled “People and Resources” in grade 9 social studies from the 1980 curriculum, students were expected to come to an understanding of “citizens as consumers, producers, taxpayers” (1980:100). Furthermore, there were two institutions stated as major “components of the Canadian economy:” corporations and labour unions. One of the unit generalizations states that all “students should come to recognize that all peoples and societies are faced with the same economic problem: conflict between unlimited wants and limited resources” (1980:100). By overstating the case for material consumption, the curriculum performs once again as a hegemonic device in that it normalizes a major aspect of capitalism, namely, the purchasing of wants and not just needs. In this way, the curriculum is serving the pro-capitalist process that transformed workers into consumers, thereby leading to waning class consciousness (Hobsbawm 1995; Walker 2002). It also supports an imperialist discursive formation.

The 1988 curriculum had a similar approach in its representation of economic issues as its 1968 and 1980 forerunners. Borrowing from the 1968 document, Social Studies 9 addresses the lives of working families during the Industrial Revolution (1988:46). By focusing on working conditions and “worker organizations” in Britain over two centuries ago, criticism that these issues are being neglected in the present is effectively muted at the same time that current power arrangements remain hidden. Yet, in both Canada and the United States, relations between the capitalist class and labour became hostile during the 1980s, bringing to an end the relatively long truce that had more or less prevailed since the end of the Second World War (Laxer 1998). Yet, these conflicts are omitted from the liberal-influenced curriculum. Legislation around replacement workers, picketing and collective bargaining, to name but a few, are of paramount importance to working-class families. Yet, the 1988 curriculum failed to address any of them. Its successor, published in 1997, was even less forthcoming about working-class issues.

A Prescribed Learning Outcome in the 1997 social studies curriculum, which is the one used in some B.C. classrooms today, is worded in the following way: “It is expected that students will assess how identity is shaped by a variety of factors, including family, gender, belief systems, ethnicity and nationality” (1997:A-4).

Despite the massive body of scholarly work that supports the notion that an individual’s social class position significantly shapes and limits their experience throughout life (Curtis, Livingstone and Smaller 1992), it is not included in the list of factors that the

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2 At the time of this study, the 1997 curriculum was the one in use for grades 8 to 11. Since then, there is a new Social Studies 11 IRP (2005) and a new Social Studies 10 IRP (2006). Social Studies 8 and 9 still use the 1997 IRPs. As well, there is a new Civic Studies 11 course, which I discuss at length for its potential to raise political consciousness in students (Orlowski 2008).
curriculum developers consider to be important in the construction of identity. Moreover, there is very little in the way of suggested learning resources that refers to issues of social class, such as labour struggles, trade unionism, tax reform, and free trade. Is this an oversight or is it an intended hegemonic strategy? Hegemony is involved either way. Even well-intentioned curriculum developers may be influenced by the dominant values of capitalist society that includes the meritocratic anyone-can-make-it ethos. This would result in the omission of working-class issues in the official knowledge of the formal curriculum.

The answer to this question about intention is not as important as the omission itself. It is clear that working-class students are at a disadvantage when compared to their middle-class counterparts, especially in terms of representation. Their situations and concerns are not addressed at all, while the middle class is entrenched as the hegemonic norm. Although there is a Suggested Instructional Strategy about the Great Depression in Social Studies 11, the root causes of the Depression and who suffered the most are not included. A critical or radical interpretation of this omission is that the curriculum is based in liberal power-blindness. A radical-influenced curriculum would have pointed out the huge discrepancies in suffering based on social class, as well as the role of the banks in creating a culture of credit and the role of industrialists in creating an ethos of overproduction.

The authors of the 1997 B.C. social studies curriculum did not consider social class to be a factor in the identity construction of an individual. Nor did they bother to represent the role of the public sector as “an alternative source of capital and creative energy in both the economic and cultural spheres” as it was in the post-war years up until at least the 1980s (Laxer 1998:41). Consequently, Canadians are experiencing attacks in both spheres, led by the neoconservative and neoliberal federal and provincial governments. The social studies curriculum cannot be blamed for the lack of resistance to this dismantling, of course. Yet, it is clear that the spirit of educational philosopher John Dewey and his dream of an informed citizenry have had very little success here, as elsewhere. Middle-class normativity is a key hegemonic component in the liberal ideology, and this is clearly reflected in the 1997 social studies curriculum (Orlowski 2001a). In this way, the curriculum helps maintain the status quo in ways that are difficult for the majority of students, as well as teachers, to detect and resist. The curricular focus on the individual has the same effect.

The concept of the individual made its first significant appearance in a B.C. social studies curriculum in 1949. A learning objective for students in one of the sample units is stated as “a realization of the importance of the individual in the advancement of civilization” (1949:70, emphasis added).

The 1949 curriculum also has several references to community. References to any collective ideals, however, have completely disappeared with the 1997 curriculum. The 1997 B.C. social studies curriculum does not encourage students to recognize the benefits of the collective or of community; nor does it help them to understand that the individual really exists as a social being who has responsibilities to help others, especially those who are having difficult times. This is yet another way that the school curriculum has failed in helping students understand what is in their best interests. It is also a failure of the state to develop educated citizens aware of what is in their best collective interests. The liberal focus on the individual all but obliterates social connections, supporting business interests and regressive tax reform in the process. Michael Apple furthers this line of reasoning. The curriculum “does not situate the life of an individual … as an economic and social being, back into the unequal structural relations that produced the comfort the individual enjoys” (1990:10).

