Class Structures and Class Conflicts in "Instant" Resource Towns in British Columbia — 1965 to 1972*

J. H. BRADBURY

Several articles in past issues of *BC Studies* have dealt with class and class relations in British Columbia. In 1975 Marchak outlined regional features of class expression by using a metropolis-hinterland model. She identified four classes: controllers of wealth and property, managers, workers, and unemployed or marginally employed workers.[1] In 1976 Koenig and Proverbs attempted to isolate the voting patterns in the province, which may have had a regional class basis, following the election of an NDP government.[2] These authors concluded that there were significant differences in class relations and voting patterns between rural and urban areas, and between industrial towns in the interior and larger urban centres. However, no attempt was made to discuss the meaning and derivation of class, and class relations and conflicts, in specific areas of the province.

This paper's focus is more explicit. It aims to discuss the meaning and derivation of class, class relations and class conflict in British Columbia's "instant" towns. These settlements, built between 1965 and 1972, were chosen first because they were new communities designed explicitly to replace company towns. It was hoped by the promoters that some of the conflicts and industrial strikes present in older resource-based communities

1 P. Marchak, "Sources of Social Conflict in B.C.," *BC Studies* 27 (Autumn 1975): 30-49.

2 D. J. Koenig and T. B. Proverbs, "Class, Regional and Institutional Sources of Party Support within British Columbia," *BC Studies* 29 (Spring 1976): 19-29. Also see comments on class and voting patterns in British Columbia: Mark Sproule-Jones, "Social Credit and the British Columbia Electorate," *BC Studies* 12 (Winter 1971-72): 34-45.

3

in the province would be removed by the creation of new towns.[3] Secondly, they were created in a period when different ownership patterns were being forged in the province's resource extraction industries, a factor which was accompanied by a move toward locally controlled Canadian unions apparently as a reaction to a new form of absentee ownership by multinational corporations. They therefore presented an opportunity to look at possible changes in the basis of class relations, strikes and class conflict in British Columbia's resource-based communities. An examination of these towns provides, in a microcosm, an illustration of some of the processes which create and shape class relations and class conflict in both resource frontier areas and society as a whole.

In British Columbia between 1965 and 1972, multinational resource extraction companies and the provincial government co-operated in the creation of new "instant" towns to replace company towns. This process was consistent with a theme discussed by Harvey in other company-owned settlements in North America. Harvey suggested that following the experiences of Pullman in the United States in 1894, when there were several strikes in a company-owned model town, companies have attempted by various means to reduce the class tensions and class conflicts which derive from direct confrontations in company towns. He argued that

the privatization of housing provision, the creation of a separate housing landlord class, and the creation of innumerable intermediaries in the retail and wholesale sector, and government provision of social services and public goods all help to accomplish this.[4]

These measures also help companies to externalize the costs of labour, to ensure the continuity of a stable labour supply, and to facilitate the reproduction of labour power.[5] For all these reasons, industrialists investing in British Columbia sought to create instant towns and withdrew from almost all direct involvement in the provision, financing or management of resource settlements in the 1960s.

[3] D. J. Campbell, "Instant Towns," *Proceedings* of the British Columbia Natural Resources Conference (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 115-66; ————, Minister of Municipal Affairs, British Columbia, 1965, Interview with the author, 2 October 1973, Victoria, British Columbia; *Victoria Daily Times*, 24 April 1964, p. 4.

[4] David Harvey, "Labour, Capital, and Class Struggle around the Built Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies," *Politics and Society*, vol. 6, no. 3, (1976).

[5] See comments by Ian Gough, "State expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review* 92, 1975; and Harvey, *op. cit.*

The Social Structure of the Instant Towns

The social structure of the instant towns finds expression in the spatial form of settlements and in the social, economic and class relations of the inhabitants. Managers and foremen live in parts of town separate from the rest of the workers. Planners attempted to conceal the class structures but

despite strenuous efforts and plans to give ... an identity other than that of a dormitory for the mill, the houses mirror in part the pecking order at the plant. Snob hill is a lawned cul-de-sac, part encased by standing timber, which presides over the main residential area. ... Below snob hill are spread single family dwellings in a descending order of price. Below them, further still and decently hidden from the picture windows of the mill managers, is a dirty trailer park.[6]

Outside of work, people are usually identified by their role in the mine or mill and social interaction occurs mostly among social class members. The strongest dividing line is between staff and workers, but within these groups gradations exist too. There are, of course, exceptions, but it is usually those of a similar status who interact socially, or who visit each other. In the plant, social conventions enhance this staff/worker division and reinforce the different grades among the workers.[7] Moreover, these hierarchical structures have some utility in the functioning of the plant. Braverman has argued that industrial operations are dependent on the maintenance of hierarchical structures reinforced by differences in income and status.[8] In the instant towns position and income are thus the prime indices of class. While this is not unique to these settlements it is nevertheless very strongly felt in the closed social system of an isolated single-industry town.

