ITINERANT CURRICULUM THEORY AGAINST EPISTEMICIDES:
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE THINKING OF
SANTOS AND PARASKEVA

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Conflicts in Curriculum Theory: Challenging Hegemonic Epistemologies
João M. Paraskeva / Palgrave Macmillan US / 2011

Curriculum Epistemicide: Toward an Itinerant Curriculum Theory
João M. Paraskeva / Routledge / 2016

Emancipation is no more than a set of procedural fights, an endless set. What distinguishes it from other sets of struggles is the political meaning of processuality in the struggles. This sense is for the social field of emancipation, expanding and deepening democratic struggles in all structural areas of social practice. (Santos, 1995, p. 277)

We actually need a multicultural approach that adopts an emancipatory content and direction aimed mainly at the multiple articulations of difference. ... In other words, what we have is a call for the democratization of knowledges that is a commitment to an emancipatory, non-relativistic, cosmopolitan ecology of knowledges. (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 154)

As a Brazilian curriculum theorist and worker, my purpose in writing this essay is twofold. My first purpose is to continue and advance my study (Oliveira, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2017) of Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ potential contributions to curriculum and education writ large, and in extending this project here, to explore the connections between and contributions of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and João Paraskeva’s work to curriculum and education. My second purpose, really implicit in the first, is to advance a South-North curriculum inter- and transnational dialogue that, however tentatively and problematically, seeks to make Global South epistemologies and intellectual traditions intelligible to curriculum theorists and
practitioners who, through willful epistemologies of ignorance, take the Global North and its knowledge production simply as “the world.” As articulated in this essay, the first purpose of developing connections between Santos and Paraskeva provides the explicit content, and the second purpose begins as a reflective theme interwoven throughout the essay that takes center stage toward the end of the essay.

In developing these broad purposes, I begin the essay with epigraphs by Santos and Paraskeva above. Santos’ epigraph announces two aprioristic understandings that frame my work here: the first is the political character of the ideas and discussions presented, and the second is the belief in democracy as a form of relationship between individual and collective social subjects, creating what I call “social democracy” (Oliveira, 2009). These two understandings together animate the choices of the topics covered below in the overall trajectory of this essay. Beginning with the work of Santos as foundational—in particular, his idea of epistemicide and the need to struggle against it—I focus on concepts of cognitive justice, ecology of knowledges, and their potentials in education. Then learning with Santos, I put these concepts in dialogue with Paraskeva’s (2011, 2016) concerns for a possible emancipatory contribution to curriculum theory and work, to which the second epigraph alludes. As I maintain throughout this essay, cognitive justice, ecology of knowledges, and social emancipation should fuel new emancipatory theories in the South-North curriculum dialogue I seek to advance here.

With my focus on new emancipatory theories, Santos and Paraskeva provide key conceptual content that requires attention by a field historically understood through Global North discourses. Implicit in both epigraphs, curricula is considered all that goes on in schools, involving formal educational content, social relations, cultural demonstrations, and networks of nonschool knowledge. Furthermore, it is understood that all these aspects are steeped in social, epistemological, and cultural relations of a more global nature. The essay at hand is thus intended to highlight the ways in which some of the principles of social emancipation and the struggle against epistemicides contributes to curriculum theory and work. Especially, this essay emphasizes the notion of knowledge-emancipation and the idea that the more global the problems are, the more local the solutions are. In emphasizing global-and-local understandings, the essay provides new directions that enhance the expanded understanding of those issues and solutions, which, as I emphasize in my conclusion, involve curriculum and everyday school-life studies in different schools in localized settings.
As an overview of the essay, I begin by explaining the inseparability of the political and the epistemological fields in Santos’ work through the idea of “a prudent knowledge for a decent life.” Then, considering the relevance of a new relationship between different knowledges, the discussion goes through the proposals of both Santos and Paraskeva with regard to the struggle against epistemicides (one of the many concepts Paraskeva has introduced to the North American curriculum and education fields). From there, I build on Santos and Paraskeva in proposing a new ecology of knowledge as a way to overcome both epistemicides and curriculum theories and perspectives that are sustained by the belief in the aprioristic superiority of some knowledges over others. Finally, I argue that Paraskeva’s itinerant curriculum theory (hereafter ICT) provides a way to think about curriculum from the perspective of the ecology of knowledges and South-North dialogue, and considering ICT to be a daily knowledge practice, I reflect on ICT’s contribution to curriculum and everyday school-life studies.