Not able to see who is producing what we consume, we live in a society in which the majority of people will wear clothes and buy stereos produced by sweatshop labour. Of course, I do not intend to imply that schools work in a vacuum, able to be a panacea for all of our social ills. They must contend with myriad social forces, especially the media, that are competing to shape societal values.

Except for a brief period of minor representation during the middle decades of the past century, working-class issues were not represented in the formal curriculum. In order to determine how political
ideology has influenced the way that veteran teachers look at social class issues, I will briefly discuss the findings of a study on how the Ontario public views the unequal success rates of students from various class backgrounds. This taxonomy may shed light on the ways in which veteran Vancouver teachers and their students engage in the enacted curriculum.\(^3\)

**Ideology and Discourses of Working-Class Academic Performance**

To help me determine the degree to which the various political ideologies have influenced the teachers’ attitudes around issues of social class, I used the taxonomy developed by Curtis, Livingstone, and Smaller (1992). In *Stacking the Deck: The Streaming of Working-Class Kids in Ontario Schools*, the authors refer to Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), Bernstein (1977), and Lareau (1989) among others, to support their claim that “every study of schools that has paid attention to class differences has found that working-class kids have always fared much worse than middle- and upper-class kids” (1992:7). They claim that working-class students leave school for poorer paying jobs with little or no security because they have not been served very well by the public education system. In their words, “working-class kids still receive less schooling, and a different kind of schooling” than kids from more privileged economic backgrounds (1992:8). Curtis, Livingstone, and Smaller have developed a taxonomy based on the explanations people offer as to why working-class students fare less well in school. This helped me determine the political ideologies underlying the teachers’ attitudes and beliefs.

“Socially powerful people tend to encourage the less powerful to blame themselves for their own misfortunes” (Curtis et al 1992:14). This idea, based in nineteenth-century Social Darwinism, promotes the meritocratic notion that people who are bright, talented, and hard-working will rise to the top. By corollary, lazy and dull people will fill the lower ranks of society. This version of meritocracy differs from the liberal version in that it is applied to whole groups of people rather than individuals. In this way, it is imbued with an essentialist component. Many conservatives, therefore, still claim there is a genetic component to explain the conditions of poverty many social groups experience, a position still held by a couple of the teachers in this study.

Rather than using the *genetic-deficit theories* of traditional conservatism, people who see the world through an ideological lens of either contemporary conservatism or liberalism explain the stratified nature of our society using *cultural-deficit theories*. Curtis, Livingstone, and Smaller specify three different types of cultural-deficit theories. Because I consider these social theories to be interwoven with power, I will use the word *discourse* in place of the word *theory*. First, the *value deficiency discourse* claims that working-class people hold the same values as their more privileged peers, but it is their traditions or circumstances that keep them from being as successful as middle and upper middle-class people. In particular, it is the failure on the part of the working class to “defer gratification of baser subsistence needs for nobler ones like formal education” (1992:16). This translates into the idea that all people within a capitalist society, regardless of class background, want to become rich. This is hegemonic because it leads to the conclusion that if fortunes were reversed and the poor were indeed the wealthy, they would have the same attitudes toward the poor themselves. Consequently, the notion within this dominant discourse is that the less fortunate should figure out how to help themselves. This pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps notion is part of the conservative and right liberal ideologies.

Sociologist Oscar Lewis (1966) developed a variation of this discourse, which he called the *culture of poverty*. This variant cites a lack of role models in the life of working-class youth as the main reason for their lack of academic success, as poor skills and attitudes are handed down through the generations. The focus of this discourse, the way conservatives see it, is to blame entire groups for the oppressive situations in which they find themselves. Liberals, on the other hand, focus on an individual’s shortcom-

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3 The *enacted* curriculum refers to an alteration of the formal curriculum. It describes the ways teachers and students engage in the classroom with the course content. (See Ross, 2001.)
ings. The results of these variations are the same for those at the receiving end, of course. Cultural capital discourses, the third variant within these conservative/liberal discourses, emphasize that students from middle-class families have an advantage over their working-class peers by learning from their families the “general culture knowledge, elaborated language codes, and information about how schools work” (1992:16), all things that tend to increase academic proficiency.

Traditional solutions, according to cultural-deficit theorists, is for the schools to provide more programs geared toward helping the working classes learn skills so they can find gainful employment. This reasoning results in a call for streaming. As with almost all aspects of cultural-deficit theories, this position “tend[s] to ignore or discount the material conditions, such as inadequate food, housing and clothing, that can limit poor people’s learning potential” (Curtis et al. 1992:17). Moreover, according to Ken Osborne (1991), support for streaming conceals a middle-class bias.

The radical–influenced class–power approach described by Curtis, Livingstone and Smaller critiques the connections “between the forms of schooling and the structures of capitalist society” (1992:19), as well as a curriculum that favours the middle and upper classes. Any teacher who explains the lack of academic success of working-class students as a failure of the system to serve them properly, rather than as a failure by the students or their families, has been influenced by a radical ideology.

The class–power approach is related to critical multiculturalism as described by Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997). A key component of this form of multiculturalism is the demand that people comprehend how “power shapes consciousness” (1997:25). This is also a key feature of the class–power approach. It is also similar to the focus in the article by Sleeter and Grant entitled “Education that is Multicultural and Social Reconstructionist” (1994). They demand that students be taught to understand the social construction of knowledge and that they become politically literate. Illuminating the hegemonic veils that conceal the ways power works to maintain the privilege of certain social groups while oppressing others is common to all of these discourses and theories. The variation is on the degree of emphasis they place on social class as a marker of a person’s identity. (See also Malott and Pena 2004.) It is time to look at the findings of the curricular analysis. It is crucial that we find out the degree to which the veteran social studies teachers consider social class to be a marker of a person’s identity.