The internal class and occupational structure of any area is defined by the nature of enterprises involved and the work available. However, it is important to understand that class is not simply a conglomerate of employment categories. Rather, it is a relationship based on social and economic divisions within the work place, in which people occupy posi-

---

[6] *Province*, 18 August 1971, p. 16; cf. *Vancouver Sun*, 11 July 1956.

[7] R. B. Horsfall et al., *Parameters of Healthful Community and Individual Functioning in Resource Frontier Towns*, Simon Fraser University, Department of Geography, Research Project for Health and Welfare Department, Ottawa, 1974; cf. H. W. Walker, *Single Enterprise Communities in Canada*: A report to Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (Ontario: Queen's University, Institute of Local Government, 1953).

[8] H. Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital: the degradation of work in the 20th Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

tions of opposing social and economic interests. That is to say, the economic interests and divisions structurally determine an individual's class place. It is important also to realize that our definition here is based on the totality of effects of the position people hold in the work place, and that this position influences their social and economic relations with their fellows. Political and ideological relations, as well as economic relations, always play a role in the structural derivation of classes. Indeed, these relations originate within the production process itself.[9]

The fact that instant towns in British Columbia, like most resource towns, are based around a single industry has meant that class and occupation are a very important feature of life. There is no escape from class definitions. The hierarchy of the mill or mine becomes the social hierarchy of the town. Individuals become rolebound, and class divisions are often reinforced by physical isolation.[10]

Despite their isolation the class structure of such towns must not be regarded as being influenced solely by local circumstances. Naylor has argued that changing class and socio-economic divisions in dependent areas or societies, which he calls "a hinterland", result from changes occurring in a central or controlling area, which he names "a metropole". He states that

> while the internal dialectics of class and of capital accumulation may determine the nature of metropolitan expansion, the social structure and the structure of capital in the hinterland cannot be regarded as independent of the metropole. On the contrary, internal changes in the metropole are the immediate cause of socio-economic reorganisation in the hinterland.[11]

Hence if the relationship between changes in class, and control and ownership is to be fully understood, resource towns must be viewed not as isolated sites of industrial growth or merely as company towns, but as parts of a pattern of resource exploitation by corporations which operate wherever resources can be profitably exploited. If we are to seek explanations for changes in the class structure of resource towns we must also look to changes in the dominating centres and to changes in the ownership of the industrial base.[12]

---

[9] Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975).

[10] Rex A. Lucas, *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of single industry* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 147-65.

[11] R. T. Naylor, "The rise and fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence," in G. Teeple, ed., *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 2.

[12] R. T. Naylor, "Domination of Capital," in Alkis Kontos, ed., *Domination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 34-35.

Changing Ownership Patterns

In British Columbia between 1950 and 1970 small firms associated with resource extraction, especially in the lumber industry, were taken over or absorbed by multinational corporations. While absentee ownership by companies located in Vancouver and even San Francisco had not been uncommon in the past,[13] the 1950s saw a vast increase in the involvement of large multinational firms.[14] The changing patterns of ownership coincided with the development of the instant towns which epitomized the growth in scale of absentee and foreign ownership in the province's resource industries. The instant town legislation of 1965, formulated by the companies and the government, can be seen as a result of both the changed nature of ownership and the extent to which it was absentee. Private home ownership, citizen's franchise and the encouragement of a local commercial class allowed companies to rule by proxy to a greater degree than in older "closed" company towns. There the company had exercised control in a settlement by means of its ownership of the town as well as of the plants, mine or mill. The new arrangements left them unburdened with the day-to-day problems of town and community management and freed them from the associated costs now transferred to the local workforce. Control could thus be effectively exercised from the company offices and multinational corporations located in such distant metropolises as Toronto or New York.[15]

Of the eight instant towns constructed, all but one were owned and controlled from outside the province. The process is best illustrated by an example taken from the takeovers of two British Columbia companies prior to 1965. The Rayonier Company of British Columbia, a wholly owned subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) of the United States, built the instant town of Rumble Beach on Vancouver Island to replace the company town of Port Alice built in 1915-18. This was subsequent to Rayonier's purchase of the British Columbia-based company of Alaska Pine and Cellulose Ltd. Similarly the

---

[13] J. H. Bradbury, "Instant Towns in British Columbia — 1965 to 1972," (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, 1977), pp. 70-93.

