
JoVictoria Nicholson-Goodman, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations
Penn State University, Harrisburg
jovictoria@psu.edu

Disorder... is continually breaking in; meaninglessness is recurrently overcoming landscapes which once were demarcated, meaningful. It is at moments like these that the individual reaches out to reconstitute meaning, to close the gaps, to make sense once again. It is at moments like these that he will be moved to pore over maps, to disclose or generate structures of knowledge which may provide him unifying perspectives and thus enable him to restore order once again. His learning... is a mode of orientation—or reorientation in a place suddenly become unfamiliar.

Introduction

Greene’s (1971) articulation of a curriculum of possibility positions the intrusion of disorder and meaninglessness as features of being-in-the-world that stimulate learning to ‘restore order’ in ‘landscapes’ that have become ‘unfamiliar’ for the purpose of reconstituting meaning. Education policy trends have moved public schooling in the U.S. towards a serious distortion and deterioration of focus and aims, a situation exacerbated by our current cultural surround, which reflects both disorder and meaninglessness. This presents us with dangers, but also with opportunities. The danger of a lack of meaningfulness in schooling today may, among other effects, result in hindering genuine civic and human development sorely needed in a society aspiring to democracy. Opportunity also arises, however, as a result of the human instinct to ‘make sense once again’; the learning that is stimulated by disorder may serve as an avenue of hope for keeping such aspirations alive. The outcome is bound to have repercussions for our society.

I attend here, then, to how it is that our present cultural surround comes to reflect such disorder and meaninglessness, and how education policy leads to constraints on the focus and aims of schooling today in such a way as to retard progress towards greater
understanding of what ‘order’ requires from an aspiring democracy. Both the danger and the opportunity play into the emergence (or not) of a curriculum of possibility. I work with the cultural surround, this post-9/11 America, acknowledging that there are difficulties in this landscape resulting from our multiple ways of seeing and being-in-the-world as Americans, difficulties magnified by the events of September 11th, 2001, and by how we as a nation responded to those events. Further, I use the national scene, rather than state or local foci, because of the new role of federal intervention in education policy, which I take some pains to elaborate below.

I work from a sense of the nation (or ‘nation-ness’) (Anderson, 1991, p. 4) as a cultural artifact, an ‘imagined political community’ (p. 6) that depends upon “the imagination as a social practice” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31) and involves conflicting social imaginaries not only colliding within the culture, but spilling over its own limits, beyond the boundaries of the nation-state itself (p. 40). In post-9/11 America, this has resulted in what I would characterize as multiple personality disorder, but, seen from the outside world, it looks very much like hypocrisy (Barber, 2001/1995), heralding further and perhaps greater dangers to come. In order to address these problems, I undertake here to explore, therefore, three distinct strands of inquiry as I consider this curriculum of possibility.

First, I explore academic discourse about education policy-making as a sign of the times in which we teach and learn (i.e., I follow the storylines of academic narratives about education policy). Second, I elaborate some of the difficulties posed by the social and political dysfunctions of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1991), which, together with Barber’s (2001/1995) dialectic between Jihad and McWorld, I treat as our present cultural surround. This is reasonable, since I’m looking for a curriculum of possibility in a post-9/11 era. Finally, in order to discover the potential for such a curriculum, I pursue an autobiographical approach (Pinar 2004, 1994, 1975) to mapping a schizophrenic dispersion of imaginaries of our nation and of citizenship. Multiple and diverse understandings emerged in the wake of questioning who we are as a result of 9/11 (Mailer, 2003). I view this approach as one way to re-envision how constituency might be viewed for purposes of education policy analysis. I use it to suggest a new paradigm for education policy-making (constituency-based) and to provide a counter-discourse to the triumphal (nationalistic) discourse—and its bullying backer, hypernational (fascist) discourse—and articulate my own concerns about the voyeurist (disoriented, disengaged, submitted) discourse that enables them both. The latter are elaborated below as I consider ‘cultures of citizenship’ (Nicholson-Goodman, 2006; Goodman, 2003) that showed up in my cultural portrait of American discourse following September 11th, 2001.

I am concerned with moving education policy in a direction that can help us to empower, rather than hinder, a curriculum of possibility in the face of these complications—i.e., with a paradigm for policy-making that can ‘make sense once again’ of what schooling is for, and that can also assist us to ‘reconstitute meaning’ in terms of ensuring that policy is turned towards a more (rather than less) democratic future. If ever there was a time when a new paradigm for education policy was needed, this is that time. However, I am obliged to ask whether space exists for such a shift, as well as how to ensure that this shift finds space to emerge, given the exigencies of the cultural surround.
Therefore, I begin by examining narratives of how education policy-making occurs and where it is taking us, and I focus specifically on the role of constituents, because this is where the question of who we say we are has greatest saliency, since our varying senses of belonging and identity are intimately connected to educational needs, concerns, and interests. The question of how the cultural surround contributes to disorder and meaninglessness is equally important because it shapes our narratives of self, both as individuals and as a nation. In order to address such a shift in policy-making, in other words, we must first know who the constituents are who require this shift, and why they require it.

Narratives about Education Policy

One strand of recent scholarship asserts that there is a vast right-wing movement composed of “idea brokers” (Kovacs and Boyles, 2005, p. 1) who determine what policy choices are made. This movement, according to Kovacs and Boyles, constitutes a coup by ultraconservative institutes, foundations, and think tanks that have wrested control over our schools from the public and placed them in privileged private (corporate) hands. The authors contend that “the voice dominating discourse over public education in America has a distinctly neoconservative tone” (p. 2), and raise the issue of the use of propaganda by those in positions of power to prop up support for a distinct ideological perspective on issues in which the public has a vested interest, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) (2002), as a fascist technique (p. 11). This is a theme that raises its ugly head repeatedly, and comes more clearly into sight as I consider the many constituencies (framed as cultures of citizenship) represented in post-9/11 American discourse.

Although “the desirability of corporate involvement in schools” has, according to Molnar (2001), “not gone entirely unchallenged” (p. 1), increased public contestation of the trend may or may not be successful. Molnar contends that “it is quite possible that by mid-century American public education will be transformed from an expression of democratic values into a system whose structure and functions are determined by mercantile criteria,” but argues that “this need not be the case” (p. 7). Offering a list of questions to be asked by local and state policy makers about specific practices or initiatives, Molnar concludes that

Within the realm of public education, the translation of citizens into consumers and students into a commercial resource to be harvested for the benefit of private interests would alter the character of not only America’s schools, but American civic culture as well. Whether a transformation this profound is to be embraced or rejected is a subject worthy of a far-reaching and vigorous public debate. (p. 7)

One problem we must confront, then, is how to get such a debate going so that it becomes ‘far-reaching’ and ‘vigorous’ enough to reach the ears, first of the public, and second, of policy-makers themselves—before it is too late.

A second strand of discourse reveals a similar trend in research, where scientific method is legislated through NCLB as the only method appropriate for educational research, “a sort of ‘regressive modernism,’ this disciplining and normalizing effort to standardize educational research in the name of quality and effectiveness,” which
Lather (2004) sees as “an attempt to hegemonize and appropriate to a reactionary political agenda deeper tendencies in cultural shifts” (p. 26). She notes “how the Right models Gramsci’s tactics of a ‘war of position,’” so that “through a series of... displacements, the state ‘plans, urges, incites, solicits, punishes’ (Hall, 1996, p. 429)” to form what might be called “a ‘new cultural politics of difference’ (Hall, 1996, p. 464)” (p. 26).

Lather’s concerns are broad and her analysis multilayered, but I highlight here one primary concern about the National Research Council’s (NRC) (2002) report—intended to “negotiate between the federal government and the educational research community what it means to do scientific educational research” (p. 17)—“rationality’s domesticating power” (p. 19), under which:

Values and politics, human volition and program variability, cultural diversity, multiple disciplinary perspectives, the import of partnerships with practitioners, even the ethical considerations of random designs: all are swept away in a unified theory of scientific advancement with its mantra of “science is science is science” across the physical, life, and social sciences. ...in the end, its efforts to provide guidelines for rigor and enhance a “vibrant federal presence” (NCR, 2002, p. 129) are complicit with the federal government’s move to evidence-based knowledge as much more about policy for science than science for policy” (p. 19).