Overall, I argue that ICT pushes the field of curriculum studies along a totally different, creative, and inter-and transnational path, one that engages the Global North from the perspective of southern epistemologies and intellectual traditions exemplified my writing here. While respecting curriculum studies’ past by highlighting its accomplishments, Paraskeva (2011, 2016) makes an important contribution to the field by exposing and denouncing the wounds caused within hostile political terrain that paradoxically overcame tough challenges in carving out the very existence of reconceptualist curriculum studies while simultaneously destroying pedagogical knowledge traditions from the Global South.

Prudent Knowledge and Decent Life:
The Inseparability Between the Epistemological and Political

In different works, Santos defends the premise that there is not and there will be no social justice without cognitive justice. In this sense, he develops an important counterargument to the curriculum theorists of the Global North in taking on problems related to the perverse forms of exclusion promoted by the monocultural school structure. This structure, classist and sexist, has cognitively and socially “wronged” both students and knowledge that is considered dissonant with hegemonic patterns and social ends. Within the field of curriculum studies, Paraskeva (2011, 2016) raises previous critical and counterhegemonic arguments to an important new level. Paraskeva, like Santos and others, situates the struggle for social justice within an understanding of the coloniality of knowledge (e.g., Lander,
1995), and in so doing, Paraskeva challenges the curriculum studies field to rethink its own history. That is, the struggle for social justice cannot be ‘de-linked’ (another of the concepts that Paraskeva introduces in the field) from the struggle for curriculum relevance, and it cannot marginalize the social movements and intellectuals that shocked society, such as the civil rights movement leaders and the Romantic Critics on the US scene. Additionally, Paraskeva insists that curriculum studies must squarely engage Global South epistemologies and intellectual traditions that heretofore it has completely ignored. In this sense, Paraskeva calls on curriculum theorists to retune and resize the struggle for curriculum relevance within the nexus of social and cognitive justice, and in doing so, he consciously defines US-centered, Anglophone, and Eurocentric curriculum theory as ‘the epistemicide’—a bombshell within the field for Northern curriculum theorists and workers to confront.

Returning to Santos (1994, 2004), a paradigm recognizing epistemicide cannot only be scientific, it must be also social: Here, Santos argues for the paradigm of prudent knowledge for a decent life. This inseparability of the scientific and the social, an inseparability which modern science has ignored, is essential to Santos’ work. Either explicitly or implicitly, all the reflection and epistemological proposals developed by Santos involve social issues and the construction of democracy. At the same time, all political constructions embark on a debate concerning knowledges, their social uses, and their epistemological status. Therefore, he discusses, for example, an emancipatory educational project which is:

... a learning project of conflicting knowledge in order to, through it, produce radical and destabilizing images of social conflicts that have resulted in the past, images capable of enhancing indignation and rebellion. Hence, education for nonconformity. (Santos, 1996, p. 17)

Paraskeva’s (2011) approach advances the call by Santos (1996) for nonconformity, denouncing the hegemonic curriculum field’s massive conflict abstinence wrought in school-level standards and accountability that embody “a dangerous cult of positivism that has fostered a robust cognitive passivity as well as a unique version of the do-ability of science” (p. 9). Advancing Santos’ education for nonconformity, Paraskeva denounces the hegemonic field of curricular influence on school-level practice as exporting US-centered, Eurocentric, and Anglophone epistemologies through decontextualized “scientific” assessments (Jupp, 2013, 2014).
In the nonconformist educational project, it is the participants’ options for pedagogical action and conflict that marks, not only the products of ideas and reflections, but also emotions, feelings, and passions which make possible a plurality of educational content. The central aspects of an educational experience focused on the struggle for emancipation would be, from this perspective, the conflicts between the implementation of technology and an edifying application of science; between knowledge-regulation and knowledge-emancipation; and between cultural imperialism and insurgent multiculturalism. Santos (1996) explains:

First of all, the conflict serves to make vulnerable and destabilize the dominant epistemological models and to [force one to] look at the past through the human suffering that through them and their human initiative was inexcusably caused. This view will produce destabilizing images, [ones] likely to develop in students and teachers the capacity for astonishment and indignation and the will to rebellion and nonconformity. This ability and this willingness will be essential to committing to look at the dominated or emerging models through which you can learn about a new type of relationship between knowledges and, therefore, between people and social groups. A more egalitarian relationship, a fairer way in order to make us to learn the world in a more edifying, emancipatory, and multicultural way.