[14] M. Robin, *The Rush for Spoils: the Company Province, 1871-1933* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), p. 20.

[15] See discussion of the process in Canada in Cy Gonick, *Inflation or Depression: The Continuing crisis of the Canadian Economy* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975). Also see Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in H. Radice, ed., *International Firms and Modern Imperialism* (Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 37-62.

Tahsis Company built the instant town of Gold River on the west coast of Vancouver Island in 1968. The Tahsis Company, a British Columbia family corporation, was purchased by two foreign companies under a Canadian subsidiary (East Asiatic Company of Denmark and the International Paper Company of Canada, which was in turn wholly owned by the International Paper Company of U.S.A.). The direct control which was exerted by the foreign corporations (monopoly capital) during this phase ensured that the previously Canadian-owned corporations (non-monopoly capital) were drawn into and firmly attached to new metropolitan corporations in the United States. The implications of this form of monopoly integration were made clear at the Pearse Royal Commission on Forestry hearings in Vancouver in 1975 at which evidence was given by executives of the Tahsis Company (and the Rayonier Company) indicating that the foreign metropole controlled some of their long-term policy and activities in British Columbia. In both cases, the indigenous ownership and management, and the family-controlled executive structure, had been superseded and replaced by a locally based management acting for and subordinate to the decision-makers of the parent companies.[16] In certain circumstances the management class may have included elements of the old indigenous bourgeoisie which were simply absorbed into lower echelon executive positions.

Changes in the ownership and control of industry were accompanied by legislation to make all new towns instant municipalities, giving each settlement its own mayor and council. Under this legislation houses could be purchased by workers and each property owner was given a vote in municipal elections.[17] Previously the "closed" town, as company-owned property, was controlled by the company as rentier, manager and owner. The promotion of working-class home ownership in this manner was seen as advantageous to the companies because, as Harvey has indicated for other urban situations,

it promotes the allegiance of at least a segment of the working class to the principle of private property, it promotes an ethic of possessive individualism, and brings about fragmentation of the working class into housing classes of homeowners and renters.[18]

The involvement of the workforce in home ownership thus served to rein-

---

[16] Royal Commission on Forestry in British Columbia, "Evidence presented by Tahsis Company and Rayonier Company," Vancouver, British Columbia, 1975.

[17] British Columbia, *Municipal Act*, Section 10A, *Revised Statutes of British Columbia, 1970* (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1970).

[18] Harvey, p. 272.

force the commitment of workers to living in resource towns. The majority of owner-occupants do not, however, own their housing outright. They make interest payments on a mortgage, and what is often seen as an "investment in property" in a resource town becomes a chronic debt encumbrance, especially in an unstable economic situation. A worker mortgaged up to the hilt is, for the most part, a pillar of social stability, and schemes to promote home ownership within the working class have long recognized this basic fact.[19] In most non-resource towns, the worker may, in return, very slowly build up some equity in the property. Needless to say, property equity in isolated single-enterprise communities with a lifetime limited to that of the mine or mill is generally negligible but more often non-existent.[20]

In older "closed" company towns, commercial enterprise was generally limited to the company-owned store or to transport or vehicle servicing. In the new instant towns these relationships were ostensibly ended by government legislation, but the companies still maintained a rentier function by virtue of a degree of control over housing and over settlement development. In addition the introduction of new commercial enterprises in the service sector, promoted or supported by the resource company, meant the company still often controlled the longevity and viability of the new merchant and commercial enterprises. As we will see later, these changes introduced a modified set of class relationships resulting in alternative class alliances.