### Ideology and How Veteran Teachers View Issues of Social Class & Working-Class Students

This component of the study consisted of ten in-depth, semi-structured interviews with high school social studies department head teachers. Department heads are veteran teachers who often act as mentors to their more junior colleagues and are well positioned to understand how curriculum is shaped by context. Reflecting the demographic profile of social studies department heads in Vancouver overall, my purposive sampling strategy resulted in interviews with 10 white men. There were four interview questions that referred directly to social class. (See Appendix 1.) Yet, many of the teacher responses to other questions—for instance, about race—revealed aspects of how they either think about social class or how they teach about it. In analyzing the teacher interviews, I employed Steinar Kvale’s five approaches to interview analysis: condensation of meaning, categorization of meaning, structuring of meaning through narratives, interpretation of meaning, and ad hoc methods for generating meaning (1996:187–204). I have divided the analytic codes into two groups: the ways that teachers think about social class, and the ways that they think about teaching class issues.

### How teachers think about social class

Despite the 1997 curriculum’s omission of social class as a factor in a person’s identity construction, I will not do the same here. All ten participants are white men. In terms of social class background, however, there was less homogeneity. (See Table 1.) According to their own perceptions, four of the ten teachers grew up in a middle-class household. One of the questions I asked the teachers during the interviews was whether they considered social class to be
an important factor in a student’s identity construction. Only one of the teachers, Steve Graham, an east side teacher who ironically grew up in a middle-class family, considered social class to be very important.

SG: I see their class as a big factor because it has a lot to do with their opportunities. And they know this from a young age. Kids at west side schools just assume they’re going to end up at university. It’s assumed by mom and dad. It’s assumed by them. And guess what? The money’s there for them and they’ll go. Here, it’s the opposite. Here the kids won’t even be thinking of university but maybe some particular kids should be thinking of university. So I see it as pretty important, personally.

Graham focusses on the varying degrees of opportunities afforded to students based on their social class. He rightly points to higher education as a crucial factor in a person’s future (Laxer 1998; Levin 1995; Curtis, Livingstone, & Smaller 1992).

Most of the teachers did not consider social class to be very important in a student’s identity construction. In fact, six of the remaining nine expressed this very perspective. Three of these six expressed the same reason for holding this view, namely, that compared to countries in the Third World, no one in Canada is very poor. Yet, there were significant differences in their reasoning, as well as significant differences in their background. Here are quotes by the three teachers, Craig Evans, Eric Quinn, and Barry Kelvin, responding to either my query about the importance of social class in a student’s identity construction or my point that the wealth gap in Canada is growing:

CE: The working class [in Canada] isn’t necessarily poor, either. They’re just the working class. It’s a different history from the real poor. I mean, do we have the working poor in Canada like they do in the United States? It’s a coming thing. We don’t have them yet, but it’s a comer.

EQ: I think we’ve got to have a global focus. One of the things I do with my students here is, let’s point out that poverty is relative. In a way, wealth is relative. So let’s have a Canadian focus but also let’s remember that, for instance, poverty here is actually contextually defined. And that’s not to say that it’s not a problem. But let’s also remember to look at this globally and realize the privileged base of all of Canadian society.

BK: When I travelled, poverty is just so obvious. You know, when I was in Egypt, there were thousands of men in the streets, unemployed, smoking those tobacco things, just sitting there all day. And I’m thinking, “This is a crappy life.” And I guess I just don’t pay enough attention, you know, when I go downtown here, which I don’t do very often, but then you see [poverty]. I’ll do like probably most people do, try to give some money to the fella, depending on—but I’m also a little more severe than some people because I have a handicapped brother and he doesn’t beg. He’s got cerebral palsy and he tries to work. Then I get caught up in thinking, “You’re only 18. What are you doing with a squeegee? You can’t possibly be that run down.”

Although all three teachers expressed the same sentiment, namely, that there are people in other countries who are worse off than the poor people in Canada, there are important differences, as well. Craig Evans, who grew up in a working-class home in the Maritimes, expressed disdain for the United States several times during our interview. He also teaches at Victoria Park Secondary, an inner-city school where I was a colleague of his for eight years. It is my belief that Evans is naïve in his thinking around poverty among the student population at this particular school. Elsewhere in the interview, he recalled childhood friends who were poor, who “lived in one room with their mother … and the food was measured out” but, according to Evans, Canada no longer has that kind of poverty. Craig Evans was not old enough to have been a child in the 1930s. Consequently, I consider his views on contemporary poverty in Canada to be erroneous. The “working poor” definitely do exist in Canada today, and they are growing in number (Laxer 1998).
Eric Quinn, on the other hand, is clearly a liberal thinker. He grew up in a middle-class Christian home and teaches in what is ostensibly the wealthiest neighbourhood in Vancouver. His experience is perhaps why he does not consider poverty in Canada to be significant. At the least, he has not taught very many poor students and therefore may have a legitimate reason for being unaware that poverty is not a serious problem in Canada. Moreover, this notion is nowhere to be found in the formal curriculum. In terms of social class, Quinn exhibited a strong power-blind liberalism.