(p. 33)

Paraskeva (2011) complexifies this issue within the field of curriculum. He challenges Santos and the curriculum field to place this struggle within a complex framework—organized among decolonial intellectuals (e.g., Lander, 1995)—called the coloniality of knowledge (another concept Paraskeva introduces into the field). Paraskeva (2011, 2016), requiring us to view Santos’ ecology of knowledges through the coloniality of knowledge, demonstrates how previous multicultural curriculum projects were necessarily nonemancipatory and undeniably and profoundly regulatory. Drawing on Santos, Paraskeva (2011, pp. 153–154) denounces hegemonic curriculum multicultural forms for being overtly and assumedly US-centered and Eurocentric, arrogantly ‘allowing’ the ‘multi’ only within a very narrow Western, Eurocentric, Anglo-Saxon platform.

This possibility of the horizontal reconstruction of relations between knowledges—a kind of thinking in which the epistemological and political are inseparable—requires understanding the school as an institution crossed by the society that created it, as
impregnated by what it is intended to overcome, nondemocratic and nonhorizontal values and practices. The presence of multiple knowledges is also a characteristic of both schools and society. Again, Santos (1995) explains:

there is not a single form of valid knowledge. There are several forms of knowledge, as many as the social practices that generate and sustain them. ... [A]lternative social practices will generate alternative forms of knowledge. Not recognizing these forms of knowledge implies the delegitimizing of social practices that sustain them; and in this sense, promoting the social exclusion of those who promote them. (p. 277)

This process of exclusion of forms of nonscientific knowledge came in the process of US-centered and European paradigm expansion, which included many ‘epistemicides’, i.e., annihilation, subordination, marginalization, and the outlawing of practices and social groups with “different” knowledges because they were sustained by threatening social practices. Santos considers “epistemicides” as one of the many great crimes against humanity. These crimes against humanity caused:

... an irreversible depletion of horizons and possibilities of knowledge. ... [T]he new paradigm proposes to upgrade the nonhegemonic knowledge and practices that are, ultimately, the overwhelming majority of the practices of life and knowledge, within the world system. (Santos, 1995, p. 329)

Curriculum, as Paraskeva (2011; 2014; 2016) argues, has historically made and provided for ‘epistemicides.’ And, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic curriculum theory and work are historically ingrained in epistemicides. Through a lethal cult of the uniqueness and infallibility of a positivist scientificity promulgated by functionalistic, hegemonic pedagogical movements, as well as the incapability of specific counterhegemonic traditions to wipe out hegemonic perspectives and avoid falling into a sort of functionalist nightmare, curriculum has historically advanced epistemicides. These epistemicides are visible not only in the kind of knowledge that has been taught, the way it has been taught, and the way it has been evaluated, but epistemicides are also intimately connected with the metamorphoses involving educational and curriculum policy and reform, teacher education, and accreditation. In contrast, in advancing an epistemologically diverse cosmovision, Santos and Paraskeva—from different terrains—challenged the eugenic nature of social
apparatuses—such as schools, curriculum, teacher education, and reform—that legitimized the epistemicides.

Knowledge is always linked to a culture and to social practices in which it develops. Following ecologies of knowledge, the new paradigm rejects the idea of the timelessness of truths as advocated by the Global North’s scientific knowledge traditions and therefore the idea of the evolution and completeness of knowledge implied therein or the ideas of advancement and expansionism in counterhegemonic curriculum discourses. The recognition of the contemporary and intrinsic bias of different forms of knowledge inherent in the ecology of knowledges replaces the dichotomy between the wild/primitive and the civilized/modern or between progress and backwardness through the identification of processes of oppression and subordination.  

Overall, the ecology of knowledge developed by Santos and introduced into curriculum by Paraskeva provides a perspective that helps curriculum theorists and workers to consider all the social forces and the circumstantiality of truths. The ecology of knowledges, which emphasizes circumstantiality of truths, provides an in-way for understanding truth as itinerant. With this notion of truth’s itinerancy, I approach Paraskeva’s itinerant curriculum theory (ICT).

**The Ecology of Knowledge and Cognitive Justice: The Dialogue Between the Work of Santos and Paraskeva**

Articulating the struggle against epistemicides, Santos has been writing since 2000 about the ecology of knowledge. Initially, his “sociology of absences” procedure entailed discovery in an attempt to understand and incorporate something that already exists, but whose existence had been ignored. The archaeologist, with each discovery, rethinks and redraws previous knowledge about the civilization that he researches, through the epistemological and social incorporation of the ‘novelty.’ In the same way, the "sociologist of absences", with the help of an archeology of invisible existences, tries to overcome each form of nonexistence and monoculture associated with it. For that reason, the sociology of absences needs to adopt procedures specific to each nonexistence, having in common the visibilization/recognition of what has been hidden by metonymic reason.

