The current context of curriculum and evaluation looks bleak to those of us who value the centrality of the person in the educational process. Driven by the demands of data, teachers are hounded relentlessly to keep the “end in mind” and demonstrate the worth of their work by producing measurable outcomes. As Taubman (2009) has deftly illustrated, a corporate mentality that demands the reduction of complicated phenomena to quantifiable data now structures even how we think about what should happen in classrooms. Curriculum planning and implementation occur within a discourse of instrumental reason and technical knowledge that gives higher regard to assessment than to the broader and more conceptually variegated phenomenon of evaluation.

When traced historically, the preeminence of assessment over evaluation can be seen to ebb and flow with the particular demands that society places upon schools (Tellep, 1989). While assessment dominated early in the 20th century, Ralph Tyler’s pioneering work with the Eight Year Study during the 1930s promoted and developed evaluation in significant ways. Kridel and Bullough, Jr. (2007) elaborate on one of Tyler’s most important contributions:

Underlying [his] orientation was a fundamental belief in open discourse since, for Tyler, evaluation consisted of a process by which the values of an enterprise were articulated and ascertained. In essence, e-valuating – or drawing out values – was conceived as first and foremost a philosophical rather than a technical activity. For Tyler, evaluation represented a way to enrich and to improve the decision making critical to curriculum and instruction . . . (pp. 78-79)

The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation defines evaluation as the “systematic investigation of the value, importance, or significance of something or someone along defined dimensions (e.g., a program, project, or specific program or project component)” (Yarbrough, Shulha, Hopson, & Caruthers, 2010, p. 287). It defines assessment as “the determination of relative or absolute position on some variable of interest based on qualitative and/or quantitative evidence” (p. 283).
Unfortunately, a variety of events interrupted the growth of this work in which “Evaluation and curriculum became closely linked in positive ways” (Kridel & Bullough, Jr., p. 86). The incident that appears to have dealt the greatest blow to further development of the two fields' constructive relationship was the Soviet's launch of Sputnik in the fall of 1957 and the full-scale entrance of the federal government into curriculum reform. As per the story that is well known in the curriculum studies community, the wave of federal funds for new curriculum projects bypassed curriculum professors and was directed, instead, to scholars in the disciplines. Subsequently, many curriculum specialists refocused their scholarship on theory and on areas less directly grounded in schools and classrooms. As a result of the divorce of curriculum and evaluation at a time of explosive growth for the evaluation field, the two areas of scholarship developed along gradually diverging trajectories, so much so that we seldom even hear the phrase “curriculum evaluation” now. We evaluate teachers, students, and administrators to assure accountability, but virtually no one speaks of evaluating the curriculum. Indeed, it is now possible to proceed through an entire doctoral program in either curriculum or evaluation and gain little to no exposure to literature in the other. The degree to which this is true may be disputed, of course, but it can be generally said that the two areas have produced two distinctly separate bodies of scholarship.

The intent of this paper is to see what generative understandings for today can be gained by reading developments in curriculum studies alongside particular developments in evaluation scholarship. My hope is that this process might find ground for a restored relationship of the two so that our notions of curriculum/evaluation may be recast in ways that foster new possibilities for both fields. I begin with a brief survey of selected points in the histories of curriculum and evaluation and then, drawing upon insights from each field, I focus on both a theoretical framework and a heuristic that have the potential to move curriculum evaluation beyond the current dominant discourse.

Genealogy

A reconceptualized curriculum studies field began to challenge the efficacy of scientific thinking as a basis for curriculum work over 40 years ago. The challenge came at a time when society's devotion to science was at a peak. The splitting of the atom was given credit for ending World War II, and when the nation's technological superiority was challenged by the Russians' launch of Sputnik, the country turned to its savior with an increased fervor. The U.S. government allocated millions of dollars for massive new curriculum development projects in science and math. Additional money was poured into finding the best and the brightest minds, which could then be tapped to lead in further scientific discoveries. It may be difficult for us today to understand the sense of a “profound scientific revolution” (Bruner, 1960/1963, p. 1) that gripped the country. Given the spirit of the age, it is not surprising that confidence in scientific methods (i.e., experimental studies) was extended to the social sciences and the study of education. When the Commission on Instructional Theory of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) met in the mid-sixties, they decided on a scientific base for theory development.