While acknowledging that “it is not that ‘academic capitalism’ has not become our way of life,” Lather takes “particular interest” in “how conservative think tanks have ratcheted up their focus on education issues since the late 1980s and how entrepreneurial interests are at work” (p. 22). The question becomes, for Lather, “the extent to which we can promote critical work within such a milieu” (p. 22). In the end, the most “urgent questions become: Where are we going with democracy in this project? Who gains and who loses and by which mechanisms of power? Given this analysis, what should be done?” (p. 23).

Lincoln and Cannella (2004) also offer that specific research forms have “come under fire” from “traditional opponents of postmodern theoretical perspectives, affirmative action, and multiculturalism/diversity” in a scenario where the political Right has taken aim at a set of methods and methodological tools that have supported the exploration of identity politics, postmodern perspectives on literary texts, the experiences of multiculturalism, and other strategic social issues but that are themselves, as tools, not politically aligned or loaded. Clearly, identifying the sources of the attacks and deconstructing them enables qualitative researchers to understand more clearly the heart and soul of the political Right’s apparent fear of such methods. (p. 178).

Such forms of research are, according to Lincoln and Cannella, opposed by a conservative position that represents “an aversion to change, the insistence on retention of power, patriarchy, and perspectives that are grounded in the political Right” (p. 177). They acknowledge, however, that this use of the term ‘conservative’ is “economic, political, represent[s] multiple and contradictory meanings, and [is] grounded in Western Enlightenment/modernism” (p. 177), and they qualify its use for the purpose of speaking about
social justice (which goes straight to the question of constituencies). The question remains, then, as to how to characterize this ‘right-wing’—i.e., who are the actual ‘constituents’ of this movement? Has the American populace moved to the far right, or have the voices that get heard publicly simply managed to depict themselves as representative of the whole? Lincoln and Cannella posit a scenario where “special interest groups formed for purposes of creating a business lobby” coalesced with “New Right conservative groups” and the Republican Party “to create a social movement that would counter 1960s and early 1970s social gains,” a “sometimes accidental coalition” that has been at work over the past 30 years (p. 183).

What has been so destructive, according to these authors, is that “the attack is far reaching and has been so woven into the public’s imagination that even individual members of American society who would not want to limit diverse voices have accepted conservative Right discourses as truth” (pp. 183-184). Here the dilemma, along with the potential, of a loss of national identity—our sense of our nation as an aspiring democracy—in the wake of 9/11 poses an intriguing conundrum. Is it possible that the possibilities of ‘reconstituting meaning’ might come alive again in the face of national social trauma, despite the initial rush to ‘restore order’? Is it possible that as the nation looks back upon its responses, the responses of those charged with our protection as citizens (our ‘risk experts’), that the door to a curriculum of possibility is opened once again?

Right-wing conservatives have, in fact, often had their way in controversies over questions of curriculum content, as well as other aspects of K-12 schooling (Schlesinger, 1998; Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1993). The intrusion of 9/11 into this scenario appeared to secure, at least in the short-term, a firm foundation for nationalist discourses to gain popular appeal as Americans waved their flags, invoked God, and focused on security (Mailer, 2003). In such a setting, the New Right certainly seemed to have the upper hand. Barber (2001/1995), examining the state of the nation and world in the 1990s, had already characterized the actions of this segment of our society as a kind of tribalism he calls “American Jihad” (p. 9). In the larger cultural surround, however, he sees this segment of our society as a secondary, not the primary problem. That place is reserved in Barber for the forces of Jihad and McWorld (the latter of which represents free-market fundamentalism spawned by global neo-liberal economic and political forces), which pose the prospect of being caught in the fray as forces of ‘wild terrorism’ battle against the forces of ‘wild capitalism’ (p. xxiii).

Barber describes a world that “is falling precipitously apart and coming reluctantly together at the very same time,” offering us a confrontation between a global hegemony based on consumerism and feudal control of workers and citizens, on the one hand, and a form of tribalism that reflects “a return to the past’s most fractious and demoralizing discord,” “the menace of global anarchy,” on the other—in short, a “world totally ‘out of control’” (p. 4). He raises the question: “Can it be that what Jihad and McWorld have in common is anarchy: the absence of common will and that conscious and collective human control under the guidance of law we call democracy?” (p. 5). I would add to this the question: What does it mean when ‘common will’ and ‘conscious and collective human control’ may only be found on the Right side of the American political spectrum, while everyone else seems to be responding in other ways to the impacts of anarchy in these times?
My concern for the cultural surround therefore is with the notions of a re-envisioned and re-energized democratic polity and with the difficulties of conceptualizing ‘common will’ and ‘conscious and collective human control’ in a chaotically positioned and pluralist society. I therefore situate both public will and public control as features of a struggle for democratic thinking, principles, and action currently constrained and conflicted in post-9/11 America beyond measure. This is further complicated by the “mono-intellectualism” used by this right-wing coalition, which consistently presents the public with a form of critique that “holds academics responsible for all of society’s problems” and that “privileges a form of reasoning—however dominant—that acknowledges legitimacy only for those who... agree” (Lincoln and Cannella, p. 186). Space is reduced, in such a milieu, for re-envisioning and re-energizing democratic policy in any sense that could be inclusive of diverse perspectives, and therefore tilts dangerously towards fascism.

A teacher educator by profession, charged with introducing pre-service and in-service teachers to an orientation/re-orientation to the cultural surround within which schooling takes place, I highlight here as well another factor contributing to the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment (Schambach, 2004, p. 1) of this post-9/11 America. While my aim here is to locate hope for a curriculum of possibility suitable for sustaining an aspiring democracy—even as we endure a post-democratic surround—I must at the same time acknowledge and elaborate the complex transitions forging our present limitations. Our transition to a security state—and the anxieties related to such a shift—necessitate that I attend to the dynamics of a risk society and its sub-politics, which operate under the radar of democratic processes and lead to a form of anarchy that becomes normalized and is accompanied by a loss of social thinking (Beck, 1992). This loss is a major hurdle for a curriculum of possibility.

I review and critique education policy trends, pointing to the constriction of educational purposes and aims to serve special economic and political interests, and I provide a counter-discourse inspired at least in part by a newly emerging call to ‘educate for democracy,’ as well as by Barber’s own call for renewed visions of globally extended and thus ‘preventive democracy’—what Barber terms CivWorld (2004/2003, 2001/1995). Ultimately, however, it is to the question of who we say we are—or say we will create ourselves to be—that I turn, since this query strikes me as most salient for a curriculum of possibility suitable for a democratic future. To take such an approach requires some attention to the notion of autobiography, which I provide below—here, an autobiography of a (democratic) nation at risk.

The theme raised by Barber is the dialectic inherent in tensions between Jihad and McWorld; anarchy is the thread they have in common. For Barber, neither McWorld nor Jihad holds any promise for democracy; both are destructive. If democracy is to survive, according to Barber, CivWorld will have to emerge and will also have to confront the reactionary forces of American Jihad in order to gain a foothold among citizens in our post-9/11 nation. In the meantime, Barber argues, anarchy holds sway, and the autonomy of the nation-state—a key construct of American Jihad—is a thing of the past in a world that has become interdependent. This chaotic scenario is counter-productive to the pursuit of order (upon which sense-making depends), requiring new modes of orientation.
Confusion reigns where 'disorder is continually breaking in.' However, my focus is fixed firmly on a curriculum of possibility, on re-orientation in a “place” that was once familiar, but has become strange. I employ mapping as a means to ‘reconstitute meaning,’ following Greene’s lead, and use a research genre called social cartography (Nicholson-Goodman, 2006; Nicholson-Goodman and Paulston, 1996; Paulston, 2003, 2000/1996) to explore and name interrelations within the terrain. The landscape of disorder which I map here is the terrain of meaning-making surrounding citizenship in post-9/11 America, a nation mutating into a risk society as it flounders in its new awareness of being situated within post-national space (Barber, 2001/1995; Appadurai, 1996).