The monoculture of knowledge assumes the Global North’s hegemonic scientific traditions historically provided the unique criteria of truth, preceded, therefore, by
the logic of formal knowledge. This renders an ignorance of these traditions as a form of nonexistence. To overcome this monoculture, the development of an ecology of knowledges processes “ignorance” into applied knowledge where necessary. Santos (2004) argues that we have to do battle with the monoculture of scientific knowledge, and both Santos and Paraskeva (2011) propose that we fight for an ecology of knowledge, which is:

... an invitation to the promotion of non-relativistic dialogues among knowledge, granting [an] equality of opportunities to the different kinds of knowledge engaged in ever broader epistemological disputes aimed both at maximizing their respective contributions to build a more democratic and just society and at decolonizing knowledge and power. (Paraskeva, 2011, p. xx)

The exercise of the sociology of absences would be at work in the identification of contexts and practices in which different knowledges become operative, and in becoming operative, these knowledges overcome in their very implementation the “ignorance” with which they were previously identified.

Hence, emerging from this sociology of absences, we see two ideas: the monoculture here identified with Global North scientific traditions is understood as the origin and source of epistemicides committed by modernity, and in a struggle against Global North traditions, the process of overcoming them—establishing the ecology of knowledge—rests on the idea presented in “A discourse on the sciences” (Santos, 1985) that was developed throughout the course of his work:

There is, therefore, neither ignorance in general nor knowledge in general. Each form of knowledge recognizes that a certain type of knowledge contrasts with a certain type of ignorance, which, in turn, is recognized as such when in confrontation with this type of knowledge. All knowledge is knowledge about a degree of ignorance; and vice versa, ignorance is ignorance of certain knowledge. (Santos, 2000, p. 78)

More recently, Santos has linked this idea to cognitive justice, which he considers one precondition for social justice. In this way, Santos argues that global social injustice and cognitive injustice go together, legitimizing one another in different circumstances, which precludes fighting the one without fighting the other.
Following Santos’ reasoning, there is no possible social justice without cognitive justice because in modern society cognitive injustice constitutes one of the powerful arguments in the production of social injustice. Therefore, it becomes necessary to move back to the modern construction of cognitive injustice by promoting the ecology of knowledges, building one prudent knowledge, standing up politically and epistemologically in the struggle for a decent life, since we assume that cognitive justice is crucial to the construction of social justice. Only through the notion of cognitive justice does it become possible to question the epistemicidal exclusions promulgated in the Global North’s hegemonic scientific traditions, and through this questioning, epistemological discrimination and prejudices underlying social injustices become intelligible as eugenic, genocidal, and annihilating forms.

The notion of an ecology of knowledges, advanced in Santos and Paraskeva, recognizes the plurality and heterogeneity of knowledges and ignorances that are present in the world and the different means of creating them both. Thus, in this reading, it follows that ignorance, not being monolithic, is not necessarily a starting point. It can be a point of arrival after historical losses, resulting from forgetfulness or (un)learning, which are part of mutual learning processes in the dialogues between different knowledges from the ecology of knowledge perspective. In the ecology of knowledge, the priority or superiority of a certain knowledge over another emerges from the concrete outcomes intended or achieved by each one. This criterion should be used based on the precautionary principle (prudent knowledge). Hierarchies are established based on the relative value of alternative interventions in the real world. Given the political nature of this cognitive justice, which cannot be dissociated from the pursuit of social justice, these interventions will prefer “forms of knowledge to ensure the greater involvement of social groups involved in the design, implementation, control and enjoyment in the intervention” (Santos, 2010, p. 60).

Paraskeva’s (2011, 2016) work and his fight against curriculum epistemicides tell us about both cognitive justice and the ecology of knowledges, which he articulates within his ICT. By recognizing, as did Santos, the epistemological diversity of the world, he considers that we have a huge task:

The point is to move beyond questions such as “what/whose knowledge is of the most worth” despite not having figured out a correct answer, and to fight for (an)other knowledge outside the Western epistemological harbor. Therefore, we need to engage in the
struggle against epistemicides. One needs first to assume consciously that (an)other knowledge is possible and then to go beyond the Western epistemological platform, paying attention to other forms of knowledge and respecting indigenous knowledge within and beyond the Western space. (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 152)

Paraskeva, following Santos, Menezes, and Nunes (2007), advocates that cognitive justice is a condition for social justice, proposing to fight against epistemicides from that understanding and the need to defend the revaluation of this epistemological diversity of the world. He acknowledges the criticism of the parameters of the hierarchic curricular organization, which favor “particular hegemonic forms of knowledge” associated with Global North hegemonic knowledge production.