The occupational structures of instant towns included workers, management and a group of service occupations, but never the owner. While proportionately smaller than the percentage for British Columbia as a whole, the service group comprised 28.55 percent of the workforce of the province's instant towns. (See figure 1). Nevertheless, dependence on the Vancouver metropolis for many services and sales functions continued despite the presence of this sector. In general terms the occupational structures of instant towns reflect the industrial and service requirements of the metropolis in the hinterland. The largest proportion of the population is, naturally, the workers with the skills required for the local industry. Mining, forestry, logging, processing and fabricating are presently male-dominated. Women, unless specifically trained for industrial jobs, have few opportunities for employment. However, some inroads into tradi-

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] See discussions on viability of resource-based settlements in: John Gray, *Stability of employment and production within Canadian resource-based industries.* (Centre for Settlement Studies, University of Manitoba. Series 2, Research report #23), 1975.

FIGURE 1

Occupational class structures, British Columbia 1971

1. Management and Administration — 2.44, 3.99, 3.60
2. Natural Science Engineering and Mathematics — 3.45, 2.87, 2.60
3. Social Science, Religion, Teaching, Medicine — 7.50, 10.48, 9.24
4. Clerical, Sales, Services — 28.55, 45.92, 39.25
5. Farming, Fishing, Hunting — 0.83, 1.10, 3.50
6. Forestry and Logging — 3.27, 0.40, 2.11
7. Mining — 2.26, 0.27, 0.63
8. Processing, Machinery Product Fabrication — 23.65, 11.57, 12.80
9. Construction Trades — 7.30, 5.76, 7.56
10. Transport and Material Handling — 8.92, 6.75, 7.69
11. Other — 10.55, 10.83, 10.76

Resource Towns
Vancouver
British Columbia

PERCENT

SOURCE: Occupation Tables, British Columbia. *Census Canada,* 1971.

tionally male-dominated occupations, such as heavy truck driving and equipment operating, occurred to a very minor degree in several resource towns in the early 1970s.

Local Government and Class

The creation of instant towns not only resulted from and reflected ownership changes but it also brought local government to the residents. Municipal councils were created after 1965, whereas previously no local franchise existed in several resource towns. Not surprisingly, however, company dominance continued by means of representation on town councils.

TABLE 1

*Occupation Divisions in Eight
Instant Town Councils in British Columbia*

Occupation/Class	Mayors	%	Councillors	%	Total	%
Company mgmt./supervis.	6	28	31	29	37	28
Company employee	3	13	30	28	33	25
Business/propr.	10	45	20	19	31	24
Services employee	—	—	7	6	7	5
Housewife	—	—	7	6	7	5
Teacher	3	14	6	5	9	7
Other	—	—	8	7	8	6
TOTALS	22	100	109	100	132	100

SOURCE: Survey data, new resource towns, British Columbia, 1974. Survey conducted by the writer.

Company officials still made up the largest percentage of councillors, although the growth of local businessmen is reflected in their dominance of mayoral positions. Robin has argued that such a commercial bourgeoisie can play a moderating role in polarized worker/management politics.[21] Given, however, the dependence of local businessmen on the one company employing all their customers, and the monopoly rights granted by some companies, it is clear where their alliances are most likely to be made.

[21] M. Robin, cited directly in P. Marchak, p. 48.

The introduction of municipal councils was designed to give some local control to the communities. However, as we have already seen, the companies retained considerable power. Most remained the largest taxpayer of the instant town and also exerted influence by means of letters patent, covenants and bylaws. Workers and local businessmen remained dependent on the industrial activities of the resource companies. Most important, companies could still close down towns by terminating their operations.

A picture emerges of instant towns with fairly rigidly defined classes, controlled economically from afar by multinational corporations, and still showing a lot of company influence in the new arena of local politics. Several writers have indicated that this type of situation leads to strong class consciousness and militant conflict in hinterland regions. It is important to pursue this suggestion and also to look briefly at several of the previous discussions of such questions.

Davis, for instance, endeavoured to outline a regional class analysis in Canada. However his use of "underclass" and "overclass" as categories of regional class structures adds little to the understanding of class relations and processes in the Canadian hinterland.[22] Marchak analysed the causes of social conflict in British Columbia, especially those derived from class, regional and institutional sources. Her analysis of the working class in resource towns was, however, limited by the availability of suitable data. She quotes Robin, who states that

the closed nature of many homogeneous, single-industry mining and lumbering communities with no middle class to mediate industrial conflict, in which class lines are clearly drawn, has contributed to the development of an intense working class consciousness.[23]

The existence of working class consciousness and, by implication, the proliferation of union activities such as strikes and industrial disputes is also supported by Kerr and Siegel in their 1954 study of industrial conflict. In this study they argue that geographical and social isolation create a homogeneous working class whose shared grievances become articulated more easily than those of workers in urban or highly stratified industries.[24]

---

[22] A. K. Davis, "Canadian Society and History as Hinterland Versus Metropolis," M. Horn and R. Sabourin, *Studies in Canadian Social History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 447-75.