The response given by Barry Kelvin, however, is very significant for a number of reasons. By pointing out what he observed on his travels to Egypt, he agrees with Quinn in looking at poverty in a global context. Yet, he knows that poverty also exists in Vancouver. In fact, more than any of the other teachers, Kelvin’s philosophy around class issues is commonly referred to as pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps conservatism. This explains his comments about a hypothetical “squeegee” kid. Yet, there is a reason why he feels so strongly about this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Years Teaching</th>
<th>Years Dept. Head</th>
<th>Student Demographics</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Side Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Evans</td>
<td>Victoria Park</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>90% working class, 80% East Asian</td>
<td>Christian, working-class upbringing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Graham</td>
<td>Turner</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>95% working class, 80% East Asian</td>
<td>middle-class upbringing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hal Nagel</td>
<td>Hedley</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80% working class, most racial groups</td>
<td>taught on a Saskatchewan reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Nelson</td>
<td>Larson</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70% working class, 80% East Asian</td>
<td>working-class upbringing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Tragas</td>
<td>Wilson Heights</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>85% working class, over 50% ESL</td>
<td>working-class upbringing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Side Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Carson</td>
<td>Hudson</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>equal groups of working, middle &amp; upper middle classes</td>
<td>Geography/PE major</td>
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<td>Ed Hitchcock</td>
<td>Kipling</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>mostly upper-middle class, 70% Asian</td>
<td>music/history major, working-class upbringing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barry Kelvin</td>
<td>Chamberlain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>mostly upper-middle class, 50% Asian, 50% Euro</td>
<td>MA in curriculum, under-class upbringing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tim Patterson</td>
<td>Greenway</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>mostly upper-middle class, 60% East Asian, 40% European</td>
<td>middle-class upbringing (Ontario)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eric Quinn</td>
<td>Warner</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>mostly upper-middle class, 70% East Asian</td>
<td>Christian, middle-class upbringing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BK: I came from a fairly bizarre background.... And my mom was quite sick so we were a welfare family. So in school, I had extremely low self-esteem.

Kelvin's upbringing shaped the way he perceives poverty today. Regarding issues of social class, however, Kelvin is a conservative. The influence of the conservative ideology was further demonstrated later in the interview when the conversation digressed to the topic of unions.

BK: I think unions were created rightly for industry. And now they've incorporated themselves in other areas and I'm not sure that's the way it should have turned out... And that's not to say I'm White collar because I like playing hockey. I like to have a beer. I like to get down to earth. But I just see a difference. I also, arrogant or not, I like to think of myself as educated, as in a position where I've worked hard to get here. And it's a position that's fairly powerful in society, powerful in a good way... Self-respect is something that comes along with teaching.

Kelvin exhibits an elitist view toward unions in that he considers his high level of education to put him above membership in a union. Regarding poverty, it is the last sentence in particular that reveals the reasoning behind Kelvin's seemingly unsympathetic view toward poor people. “Self-respect” is particularly important to him because of his upbringing, which was laced with “extremely low self-esteem.” For Kelvin, self-respect must be earned. It is not that he is unsympathetic toward the poor. In fact, Kelvin claims to protect students from ridicule who he thinks have family and financial problems. All of this would at least partially explain why he has developed a tough love perspective toward underprivileged students and why he disdains unions, which he claims are much too “overly protecting.” It is clear that for Barry Kelvin, his own upbringing has had a large influence on the way he views social relations today, especially around issues of social class.

In general, class-blind liberalism is the dominant ideology among this group of teachers, as with the current formal curriculum. It is therefore difficult to imagine the enacted curriculum dealing with social class in a critical manner, if at all. Yet, conservative teachers are even less likely to do so.

Carl Tragas described the differences in teaching at an east side working-class school, primarily composed of East Asian immigrant students, and a west side upper middle-class school.

CT: I can give the same exam, teach the course the same way. Well, I don't quite teach it the same way because I do more visuals here because so many of the students are ESL. And still, the students here get 10 to 15% less than the students at Greenway. So, is that genetic? Or is that socioeconomic? You can't be politically correct and say it's the gene pool. But I think it is. There's a little bit of that, at least. And also socioeconomic.

PO: So in terms of the old nature-versus-nurture debate, how exactly would you position yourself?

CT: I'm saying that I can buy the logistics that it's mainly socioeconomic. But I also think there's a genetic component.

PO: Do you think this is why someone ends up being a labourer rather than, say, a professional?

CT: I think, although I know it's not popular to say, that there's something to that.

Tragas’ reasoning is what Curtis, Livingstone, and Smaller (1992) call the genetic-deficiency theory. They dismiss the premise of any essentialist explanations of a stratified socioeconomic society as false.

The variations are much greater within than between such groups of people. These criticisms do not necessarily deny that there is some genetic basis to intelligence. But they definitely refute the long-standing claim that there is a primary biological basis for either class differences in schooling, or the inter-generational reproduction of social classes (Curtis et al 1992:15-16).

These educators believe that the problem lies in the environment, especially the school system itself. There are clear implications about the fairness of the school system for working-class students: teachers in primarily working-class schools who accept this essentialist discourse will be less likely to develop critical thinking skills in their students.
Tragas wasn’t the only one to use the essentialist discourse in describing the working class: Carl Evans believes that there are elements within the working-class mindset that simply cannot be changed, no matter the pedagogical strategies employed. Although he does not suggest a genetic component to support his argument, he is using an essentialist discourse. Such an attitude is pessimistic and defeatist because it is based on the premise that the “fear and hatred is in the culture” itself. In other words, Evans considers it near impossible for schools to change these traits.

Usage of the essentialist discourse demonstrates that the conservative ideology has influenced these teachers. Moreover, it is not very difficult to see how this conservative view can negatively impact on the learning and subsequent future options of students from marginalized groups. On the other hand, the pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps philosophy of Barry Kelvin also stems from conservatism; yet, his perspective may lead to increased motivation for both teacher and student.