My gaze, however, is not set on social studies or civics education, although they certainly have their place at the table around which this conversation must occur. While I draw here in part on current scholarship examining complications arising in citizenship studies (Banks, 2004; Richardson and Blades, 2006), what I am seeking is a curriculum of possibility tending towards democracy that could empower our young to ‘re-orient’ to the new and unfamiliar terrain of post-9/11 America. A door of possibility must be found or made through education policy, a culture of power that looks to constituents to maintain its power, and is therefore dependent upon public will, even as it often seeks to manipulate—and even to coerce—that will.

Greene’s notion of this curriculum that presents itself as ‘possibility’ takes “place” as “a metaphor, in this context, for a domain of consciousness, intending, forever thrusting outward, ‘open to the world,’” but “it requires a subject if it is to be disclosed; it can only be disclosed if the learner... lends the curriculum his life” (2004/1971, p. 141). Such a curriculum must face the hurdles presented by disorder and meaninglessness if it is to succeed in awakening learners in such a way that they will ‘lend [such a curriculum] their lives.’ Even in these ‘dark times’ (Arendt, 1961), there are guideposts that might usher in the dialogue we so sorely lack as we tentatively make our way through the fog of multiple, complex and uncertain transitions. My goal here is to highlight some of these guideposts. I begin first by examining several narratives surrounding policy-making, its actors, and the culture within which it operates. I then consider pertinent features of the larger cultural surround with which a curriculum of possibility must contend. Finally, I seek space where such a curriculum might emerge in autobiography (Pinar, 2004, 1994, 1975) as a national project (albeit situated in post-national space) for citizenship studies.

Narratives of Policy-Making: Past into Present

In his introduction to Thirteen Questions, (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1992), Kincheloe offers that it is in the narratives “about what constitutes a good society, an ethical act, an authentic way of being human” that “the sub-story of education takes shape (Giroux and McLaren, 1989, p. xii)” (p. 1). He asserts that “a dramatic debate” took place in the 1980s over these narratives, but laments the fact that “too little of this debate has filtered to the public or even to the pre-service or in-service teaching of teachers” (p. 1). Acknowledging that “traditional stories (sometimes called the meta-narratives) were being attacked, he characterizes the response of the New Right as “an elaborate re-packaging of their tales” (p. 1) to serve their purposes. He takes us through a narrative of what the New Right has wrought relative to public education as they “rode to power on their skillful
depiction of a good vs. evil struggle,” where the modernist story of progress, characterized by a faith in traditional science, time as money, a cult of reason, an idealized notion of freedom framed within a decontextualized and vague humanism, and the superiority of the Western tradition, formed a tentative [sic] alliance with a fundamentalist Christianity and its Puritan vision of a Christian "theocracy on a hill" (Giroux, 1991, pp. 7-8). Education became one of the primary battlegrounds for the conservative forces, as a veritable “battle for the mind” took shape around issues such as school prayer, textbook content, government support for private Christian schools, the evaluation of teachers, phonics, the curriculum, and school management. The conservative story has certainly established itself as the dominant narrative... (pp. 1-2)

A curriculum of possibility is deeply challenged by a cultural surround that bears the markings of the simultaneously complementary and contradictory power grab of both McWorld and of what Barber (2001/1995) terms “American Jihad” (p. 212). We are witnessing, much as Stefancic and Delgado (cited in Kovacs and Boyes, 2005) presciently anticipated in 1996, “a future dominated by ultra conservative ideology, established and maintained by well-funded think tanks” (p.1), such that Black misery will increase. The gap between the rich and the poor... will widen. Women’s gains will be rolled back, foreigners will be excluded... Conservative judges... will repeal prisoners’ and children’s rights, and narrow women’s procreative liberties. Unregulated industries will require employees to work in increasingly unsafe workplaces, pollute the air and water, and set aside less and less money for workers’ health benefits and retirement. Tort reform will ensure that consumers and... patients injured by defective products, medical devices, and careless physicians will be unable to obtain compensation. Children will be required to pray in schools, absorb conservative principles of freemarket economics, salute the flag, and learn in English whether they know that language or not. (Stefancic and Delgado, cited in Kovacs and Boyles, p. 1)

Kovacs and Boyles point out that “while education is only one area where neoconservative think tanks seek to influence public policy, it has become the issue for many neoconservatives” (p. 1). Kovacs and Boyles highlight, for instance, the Bush administration’s use of propaganda to push education initiatives, both in the case of Armstrong Williams’ payment for promoting No Child Left Behind (NCLB) on his national television program and in the case of payment to the New York public relations firm, Ketchum, for producing a video disguised as a “news release” promoting this same initiative. The authors conclude that both the paid commentator and the “news” video qualify as propaganda. ...the use of tax dollars to promote neoconservative, corporatist ideology ... is illegal, and technically, it is fascist, for fascism obtains when public funds directly support corporate needs. (p. 11)

The right-wing political assault on how schooling is conducted narrowly restricts what is taught and how teaching occurs, as well as what counts, as we have seen, as research in education (Lather, 2004; Lincoln and Cannella, 2004). This is concurrent with the ‘corporatization’ (Kovacs and Boyles, 2005) and commercialization of American schools (Molnar, 2001). It is a matter of vital importance that schooling maintain as one of its primary aims preparation of our young against the adversities of these (and other) post-democratic tendencies in our cultural surround. I address this first, therefore, by considering current policy dangers, but seek hidden opportunities in
Looking back, we can see that the prospects for a curriculum of possibility are deeply impacted by our transition from competition between efficiency, equity, quality, and choice—as contentious historical claims for priority in education policy (Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt, 1989)—to the more current focus on education as a risk factor framed in terms of our national image, power, and security (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). In 1983 (as in 1957 with the launching of Sputnik), this nation was troubled by a growing fear that our place in the world was diminishing, that we were losing the race for world preeminence in what was then still a Cold War scenario. The ensuing education policy initiatives led to an increase in funding for specific (top-down) math, science, and foreign language curricula (Flinders and Thornton, 2004), among other reforms, while those fomenting the battles planted images of failing schools, ignorant and/or indifferent teachers, and lazy students in the public mind. They went so far as to claim that the failure of public schooling posed a threat to the nation and framed it as the moral equivalent of an act of war (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983).

This ongoing attack on public education (via its constituents)—on teachers, administrators, and on youth especially (Giroux, 2004)—as an institution that is failing the society has provided a rationale for takeover of the schools by particular economic and political forces, as noted (Kovacs and Boyles, 2005; Molnar, 2001). Vinson and Ross (2004) label this the spectacle-surveillance paradigm, where the spectacle of failing schools empowers a growing momentum towards surveillance of what schools do and how they do it, fully supported by the standards and accountability movement, but placed in the hands of those who stand to benefit from the privatization of all schooling for purposes of profit-making, consistent with Kovacs and Boyles’ estimation. It is therefore highly pertinent that schools were then, as they are now, hard pressed to solve the social ills and injustices that the polity will not address elsewhere.

Additionally, the ‘crisis’ in educational achievement, some believe, was one that was ‘manufactured’ as a maneuver to bolster public support for privatization (Berliner and Biddle, 1995), although this has been partially contended (Stedman, 1996). Despite his dispute with Berliner and Biddle’s analysis (p. 1), Stedman concluded that there was exaggeration for political purposes in the 1980s, but that the need for education reform was real, and what was truly needed was a reawakening and revitalizing of the polity itself:

Educators must challenge the vested interests that are more interested in profits than the welfare of communities and civil society. We must fight the economic displacements that disrupt families, produce violence, and undermine students’ development. We must take on the media conglomerates that are focused more on selling products than nurturing our cultural and intellectual life. We must change a system that values the bombastic broadsides of radio talk show hosts and political candidates over reasoned and civil discourse.

