DUDEK ON FRYE

or,

Not a Poet's Poetics

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Perhaps nothing written during the three decades that Northrop Frye reigned as Canada's most eminent literary figure expresses the spirit of his work so neatly as the title of an article published in The Globe and Mail shortly after his death. In the title of the essay, "Frye's soaring cathedral of thought," the author, Robert Fulford — or the editors — managed to neatly sketch Frye's chief preoccupations and the premises underlying his approach to literature and culture: 'soaring' for the great, hopeful schemes he drew up, 'cathedral' for his underlying religious nostalgia, and 'thought' for the essentially idealist nature of his theories, all these part of and tributary to his great encyclopedic intellect. Whatever the difficulties with Frye's work, as the image of a soaring cathedral of thought implies, it was certainly ambitious, grand, and impressive; and like the great Gothic monuments of centuries ago it will continue long after its creator to inspire and trouble, to intimidate and intrigue.

In Canada, Northrop Frye was a monument during his own lifetime and, despite his international renown, a typically Canadian monument at that. For while most countries have as their greatest literary figures poets, novelists, and playwrights (Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare), Canada has a critic and theorist, confirming by analogy Frye's own comment that Canadians are more capable administrators than businessmen: they are better at taking care of money than making it; and that in no other country are accountants held in such high esteem. Similarly, the man who became the most renowned figure in Canadian letters was not one who created in the traditional sense, but a critic, one who explains and explicates, and particularly so in Frye's case one who rationalizes what others have done — a literary accountant. Yet this designation should in no manner be taken as a slight; for unquestionably, as a man of letters Frye rendered an important service to Canadian culture. He holds the (not to be undervalued) distinction of having resisted tempting offers from prestigious universities such as Princeton, and of having stayed home to carve out a place for himself and his new discipline at Victoria College (University of Toronto), a conservative institution in an eminently conservative context. Northrop Frye, it should be remembered, became the
University of Toronto's first Professor of English — in 1967, almost a half-century after scholars like F. R. Leavis and I. A. Richards had established the legitimacy of English studies in Britain, and a generation after the New Critics had done the same in the United States. Frye's influence outside the universities as a public critic was equally important: he wrote regularly as a reviewer for many journals, including The Hudson Review and, more significantly for Canada, The Canadian Forum, where as editor he encouraged (and sometimes discouraged) new poets throughout the 1960s. His importance was such that George Woodcock, in The Oxford Companion to Canadian Literature, writes that with his annual surveys of Canadian writing "Frye contributed more than any other critic to establishing the criteria by which Canadian writing might be judged."

That Frye became Canada's most famous man of letters is perhaps a typically Canadian irony. Yet an irony it is; for in a country where searching for a national identity, where defining ourselves as distinct from Americans is almost a national neurosis, the international symbol of Canadian letters is a critic whose theories imply that if a Canadian writer has made great art, it is ultimately not because he or she has captured the essence and particularity of Canada, but because his work successfully manifests archetypes or myths for which such notions as a national identity are absolutely inconsequential. This position, that literature is not about the immediate, particular world we live in, but first of all about a great mythological system, has often been criticized, in particular (since the publication of the Anatomy of Criticism) by Frye's fellow Canadian, the poet Louis Dudek.

Though Dudek has never enjoyed Frye's international renown, he is indubitably one of the finest poets Canada has produced, and a critic in his own right whose work since the 1940s remains today a major influence in the development of Canadian poetry. Born in 1918, only six years after Frye, Dudek is one of those many writers who in this century contributed to making Montréal, a francophone city, the literary capital of anglophone Canada, a title it has not quite relinquished despite having been surpassed in size and economic importance by Toronto some twenty years ago. In the 1940s and 1950s, when Frye was working on his seminal study of Blake and on his Anatomy of Criticism, Dudek was associated with writers such as Irving Layton, Raymond Souster, F. R. Scott, and P. K. Page, publishing his own poetry and giving a voice to new poets in magazines such as First Statement, Contact, and Delta, and with publishing houses such as Contact Press and DC Books. Through the McGill Poetry Series he published, for example, Leonard Cohen's first book, Let us compare mythologies. Until his retirement in 1984, Dudek lectured on Canadian and European literature at McGill University; as a teacher and as a poet his contribution to Canadian letters has been quite different from Frye's more strictly scholarly influence, but it has been no less profound. His polemic against Frye is of interest, though, not only because Dudek is an important Canadian literary figure, but also because he reveals in Frye's position a remarkable
resemblance to that which Plato adopted almost twenty-five centuries ago when he opened philosophy's quarrel with the poets. And it is of interest especially because it represents a poet's answer to the philosopher's and the critic's charges.