Paraskeva, in advocating for cognitive justice, concurs with Santos’ assessment that the Global North’s hegemonic knowledge forms and even counterhegemonic traditions have historically been and continue to contribute to epistemicides. As Santos notes, these traditions of knowledge production were considered a weapon as lethal as genocide in the construction of Western supremacy over the colonies, their cultures, and their knowledges. In defending the struggle against epistemicides, Paraskeva makes an argument based on the work of Santos et al. (2007), and punctuates the issue with the authors’ own words:

Many non-Western (indigenous, rural, etc.) populations of the world conceive of the community and the relationship with nature, knowledge, historical experience, memory, time, and space as configuring ways of life [that] cannot be reduced to Eurocentric conceptions and cultures. ... The adoption of allegedly universal valid, Eurocentric legal and political models, such as the neoliberal economic order, representative democracy, individualism, or the equation between state and law often rests ... on forms of domination based on class, ethnic, territorial, racial, or sexual differences and on the denial of collective identities and rights considered incompatible with Eurocentric definitions of the modern social order. (Santos cited in Paraskeva, 2011, p. 153)

Thus, in accordance with Santos (2004), Paraskeva defends the need to fight against the Global North’s hegemonic and counterhegemonic knowledge traditions in the name of the ecology of knowledges, as mentioned above.
Adding to Santos’ notion of ecology of knowledges, Paraskeva (2011, 2016) rightly situates the Global North’s hegemonic and counterhegemonic knowledge traditions within the coloniality of knowledge. It is important to note that this association has been debated in Latin America, with Santos eventually joining the discussion. It has a beautiful and relevant expression in Lander (1995). Turning to multiculturalism, Paraskeva remains in step with Santos et al. (2007):

We actually need a multicultural approach that adopts an emancipatory content and direction aimed mainly at the multiple articulations of difference. Thus, we will be allowing for the fruitful conditions of what Sousa Santos (2004) calls the sociology of absences. In other words, what we have is a call for the democratization of knowledge that is a commitment to an emancipatory, non-relativistic, cosmopolitan ecology of knowledge, a “bringing together and staging [of] dialogues and alliances between diverse forms of knowledge, cultures, and cosmopolologies in response to different forms of oppression that enact the coloniality of knowledge and power. [We need actually] to learn from the Global South since the aim to reinvent social emancipation goes beyond the critical theory produced in the North and the social and political praxis to which it has subscribed (Sousa Santos et al., 2007, p. xiv).” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 154)

Questioning the Global North’s hegemonic and counterhegemonic knowledge traditions—which Paraskeva emphasizes actually provide for curricular epistemicides in their arrogant annihilation of indigenous and African sociology, Paraskeva (2011, 2016) underscores the process of silencing the “struggles, debates, tensions and clashes” in their relationship with African epistemologies. Hand in hand with Santos (2005), Paraskeva (2011) argues that such arrogance “has shown ‘either a passive inability or an active hostility in recognizing scientific work autonomously produced’” (p. 155). He goes still further, contending that behind a very narrow Western Eurocentric epistemology there exists a ‘non-existence,’ a superior eugenic cult, of which counterhegemonic curriculum discourses were not initially or only partially aware.

Countering the biases of this process and these procedures to make knowledge traditions associated with the Global South (and the South in the North) invisible, Paraskeva (2011, 2016) develops his own sociology of absences, and in doing so,
brings many African philosophical and sociological references into his work. In so doing, he demonstrates the validity of his arguments and at the same time implicitly points to some possibilities for curriculum theory to advance a South-North curriculum dialogue very different from previous versions of curriculum internationalization. Paraskeva’s (2011, 2016) ICT, as key in this dialogue, is advanced as a method for criticizing the epistemicides perpetrated historically by US-centric, Eurocentric, and Anglophone curriculum proposals. Moreover, ICT provides for the viability of Global South epistemologies and intellectual traditions’ incorporation into an ecology of knowledges that, in turn, can realize cognitive and social justice both within the South-North dialogue and also as part of teachers’ praxis in classrooms. Here, Paraskeva both makes the argument and enacts the ecology in working, especially, with African critical theories and sociology permanently and conspicuously absent or, conversely, understood as inferior “knock-offs” of real Global North critical theories embraced by the US-centric, Eurocentric, and Anglophone curriculum field.