...school reform is no substitute for job creation, income redistribution, and political empowerment. We
must make our educational efforts part of a broader social and political agenda, one that promotes full employment, community revitalization, and civic participation. (p. 9)

Policy battles have continued over decades, with the federal government taking intermittent responsibility for varying kinds of interventions. In the 1970’s, arguments for “scientific management” as an ethos for how schooling should be conducted—historically framed in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and the elimination of waste—won out over broader conceptualizations of what schooling should be for and over how it should be conducted and evaluated (Kliebard, 2004/1975). In fact, under the first Bush administration, support for a private-sector organization—the New American Schools Development Corporation (NASCD)—“was intended to support the creation of ‘break the mold’ whole-school restructuring models” (Borman, 2005, p. 4) based on “a business model” of schooling that could be scaled up nationwide (p. 5). It was then, I believe, that McWorld truly took hold of the reins of public education to make it a market commodity, even as American Jihad, to use Barber’s term, was wresting public loyalty away from those who had previously held those reins to control K-12 schooling for its own ideological purposes (Schlesinger, 1998).

This focus was redefined under President George W. Bush in a way that “linked the issue of education to the imperative of national security” (DeBray, 2005, p. 45) and led to policies and legislation, especially the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) Act of 1965, that would weaken ESEA’s entitlements for the poor and disadvantaged and that would seek to privatize education. This legislation was now artfully renamed No Child Left Behind (NCLB); it seemed to be a promise to address social justice issues in education that had eluded effective resolution for decades. However, while the policy language promoting NCLB used the outright rhetorical claim of equity and the promise of quality nationwide to support the risk claim, the Act defined risk explicitly as the failure to produce adequate human resources for a competitive global economy and narrowed the curriculum to serve McWorld’s purposes. Thus the rhetorical power of equity and quality claims were used to manipulate public and political will, with ‘the imperative of national security’ providing the spectacle that could support punitive enforcement and its corollary, surveillance, which takes the form of high-stakes testing.

This initiative was, according to DeBray, the result of various factors that had come together in the 1990’s, and included: a climate of skepticism regarding social programs; the heightened role of conservative think tanks in education policy; a belief in the “superiority of market mechanisms over public institutions” (National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, cited in DeBray, p. 35); and a power position that enabled Republicans to pursue “an aggressive, conservative education agenda” (Brownback aide Chambers, cited in DeBray, p. 36). The “conservative think tanks... had developed proposals for weakening the structure of federal categorical education programs” (p. 36), and “the traditional education lobby groups... were displaced by newer, more conservative think tanks and coalitions” (p. 40).

With Democrats out of power, a newly revised right-wing interpretation of educational priorities came into play that sought “to influence media coverage and public opinion by emphasizing
Different dimensions of policy images for evaluating an issue” (Evans, cited in DeBray, p. 36). In 2002, President Bush signed NCLB into law as a purposefully redefined reauthorization of ESEA. ESEA had originally been passed to “offer equitable educational opportunities to the nation’s disadvantaged,” providing funds to “enhance the learning experiences of underprivileged children” (Thomas and Brady, 2005, p. 51).

The Act, however, now enacts, as NCLB, a turn “from an input-driven program to an outcome-driven one” (DeBray, p. 40). The initial results show that its “accountability requirements... were developed from a theoretical perspective and lacked an understanding of the complex issues involved in serving disadvantaged schoolchildren” (Thomas and Brady, p. 51). It is seen by many in education as “a Trojan horse for those who would challenge the very notion of a public school system,” and as a “ticking time bomb set to destroy them” due to its “special interest pleading and ideological agendas” (Meier et al, 2004, p. ix). It is relevant that these are the objections of those who see that

Schools need to be governed in ways that honor the same intellectual and social skills we expect our children to master, and—ideally—in ways the young can see, hear, and respect. At every point along the way we must connect the dots between our practice and democracy. (p. 78)

**Education Policy: A Reconceptualization**

Although Kincheloe frames the ‘battleground’ of education as a terrain of conflicting narratives, he also provides alternatives to the stories told by the New Right as he works to “confront the many dimensions of narrative composition” that need to be considered “in order to tell coherent, convincing stories,” and argues that one compelling consideration is “a system of meaning” (p. 2). Advancing a post-modern critique that is grounded in a “democratic system of meaning,” Kincheloe looks for “new ways of seeing ourselves, the world, and education” (p. 3). The goal of this meaning system is “to make the process of learning a democratic act—an act which refuses to be satisfied with dominant definitions of knowledge, intelligence, and school success (Kincheloe, 1991, pp. 28-47)” (p. 3). Offering that “hope exists in the formulation of the postmodern stories,” Kincheloe tells of the efforts of the New Right to undermine these stories in regard to education.

This occurred, according to Kincheloe, as conservatives “made the traditional Puritan dream fashionable again, and education was viewed as an avenue to individual fortune”—an avenue which would no longer tolerate the “breakdown of authority, patriotism, and discipline” occasioned, according to the New Right, by “a permissive liberal ethic” (pp. 1-2). Such a narrative, Kincheloe offered, was framed as “the crisis of schooling,” so that the New Right, since the late 1970s, has forced democratic progressives of any stripe into the position of having to defend failed or unpopular policies of the 1960s. Even though some of these policies were never given a chance to achieve their promise and despite the fact that many of the progressives forced to defend such programs have little or no historical or theoretical connection with 60s reforms, the Right has won hearts and minds with such a tact. (p. 4)
Kincheloe’s review takes us from the Reagan years, when a tense coalition was formed between right-wing ideologues, big business, and Christian fundamentalists, to the years of the first Bush presidency, when common ground was found by shifting attention to the teacher. He explains:

the accountability-based, standardized orientation of the excellence movement dovetails with the concerns of the advocates of Western tradition. The politically “inoffensive” story of the West can be transmitted and then scientifically assessed to make sure that teachers are performing their jobs properly (Ryan, 1989, p. 159; Giroux and McLaren, 1989, p. xix). (p. 6)

For Kincheloe, the focus on teachers took the form of making sure they were ‘getting the story right,’ adhering to nationalist doctrines. The New Right depicted attacks on America within the institution of public schooling as “unfair” and responded accordingly:

Schools set out to reclaim the legacy of American greatness and to quell the doubts. Turning to the authority of tradition, the right-wing leaders re-told the story of Manifest Destiny only in late twentieth century garb. Basking in the “great victory” in the Persian Gulf, George Bush heralded the story to the world, proclaiming that America had quieted her detractors. “Who can doubt us now?” he rhetorically asked. (p. 6)

If some of this has a familiar ring to my reader, it is perhaps because the only thing that has changed is the acquisition of greater control over education by this cultural clique. My reader should note that the ‘great victory’ in the Persian Gulf, we now know, led to tragedies for many Iraqis for more than a decade. This event and its accompaniments also contributed to the formation and growth of one ‘sodality of worship’ (Appadurai, 1996, p. 8)—Al Qaeda—that had already attacked us and would do so again on September 11th, 2001. Further, in the eyes of the world, we stand complicit in the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam Hussein, and this played out in our failure to garner genuine international support for our ‘liberation’ of Iraq, which has contributed to present difficulties in our current efforts. But, of course, we should realize that from a triumphal perspective, the rest of the world really doesn’t matter very much—after all, we are the ones who are ‘exceptional.’ How could teachers of good conscience ever ‘get this story right’? More importantly, where is the curriculum of possibility here?

Kincheloe argues for “a postmodern reconceptualization of schooling,” one that “assaults the foundational metaphors and assumptions of the right-wing educational story” (p. 11), along with their claim of ownership to tradition. He makes his point by offering that Tradition, even Western tradition, is a cacaphony of conflicting voices of which the Right has chosen only a few to build its standardized, Eurocentric, androcentric curriculum. Thus, the post-formal challenge refuses to allow Allan Bloom to dictate the official story of how our students came to be so shallow, William Bennett to define educational excellence, E.D. Hirsch to proclaim what constitutes cultural literacy, or Madeleine Hunter to determine the correct strategies by which the official knowledge is to be transmitted to students. (p. 14)

In the place of this right-wing misappropriated guardianship of
tradition, Kincheloe offers that “tradition must be subjected to a democratic analysis,” one that “explores tacit assumptions, underlying sources of authority used to ground judgments, and unexamined ideological assumptions which shape the questions we ask” (p. 15). The result, he says, would be “a liberating sense of the inconstancy of meaning—an uncertainty that allows us to see what before was hidden from view” (p. 15). Kincheloe’s depiction of the battle over changes in the sub-culture we call education is, however, just one narrative among several that ought to be considered here, and so I turn to other articulations.

Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt (1989), in “a cross-state comparative study of educational policy-making at a critical turning point” (p. xi), focused on ‘a cultural paradigm’ for policy-making (p. 4), framing their work as a ‘structural anthropology’ (p. 7). They tracked how shifts in value priorities have been incorporated into policy, and interviewed policy leaders as well about their own cultural leanings. The cultural paradigm, the authors note, “directs us to see that the polarities and conflicts in our values are the locus of cultural meaning-making for Americans” so that “we come to understand who we are” and “construct our meanings and values through the conflictual interactions of politics” (p. 15).

Their work reveals the prevalence of a diversity of vested interests, approaches, and outcomes in the culture of policy-making. The authors contend that they found an absence of Any ‘cultural vision’ except the necessity to possess and use power. ...Maintaining power is a basic purpose of the assumptive worlds of these policy-makers; ...the values underlying policies are often contradictory but their constituencies seek power to realize them; and visions of the purpose of the political system, or political cultures, drive different kinds of power systems. All these manifest the absence of a single unifying culture. (p. 174) Acknowledging that this as a “messy picture,” they contend that “there is no simple way to describe how the policy game is played,” and that meaning differs according to “what part of this elephant one touches, or on the kind of camera one uses for a snapshot...” (p. 174).

That conclusion leads me to believe that there may be space open—however slight—for new framings, new claims, new approaches to changing the focus of education policy, given an urgency that can move public will and a paradigm that can attract public support. It strikes me that the most powerful wedge for creating this opening is to be found in public consideration of the constituencies served—and those harmed—by policy decisions. Education policy-makers should be held accountable to the public for what their policies enact on behalf of each of their many competing constituencies.

My optimism is, however, tempered by the realities highlighted by another policy analyst, Mintrom (2001), who asserts that “some of the loudest and most influential voices in recent debates about the future of public schooling in the United States have claimed that democratic control of schools is the source of their performance problems,” and offers two reasons for challenging these claims:

First, they are based on an impoverished conception of humanity and of people’s abilities to work together for common purposes. Second, they use words like choice and freedom in the service of public policies that would actually limit democratic practice. (pp. 639-640)
Mintrom advises that we pursue both vigilance and optimism, warning that we should pay attention, in discussions of reform efforts, to “how those efforts might serve to further embed democratic practice” and urging that “heightened scholarly advocacy of democracy as a social practice” would not only be “refreshing,” but is also “necessary” (p. 640). For Mintrom, the challenge, then, is to look for democratic potentials within designs for the reform of educational governance or within emerging practices. The prospects here for creative theorizing and creative practice are many, and, done well, work of this sort could eventually prompt major shifts in how people think about education as a social activity. (p. 640)

Ultimately, it is Mintrom’s advice—to pursue both vigilance and optimism—that I seek to follow as I look to move theoretically towards a vision of nascent democracy via a curriculum of possibility. This curriculum needs to begin with a ‘far-reaching’ and ‘vigorous’ public debate about education, and with the opening of space for ‘democratic analysis.’ Such an approach may benefit somewhat from current advocacy supporting a call to ‘educate for democracy’ in the face of NCLB’s reduction of school curricula to ‘readin’, writin’, and ‘rithmetic, but this discourse is restricted to social studies and civics education projects and programs (Boston, 2005), rather than the broader considerations I raise here. I therefore treat it as a ‘jumping off point,’ rather than as the direct target of my remarks, although in no manner do I dismiss what social studies and civics education can accomplish, given the resources and the will to do them well.

‘Educating for Democracy’: What Does It Mean?

Recent work on civic engagement and civics education—and a growing advocacy movement supporting them (Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, 2004)—has called attention to a number of approaches to ‘educating for democracy’ (Boston, 2005; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). The literature indicates that concern for the preservation of democracy through such educational strategies is strong (e.g., Gagnon, 2004; Glenn & Hergert, 2004; Haynes & Chaltain, 2004; McPike, 2003; CIRCLE, 2002; Ford, 2002; Vermeer, 2002). It is a sign of hope that such movements are coalescing into a well-honed cry for the needs of a democratic polity in our times, but a multitude of questions remain about the meaning of such a call.

For instance, Westheimer and Kahne’s (2004) study of ten educational programs in the U.S. “that aimed to advance the democratic purposes of education” (p. 237) derived a typology to answer the question: “What kind of citizen?” The study derived three types of citizen promoted by these programs: the ‘personally responsible,’ the ‘participatory,’ and the ‘justice oriented’ (p. 238). The authors found the ‘personally responsible’ approach problematic in that this form of civics education could as easily serve the needs of a totalitarian state as those of a democracy (p. 244), while students experiencing the ‘participatory’ orientation “tended to downplay or ignore explicitly political or ideologically contentious issues” and “were not able to talk about how varied interests and power relationships or issues of race and social class might be related to the lack of consensus on priorities and the inability of varied groups to work effectively together” (p. 261). The authors state that the narrow and often ideologically conservative conception of citizenship embedded in many current efforts at teaching for democracy reflects neither arbitrary choices nor pedagogical limitations but, rather, political choices that have political consequences. (p. 237)
It might seem like a no-brainer to say that educating for democracy is political, but ‘democracy’ has become a “master term” with multiple meanings and interpretations (Appadurai, p. 37), so that considering the politics of the call to ‘educate for democracy’ is warranted. Increasingly, other realms of discourse raise equally pertinent issues: for example, Banks’ (2004) concern that “students develop thoughtful and reflective cultural, national, and global identifications and attachments” (p. 1); Castles’ (2004) concern that they “be educated in ways that will enable them to function effectively in multiple communities” (p. 1); and Ong’s (2004) concern with the tension between “the production of a democratic citizenry and the production of neoliberal subjects” in U.S. higher education (p. 2).

Additionally, Carson (2006) is concerned with “the fragmented curriculum” of citizenship and its role in producing the citizen who is “a lonely and self-interested individual, one who is... likely resentful of the demands of community” (p. 26); Pinar (2006) argues that “the very category of the civic is saturated with the sexual and the racialized” (p. 103); and Smith (2006) urges that “global citizenship must come to terms with... one nation-state being determined to control the terms of citizenship itself” (p. 131). The list of concerns—and of important scholarship about them—goes on. I confine my focus here to ways of seeing citizenship (constituting an autobiography of the nation) in terms of the constituencies that education policies need to serve if we are to move forward towards a more democratic future.

Transcending the limitations of this call does not mean rejecting the need for fuller, deeper, and more proactive social studies and civics curricula in our schools. But it does mean that broader considerations need to be taken into account in discussions of policy, including those features of the cultural surround making everyday life more difficult, more confusing, less satisfying, and less amenable to a democratic future. These are the features that often hinder learners from ‘lending the curriculum their lives.’ They speak as well to questions of ‘what kind of citizen’ we are expecting, given this surround.

Complicating the Conversation: Attributes of a Risk Society

Post-9/11 America that has become a hotly contested terrain aflame with passions driving multiple layers of social division. Dramatically and before our eyes, post-9/11 America has become a prototype of the ultimate risk society, reflecting the dynamics of social disruption, manipulation, obfuscation, and division that accompany such a social re-ordering. Beck’s (1992) Risk Society revealed changes in social relations as techno-economic forces of modernity introduced risks and hazards into the environment ‘under the radar’ of democratic processes. While Beck’s work addresses changes resulting from environmental risks and hazards, his portrayal of this social re-ordering bears an uncanny resemblance to much of what we are seeing today, engendered in part by our need and desire for public security. The dynamics of such a society bear closer scrutiny than they have as yet borne as we consider how the public interest—the basis upon which citizenship is built—is affected by the social changes risk produces.

In Beck’s work, the risk society is a space where the “political potential of catastrophes” emerges—a “catastrophic society” where “the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm” [italics his] (p. 24). Since “risks produce new international inequalities,” they “undermine the order of national jurisdictions,” and “in this sense, the risk society is a world risk society” [italics his] (p. 23). The “loss of
“social thinking” (p. 25) is one effect of ‘the concept of system’ as the arbiter of social change, which leads to a “general lack of responsibility” on the part of individual citizens (p. 33).