NORTHROP FRYE WAS FAMILIAR with Dudek's poetry, which he reviewed early in his column "Letters in Canada" for the *University of Toronto Quarterly*. Though he included some of Dudek's poems, notably "East of the City," in his 1956 "Preface to an Uncollected Anthology," (Bush Garden 168), Frye was not overly enthusiastic about the poet's work, and especially not his early, overtly political verse. In a 1952 review of *Cerberus*, which Dudek published in collaboration with Layton and Souster, Frye offered Dudek a rather back-handed compliment, commenting that "it is clear . . . that he is no longer in danger of confusing poetry with popular rhetoric" (BG 20) ; and in his 1955 review of *Europe*, Frye labels Dudek a facile poet, though he nonetheless recognized the value of some of his verse (BG 53).

For his part, Dudek was not overly taken with Frye's critical project. Almost from the start, his criticism focused on four questions, three of which are already noted in his short essay published in 1958, "Julian Huxley, Robert Graves, and the Mythologies" — though as the title of the essay suggests, this critique does not implicate only Frye. First, Dudek censures Robert Graves who, in his opinion, "writes as rationally as an I.B.M. machine" for trying "to review the entire compost of myths, making them all valid, and making myth itself the royal road to poetry." Dudek notes that even T. S. Eliot, who "borrowed his idea of the need for a unifying myth for the modern imagination . . . from nineteenth century non-English literature. . . . avoids the use of the Christian myth directly in his poetry, since this myth, being rationally unacceptable . . . would not work in poetry," adding that "It has not worked since Milton, and even there the case is doubtful," ("Julian Huxley" n.p.). Myths belong to specific historical contexts. Any myth or mythology, be it Greek, Christian, or whatever, is convincing, has a truth-value in a specific context, at a specific moment in history. And because its truth is so bound to a context, a myth cannot be resurrected and transplanted unaltered into another context and still be meaningful or convincing. If it is meaningful, it is because it has been transformed; in "The Kant of Criticism" Dudek writes:

If the myths are Platonic forms, we may well ask, "Mighty myth, who made thee?"
But if, as I think Dr. Frye would answer, man made them, then man can unmake them, and create afresh — and find that none are central. (255)

Like Graves, Frye erroneously attributes the making of poetry to a knowledge of myths, which are, in his view, ahistorical. This is fundamentally incorrect because myths are man-made, hence historical and dynamic, and if they are to have any
meaning at all they must be, not some constant (read eternal) model, but responses to the concrete experience of present life.

Second, Dudek charges — implicitly here, but later more explicitly—that Frye's position is backwards-looking, a futile search for a religious solution that can be no more: "unless there is a present reality which is already vivid and poetic with meaning, there is no myth, new or old, that can give us more poetry than we have now." "To take up the old myths" as the stuff of poetry, Dudek suggests, "is very much like chewing fossils in a museum because there is a shortage of meat and fish on the market," ("Julian Huxley" n.p.). More than thirty years later, he would uncover again the implicit foundations of Frye's theories and the core of a problem that has haunted innumerable critics and theorists of literature since the demise of a (real or remembered) all-encompassing religious world-view. In "What Do You Have Against Myth?" — a paper Dudek delivered for the F. R. Scott lecture at McGill University in 1991—he writes: "This larger conception of myth," as defined by Northrop Frye, "is entirely a product of modern thought, since the romantic movement, that is, after the Age of Reason had virtually put the quietus on mythical thinking," (ts. p. 2. See also: "The idea of myth is a modern fabrication stuffed with the grandiose effects of unfulfilled religious yearnings." Notebook, ts. 21 June 1990 ). That this search for a substitute for defunct religious perspectives (Perspective is used here in the sense Mannheim employs in Ideology and Utopia [226, 271], that is, a total ideology: the total complex of quantitative and qualitative factors making up the ways groups of human beings see their world.) was indeed the case for Frye, the author of Anatomy had confirmed himself in his introduction to The Great Code, writing: "In a sense, all my critical work, beginning with a study of Blake published in 1947, and formulated ten years later in Anatomy of Criticism, has revolved around the Bible" (xiv). According to Dudek, with his study of the Bible Frye developed a "highly tolerant or ecumenical theory." But, bringing practice in to criticize theory, Dudek notes the historical intolerance of religions, particularly Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and suggests that if Frye's theory is tolerant, it is in spite of and not because of its (overt or covert) religious orientation; and he adds that Frye's tolerance "may perhaps be understood by seeing it in the context of responses to rationalism — and in fact accommodation to rationalism" ("Bible as Fugue" 131). In short, using the evidence of history and practice, Dudek says that the old myths and the worlds to which they belonged should not be disregarded, but should not necessarily be missed either; and he opposes Frye's backwards-looking religious nostalgia with a forward-looking secular humanism which, further, does not set any opposition between poetry and reason — this despite the fact that, ultimately, Dudek's own sense "that existence in time realizes the creative possibilities of eternity," which is, by his own admission, "a religious position" ( Letter to the author, i8Nov. 1991).