In terms of political ideology, it was also interesting to note the teachers’ thoughts around why children who come from poor families graduate from B.C. high schools at much lower rates. Two teachers mentioned curriculum relevance but spoke of it in conservative terms, indicating that vocational courses need to be increased for working-class students who show a lack of ambition. The majority of the teachers used the traditional discourse of cultural-deficiency to explain the low graduation rates. In particular, all of these teachers utilized elements of the culture of poverty discourse to make their points. These teachers pointed to a lack of positive role models in the home. The quote that sums this position best was offered by west side teacher Barry Kelvin who posited “it could be low self-esteem of the parents, who didn’t succeed in school either … family problems … money problems … split parents … a feeling of failure.” Kelvin’s west side counterpart Tim Patterson added that a major reason is that “their parents are in varying degrees of sobriety.”

Two of the teachers cited financial problems as a key reason for academic problems. Dave Carson said it best: “I think that there is a whole cocktail of social reasons that lead to people dropping out of school… I work under the assumption that poor kids have harder lives. For example, they might have a desire to work, to help their families out.” Three other teachers pointed to the latch-key phenomenon as the main reason, which can obviously be linked to familial financial concerns, as well. This view tends to be more liberal than conservative.

In short, the majority view of this group of teachers is that it is the home life of poor students that causes them to leave school before graduating. The discourse most frequently used is the culture of poverty discourse, which locates the central problem within the lives of the victims themselves. Yet, Kelly (1996) suggests that such reasoning ignores the role of the school system itself in “pushing out” these students from the regular mainstream schools. Schools are exonerated from any blame. Teacher attitudes, however, are one of the forces that can result in lower academic achievement and ultimately, students leaving school before graduating (Ornstein and Levine 1989).

The majority of the teachers used a blame-the-victim discourse for the academic shortcomings of poor students. What is most curious, then, is the reluctance on their part to teach about disparities in wealth and the current dismantling of the social welfare state in social studies. Is this because of hegemony and the power of the capitalist discourse? Is it because of a hegemonic notion around social hierarchies? I will address this incongruency in the next section.

How teachers think about teaching social class issues

I will begin this section by exploring certain attitudes of the five east side teachers. These teachers are more likely to have a significant majority of working-class students in their classrooms.

One of the questions I asked each of the teachers pertained to their thoughts on how labour issues are represented in the latest social studies curriculum. Sometimes responses to other questions yielded information about their thoughts around teaching issues of social class. Four of five east side teachers claimed that the problem with teaching about labour issues, working-class issues, or the dismantling of the
social welfare state resided with the students themselves. Hal Nagel claims that it has nothing at all to do with either the formal curriculum or the teacher’s role in the enacted curriculum.

HN: Well, when you look at the content, you try to cram knowledge into them and that’s it… Hopefully in grade 11 you can draw on it, if they remember it. That’s a big if! I think it’s a natural maturity that the kids, when they get to grade 11, they have different issues. They’re getting a part-time job. They may have to support themselves in their own living space, or support the family. Whatever the case is, they’re more involved in society from a tax-payer’s point of view. So I think it’s partly the socialization that naturally occurs that they’re dealing with.

Nagel points out that working-class students have more important things to do at that time in their lives than learn about working-class issues. He described a right-wing populism developing in the students as they get to grade 11 in which they resent having to pay taxes. As a veteran teacher of working-class students myself, I have come across these same right-wing populist sentiments (Orlowski 2001b). The point of taxes and any notion of the social-welfare state have long disappeared from the formal curriculum. Yet, the adapted curriculum in the social studies courses that I teach has units on these very topics. Nagel, on the other hand, is opposed to these adaptations because of an already over-crowded curriculum.

East side teacher Carl Tragas, who also taught for over 20 years at a west side school, made the following comparison:

CT: The east side students are less aware than the west side students.

PO: Do you mean that the east side students are less aware politically? Or that they don’t know what’s in their own best interests compared to west side students?

CT: I think the first. The knowledge isn’t there because of, I don’t know, I don’t even think it’s so much a language barrier. I think it’s a socio-economic generalization you can make that that they’re less attuned to be interested in [politics]. Whereas a west side kid has the home life where there’s expectations, academic expectations, where there’s news, newspapers, *Time, Maclean’s, The Economist*, those kinds of things … I could start a current events class in grade 11 socials, and be quiet for the rest of the hour. And they, generally, in a civil manner, would have a pretty intelligent conversation.

Tragas’ strong use of the culture of poverty discourse is very significant for this research. His position around teaching working-class students about working-class issues is the same as Hal Nagel’s, namely, they don’t do it because the students are not interested. Tragas claimed that all students, regardless of social class, have a “lack of sympathy for unions,” which he said he doesn’t understand.

There was one teacher, however, who experienced teaching working-class students about working-class issues quite differently. Like Carl Tragas, Steve Graham also taught for several years on the west side before becoming the head teacher at an east side school. In fact, the two were colleagues at the same west side school for two years.

SG: At [the west side school], I found myself being the devil’s advocate for what could be broadly called socialist perspectives, because the kids, like kids in every school, they bring what they bring from home. There’d be a handful of kids who, perhaps, would bring the minority point of view. And there’d be the overwhelming majority that would have what we might call the Vancouver Sun’s [right wing] endorsed view … At that school, you feel kind of like a person who’s been in a war zone, providing an alternative perspective, and you’d get a barrage of kids coming at you going, “Wow, those people on welfare!” Here [at the east side school], it’s a lot less. It’s not to say that every kid here comes from a family that is, you know, more left-wing. That’s not true. What it is, is that kids here seem to inherently appreciate that First Nations people have been mistreated. There’s a perfect example, compared to [west side school], where you would encounter what you’d call discriminatory attitudes toward First Nations. Here they seem to inherently, or
innately, what’s the word I’m looking for, innately know that sometimes large corporations or banks screw people around. So I guess, at a working-class school, to stereotype it, there’s a greater appreciation of some of the stuff that others have been through.