However, when an ASCD group met about the same time for a discussion on curriculum theory, they were unable to come to a consensus. A couple of years later, in his published remarks as chair of the 1967 Ohio State Curriculum Theory conference, Paul Klohr (1967) commended the work of the

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2 For the uninitiated, a detailed accounting of this event's effect on curriculum scholars may be found in Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995). For Sputnik's effect on the growth of evaluation studies, see Fitzpatrick, Sanders, and Worthen (2004).

instructional theory commission, but declared their definition of theory to be too limited for curriculum work. He pronounced the commission’s measurement-based criteria to be irrelevant to curriculum events, which lie in the “preactive realm” (p. 202) of design and pointed out that conceptual schemes modeled on the physical sciences might rule out certain kinds of data and smother some vital types of complex information. He also problematized a method that cast students as experimental subjects, rather than clients, and concluded that the problems he highlighted were undoubtedly related to the matter of values, which are a necessary consideration in curriculum work.

A few years later, as a leader in the emerging reconceptualization of curriculum studies, Klohr (1969) elaborated on the limitations of scientific thinking and specified three points for which any mode of thinking for curriculum work would need to allow:

a) that we are willing to recognize that undefined, primitive entities will precede the formulation of curriculum design data language,

b) that data language terms will have reference to both logical and empirical procedures instead of solely to empirical referents; and

c) that there must be some kind of prejudgment to guide our choice of the logico-empirical operations of what kinds of entities are most likely to exhibit orderly relations among curriculum design phenomena (p. 95).

About the same time, those in the burgeoning field of educational evaluation were struggling with the limitations of scientific thought as they attempted to provide congressionally mandated studies for the plethora of new programs spawned by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Fitzpatrick, Sanders, and Worthen (2004) note that the new legislation produced tens of thousands of grants for which local education agencies competed. Although it was likely not his intent, Baker (1969) provided support for Klohr’s critique in his late sixties review of the research on curriculum evaluation. In his analysis of the recent explosion of evaluation literature, Baker pointed to the many and various difficulties inherent in the predominantly experimental, statistically based studies and stated, “Judging by all that has preceded, one would guess that the educational researcher is hopelessly pinned beneath the sword of Damocles” (p.346). Nevertheless, the literature indicates that he and the majority of evaluation scholars remained convinced that success lay in ever more cleverly designed and controlled experimental studies (see Baker, 1969; McNeil, 1969; Rossi & Wright, 1977).

Other scholars, though, sought to resolve the types of difficulties Klohr had predicted. While rejecting the label of Reconceptualist, Eliot Eisner produced work at the intersection of curriculum studies and education evaluation that questioned the mainstream and helped “set the stage for the 1970s Reconceptualization” (Pinar, et al., 1995). Eisner (1967, 1969) pointed to the paucity of objectives as conceived and to their failure to take into account that some of education’s most significant aims may not result in measurable outcomes. He proposed “expressive” objectives, which would allow for self-discovery, originality, and inventiveness. Scriven (1967, 1972) argued that the worth of curricular goals should be examined rather than simply assumed. He also proposed goal-free evaluation, which would not be tied to curricular objectives but would examine processes and context to find unintended outcomes. To provide more useful information for curricular program planners, Stufflebeam (1971) created a model to take into account the complexities of context, input, process, and product. Moving into participant-oriented evaluation and at the same time away from the dominance of experimental method, Stake (1975) proposed responsive evaluation, so called because it is responsive to realities and issues identified by stakeholders rather than being determined by a prescribed plan. Schubert (2008)
credits this early body of evaluation scholarship with creating the space for approaches that abandon positivism, such as Eisner’s (1979) imaginative approach and Guba and Lincoln’s (1981) naturalistic studies.