[23] Robin, *ibid.*

[24] Marchak, p. 48. Reference to the study by C. Kerr and A. Siegel, "The Inter-industry propensity to Strike: An International Comparison," in A. K. Kornhauser, et al., *Industrial Conflict* (New York, 1954).

These findings can be equally applied to the new instant towns in British Columbia. A strong working class consciousness exists even though many workers are recent arrivals from other small towns, the prairies, or from outside Canada. The presence of a small commercial class, however, added a new dimension to local class divisions, but no significant mediatory role was noted between 1965 and 1972. Indeed there would appear to have been an inverse relationship between the growth of a commercial class and the incidence of industrial strife in the instant towns in those years.

Marchak, in her study of social conflicts in British Columbia, identified four major social classes. These were, briefly: those who control essential resources consisting of wealth and property; the managerial class employed in both private corporations and public governments; workers whose productivity is determined by others and who have no control over industrial wealth, either through ownership or derived responsibility; and the permanently unemployed or marginally employed.[25] As primary industrial and processing sites, the new instant towns contained few if any of class one, the owners and controllers of major wealth and property. Clearly there is no place for the independent industrial capitalist or the financial entrepreneur in the hinterland resource towns. They are to be found in the centres of financial and governmental power. The resource towns have always served as receptacles of investment, subject to the controlling interests of the owning class. The very attempts at changing company towns to instant towns were a result of the different objectives of the new owners, the large corporations, who certainly did not want the bother and expense of maintaining a company town. Subordinate to and the subject of control by an absentee owning class, the new instant towns and all classes in them are divorced from major decision-making or controlling activities. Thus, in these circumstances, Marchak's division into four classes could readily be reduced to two: the owning/controlling absentee class represented by local managers, and the class of non-owners who work in the mine or mill.

However, single-enterprise communities have always contained this basic dichotomy between the owners of the means of production and those who serve the owners by supervising the utilization of capital and labour in the productive process. What is being suggested here is that changes in the nature of a metropolitan bourgeoisie bring about changes in the hinterland class structures. In this case the multinational corpora-

---

[25] Marchak.

tion in a monopoly capital phase introduced changes in the hinterland, namely the growth of a new management class to serve the purposes of monopoly capital in the region, and a new series of class alliances in new resource towns resulting from corporate decisions to opt out of directly controlling their resource towns. Whereas in older resource communities and "closed" company towns the company management often adopted a paternalistic role and provided services, in the 1960s they endeavoured to reverse this role. In the new towns they serve the corporation through membership of local municipal councils and clubs and through the maintenance of an identifiable corporate-ideological perspective.

There are other occupational groups who do not work for the company directly and who thus also prevent us from reducing the class structure to two groups. Teachers, merchants, doctors and civil servants all live and work in the instant towns. Such groups are of importance on the political and ideological levels, which is not to say that their actions as citizens or municipal councillors can be determined for or against company interests. Such groups can perform a hegemonic function in conformity with company interests by maintaining or attempting to maintain social cohesion and the illusion of autonomy of the municipality.

Industrial Disputes

As Jamieson, Robin, Resnick and Scott have remarked, resource towns in British Columbia have a long record of industrial strife and class conflict.[26] This has been expressed in the numbers of industrial strikes of longer than average duration for Canada. Jamieson argues that this is partly due to the higher rates of unionization in the region and the presence of certain industries that have been found in other areas to be unusually strike-prone. Jamieson also concurs with Kerr and Siegel's study of industrial patterns which suggested that

the high incidence of strikes [was due to] ... the geographic and social isolation of the workers, like a race apart, living in one industry towns or special districts in cities where they have little contact with other occupational groups or classes; the large proportion of transient single workers ...; the limited opportunities for a stable family life; and other special hardships or limitations associated with work in such industries.[27]

[26] Jamieson; Robin, 1972; P. Resnick, "Social Democracy in Power: the Case of British Columbia," *BC Studies* 34 (Summer 1977): 3-20; J. Scott, *Sweat and Struggle: Working Class Struggles in Canada*, vol. 1:1789-1899 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1974).