The different descriptions offered by Graham and Tragas about teaching working-class students versus upper middle-class students could not differ more. This is especially interesting considering that both of them are describing classroom discussions that occurred in the same west side school. What is the crucial factor for these different perspectives? It has to be the political ideologies influencing the teachers themselves. For the most part, Tragas has been influenced by conservatism. On the other hand, Graham is a progressive in his thoughts on class issues.

Ornstein and Levine (1989) consider teacher attitudes to be of paramount importance. They contend that one of the major reasons for low achievement among many working-class and non-White students is teacher perceptions of student inadequacy.

Many teachers in working-class schools reach the conclusion that large numbers of their students are incapable of learning. This view becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because teachers who question their students’ learning potential are less likely to work hard to improve academic performance, particularly since improvement requires intense effort that quickly consumes virtually all of a teacher’s energy. Because students are influenced by their teachers’ perceptions and behaviors, low teacher expectations generate further declines in students’ motivation and performance. Ornstein and Levine, 1989:153-154

Ornstein and Levine believe that the perspectives of conservative teachers have most likely affected the motivation and performance of their working-class students. There are differing discourses within the conservative ideology, of course. The tough love approach of Barry Kelvin’s bootstraps conservatism is not what Ornstein and Levine are referring to. Kelvin believes that students from under-privileged backgrounds can succeed, provided they get the support they need, whether from peers or the teacher, and they put in the effort. The genetic-deficiency discourse espoused by Tragas and Evans, however, is exactly what Ornstein and Levine are referring to about negative effects on teachers motivating students and, by corollary, student performance.

All ten participating teachers stated that the current social studies curriculum was not fair in its depiction or lack of depiction of labour or working-class issues. Despite this uniform perspective, there was very little agreement on what should be done about this. Three teachers gave responses that are progressive in nature, or somewhere in the overlap region of left-liberal and radical. For example, east side teacher Steve Graham stated emphatically that teachers of working-class students should teach about working-class issues even if they are not covered in the curriculum. According to Graham, “I think it’s important for them in their development as citizens.” He admittedly found it difficult in “bringing to life the Winnipeg General Strike” of 1919 for his students. Yet, he found it “easy” to teach them about current examples of working-class exploitation, such as the recent lowering of the minimum wage in British Columbia.

Cornbleth would approve of Graham choosing relevant topics, such as the recent lowering of the B.C. minimum wage, for his working-class students to discuss: “Sociocultural context includes demographic, social, political, and economic conditions, traditions and ideologies, and events that actually or potentially influence curriculum” (1990:6). Cornbleth calls for contemporary and historical conflicts to be brought to the fore in the enacted social studies curriculum (34). She theorizes that “curriculum is contextually shaped” and “always mediated by students” (53). Part of what Cornbleth means by contextually shaped is the sociocultural aspects of the local population.

Two teachers claimed that the reason that they don’t cover working-class issues in the classroom is because they “don’t have the information needed to cover” them, as Dave Carson said. Indeed, all of the teachers were aware that the gap between the wealthy and the poor has reached unprecedented rates in B.C. and in Canada, but not one of them discusses this in their classroom. Carson wished that we taught in a system that sent teachers back to university “with pay”
in order to learn about these topics. This is unlikely, but teacher education courses should consider these issues.

There were a variety of reasons among the remaining six teachers for not teaching about poverty and labour issues. Two of them, Carl Tragas and Hal Nagel, put the blame on textbooks and the lack of coverage there. (Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the textbooks used in B.C. social studies courses, there are more references to labour struggles in some of the prescribed texts than in the formal curriculum itself.) The two remaining teachers, Tim Patterson and Barry Kelvin, were able to articulate a few examples of labour issues they covered in the classroom. Patterson emphasized twice in the interview that he “signed a piece of paper” to cover the curriculum and “not to push a particular personal agenda.” Consequently, the only topics he named were “the Industrial Revolution in Socials 9” and “the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike in Socials 11,” both of which are included in the formal curriculum.

Summary and Conclusions

The most important conclusion of this study is that there is a clear mirroring between the political ideology underlying the formal curriculum with the attitudes of the teachers and, by corollary, the enacted curriculum. Simply put, issues of social class were absent from both data sources. This is not surprising when one considers that neither the formal curriculum nor the vast majority of the teachers claim social class to be an important factor in a person’s identity construction. In fact, the curriculum currently used in B.C. social studies classrooms emphasizes that each student should understand that a person’s identity construction is affected by a list of factors that sociologists would accept, save for the omission of social class from this list.

The evolution of the B.C. social studies curriculum has undergone an ideological shift in terms of social class representation from conservatism to liberalism. What began as a stridently conservative document in 1941 underwent changes such that it is now almost completely liberal in its ideological orientation. There was some oscillation between the two ideologies in the 1956, 1968, and 1980 versions. By 1988, however, conservatism had been displaced by liberalism as the central curricular influence. The 1997 document continues the liberalization of the curriculum. The only mention of any aspect of social class is a reference to the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Mirroring the formal curriculum, only one teacher considered social class to be a central factor in a student’s identity construction. An argument can be made that implicates teacher education for this overall glaring omission. Despite this match with the curriculum, the teachers responded to questions that allowed me to glean the ideologies influencing the ways they think about social class.