So it can be seen that in the three decades following the post-Sputnik flurry of evaluation activity, scholars working within the curriculum field took any number of meaningful steps toward addressing the limitations identified by Klohr (1967, 1969). However, even Pinar et al. (1995) who declared “a reconceptualization has occurred” (p. 737) in evaluation also admitted that the mainstream practice of curriculum evaluation continued “to function primarily as bureaucratism, i.e., as a conservative social practice designed to maintain the institution as it is” (p. 744). Evaluation’s tent had been broadened to make room for constructivist scholars, but just before the end of the century Madaus and Kellaghan (1992) observed that qualitative methods were far from dominating the scene: “There is still a strong view that methods derived from the physical sciences and used widely in educational research provide the strongest basis for drawing inferences about cause-effect relationship” (p. 134).

Unfortunately, the failure of mainstream educational researchers to seriously consider the limitations of experimental studies left the door open for the return of assessment with a vengeance. The promising approaches that had been emerging were soon to undergo banishment with the ascension of George W. Bush to the White House.

A Mandate for Old Wineskins

Smith and Brandon (2008) lay out the story for us. In 2003 the U.S. Department of Education (ED) published a “proposal” that evaluation studies using the randomized controlled trial (RCT) method would be given priority, with some provision for an occasional quasi-experimental approach or a regression discontinuity design. In spite of the submission of 300 comments on this proposal with concerns listed in 11 different categories, the ED simply responded that it did not agree and chose not to change the proposal. Smith and Brandon choose to see the methodological controversy that has ensued as an opportunity to use contentious issues to refine and energize the evaluation profession. However, they also express concerns about the consequences of the ED’s decision, such as the narrowing of evaluation purposes, the corruption of the accepted logic of problem-driven methods choices, the inability to study some issues to which RCTs are not suited, and the ethics of federally mandated choices. Drawing on the work of Brass, et al., (2006), they also summarize many of the difficulties with this methodology:

An analysis of RCTs by the Congressional Research Service... notes the difficulty of designing and implementing RCTs well. Difficulties include problems with small sample sizes, generalizing program impact to broader or different populations (i.e., limitations of external validity), being impractical or unethical, requiring too much time or resources, and not providing information on causal mechanisms, cost effectiveness, or unintended side effects (p. 17).

The concerns raised by these evaluation scholars are important ones. A look at curriculum scholarship highlights many of the same concerns, but adds another dimension. What had become clear to curriculum scholars by the end of the 20th century was that the world had entered a new “post” condition postmodern, post-industrial, post-positivist which had rendered the thinking of the previous age inadequate. Even (or perhaps, especially) physical scientists recognized that the old framework for thinking about science no longer fit what we know about the universe at any level. An epistemology that Klohr had pronounced too limited for curriculum theory development fifty years ago is being
reconsidered, apparently everywhere but in the nation’s capital and schools. To use McLuhan’s (1962) analogy, the ED is speeding into the future looking in the rear-view mirror.

What insights, then, might we find in curriculum scholarship for evaluation in a “post” age? First of all, there is a rich and deep literature explicating conditions and concepts of the age and their implications for curriculum work (e.g., Cary, 2007; Cherryholmes, 1988; Doll, 1993; Pinar & Reynolds, 1992; Reynolds & Webber, 2004; Roy, 2003; Slattery, 2006). Some of this literature addresses the issue of evaluation explicitly. Cherryholmes (1988) points out that evaluations “involve comparisons, sometimes of observations to each other or to agreed-upon standards or sometimes to both” (p. 171). These evaluative processes are part of our daily concerns, which are “historically conditioned and reflect and exercise the conditions of power” (p. 171). Cherryholmes provides an extended description of the difficulties with setting standards and the many problems that plague evaluation research in regard to validity, reliability, and inference. Cherryholmes also draws upon the work of Michael Fullan (1991) to demonstrate the mismatch between the “nonrational quality of social systems” (cited in Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 103) and the modernist educational reform strategies of recent decades.