Third, again in his 1958 essay, Dudek argues that the opposition between
scientific truth and religious or quasi-religious beliefs, which is "the great axis of modern thinking about poetry and science" and the (paradoxical) foundations of Frye's theories, is not a valid position. He suggests, rather, that poetry implies "the fullest conception of life and reality," a view that in no way excludes — but in fact implicates — scientific and rationalist means of understanding the world as well as religious and mythological approaches, when these approaches have a truth-value, that is, when they stand as the best means human beings have for describing and mastering their world. "In deference to Northrop Frye," Dudek concedes that "the imagination tends to fall into .. . patterns (or archetypes) and shapes its materials around them," ("Fallacy" 184). Myths, patterns and models — ideologies — inherited from the past shape the way we understand the world and act in and upon it, but a theory of correspondences with such organizing myths or their structures is no criterion for evaluating a literary work. Unhappily, coupled with a fundamental misunderstanding of the relation of truth and meaning, Frye's tenet (expressed in The Secular Scripture, 1976: 45-46) that "as life has no shape and literature has, literature is throwing away its one distinctive quality when it tries to imitate life" (quoted in Graff 52), leads him to propose that literature must imitate a rational pattern — this while denying it any truth-value and relegating it to the traditional philosophical limbo of belief. In contrast, Dudek posits simply that "Art is the perfect union of the real and the ideal ("Fallacy" 185), which of course includes the rational and the irrational, truth and belief. (For example, even the Renaissance neo-Platonist Sidney proposes a view of literature closer to Dudek's than to Frye's position, when he suggests that poetry, which encompasses both the particular and the general is greater than history, which is limited to the particular, and philosophy, whose domain is the general. )

In this last statement, taken from "The Fallacy of Literalism and the Failing of Symbolic Interpretation" written in 1964, is contained the fourth element of Dudek's critique and a succinct expression of the conflict between his and Frye's positions. Dudek is not simply against mythology, though he is wary of mysticism and religious nostalgia, as he is also equally of reductive science (Letter to the author), of all systems which, because they present themselves as all-encompassing and exclusive are forms of false consciousness. Nor is he simply insulted — as well he might be — by Frye's reiteration of the prejudice of theorists from Plato to Lukâcs against the poet's knowing anything about what he does: "Part of the critic's reason for feeling that poets can be properly assessed only after their death is that they are then unable to tease him with hints of inside knowledge" which is of no use for critical analysis because, in fact, the poet "cannot talk about what he knows" (Anatomy 5). Yet it is neither personal animosity nor indignation at being disqualified to discuss his art that is at the root of Dudek's rejection of Frye's theories. It is his fundamental opposition to Frye's mystico-religious ontology and his naively positivist epistemology.
the rigid disjunction between 'is' and 'ought' statements that we associate with early logical positivism" (183; This positivist element in Frye's work is in concordance with his notion of the 'disinterested critic' for which the "Polemic Introduction" of his Anatomy is to a large extent an apology.). Literature is about 'ought,' which manifests itself in myth. On the one hand, it has nothing to do with truth, which belongs only to the domain of the 'is'; but on the other hand, interestingly enough, Frye uses myth or archetypes as criteria upon which literature is absolutely dependent, and against which it is evaluated with an implicit epistemology of correspondence. Though in The Critical Path he admits that "The vision of things as they could or should be certainly has to depend on the vision of things as they are" (104), Frye immediately — and unfortunately — backs away from the consequences of this position, stating further along in the same paragraph that