Beck notes that “the center of risk consciousness lies... in the future” [italics his] (p. 34). Beck offers that we “become active today in order to prevent, alleviate, or take precautions against the problems and crises of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow” (p. 34). For Beck, the picture looks very much like this:

Everywhere the spotlight in search of a cause falls, fire breaks out, so to speak, and the hastily assembled and poorly equipped ‘argumentation fire company’ must try to put it out with a powerful stream of counter-arguments... Those who find themselves in the public pillory as risk producers refute the charges as well as they can ...and attempt to bring in other causes and thus other originators. The picture reproduces itself. Access to the media becomes crucial. ...arguments capable of convincing the public... become a condition of... success. Publicity people, the ‘argumentation craftsmen’, get their opportunity in the organization. (p. 32)

“By nature,” Beck argues, “risks have something to do... with destruction that has not yet happened but is threatening, and of course in that sense risks are already real today” (p. 33). At the same time, risks are also unreal, so that “the actual social impetus of risks lies in the projected dangers of the future” [italics his] (p. 34)—and so it is for threats to our national security as well. Since these risks have a global reach, their effects—both real and unreal—are ubiquitous. This has its own implications:
Where everything turns into a hazard, somehow nothing is dangerous anymore. Where there is no escape, people ultimately no longer want to think about it. This... allows the pendulum of private and political moods to swing in any direction. The risk society shifts from hysteria to indifference and vice versa. Action belongs to yesterday anyway. (p. 37)

The result, Beck notes, is that “the basis and motive force” of the risk society is not equality, but rather safety, and “the utopia of the risk society” is “peculiarly negative and defensive,” in part because “one is no longer concerned with attaining something ‘good,’ but rather with preventing the worst” (p. 49). In this society, “the commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need. ...solidarity from anxiety arises and becomes a political force” (p. 49).

Political choices in the risk society appear to lie along one of two paths: either the problems “require... a focused and massive ‘policy of counter-interpretation’ or a fundamental rethinking and reprogramming of the prevailing paradigm of modernization” (p. 52). In the current scenario, the latter has been ignored, while ‘counter-interpretation’ has taken front and center stage. But the sub-politics of the risk society run deep, and Beck’s assessment is chilling:

tnewly arising... commonalities of danger... collide with national-state egoisms... the dangers grow, but they are not politically reforged into a preventive risk management policy. ...it is unclear what sort of politics or political institutions would even be capable of that. An incomprehensible community emerges
A Curriculum of Possibility Redux

I point here to a curriculum of possibility that recognizes the social and political dysfunction of our status as a risk society. We need a revitalized commitment to Dewey’s (1938) notion of freedom of intelligence (Boydon, 1988), and so I draw on Greene’s (1986) search for a critical pedagogy, her (1988) exploration of a dialectic for freedom, and her (1995) work on releasing the imagination.

We need to focus on how schooling might more fully prepare our young in terms of the moral will and creative energies needed to navigate a chaotic complex of conflicting social values and conceive and/or negotiate better ways of being-in-the-world. I see this moral-creative energy as the first strand of this curriculum. Openness to—and awareness and appreciation of—diverse social constructs and realities affecting identity and belonging, and learning to work across those differences, strikes me as an essential component of citizenship in our times. This would involve heightened attention to developing our social-constructive affect. Finally, developing and applying informed and appropriate citizen responses to risk could empower those who might build a democratic future in the face of adversity. This would require that our young are working with a well-informed critical-responsive intellect, the third strand of a curriculum of possibility. Discourse about right-wing policies suggests that we may be approaching a tipping point where authoritarianism becomes fascism. The schools are not just a primary loci of attack, they are also a primary loci of resistance. How can we ignore the needs of our young to face off against such adversity? How can we expect them to act if they are not even equipped to understand? How can we ask them to do what we won’t?

We can continue to engage in our own readings and renditions of risk—and to stay focused on schooling as a site closely allied with a future for democracy—in order to foment a sea change of priorities in educational policy-making for the public interest. The question of where to begin leads me to propose working towards this curriculum of possibility with a public conversation based on autobiography. We need to acknowledge, honestly and in a genuine search for resolution, that we have always been a nation at odds with our better selves over both our aspirations and our failures (West, 2004). At the same time, we have the benefit of aspiring towards realizing our democracy as a matter of historical narration of the nation’s purpose and destiny (West, 2004); it is our habit of mind, how we think about ourselves and the nation (Dewey, 1988/1939).
The question of who we say we are as Americans, or who we will create ourselves to be in a post-9/11 era, is a question of immense importance, and may truly require some difficult soul-searching. There is no doubt that we have been confused about who we are as a nation. Mailer (2003) perhaps put it best when he wrote: What in God’s name was happening? It is one thing to hear a mighty explosion. It is another to recognize some time after the event that one has been deafened by it. ... An identity crisis builds slowly, or it can strike like a thunderclap, but the effect is unmistakable. One can no longer offer a firm declaration of who one is. The seat upon which the ego depends has been slipped out from under. The psyche is in a sprawl. ...A mass identity crisis for all of America descended upon us after 9/11, and our response was wholly comprehensible. We were plunged into a fever of patriotism. ...We had to overcome the identity crisis—hell, overpower it, wave a flag. (pp. 10-12)

This ‘identity crisis’ is the dilemma that defines the public interest in our times. It is further exacerbated by the reality that the ‘nation’ is an imagined community, unlike the state, which is an actual entity (Anderson, 1991), and that this imagined community is composed of many peoples. I work here with the central idea of mapping the interrelations of multiple narratives of identity defined by a range of social imaginaries so diverse that the ways in which they relate to one another take us well beyond the ‘culture wars’ of the past (Shor, 1986).

Schooling for democratic public will and capability is dependent upon the return to a sense of wholeness, which requires a more generous and civil public conversation than has been afforded space in recent years. Our vulnerabilities lie exposed: suppression of dissent has been put forth as a desperate effort at prescribing unity in the face of anxiety, but also as a punitive effort to shame dissenters into submission. These vulnerabilities belie, for many concerned citizens, our professed belief in America as a towering fortress and a stable democracy, especially in light of the portal to terror that opened before us on September 11th, 2001, and the questionable responses of our governmental agencies and authorities—our presumed ‘risk experts.’

Our vulnerabilities lie as much within our own sense(s) of national being as they do beyond it. Public anxiety over our inability to cope reasonably with security in public spaces; exposure of failed leadership on multiple official fronts; controversies arising from a politics of corruption, manipulation, and fanaticism; and the exacerbation of government intrusion into our everyday lives, inter alia, have, sadly, become more or less accepted features of the cultural surround. Many hold schooling up as the fount of hope for change. The key here, in my thinking, is working towards greater public understanding of the diverse visions, interests, and needs of multiple constituencies, and the creation of the kind of public will needed to serve them and to move policy-makers to take proactive democratic positions on behalf of those constituencies.

Finally, therefore, I present an approach to making sense of the chaotic complex of conflicting social values that makes up the terrain of America and of being American following a social moment that brought one constituency—the hypernational—out of its hiding in the shadows, forcing us to face our dark side. This approach demonstrates that there is space—even with our national psyche in sprawl—for a curriculum of possibility that could help our young re-orient in unfamiliar terrain, and that could ultimately birth new vision in the struggle toward democracy.
An (Anecdotal) Autobiography of Post-9/11 America: Genealogy of the Work

I began this project by mapping public, political, and academic discourse following September 11th, 2001, discourse that candidly and naively—due to the shock and awe of 9/11—disputed meanings of America and of being American in the face of terror. I bore in mind Apple’s plea for “alternative visions bearing witness to the negativity of existing patterns of interaction and knowledge” and his assertion that “the knowledgeable critique, the standing in witness, is the prior act [emphasis his]” (in Pinar, 1975, p. 91). The mapping served as a way to compose an (anecdotal) autobiography of the post-9/11 nation as we endured this identity crisis. It provided me the opportunity to outline a cultural portrait where coexisting cultures of citizenship clash and collide on many issues. It thereby highlighted as well the difficulties of living in a pluralistic society in a time when orthodoxy and control actively seek to rule the day.