By the early 1990s, Doll (1993) was warning about the near impossibility by then of thinking of evaluation in post-modern terms because of the modernist assumptions that thoroughly undergird it. For example, our inherited understanding of teaching casts students as receivers expected to acquire a predetermined body of knowledge in a particular, set way. In this context, it makes more sense that only experts following an orderly, linear, “scientific” procedure are allowed any hand in the expansion of knowledge. Contemporary insights into how knowledge advances (e.g., via randomness, quantum leaps, self-organization) are not recognized. Student achievement is determined by measuring the gap between the “canon presented and the canon acquired” (p. 172). In this form, evaluation becomes a way of measuring deficit, and the curriculum may legitimately be labeled as “deficit driven” (p. 172). In a modernist frame, then, the purpose of evaluation is fundamentally to separate winners from losers, whether we are speaking of programs or people.

Drawing on insights from science complexity, uncertainty, open systems, process, and transformations Doll (1993) demonstrates how the mechanistic Newtonian worldview of the past is no longer adequate and why educational policies and practices undergirded by that worldview will no longer suffice. In place of the modernist epistemology of verification, he suggests an epistemology that is more hermeneutical/historical. While he concedes that a need will always exist for positing hypotheses and making testable deductions, these must be placed within a framework that emphasizes the relational, rather than the discrete. Within a curriculum based on such an epistemology, evaluation would serve a different purpose transformation and would be a “negotiary process within a communal setting . . . . It would be used as feedback, part of the iterative process of doing-critiquing-doing-critiquing” (p. 174).

Continuing to emphasize the limitations of modernist thinking as a base for contemporary curriculum theorizing, Doll (1993) observes that:

. . . to create transformative transactions . . . it is imperative we question the assumptions and prejudices we hold so dear, particularly those supporting our own historical situations. Goals and ends, those beacons that guide so many of our curricular actions, do not just appear; they are personal decisions made by cultural beings at historical moments . . . . By dialoging with texts, their creators, and ourselves we come to a deeper, fuller understanding not only of issues but of ourselves,

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4Many curriculum scholars have chronicled the significant theoretical shifts made by 20th century scientists. For two of the earliest and most comprehensive see Cherryholmes (1988) and Doll (1993).
as personal and cultural beings (p. 136).

The framework that Doll envisions with its emphasis on a hermeneutical view of curriculum seems a good fit with the needs outlined for curriculum theory by Klohr at the dawn of the Reconceptualization. Significantly, Thomas Schwandt is developing similar insights in evaluation studies insights that counter the current reduction of evaluation to assessment.

A New Framework for Evaluation

Despite the Department of Education’s recent mandate of a (post)positivist methodology, Schwandt (2002, 2008) has been working to recast the study and practice of evaluation in the discourse of hermeneutics and its central concept of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. He describes the project as one of indexing “the practice of evaluation to a neo-Aristotelian focus on practical judgment and a hermeneutic concern with particularities of concrete situations” (2002, p. 66). Resonating with Klohr (1969) and other curriculum scholars (e.g., Eisner, 1999; Huebner, 1962,1966); Schwab,1969), Schwandt highlights the need for a new language of evaluation practice, for different discourses make possible different purposes.

Presenting his effort as the creation of a new discourse rather than a new epistemology, he casts his project as “a radical critique of epistemology as definitive of our primary relations to the world. It rejects the modernist paradigm of subject-object thinking with its ideal of a determinate object out there waiting to be known by a disengaged knower” (p. 67). Instead, the relationship between the knower and what she would seek to understand is cast as a dialogical encounter. There is a dynamic interaction, offered by Gadamer (1960/1997) as the concept of back-and-forth “play” that occurs between that which is to be known and the knower who encounters it. This view of human agency is in stark contrast to the assumptions that undergird mainstream evaluation practices. Schwandt draws upon Shotter (1993) to describe the presuppositions of this way of thinking as follows:

- That the social world is not just out there waiting to be discovered but is “a continuous flux or flow of mental activity containing regions of self-producing order [and] that such activity can only be studied from a position of involvement ‘within’ it, instead of as an ‘outsider’”;
- That knowledge of that world is practical-moral knowledge and that does not depend upon justification or proof for its practical efficacy;
- “That we are not in an ‘ownership’ relation to such knowledge, but we embody it as part of who and what we are” (cited in Schwandt, pp. 66-67)

Schwandt emphasizes that this view of human agency positions “human Being as a situated, ethical ongoing discussion of what we should, could, must be” (p. 66).