[27] Jamieson, p. 410.

These reasons, however, beg the question of the causes of strikes and conflict in resource towns. Jamieson suggests that the prevalence of radical ideologies in frontier economies would appear to be a result rather than a cause of industrial conflict. Equally it can be argued that in isolated single-enterprise communities the social and economic contradictions inherent in the capitalist system — namely class differences, alienation, absentee ownership and separation of the workforce from ownership and control of the means of production — are in their most exposed form. Indeed, these contradictions are probably exacerbated by and interlocked with isolation, distorted age structures, male dominance of the workforce and high population turnover rates.

The creation of instant towns by the new multinational owners did not decrease industrial conflict. Table 2 shows that after 1965 wildcat and other longer strikes continued in the province. There were a number of reasons for these conflicts. The rejection by many workers of control by large American-based unions in British Columbia, as well as in other regions of Canada, sparked inter-union debates which erupted in strikes in five instant towns. (See table 3). In the mid 1960s the turning by workers in resource towns to locally controlled unions was in part a reaction to absentee direction by both multinational owners and "international" unions. The inter-union debates and struggles were thus a manifestation of this overall change of power relationships. Indeed a number of strikes, especially the wildcat variety, resulted from shows of strength between union groups, each anxious to claim new members and to prove it had the mandate of the local workers.

There were also inter-industry differences in strike patterns in resource towns in the mid-1960s which complicated the issues surrounding the ousting of international unions. As table 2 shows, wildcat strikes occurred frequently where union jostling prevailed. There were at the same time general wage strikes in the lumber and associated industries aimed at achieving intra-industry parity. Other strikes occurred in recently constructed instant towns where workers arrived to find housing and work conditions not up to standard. Often workers arrived before the towns were completed and the strikes took place over living conditions and limited services.

Several instant towns in 1972 and 1973 were involved in long strike periods (up to six months in the case of Granisle) which closed down the industrial plants. Thus as newly started communities they were overtaken by struggles which affected their stability, particularly where long-term strikes forced workers to move elsewhere in search of alternative work.

TABLE 2

Strikes and Industrial Disputes in British Columbia
Resource Towns — Including Instant Towns

Company	Town	Union	Wkrs.	Days	Dispute
Year: 1975					
BCFP	Mackenzie	PPWC, CPU, IWA	ND	56	General Strike
			ND	1	Wage Dispute
Lornex	Logan Lake	Steel	500	4	Trades Dispute
			25	3	Trades Dispute
			500	2.5	Suspension
Fording	Elkford	Steel	ND	6	Unjust Discharge
			ND	3	Work Cond.
			ND	1	Discip. Proced.
			ND	2	NR
Year: 1974					
Colcel	Ocean Falls	CPU	ND	1	Work Cond.
			ND	1	Workforce Red.
			ND	1	Wildcat
			ND	1	Wildcat
BCFP	Mackenzie	PPWC, CPU, IWA	ND	7	Overtime Ban
			ND	1	Trades Dispute
			ND	1	Wage Dispute
Tahsis	Gold River	PPWC	ND	1	Wage Dispute
			ND	1	Wage Dispute
			ND	1	Slow Down
			ND	8 Hr.	Plant Closure
			ND	1	ND
			20	8 Hr.	ND
			ND	5	Illegal Strike
Eurocan	Kitimat	CPU	100	16 Hr.	Grievance
			100	1	Grievance
			20	1	Work Cond.
			100	8 Hr.	Discharged
			ND	16 Hr.	Rate Dispute
			165	10	Wage Dispute
			200	28	Overtime Ban
			200	1	Info. Picket
Placer	Fraser Lake	Steel & Caimaw	ND	1	Legal Strike
Rayonier	Port Alice	CPU	ND	ND	General Strike
Year: 1973					
Lornex	Logan Lake	Steel	500	10	Shift Change
Tahsis	Gold River	PPWC	ND	13	Overtime
			ND	51	Wage Dispute
			35	1	Overtime
			150	1	Wage Dispute
CFP	Port Mellon	CPU	ND	Slow Down — Wages	
Eurocan	Kitimat	CPU	ND	4 Hr.	Pickets
			50	8 Hr.	Wage Dispute
			ND	8 Hr.	Illegal Firing
Placer	Fraser Lake	Steel	ND	3	Wildcat
			ND	3	Wildcat
Fording	Elkford	Steel	ND	36	Legal Strike