the notion that our choices are inevitably connected with things as they are, whether through the mind of God or the constitution of nature, always turns out to be an illusion of habit. The mythical and factual or logical attitudes are really connected by analogy. If, for example, such a philosopher as Bergson or Lloyd Morgan bases a metaphysical or religious structure on the conception of evolution, what he is working with is not really the same principle as the biological hypothesis of evolution, but is rather a mythological analogy of that hypothesis. (105)

In the sense that any model we use to describe the world is necessarily not the world, Frye distances himself from naive positivism, and in this he is quite right; but in the radical opposition he posits between "mythical and factual logical attitudes" he reveals himself the inheritor of positivism's inadequacies. (Criticizing such positivism, Bourdieu recalls Borges' map which must be as big as the country it describes: Distinction, 2Q.on.) His separation of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of knowledge is remarkable in that it ignores virtually everything that has been said about the problem from Marx to Bloch to Mannheim, for example, and more recently and specifically in relation to art, Panovsky and Bourdieu. (Panovsky's concept of habitus, "a system of interiorized schemata that allow all the thoughts, perceptions and actions of a culture, and these only." Bourdieu, Postface to Panovsky, 152.)

In opposition to Frye, Dudek considers poetry as belonging to a twofold reality, encompassing at once and equally "the particulars of experience . . . and the potentiality of psychic life" ("Fallacy" 181). In other words, art is a means to reconcile, to express, and to communicate the discordances (and concordances) between immediate, lived experience, what is, and the lens through which we perceive and understand the world, ideology and Utopia, what ought to be. Frye takes what may be termed an intellectualist position, confining himself to organiz-
ing and rationalizing a system of beliefs, an ideology, without any hint that he is aware that it is an ideology; in his view what we think and believe is distinct from and more important than what we do. Dudek, however, adopts the natural stance of an artisan, and significantly it is a position that does not radically separate thinking and doing, intellectual and manual labour. Or, to place the question in the larger context of the history of literary theory, Frye's position is similar to that presented by Plato in the *Ion* and in the last book of *The Republic*, while Dudek's is that of the poet who, armed with 2,000 years of philosophical investigation and an acute consciousness of his craft, is — finally — attempting to answer the philosopher.

It is perhaps significant that, like Plato, Frye struggled to have the legitimacy of his discipline recognized by a not overly receptive audience. Plato condemns the poets, and with them the other educators and ideologues of Greek society: sophists, rhetoricians, diviners, soothsayers, thaumaturges, and so on, because they had proven themselves manifestly incapable of reversing what he saw as the decline of Hellenic civilization; he attempts to place himself and those practicing the new discipline of philosophy as the new consciences and legislators of his society. Similarly, Frye devotes the larger portion of his "Polemic Introduction" in the *Anatomy* to arguing for the legitimacy of literary criticism, and in particular that practiced by his 'disinterested critic' (7). Admittedly, the context in which Frye argues is far narrower than Plato's, his opponents far weaker, and his claims somewhat more modest. Where Plato sought, at least, ostensibly, to cure all the ills of his society (Plato's retraction of his social project at the end of *The Republic* does not contradict the fundamentally social and political nature of his work), Frye only proposes to impose some order on a discipline which he saw as plagued by subjectivity and conscious or unconscious interests: he confines himself to academia and literary circles — here Frye's position is paradoxical and typical of modern critics who would deny that poets or artists know what they are doing; for where Plato simply dismisses all their claims of competence, because he maintains a vestige of Romantic notions of creativity, his position is dependent upon what poets do and he cannot subjugate them unconditionally to the critic's censure — since the poets (if not the critics as well), whom he condemns for not being able to explain what they are doing, long ago either discredited themselves or were for the most part simply relegated to a marginal role in society: especially in Frye's own Canada, replaced as they have been by ad-men and network television. (This comment should be read as a simple statement of the state of things, *not* as a nostalgic lament for 'better' times when men of letters and poets in particular were held in greater esteem than they are today.) Such differences notwithstanding, the similarity of Frye's and Plato's positions in their societies is interesting, and it may help explain Frye's project and its success; but, as Dudek's criticisms suggest, it is not the only nor the most significant connection with Platonic philosophy.
In her essay, "The Prospero Figure : Northrop Frye's Magic Criticism," Maggie Helwig notes the recurring images of the biblical Flood and Leviathan in Frye's work, and their analogy with Plato's cave. There are profound differences separating Frye's and Plato's theories; to deny this would be to deny the historicity of thinking and social practice. But the Flood-Leviathan and cave analogy is particularly significant because it points, from another direction, to the same problem which Dudek suggests is at the heart of Frye's theories : the archaism of his ontology and epistemology.