A critical insight here is that this discourse reveals a way of being-in-the-world that remains “rationally invisible” in the modernist worldview:

We come to understand that the apparently orderly, accountable, self-evidently knowable and controllable characteristics of our selves and our social forms of life are constructed upon a set of disorderly, contested conversational forms of interaction. It is through a dialogical encounter that we develop knowledge of our selves and our practices (Schwandt, 2002, p. 68).

Thus, evaluation practice shaped by this discourse is reframed as a dialogical, interpretive encounter
that transforms both the evaluator and the evaluand. It is a process dealing with concrete events and people under particular circumstances. It involves judgment, deliberation and the assembly of a variety of empirical, ethical, and political considerations to make sense of the situation. It is much less tidy than the dominant model in which rationality is a matter of having the correct procedure and the aim is to minimize ethical and political ambiguities and dilemmas. Instead, evaluation recast as practical hermeneutics accepts the fact that “daily activity is characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, ambivalence, contingency, the endlessly critical, and the disruptive” (p. 199).

Accordingly then, there would be a profound difference in the way in which evaluators envision and engage the socio-political world of programs and stakeholders. Decentered from a position of authority, evaluators would serve more as teachers and interpreters, helping clients better understand one another's interpretations and judgments. In the spirit of Doll’s vision for a “negotiary process” (Doll, 1993, p. 174) they would aim to make their practice continuous with the work of stakeholders by becoming partners in an ethically informed, reasoned conversation about essentially contested concepts. They become less like social scientific experts who, having employed rigorous procedures, authoritatively pronounce that the evaluand has particular characteristics or should be valued in certain ways based upon a given set of criteria.

This final point leads to Schwandt’s discussion of the power of the dominant rationalist notion of evaluation expertise to define the experiences of participants and stakeholders and to (re)present them to others. In recontextualizing the lived realities of people, the actual conditions of their experience are delocated from their original site and relocated to a new one. In so doing the evaluator changes the way in which the experience of stakeholders with a particular program is positioned in relation to other aspects of stakeholders’ experience. What was once part of the discourse of program participants becomes the discourse of the expert, and the original participants’ experience begins to orbit around a different set of needs and priorities dictated by the evaluator’s professional group.

Shifting the conceptual lens to one of practical hermeneutics helps to bring into focus this role of evaluation as social practice and the way the practice of “e-valuation” (Kridel & Bullough, 2007, p. 78) itself invariably contributes to the construction of our social world. Evaluation practice through this lens remains conscious of the conceptual practice of power and, indeed, of the role of evaluation as one of the “ruling apparatuses of society” (Schwandt, 2002, p. 175). Viewed in this light, the implications of reducing evaluation to assessment can be disquieting. Who are the experts creating the system of assessment? Which of their needs and priorities does curriculum now shift to accommodate? Which of students’ needs are displaced in the process, and what ultimate effects reverberate throughout whole of society? Such a perspective foregrounds the importance of taking an ethical stance on the question of how one ought to be as an evaluator.

A Compatible Heuristic

Schwandt (2002) meticulously details the complexities of adopting a more suitable framework for evaluation in a postmodern world, complexities that are augmented by the messiness of lived reality and the realization that evaluation is both a cognitive and a moral enterprise. Writing as a scholar of evaluation studies, he draws upon many of the same sources as curriculum scholars and provides an elaboration of evaluation as practical hermeneutics that can provide a significant contribution to both curricular thought and practice. However, as is typical of much theorizing, this work may be slow to

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See Taubman (2009) for a comprehensive accounting of the forces behind the current assessment system and of their danger to the foundations of public education.