The class-power discourse was almost completely absent from the thoughts of the teachers. This indicates a paucity of radical thought among the entire group. Three of the teachers turned any mention of poverty in Vancouver or Canada to worse conditions for poor people elsewhere in the world. The hegemonic strategy of displacing a local and present concern for social class to economic conditions perceived to be worse in distant places or long ago was also reflected in their teaching: almost all of them taught about class issues either outside of Canada or in a historical context. The gains made through the construction of the social welfare state and its current dismantling were also omitted from the enacted curriculum that each described. This is another match with the formal curriculum.

In terms of explaining the lack of academic success by poor students, the most common discourse used by the teachers was the culture of poverty. Almost all of the teachers considered the home of poor unsuccessful students to be the root cause rather than the curriculum or the school system itself. Half of the teachers also cited familial financial concerns for the main reason poor students often fare poorly in academic terms. These teachers are using the traditional culture of poverty discourse that straddles conservative and right-liberal perspectives. Two teachers used the conservative essentialist discourse to explain low graduation rates of poor students. One of these educators spoke of a genetic deficiency as a major reason why people become labourers.

Despite the awareness of class issues, teachers were, by and large, extremely reluctant to address a
critique of material inequality in our society. Part of the reason for this was that some consider the Canadian poor to be much better off than the poor elsewhere. This reluctance may also be a result of the normalizing effect of certain hegemonic discourses in support of capitalism in both the curriculum and in mainstream media (Ross 2000). Fear of rebuke from authority figures may also be a factor.

All ten of the teachers considered the curriculum to be unfair in its depiction of labour and working-class issues. Yet, there was considerable disagreement over what to do about it. Several of the teachers who grew up in working-class families claimed that working-class students are simply “not interested” in working-class issues. Ironically, a middle-class teacher was the only one who described his working-class students as enthusiastic learners, especially if they felt “the heat of the issue.” The ways in which the teachers perceived working-class students and their abilities appeared to be very influential in the academic expectations they held for their students and, subsequently, student efforts. Political ideology was involved in the ways teachers described their students’ learning interests and in the topics they chose to cover.

In sum, the majority of the discourses used by teachers to describe issues of social class were traditional ones that incorporate ideas from both conservatism and liberalism. In this way, they are a clear reflection of the formal social studies curriculum itself. Although the latest versions are mostly liberal, their predecessors had a conservative perspective. The teachers also demonstrate this combination. Occasionally, a few demonstrated a radical influence on their thinking and their teaching.

The analysis about social class indicates that there has been an ideological struggle between conservatism and liberalism during the twentieth century in B.C. social studies education. The radical ideology that questions aspects of capitalism has made only fleeting appearances. In fact, despite the overwhelming evidence that suggests the importance of social class in identity construction and determining one’s life chances, there is very little directly referring to it in the curriculum or in the thoughts of the teachers. In this manner, the curriculum and the teachers’ thoughts are quite similar. The curriculum matches the low comfort level of most people when the topic of social class enters the conversation. The curriculum both reflects and entrenches this reluctance.

Implications: Can Social Studies Bring Social Class Back to the Fore?

The study made it clear that if social studies education is to be used for the purposes of social and economic justice, changes must be made to both the formal curriculum, ongoing professional development for teachers, and teacher education. The current liberal-influenced B.C. social studies curriculum highlights the individual to such an extent that it virtually ignores all aspects of social class. Consequently, there has been a concerted movement to dismantle the social welfare state, including public education, in both Canada and the United States (Laxer 1998). A number of teachers in the study mentioned they do not cover poverty and working-class issues because they have not been taught about them themselves. Requiring some labour history in teacher education would clearly go a long way toward rectifying this situation. In other words, a more radical approach to social studies teacher education is required.

The populist movements that swept western nations beginning in the 1920s, culminating in the post-Second World War social welfare state should also be represented in the curriculum. The struggle that first took place in Saskatchewan resulting in the first publicly-funded healthcare system in North America should be the focus of social studies lessons for every student in Canada. Today’s concerted attacks to dismantle the egalitarianism of our current medicare system would undoubtedly meet a higher level of resistance if this were the case. All students should be given the opportunity to grapple with issues such as private versus public ownership, the effects of corporate political donations on law-making, the average income of CEOs versus labourers in their employ. A radical-influenced curriculum should include labour struggles and the construction of the social-welfare state in its content.

Such a curriculum would better enable students to become informed citizens who are aware of past struggles, as well as what is in their best future interests. This would engender a stronger democracy supported
by participatory citizens, rather than the current one in which so many people are passive and unaware. After all, progressive changes have always come about as a result of the agency of dominated groups, rather than out of the kindness of dominant ones. I contend that not only working-class students would benefit from this; rather, the majority of Canadians would.