In short, whatever other transformations Frye has affected, his myths or archetypes neatly replace Plato's forms:

The anagogic view of criticism thus leads to the conception of literature as existing in its own universe, no longer a commentary on life or reality, but containing life and reality in a system of verbal relationships . . . Similar universes exist for all the arts . . . Pictures as pictures are themselves facts, and exist only in a pictorial universe.  

(Anatomy 122)

With such an ontology, any epistemology is necessarily one of correspondences, or mimesis. Like Plato before him, Frye shifts the matter of art from reflections of lived experience: facts and reality, maintaining always a fundamental separation of the two, to reflections of ideal and unchanging forms or patterns : myths. And like Plato, he establishes himself as the judge of poetry, according to how well it reflects or manifests a pre-existent reality.

At the heart of Plato's condemnation of the poets is not simply his attempt to usurp their traditional position in Greek society, however; more important to modern discussions of the problem is his concept of poetic activity, which he assimilates to the practice of other arts, in the sense of téchnê. To understand his (and thereby Frye's) position it is useful to review briefly the ideas concerning the skills of the artisan current in the slavery-based economy of Antiquity, ideas that make a striking contrast to concepts of work developed since the Renaissance. As Jean-Pierre Vernant writes in Myth and Thought of the Greeks:

While for Descartes the artisan knows his craft because he understands the mechanism of his machine, téchnê consists of knowing how to use properly and at the proper moment a dynamis that is not conceived of differently be it a force of nature or a man-made tool (290-91). [Philosopher and physician aside, the possible exceptions to this conception of the worker is the farmer. In his Works and Days Hesiod expounds upon the character-building nature of agricultural work, and Xenophon considers agriculture a good apprenticeship to military discipline ; he recognizes the effect of work on the subject without, however, developing a general concept of work.]

The artisan neither invents new models nor changes old ones. The rules he knows how and when to apply concern the manufacturing process, poiēsis, but the product, poiēma, does not belong strictly to the technical domain and surpasses both his existence and his understanding:
Superior to the worker and his téchnè, the Form directs and guides the work to successful completion; it assigns the work its terms and limits, defines its context and its means. In the work of art, just as in the natural processes, it is the ultimate cause which determines and commands the totality of the process of production — the efficient cause; the artisan, his tools, his téchnè are nothing more than the instrument thanks to which a pre-existing Form shapes matter. (Vernant 320)

As reported by Plato's student and successor, Xenocrates, "The Idea is the cause that serves as model." The worker's relation to his work is passive; the only contribution the artisan makes beyond a purely physical movement is knowing when to make the movement: his purpose is to realize in matter a pre-existing form; he can in no way transform or create the archetypes which guide and determine the manufacturing process — it is this concept of work that allows Plato to assimilate the rhapsodist and the poet; he does not make the modern distinction between the rhapsodist's repetitive craft and the poet's creative art: both téchnè are in his view repetitive — and the product of his efforts is evaluated according to how closely it imitates these ideal forms in the material world.

The concept of work thus limited to the production of use-value, it is not the maker but the user who knows and understands the product being made. Plato writes:

'You always have the three techniques — use, manufacture, and representation . . . And isn't the quality, beauty and fitness of any implement or creature or action judged by reference to the use for which man or nature produced it? . . . It must follow, then, that the user of a thing has the widest experience of it and must tell the maker how well it has performed its function in the use to which he puts it.