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attract attention as an alternative to dominant practice unless some fleshing out of its possibilities is provided. I suggest that evaluation scholars Rollis and Rossman provide a compatible heuristic for fleshing out Schwandt’s framing of evaluation as a dialogical, collaborative, and ethical/political process. Rallis and Rossman (2000) propose that the fundamental purpose of evaluation in a post-industrial world should be a dialogical form of learning with a commitment to the value of social justice. They begin with an assumption that evaluation concepts and methodologies are value laden and contend that the process should “include the voices of those affected or of those likely to be affected by the program” (p. 82).

While they consider dialogue essential, they are careful to distinguish it from discussion, whose etymology evokes connotations of percussion and concussion and a note of finality. Dialogue, on the other hand suggests a fundamentally interactive process of authentic thinking together. It is generative. It moves beyond any single individual’s understanding to produce new knowledge . . . . And it entails a sustained democratic relationship between people – program people and the evaluator (Rallis & Rossman, 2000, p. 83).

In an ideal world, they point out, external evaluators would not be needed because organizations would be “inquiry-minded” (p. 83), practicing intentional, ongoing reflection and internal dialogue. All stakeholders would be on the lookout for emergent problems and the organization would make mid-course corrections as needed. In the actual world, however, there are seldom structures or the time to establish this culture of self-evaluation. Therefore, Rallis and Rossman propose, evaluators can help to generate data through dialogic inquiry: “They help surface troubling questions, hidden data, alternative explanations. They can help program personnel see that the emperor may in fact have no clothes on” (p. 83).

To be effective in this role, however, the evaluator must be known and trusted. Rather than sitting in the judge’s seat to determine the fate of the program, she helps stakeholders uncover and articulate the program’s guiding theories and consider their efficacy. The goal is for the stakeholders and the evaluator to become “critical friends” (p. 84). Rallis and Rossman describe a critical friend as one who is able to articulate tacit understandings, remain open to the discovery of multiple and newly emerging meanings, strive for a relationship that is equitable and reciprocal, and be willing to question the status quo and demand information, while recognizing the tentative and speculative nature of any answers (pp. 84-85). In addition, they propose that particular contextual conditions are necessary to establish the critical friend relationship and encourage dialogue. These include permeation of the evaluative process with the program values, commitment to the broad goals of the program, and mutual respect and ownership of the process.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Rallis and Rossman (2000) emphasize the centrality of language to accomplishing all of the above. The appropriate style of language for the critical friend, they suggest, is facilitative, rather than authoritative. This style helps to establish a safe environment for dialog that, of necessity, will not always be comfortable. If effectively employed, however, the facilitative style will allow dialogue to accomplish the following:

- Establishment of an action-research cycle of assessment, identification of puzzles and surprises, and clarifying problems related to practices
- Conscious mutual reflection on the program and practices, including data collection, analysis, and
interpretation
• Judgment and reframing the program or practice
• Taking action—developing and implementing new program directions or new practices (p. 90).

In sum, Rallis and Rossman have provided a heuristic that supports roles, values, context, and language that are compatible with a framework of practical hermeneutics and appropriate for the post-modern world. In their description of a proposed evaluation practice that is committed to recognizing the moral and political nature of evaluation and to promoting dialogue, collaboration, and interpretation for the transformation of all stakeholders, they provide a set of practices that make Schwandt’s framework visible for curriculum workers interested in challenging the current assessment-driven system.