Paraskeva attaches particular importance to other authors who expand their critique of Eurocentrism to take issue with male superiority and modern scientism. He denounces, explicitly or not, the promiscuous relationship between these epistemologies and the exercise of power. For example, Paraskeva (2011) writes,

According to Shiva (1993), modern Western patriarchy’s special epistemological tradition is reductionist, since it not only “reduces the capacity of humans to know nature both by excluding other knowers and other ways of knowing, but also because it manipulates science as inert and fragmented matter” (p. 22). In a way, such a mechanism and reductionism are “protected not merely by its own mythology, but it is also protected by the interests it serves”. (p. 166)

This marginalization of many kinds of knowledge and the people who produce them also takes place in everyday life curricular practices and in academic environments. So, the struggle against these reductionist processes, which produce cognitive and social injustice, requires researchers and teachers, identified by Giroux as public intellectuals whose social role should be to question and seek to overcome the curricula proposed from the hegemonic perspective:

The real issue, according to Giroux, is “how to democratize the schools so as to enable those groups who in large measure are
divorced from or simply not represented in the curriculum to be able to produce their own representations, narrate their own stories, and engage in respectful dialogue with others”. (Giroux cited in Paraskeva, 2011, p. 170)

In this way, Paraskeva himself points out the responsibility of educators and curriculum theorists in understanding the task of curriculum studies in its relationship with daily school practices:

Schooling has to play a leading role in addressing one of most challenging issues we have before us—democratizing democracy. Vavi (2004) argues that democracy is bypassing the poor, giving credence to Sousa Santos’s (2005) claim that we are living in an era with modern problems but without modern solutions. In order to democratize democracy, Sousa Santos suggests, we need to reinvent social emancipation, since its traditional modern form was pushed into a kind of dead end by neo-liberal globalization. However, an insurgent cosmopolitanism or counter-hegemonic globalization has propelled a myriad of social movements and transformations, challenging the hegemonic neoliberal perspective. (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 170)

These “economic, political, and cultural quarrels were metaphorically coined by Sousa Santos (2005) as a clash between North and South, which would bring to the fore the struggle between representative and participatory democracy” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 171). And the task presents new challenges:

The task, therefore, is to determine how to reinvent a democratized democracy in an era where globalization and localization are “the driving forces and expressions of a new polarization and stratification of the world population into globalized rich and localized poor” (Beck, 2009, p. 55). ... What we need, according to Nussbaum (1997), is “to foster a democracy ... that genuinely [considers] the common good” (p. 19). It is not good for democracy “when people vote on the basis of the sentiments they have absorbed from talk radio and never questioned” (p. 19). Most likely, an entirely new struggle has to begin.
Paraskeva, at the same time, reminds us of the responsibility of public education and curriculum theoretical production:

Public education does have a key role in claiming that (an)other knowledge is possible and explaining how that is crucial for the transformative processes of democratizing democracy. As Aronowitz (2001), who is on Horowitz’s list of the 100 most dangerous professors in the United States, accurately reminds us, “We need to fight for a politics of direct democracy and direct action. The reinvigoration of the Left depends upon this” (p. 149). Such tasks imply a different theoretical curriculum wave, one that I have tagged elsewhere (Paraskeva, 2007) as an itinerant curriculum theory which is the future path of the critical curriculum river.

In developing this cascading itinerant hermeneutic, Paraskeva (2011) notes that he learned a lot “with the South and from the South” (p. 186) in the narration of his participation in a curricular debate in 2007. Within this debate, in which Paraskeva caught a glimpse of the work of Brazilian curriculum studies scholars, some “well-grounded and well-developed Southern theory” that doesn’t waste time or experience by criticizing Western epistemology. This kind of production dialogues with Paraskeva’s proposal of ICT in the sense it pushes curriculum theories toward a new epistemological approach and terminology.

This kind of thinking looks favorably on Boaventura’s ideas about “Southern Epistemology” (2010) and post-abyssal thinking, and their “three fundamental pillars: (1) learning that the South exists, (2) learning to go to the South, and (3) learning from and with the South” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 186). For him, these studies show us that southern epistemologies and intellectual traditions are not something to dream about to be realized in a far-off future. They are happening here and now, and maintain historical trajectories that demand recognition. Thus, our task is to delineate southern epistemologies and recognize the value of their epistemological referents that “challenge a classed, gendered, and racialized Eurocentric tradition” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 187).

This experience, and the research of some Brazilian scholars (e.g., Paraskeva, 2007) provide more possibilities for the exploration of connections between them and ICT in the sense the latter is a posture that advocates challenging the favoring of different Northern knowledges over the Southern. Paraskeva has vigorously taken
up this task in his work, which also aims to expand the recognition of theoretical curriculum production in locales beyond the North and the West. Its political commitment is to the advancement of a new understanding of science “that implies an effort to decolonize the universities[,] in particular the teacher-education programs” (Paraskeva, 2011, p 187). This also requires challenging the abyssal thinking in one of its most important characteristics: the impossibility of copresence. By recognizing the copresence of multiple knowledges in schools and universities, and the itinerant character of their reflections and activities, it is possible to formulate, theoretically, a new teacher-education mainframe, based in one dynamic ecology of knowledges. This last example helps us to recognize the importance of ICT and its dialogues with Boaventura’s thinking for the field of curriculum studies.