I utilized Pinar’s (2004, 1994, 1975) method of currere and its central notion of autobiography as a means to distance oneself from the given or taken for granted (Greene, 1995, 1988) in notions about the curriculum of schooling. The process of autobiography—methodically exploring one’s consciousness in relation to what is conveyed and/or imposed—was cultivated for the purposes of conceptualizing personal, political, and intellectual emancipation to more fully engage with and participate in the curriculum of learning, being, and growth. The process involves four stages. The first is the regressive moment, where the learner free associates to recall the past and to enlarge her memory. The second is the progressive moment, where the student of currere imagines possible futures. The third is the analytic moment, where the learner must integrate his understandings of past, present, and future. Finally, there is the synthetical moment, which involves re-entering the lived present in such a way as to put it all together (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman, 1995).

I extended the application of this approach from the individual to the nation as a very specific imagined community (Anderson, 1991), one that employs diverse, diasporic and deterritorialized social imaginaries in postnational space (Appadurai, 1996). The mapping, drawn from discourses following September 11th, 2001, represents the regressive moment. The second phase, the progressive moment, is reflected in the construction of a tripartite vision of schooling as moral-creative, social-constructive, and critical-responsive. The third phase, the analytic moment, is represented by inspecting transitions in policy priorities vis-à-vis what education is for as they impact issues of ‘race’ and ‘soul.’ Last, I move into the synthetical moment by working to understand what needs to be done (and can be done) given the ‘then,’ the ‘now,’ and my apprehension about the ‘soon-to-be.’

The cultural portrait, while my construction, takes its shape from the interrelations of disputed and disputatious social imaginaries reflected in, as noted, post-9/11 discourses. I used a research genre from the field of comparative education that draws on hermeneutics to analyze such discursive interrelations—social (or comparative) cartography (Nicholson-Goodman, 2006; Nicholson-Goodman and Paulston, 1996; Paulston, 2000/1996, 1995, 1993; Paulston and Liebman, 2000/1996)—to perform the mapping itself. In this inquiry approach, the map represents “cognitive art, the artist’s scholarship resulting in a cultural portrait” (Paulston and Liebman, 2000, p. 14). September 11th, 2001, was a watershed for a changing social, cultural,
and political terrain reshaping conventional American understandings of democracy, which had been taken for granted by too many as a ‘given.’ In such times, conceptual maps can help us make our way around the messy and disputatious terrain (Paulston, 1993) we call home. To let those in power revise and constrain the territory and its boundaries, twist its dynamics to their own ends, and mystify the resulting changes is unwise. Much was revealed as terror and chaos came into full view. Reactions were intense as a result of our then-new national sense of vulnerability. I conceptualized the autobiography in an effort to enrich our understanding of our differences and to open our discourses about the nation and citizenship to a more ‘generous and generative’ (Henderson & Kesson, 2004) spirit of public dialogue. My aim was to draw attention to a number of features of the ‘complicated conversation’ (Pinar, 2004) we were somewhat unwittingly engaged in.

Comparative cartography—mapping the epistemological or ontological terrain of social scapes—opens space to consider the interrelations of multiple narratives, especially mini-narratives vying for space against dominant meta-narratives, consistent with Kincheloe’s reconceptualization of schooling based on multiple narratives (above). Such an approach releases the imagination by allotting space for alternatives to the ‘given’ (Greene, 1995, 1988).

The mapping project was useful for portraying the complexities of national identity, yielding a figure depicting the interrelations of diverse understandings of nation and citizenship—a conceptual autobiography of post-9/11 America (see Figure 1, Appendix).

We might consider this representation as a starting point for contextualizing features of a curriculum of possibility for addressing civic-cultural issues in post-9/11 America. This would be enhanced by ongoing monitoring and analysis of the education policy-making environment and its relationship to the civic culture within which schooling is embedded, which forms a dominant public sphere unique to education. Most importantly, however, as noted above, we need to scrutinize how these constituencies differ in terms of their educational needs, interests, and desires, and also their understandings of what it means to be a nation and what citizenship involves. The social fabric we form together as a nation has been portrayed by the media as though it had a rent in the middle; this depiction is inaccurate. In fact, I would argue, we are suffering from schizophrenic multiple personality disorder, and we need to find a way to ‘get it together.’ We can only do so as we realize that our many personas can coalesce, but that it will take a domain of consciousness—in Greene’s terms, “intending, forever thrusting outward, ‘open to the world’” (2004/1971, p. 141)—in order to realize a curriculum of possibility for a democratic future. As long as education policy-makers hold the reins, they should be the target of accountability investigations vis-à-vis those constituencies that are best served and those who are actually harmed. It will take such drama to get a ‘far-reaching’ and ‘vigorous’ public debate into play.
people living under a weight, a nameless inertial mass. ...Where are the sources of questioning, of restlessness? (Greene, 1986, p. 427)

The conceptual mapping I have articulated here signals that ranges of attitudes and perspectives within this ‘inertial mass’ do exist, that there are different ways of being American and different modes of expressing and enacting our citizenship. My concern here, of course, is the curriculum that lies within all of this, and this mapping project serves to illuminate at least some broad outlines of a curriculum of possibility. Here illumination might serve emancipating purposes through greater research and dialogue among those communities and citizens who are able and willing to engage in the work of resuscitating our public sphere, even in the face of adversity posed by McWorld, by Jihad, and by American Jihad. This is, after all, the trajectory of civic courage.

Greene speaks of a disruption of what William Blake referred to as “mind-forg’d manacles” (1986, p. 430), locating this disruption in the public sphere:

The American tradition originated in... the critical atmosphere specific to the European Enlightenment... created in large measure by rational, autonomous voices engaging in dialogue for the sake of bringing into being a public sphere. ... Liberty, at the time of the founding of our nation, meant liberation from interference by the state, church, or army in the lives of individuals. ... liberty also meant each person’s right to think for himself or herself, “to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead” in an atmosphere that forbade “mental slavery.” (p. 430)

Greene elaborates a heritage that it is congruent with those whose foundation for citizenship is located in the space of reason (rationality); this is not the only framework, however, that pertains. Increasing numbers of citizens hold onto orthodoxy as their foundation. And there are many whose foundation is blurred by a shift to perspective as they tread new and uncertain territories. When we consider modes of civic engagement, we see citizen behaviors moving in any of a number of directions: sanctioning government policy and practice based on a desire for control; debating legitimacy on a per-policy basis and relying on representation; or working for empowerment through collective activism to oppose, present, and change particular policies. Such is the life, the struggle, the imagining of America as a nation.

Autobiography of a (Democratic) Nation at Risk

The stories we tell about ourselves as a nation and as citizens within that nation are, in fact, quite extraordinarily diverse. Eight variations on America and on being American emerged, each one reflecting its own ‘culture of citizenship’ (Nicholson-Goodman, 2006; Goodman, 2003). These cultures of citizenship reflected distinct notions about foundations of citizenship (based on orthodoxy, reason, or perspective) accompanied by notions about preferred modes of civic engagement (anchored in control, representation, or activism). The differences in primary features, modes of discourse, and perceived role of the nation and its citizens may be seen in Figure 1 (see Appendix). The resulting cultures of citizenship are: triumphal, voyeurist, vigilant, pluralist, globalist, reparationist, communitarian, and hypernational.
Each of these cultures of citizenship serves as a constituency with distinct characteristics. Space constraints prevent more than simply highlighting here central tendencies in each, as follows:

*triumphal: the culture of American exceptionalism embodied in the 'one true narrative' of the nation as God-fearing and therefore blessed, selfless, and righteous, where calls emerge for faithfulness to prevailing doctrines to reap the blessings bestowed upon the nation by an approving God;

*voyeurist: the submissive, acquiescent, seduced, or indifferent culture of an overwhelmed, uninformed, and/or insecure citizenry who expect their leaders to guide them through troubled times, as they passively watch (or not);

*vigilant: the sanctioning, but not submissive, culture of citizens who seek protection and security, but who nevertheless hold their leadership and experts 'accountable' and keep an actively watchful eye on them;

*pluralist: the culture of citizens who realize that there is more than one narrative of the nation in play, that there are 'counterstories' to be told (Lopez, 2002), and who esteem difference and perspective as elements of 'the American way';

*globalist: the culture of citizens who acknowledge the interconnectedness and interdependence of all peoples, see the nation as a 'global citizen,' and appreciate that its historic role in the world is implicated in the present chaos;

*reparationist: the culture of citizens who argue that in order for the nation to move forward, i.e., to be 'the beacon of freedom' that we proclaim ourselves to be, amends must be made for the wrongs that have been done;

*communitarian: the 'solidarity' culture that emphasizes the need to address inequities and injustices in unity and to transform the larger culture in those terms; and

*hypernational: the coercive culture of citizenship that serves as a support to the triumphal, seeking to castigate as internal enemies and traitors all those who fail to display solidarity with this enunciation of America.