Company	Town	Union	Wkrs.	Days	Dispute
Year: 1972					
BCFP	Mackenzie	PPWC	ND	21	Wage Dispute
Lornex	Logan Lake	Steel	500	42	Contract
Year: 1970					
Placer	Fraser Lake	Steel	ND	1	Wildcat
Tahsis	Gold River	PPWC	ND	51	Wage Dispute
Cassiar Asbestos	Cassiar	Steel	300	13	Wages
Tahsis	Tahsis	IWA	450	45	NR
FFP	Mackenzie	IWA	190	2	2 Shifts & Living Cond.
Alcan	Kitimat	Steel	1,198	73	Wage Dispute
Rayonier	Woodfibre	PPWC	300	5	NR
Kaiser	Natal	Mines	460	5	Wage Dispute, Travel time
Year: 1969					
Tahsis	Tahsis	IWA	435	6 Hr.	Recreation
Year: 1968					
Endako	Fraser Lake	Steel	355	76	Wages, Benefits
Tahsis	Gold River	PPWC	300	9	Overtime
			ND	13	Overtime
Year: 1967					
CNI	Fernie & Michel	Mines	500	10	Wage Dispute
BCFP	Mackenzie	IWA	ND	72	Wage Dispute
Placer	Fraser Lake	Steel	ND	72	Legal Strike

(See table 3, "Changes in Union Control ..." for details of union names).

ND = No data available; NR = No reason given.

N.B. Data could not be verified from more than one source — hence the table in this sense is incomplete.

SOURCE: Labour Canada, Economics and Research, *Strikes and lockouts in Canada*, Ottawa, Annual Reports, 1950-1970.

Such situations are not unique to instant towns, but certainly they exacerbate an inherently unstable situation. The impact of strikes and industrial unrest is immense in towns where there is only one employer.

The class structures of the instant towns resulted from the changing pattern of ownership. The removal of direct company control of housing and services allowed the development of a local class of petit-bourgeoisie dependent on the company for customers, and in many cases for privi-

TABLE 3

Changes in Union Control in Selected British Columbia
Resource Towns — Including Instant Towns

		Union base	
Town	Company	International	Canada
Mackenzie	BCFP	IWA*	PPWC, CPU
Port Alice	Rayonier	IBPS*, UPIU*	CPU
Ocean Falls (+)	Crown	UPIU*	CPU
Logan Lake	Lornex	Steel	
Granisle	Granisle Copper	Steel	
Elkford	Fording Coal	Steel	
Sparwood	Kaiser	Mineworkers	
Fraser Lake	Endako	Steel*	CAIMAW
Granisle	Bell Copper		CAIMAW
Kitimat (+)	Alcan	Steel*	CASAW
Kitimat (+)	Eurocan	UPIU*	CPU
Port Mellon (+)	CFP	UPIU*	CPU
Gold River	Tahsis		PPWC
Woodfibre (+)	Rayonier	UPIU*	PPWC

(+)   = non-instant towns
*   = union affiliation changes from international to Canadian
IWA   = International Woodworkers of America
PPWC   = Pulp and Paperworkers of Canada
CPU   = Canadian Paperworkers Union
IBPS   = International Brotherhood of Pulp Sulphite and Papermill Workers
UPIU   = United Paperworkers International Union
Steel   = United Steelworkers of America
Mineworkers   = United Mineworkers
CAIMAW   = Canadian Aluminum Smelter and Allied Workers

SOURCE: Labour Canada, Economics and Research, *Strikes and Lockouts in Canada*, Ottawa, Annual Reports, 1950-1970.

leged monopoly charters. In direct contrast to the appropriation of control by large multinational corporations was the fight by workers against American-dominated unions. The two must surely be viewed as related. In a situation where many workers believe that owners care and know little about their particular town, often a small island in a large empire, they have attempted to win at least a semblance of local control. This local control was not won with the right to vote given as part of the instant town legislation. Formal democratic rights did not prevent company control of these towns, particularly through previously arranged covenants, domination of councils and power over everyone's livelihood.