Final Considerations

An itinerant curriculum theory, because it is deterritorialized and mobile, leads us to think about the responsibility of curriculum studies researchers in the struggle against epistemicides and modern abyssal thinking (Santos, 2010) by resizing the role of hegemonic Global North traditions of scientific knowledge and also counterhegemonic traditions. ICT provides a means of overcoming epistemicides that split social realities and knowledges into two realms, existence and the abyss. Everything on one side of the line is understood as valid knowledge, and on the other side lie knowledge and social practices that are not recognized as a reality and are produced as nonexistent. Paraskeva (2011) proposes that “[t]he new itinerant curriculum theory will challenge one of the fundamental characteristics of abyssal thinking: the impossibility of co-presence of the two sides of the line” (p. 188).

In her reading and analysis of Paraskeva’s work, Süssekind offers the understanding that:

Paraskeva’s theory is a dialogue with southern epistemologies—he cites specifically "some interesting and powerful curriculum research platforms emerging in Brazil" (p. 150)— and is a fruitful initiative to grow the efforts to realize that the knowledge of the world, and curricula, are things that go much further than western/northern understandings of them (Süssekind, 2014 p. 75, citing Santos, 2013, p. 25)
Süssekind (2014) maintains, following Paraskeva, that “the struggle for curriculum justice which is a struggle for social justice implies a struggle for cognitive justice” (p. 70). She claims that “this is one of the pillars of Paraskeva’s deterritorialized ICT” (p. 70). Thus, in these final words, we bring in another theoretical perspective within curriculum studies that seems to be in dialogue with Paraskeva’s proposal, taking up some of its elements beyond the dialogue with Santos that gave rise to it, specifically the idea of curriculum and everyday school life studies (Oliveira, 2012). As part of the inter- and transnational South-North dialogue begun with Paraskeva’s ICT, curriculum and everyday school-life studies is a particular South-to-North contribution that offers new possibilities and merits greater attention.

According to the developing study of curriculum and everyday school life emergent on the Brazilian scene, the curriculum takes shape in schools on an ad hoc basis through dialogues and clashes between the curricular prescriptions and the other knowledges that inhabit the schools. Many of these knowledges are invisible in the curricular proposals and theoretical productions. Curriculum as a daily creation was developed within some of the research groups mentioned by Paraskeva in his book as “interesting and powerful research platforms”, and I consider it to be a kind of itinerant and deterritorialized curriculum theory. I concur with Certeau (1994) that this spontaneous production by practitioners of everyday life is something that does not have its own territory. What it produces cannot be accumulated or capitalized. Thus, I can consider itinerancy to be the way of daily production of curricula—fleeting creations without a proper space—deterritorialized by its productive reality and logic.

Moreover, this same perspective allows for the recognition of plural existences in the curricula, many of them having an emancipatory character. In these, the presence of multiple transgressive perspectives of understanding the world can be identified, made invisible and sent to the “other side” by modern abyssal thinking and the monoculture of formal knowledge. These perspectives only recognize the official curricula and their prescriptions. They cannot see the pulse of mobility and temporality that characterizes everyday life. Paraskeva defends the unveiling of these existences and the producing of ways of understanding them in the final part of his book: “Curriculum theory needs an encounter with the very practices and the reality that surround it” (Paraskeva, 2011, p. 174).
In essence, and to rely on Deleuze’s (1990) framework, curriculum theory should contribute to subverting and reversing the Platonic position, which sees the world as a reproduction of a particular original model and perceives it as a simulacrum or a copy without an original (Roy, 2003; Paraskeva, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008). As Roy (2003) argues, rather than approaching ‘things’ as ideal states, we need to find advantages in their own variations and dynamics. To fight for a deterritorialized curriculum theory and practices that privilege the cult of difference implies the need to understand education as a set of relationships in which the personal plays a leading role.

Adopting this new understanding of the curriculum creation process enables us to overcome the formalist perspective that defines curricula only as a fixed and completed product. Moreover, doing so introduces us to the discussion of curricular theoretical production, starting from the notion that these are processes, full of dynamism and, therefore, of mutability. The unveiling of these daily created curricula appears, therefore, as fundamental to paving the way for the appearance of this everyday curriculum creation, potentiating the fights against the scientific discourses that disqualify schools, their subjects, and their knowledge. It also allows for the demonstration of the falsity of the ideas that the hegemonic curriculum fragmentation is real or that different knowledges circulating in schools can be separated, classified, and hierarchized.