Each forms a constituency, and most constituencies (with the exception, perhaps, of the voyeurist) have their own policy interests related to what schooling should accomplish. So what does this autobiography and its derived constituencies mean, relative to a curriculum of possibility?

First, it means that in order to address such a curriculum—in ways that are consistent with vigilant, pluralist, globalist, reparationist, and communitarian cultures of citizenship—we must first find moral and creative ways to compete for and win legitimacy in a cultural surround where triumphal and hypernational cultures of citizenship currently prevail over public policy and (up to this moment) even public will, and where their discourses play out in our schools as the battleground of first resort. This necessarily involves working as well to alleviate the psycho-social deficit implicit in having a sizeable voyeurist culture of citizenship in our midst, which may to some
extent be the result of social, economic, and political paralysis, but may also be related to the soulless nature of our cultural surround (Barber, 2001/1995; Berman, 2000). In order to move and/or appropriate public discourse towards this end, we need to continually seek and actively promote new avenues for voices silenced by McWorld and American Jihad to be heard and to be published widely.

Current policy trends in education and education research militate against this as they re-install and reinforce a paradigm that emanated from the ‘fathers’ and privileges the elite, self-proclaimed Deciders-of-Truth who currently hold—and increasingly, are grabbing—power (Lather, 2004), but working to foment and support a greater public cry for educating for democracy may be a first step, in spite of its limitations. Additionally, greater coordination and collaboration on the part of all parties interested in a curriculum of possibility is needed to strengthen ourselves across differences in the face of adversity. Finally, despite the constraints of present education policy and of the cultural surround, those who are concerned about post-democratic trends need to labor on behalf of creating and sustaining a democratic and inclusive moral conscience that is both critical and responsive to the actualities with which (or under which) we live.

Nothing less will suffice to move our nation (which is, after all, nothing more than the sum total of our various imaginings as they find collective, public expression) and thus our citizens on a path towards democratic aspirations, as West (2004) points out so eloquently:

This democratic armor allows us to absorb any imperial and xenophobic blows yet still persist. It permits us to face any anti-democratic foe and still persevere. It encourages us to fight any form of dogma or nihilism and still endure. It only requires that we be true to ourselves by choosing to be certain kinds of human beings and democratic citizens indebted to a deep democratic tradition and committed to keeping it vital and vibrant. This democratic vocation wedded to an unstoppable predilection for possibility may not guarantee victory, but it does enhance the probability of hard-won progress. (pp. 217-218)

This notion of donning democratic armor strikes me as congruent with Barber’s notions of preventive democracy. We need to find a curriculum of possibility to protect our young, a curriculum that is at once moral-creative, social-constructive, and critical-responsive, given the adversity of working in a risk society in post-national space, our post-9/11 America. In Barber’s (2004/2003) terms, we may have to become not eagles—“clinging to the hope that America’s ancient prerogatives and classical sovereignty embodied in the will to war are enough” (p. 237)—but rather, owls yielding to interdependence and seeking to enact preventive democracy both as a short-term prophylactic against terrorism and a long-term strategy aimed at educating citizens and placing them at the center of national and global life. ...Real power today lies in being able to will common global laws rather than in asserting individual national sovereignty. The logic of liberty and the logic of security can be joined: their buckle is democracy. Over true democracy, over the women and men whose engaged citizenship constitutes true democracy, fear’s empire holds no sway. (pp. 237-238)

The caveat I offer here is simply that in order to accomplish such a
lofty transformation of our social imaginaries, we must first find a curriculum of possibility—one to which our young will willingly ‘lend their lives,’ one substantial enough to withstand the portal to terror that opened before our eyes on September 11th, 2001—and all its accompaniments—and this will require tremendous effort.

Most importantly, we need to address the hypernationalist phenomenon, banding together to resist this pull-and-push towards fascism in the name of unity. We need to address the triumphal phenomenon because it keeps us separated and insulated from those in our nation who have not yet reaped the benefits of its promises, whose lives do not reflect the blessings that could have been bestowed by democracy achieved and actualized, and because it separates us from the rest of the world, falsely elevating us ‘above’ the rest of humanity.

We need to address the soullessness of our cultural surround, forged and marketed by McWorld, in order to be able to dream of better ways to be in the world. We need to address our lack of willingness and capability for working across differences as we face adversity of all kinds—neither ignoring cultural differences (and their historical realities) nor letting them divide us. We need to address our capability for taking on the tough issues, for facing new realities, for working towards social critique and engaging with, rather than drawing back from, the VUCA environment in which we live, work, and dream. In short, we must re-envision and enact new democratic ideals, forms, and principles of responding to all that we are facing in post-9/11 America.

Greene’s (1986) search for a critical pedagogy leads her to consider Arendt’s view of power and its use:

> For Hannah Arendt... power is kept in existence through an ongoing process of “binding and promising, combining and covenanting.” As she saw it, power springs up between human beings when they act to constitute “a worldly structure to house... their combined power of action.” When we consider the numbers of people excluded from this process over the generations, we have to regard this view of power as normative as well. It is usual to affirm that power belongs to “the people” at large; but, knowing that this has not been the case, we are obligated to expand the “worldly structure” until it contains the “combined power” of increasing numbers of articulate persons. A critical pedagogy for Americans, it would seem, must take this into account. (pp. 430-431)

Acting to expand ‘a worldly structure’ through which citizens might put their ‘combined power of action’ to good use according to their own social imaginaries lies at the root of many of these constituencies (cultures of citizenship). Some constituencies, however, are so focused on power and exclusion that they cannot be ignored, especially where they lead us down the dark path towards fascism. We cannot afford to ignore this dimension of our imaginaries. They live among us and call our home their home. Sometimes we must clean house, and sweep away what would keep us from our democratic aspirations. Even if the only result is that our dark side steps back into the shadows where it was lurking, waiting to emerge all along, there is something to be said for bringing it into the light and exposing it to public airing.
Others continually struggle to be heard, sometimes just for space to speak in a surround that doesn’t encourage their wandering from the orthodoxies, from the taken for granted about which Greene has so much to say. We are obliged to safeguard this space, to grow it, to keep it open to the airing of new understandings, new lived realities. Opening to multiple perspectives is not always comfortable, not always the tidy experience we expect it to be. Sometimes in confronting the ‘others,’ we wind up confronting ourselves, seeing ourselves with new eyes. We don’t seek to sow discomfort, but we do seek to be open to the pain of others’ experiences of their positioning (or lack of it) and to find ways to meet one another on common ground. Now is the time to act, to combine our limited power with that of the many other ‘articulate persons’ in the world as we work to enact a curriculum of possibility to which our young may, in good conscience, ‘lend their lives.’ Nothing less will suffice for the survival of the democratic aspirations of this nation. In a very real sense, democracy must be born anew to be borne out in the lives of all of us.

References

Academy for Educational Development for the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools (2004, November), Advancing the Civic Mission of Schools: What schools, districts, and federal and state leaders can do.


Giroux, H. A. (2005), War talk and the shredding of the social contract: Youth and the politics of domestic militarization. (In Fischman et al., Critical Theories, Radical Pedagogies, and Global Conflicts, pp. 52-68.)