{Republic, x, 601c-d}

On this point, all the arts are identical: it is not the maker who can judge the worth of the object he produces, but the user, which means that as far as literature is concerned the best judge is the philosopher or, in our day, the critic.

The affinity of Frye's theories with this position is remarkable — and, in view of his deeply Christian-Romantic heritage, hardly surprising. Yet when Frye comes close to surpassing the limitations of his ontology, he turns away from it, suggesting that any (dialectical) relation between beliefs, the realm of literature, and facts, the realm of life, is merely "an illusion of habit." (Gerald Graff points out how the fundamental weakness of Frye's world is precisely this failure to locate "a connection between two orders . . . the nature of things as they are, dead, neutral, inhuman, and unavoidable . . ." and "things as they should be as projected by human purpose and 'desire,' the order of art, applied science, religion, culture, and civilization." [Literature Against Itself, 182.] Whereas Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza recognized the problem and laboured over it, Frye dismisses it offhandedly — when he is not blissfully unaware of its existence.) Ultimately, the problem is that, were Frye to admit such a relation, he would undermine the very foundations of
his newly-won position, of the legitimacy of the 'disinterested critic' In the first place, acknowledging that myths and archetypes and the like are inextricable from real, lived experience would imply that they are inseparable from real, concrete interests; such an admission might well return criticism to the sorry state of prejudice and opinion, slave to all manner of idols, in which Frye found it and from which, beginning with his Anatomy, he tried to extricate it. In the second place, admitting a connection in poetry between the actual and the possible, such as Louis Dudek posits, would surrender back to poetry — and thereby the poet — a legitimacy far more secure than that of the critic. For such an admission would not only accept the popular prejudice that critics are parasitical, a view which Frye takes much trouble to denounce, but would also give it a rational foundation. In an ironic reversal of Plato's condemnation of the poets because their work is twice-removed, exponentially, from reality, because the critic studies literature, which is itself developed from experiences and dreams, he could be accused of dealing with matters too far removed from reality and truth to be worth troubling about. This is of course not the case, no more than it is the case, as Dudek has argued since the publication of Frye's Anatomy, that criticism is about any sort of myths or archetypes or realms existing independently and apart from the everyday stuff of life. Criticism is about literature, and like literature it is also about life: the lived and the willed, about reason and emotion, experience and ideology and Utopia, and the complex relations of these and more that constitute humanity and civilization.

Yet the question remains: If his theories are indeed so wrong-headed, then how and why did Frye gain his excellent and rarely equalled reputation with all save the poets? Why would a writer in the Times Literary Supplement remark that the "only serious rival" to this critic from a country with no great literary and philosophical traditions "is Aristotle" (quoted in Fulford)? In fairness to Frye, it should be said that he believed in what he did, and that it was good. And whatever difficulties his theoretical approach presents, like Jan Kott, who produced one of the finest studies of Shakespeare despite trying to turn him into an existentialist, Northrop Frye said much that is important about literature. His writings, from his reviews of thin volumes of poetry to his methodical analyses of the Bible, were often insightful and intelligent, though sometimes perhaps a little blind to the merits of his own compatriots' work. And paradoxically, it is perhaps the greatest shortcomings of Frye's theories that earned him his fame; for in his attempt to make order in the chaos of criticism as he found it, he did not question the dominant world-view, neither religious nor scientific; instead he tried to adopt for his study of myths and literature the method of the sciences. Whatever its merits or failings, by associating them with the truths of the natural sciences this approach gave both Frye's discipline, criticism, and its object of study, literature, a legitimacy they had never before (least of all in his own country) enjoyed in the public eye.
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WINDSURFING

David Solway

It rides upon the wrinkled hide of water, like the upturned hull of a small canoe or kayak waiting to be righted — yet its law is opposite to that of boats, it floats upon its breastbone and brings whatever spine there is to light. A thin shaft is slotted into place. Then a puffed right-angle of wind pushes it forward, out into the bay, where suddenly it glitters into speed, tilts, knifes up, and for the moment's nothing but a slim projectile of cambered fibreglass, peeling the crests.