Many practices and procedures are beyond those which lazy reason has been able to see and study. They are the contents that contribute to the maturing work of the notion of curriculum as a daily creation and to the research in/for/with everyday school life. These lines of inquiry seek to unveil those practices and procedures, in the process, learning about what happens and is made in the course of everyday school life. In turn, this opens doors for us to realize what is emancipatory in such curricula, what practiced utopias (Oliveira, 2003) emerge from innovations, and can be potentiated from it. In other words, we are able to perceive the changes that can be conceived of, responsibly, for our schools and curriculum theories from the perspective of this dialogue between curricular theories and practices that we identify with the proposal of Paraskeva.

We can illustrate this relationship between ICT and some curricular practices, recognizing in this way the high degree to which both contribute to the thinking through of the democratization of curricula and curriculum theory by overcoming the epistemicides that are often mutually reinforcing. Paraskeva’s argumentation
and unveiling of nodal elements of other epistemologies represent a great contribution to emancipatory curriculum thinking. This work also dialogues with my own reflections around the potential of knowledge and invisible practices for building new understandings of curricula from the perspective of the ecology of knowledges and cognitive and social justice, which further require some forms of the exercise of horizontal citizenship. While I do not want to take up an unfinished debate, I do concur with the radical understanding that man is basically a social being. The Ubuntu philosophy leads to the idea that “a person is a person through other persons” (Prinsloo, 1998, p. 43; Maphisa, 1994, cited in Paraskeva, 2011, p. 164). This idea sounds perfectly compatible with the notion of horizontal citizenship and its recognition of individual responsibility for the construction of social welfare, which we have identified in some school situations through our research in Brazil. In terms of a possible southern epistemology (Santos, 2010), social justice depends not only on cognitive justice, but also on the expansion of the concept of citizenship. In addition to vertical citizenship, which encompasses the relationship between citizen and state and the associated rights and duties, Santos proposes a horizontal citizenship based on the obligations of citizens to each other, to be exercised through mutual recognition and solidarity, which is also the point of arrival of the knowledge-emancipation (Santos, 1996).

By bringing to the field of curriculum theoretical production some of Boaventura’s ideas, concepts, and terms and some of the Brazilian debates and production, Paraskeva expands the field of curriculum studies, reaching new possibilities of challenging the contemporary questions and struggles that curriculum scholars have to face. His innovations—the openings represented by the new concepts, terms, and dialogues—confirm the importance of ICT to open-ended and authentic Global South-Global North dialogue, which in turn enables inter- and transnational projects and new proposals and reflections about education’s contemporary challenges. I thus close this paper by inviting readers to dive in to this work, which is valuable for anyone who wants to live in a more democratic world.

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that the democratic demands for social and more-ecological curricular theories and practices interdict the proposition of ‘recipes’ regarding theories, procedures, and actions. The specificity of different educational space-times and approaches requires that each solution to the general problem, which, taken together, represent the development of emancipatory curriculum theories and practices, has to be local to be legitimate. These itinerant theories and practices, full of knowledge forgotten by modernity, exist and need to
be recognized on the basis of their political and epistemological statuses. Thus, the unveiling of these curricular theories and emancipatory practices, which is already underway, contributes decisively to the recovery of hope for ‘a better world’ and for better schooling, a hope that pulses beyond waiting, one that strives for its realization, as announced by Santos (2000):

Regaining hope means in this context changing the status of waiting, making it both more active and more ambiguous. Utopia is thus the desperate realism of hope that is allowed to fight for the content of waiting, not in general but the exact place and time. Hope does not lie, therefore, in a general principle that provides a general future. It lies in the possibility of creating social experimentation fields where it may be possible to resist the evidence of the inevitability locally, promoting success with alternatives that seem utopian at all times, except those that occurred effectively. It is this utopian realism that underpins the initiatives of the oppressed groups in a world where the alternative seems to have disappeared, building a bit everywhere, local alternatives that make possible a dignified and decent life. (Santos, 2000, p. 36)
References


Santos, B. S. (2013). *Se Deus fosse um activista dos direitos humanos* [If God were a human rights activist]. Coimbra, PT: Ed. Almedina.


Notes

1 In a text published in Brazil under the title *The end of the imperial discoveries* (2002) and in several versions elsewhere under different titles, Santos develops a provocative discussion on the ways in which Western capitalism created and subordinated their other: the wild, the East, and nature.