Appendix 1: Interview Questions Pertaining to Social Class for Social Studies Teachers

(Note: The original schedule had 15 questions – some about race, democracy, and the purpose of social studies)

1. Some teachers think that it is important that they remain neutral, not express their opinion in class, and instead focus on creating an open and supportive environment where students feel free to express their thoughts and feelings. Others, while agreeing that diverse views should get a fair hearing, think that it is important for teachers to clearly articulate their own positions. Where do you stand on this issue?
2. Do you encourage classroom discussions around controversial issues? (If so) Which ones? Why?
3. In teaching social studies, how do you teach about the “discoverers, adventurers, and heroes”? How important is it to highlight the members of non-dominant groups who have achieved success or made contributions to Canadian society?
4. Do you feel the Social Studies IRPs adequately cover or represent fairly the contributions or experiences of workers? (If not) Do you do anything to compensate for this? What? Why?
5. Why do you think certain perspectives on historical events are in the social studies IRPs rather than others?
6. Do you read a student’s social class as central in the construction of their identity? Recent Statistics Canada data confirm that the gap is widening between rich and poor Canadians. Do you address the growing gap between the rich and the poor in Canada? (If yes) How so? (If no) Why?
7. What are your thoughts on “streaming” or ability grouping? What are the positives, if any? What are the negatives, if any?
8. What does the term multicultural education mean to you? How do you think of this type of teaching in relation to the overall role of the teacher?
9. Why do you think that children of poor families leave school before graduating at a much higher rate than middle-class children? What about First Nations children?
10. What does the term social justice mean to you? Do you think the role of the teacher includes social justice? (If so) In what ways? (If not) Why not?

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In his review of my book *Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism*, Hristos Verikukis offers some very insightful criticisms. Particularly helpful, I think, are his comments regarding the work’s attempted reconstruction of Althusser’s philosophy of science. Though these criticisms are much appreciated, by focussing his review on what I write about Althusser’s philosophy of science, Verikukis misses the book’s argument as a whole. In addition to causing him to write off the majority of the text as “unrelated to the [book’s] core claims” (Verikukis 85), this selective attention also leads him to misread the work in both its details and its conclusions. Similarly, this focus comes at the expense of evaluating how well the book fulfills some of the other tasks it set out to do such as placing Althusser’s thought in its context and providing a representative history of the relations between Marxism-Leninism and Western Marxism in the 20th century.

Before turning to Verikukis’s insightful critique of my reconstruction of Althusser’s philosophy of science, it would perhaps help to say a bit about the structure of the book as a whole and the way in which this structure supports its argument. On the basis of one favourable reference given in a very specific context, Verikukis identifies me as the “disciple” of Roy Bhaskar. However, if I am anyone’s disciple, it is not of a transcendental realist, but of a historically and culturally immanent one: John Dewey. Indeed, it is Dewey’s method of “intelligence” or the “inquiry into the conditions and consequences of a value object” (Dewey 1958 390-391) that informs my own method. If we take the “value object” that my book is concerned with to be the constellation of values associated with Marxist philosophy, then my book’s argumentative structure can be seen as analogous to Dewey’s attempt in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* to reconstruct philosophy as a whole by (a) reflecting on its evolution, (b) analyzing its present problems, and (c) proposing a “reconstructed” philosophy suitable for today’s needs (Dewey 2004 xii-xxv). Though I do not mention Dewey explicitly, this methodology is made explicit in the book’s introduction and special attention is given to why, for this critical method to work, one must engage in an extensive historical analysis of Marxist values (Lewis 2005 17-18). Contrary to Verikukis’ contention, this moment of my argument is not historicist: nowhere do I invoke the spectre of historical determinism. In fact, I argue against such determinisms (Lewis 203-5). Further, in order to make this method fruitful in terms of the reconstruction that is its goal, it is necessary to do exactly the kind of historical work for which the review first praises me and then maintains is extraneous to my argument (Verikukis 82, 85).

Though one might get a very different idea of what *Louis Althusser and the Traditions of French Marxism* is about from reading Verikukis’ review, its focus is not Marxist philosophy of science. This is not to say that Marxist philosophy of science is not important to its argument. However, reflections on this subject emerge out of and compliment reflections on the relations among international and domestic politics, political philosophy, economics, and the general French intellectual milieu. Failing to recognize the overall way in which the book is structured and, in particular, missing the way in which the genealogical
and critical reflections are to be taken (that is, as reflections on the production and reception of values and these values’ current conduciveness to producing future goods), Verikukis zeroes in on my reconstruction of Althusser's philosophy of science and this philosophy’s relation to politics. As these are important elements in my argument, the reviewer is quite right to identify places where the book is obscure and my arguments underexplained and I have no problem with this move. Indeed, he is perspicacious in his recognition that my discussion of Althusser's philosophy of science, its revisions, and its import are under-discussed and in his general claim that this discussion lacks the level of precision necessary to its object. More particularly, he is right to maintain that my failure to explain what I mean by science’s “external check” on ideology leaves my argument for Althusser's realism quite obscure (83). Further, his assertion is correct that my reconstruction would have benefited greatly from incorporating the work of Suchtig and Baltas (Verikukis 82).

These criticisms acknowledged, it should also be noted that, in his zeal to critique my reconstruction of Althusser’s philosophy of science, Verikukis is sometimes not the most careful or charitable reader. As noted above, this approach and attitude are evidenced in his disregard for the book’s argument as a whole but they are also apparent in the specific critiques he makes about the book’s aporiae. To give one example: Verikukis charges that I fail to explain Althusser’s empiricism when, in fact, I take pains to give his specific definition and to reference its use (Lewis 2005 165–6). To give another, he maintains that I provide no textual evidence to support my claim that Althusser changed his view of science. In fact, with the aid of close readings and with the support of secondary sources, the book provides extensive evidence for the claim that Althusser changed his views about science and about the relationship of science to other material practices (Lewis 2005 191–97, 208–10).

Even if his review is incorrect in many of its details and even if Verikukis misses the argumentative structure of the book as a whole, there is no doubt that Verikukis's main assertion is correct: Althusser’s philosophy of science and my reconstruction of it needs to be more developed. Therefore, I hope it will please him that, in my recent work, I am attempting to do just this. As the critiques he provided have made this work stronger than it otherwise would have been, I thank Mr. Verikukis for his insights and I especially thank New Proposals for publishing his review.

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