Returning Curriculum to Evaluation

Schwandt’s (2002) theoretical framework and the heuristic of Rallis and Rossman (2000) provide helpful notions for reinvigorating our currently impoverished approach that reduces evaluation to assessment. However, additional leverage for change might be gained by enriching the heuristic with scholarship grounded in concerns that revolve around the perennial curriculum question of “What knowledge is of most worth?” or as Schubert (2009) has most recently revised it: “What’s worth knowing, needing, experiencing, doing, being, becoming, overcoming, sharing, contributing, wondering?” This final section returns to curriculum scholarship to further flesh out a recasting of curriculum evaluation. For this I draw upon the Curriculum Wisdom (CW) paradigm set forth by Henderson and Kesson (2004) and elaborated upon by Henderson and Gornik (2007). I choose this particular paradigm for three reasons: 1) it is compatible with the scholarship cited thus far, especially in that it reinforces the conception of evaluation as a philosophical activity, as opposed to simply a technical one; 2) it provides a framework for restoring the position of evaluation as “a way to enrich and to improve the decision making critical to curriculum and instruction” (Kridel & Bullough, 2007, p. 78-79); and 3) especially important for this project, it does both of the above by incorporating insights that cut across virtually all areas of curriculum scholarship.

The Curriculum Wisdom paradigm takes educational decision-making including evaluation to a deeper level than the dominant managerial paradigm. It relies upon phronesis, the “practical wisdom” (Henderson & Kesson, 2004, p. ix) that is central to the work of both Doll (1993) and Schwandt (2002). As Henderson (2003) has summarized it:

The focus is still on solving an immediate problem—after all, the concept of wisdom denotes such practicality; but now, the goal is to solve the problem with reference to a conception of the “good” life. . . . The search for practical solutions is transformed into an aspiration to advance a critically informed moral vision (para. 8).

For the CW paradigm this moral vision of the good life is grounded in pragmatism and committed to the value of “strong democracy” (Barber, 1985), a democracy devoted to the “growth and development of each and every one of its members” (Henderson & Kesson, 2004, p. 37). From this perspective the assessment question of “How can we get kids to pass tests?” is reframed to an e-valuative question in the following way:

How do we get kids to pass the tests and how do we help teachers elevate their curriculum judgme-
To guide curriculum envisioning and enactment – including evaluation – Henderson and Kesson (2004) provide a map of interwoven and overlapping inquiry domains that are drawn from the many and various discourses of curriculum scholarship. From this ground they are able to provide insights that are unseen or dismissed by an assessment mindset. For example, in the realm of techne, the category of instrumental thinking, the current reliance upon test scores impoverishes education by foregrounding evaluation of just one dimension of the enacted curriculum – instruction – at the expense of all other aspects of curriculum work (e.g., envisioning, designing, planning, organizing). Curriculum scholarship restores a more complete understanding of curriculum as a technical endeavor. Even more importantly, it provides other domains of inquiry that deepen our understanding of curriculum as a lived experience (poesis), as a practice of power (praxis), as various ways of knowing (dialogos), as a springboard to imagining new possibilities (theoria), and as a representation of multiple and sometimes conflicting values (polis). If we believe with Dewey (1916) that “Democracy must be re-born with each generation” (p. 22), then these are most assuredly important domains from which to draw our standards for a robust curriculum.

Within this paradigm the curriculum decision-making process is not meant to be mechanical, and for the purposes of evaluation the domains of inquiry would function as inspiration for the creation of a set of questions to guide the examination of a curriculum at any level (e.g., vision, field of study, program, or course). The entire map of domains would offer touchstones as the process unfolded, providing insights and revealing concerns that might otherwise be missed. As per the heuristic of Rallis and Rossman (2000), an inquiry guided by questions such as these would be followed by a collaborative consideration and interpretation of the collated results, and then by any indicated reframing of the curriculum design and/or implementation.

Conclusion
At one time the state of the fields of curriculum and evaluation suggested the promise of a mutually reinforcing and positive relationship. However, they developed along different historical trajectories that have resulted in a significant divide between the two. While curriculum scholarship has developed a broad and rich theoretical landscape, it has had little impact upon the enacted curriculum. Pressured by the demands of educational reform efforts, the mainstream practice of evaluation now functions primarily as an outdated social practice designed to strengthen and maintain social structures and practices that are both inappropriate for education in the post-industrial world and antithetical to the concept of strong democracy. However, this reading of developments within the separate literatures of curriculum studies and educational evaluation suggests there are compatible frameworks and heuristics within each that might work in synergy to reinvigorate both and to enrich our current impoverished notions of curriculum evaluation.
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