The “Chilcotin Uprising” was a disturbance which broke out in April of 1864 when a group of Chilcotin Indians massacred fourteen workmen on a trail being built from Bute Inlet to the interior of British Columbia. Variously referred to in the accounts of the time as a series of massacres, as an insurrection, and as a war, the Chilcotin Uprising was the type of reaction to the inroads of Europeans which certain modern historians would prefer to label as a “resistance.” “Uprising” is adequately descriptive without reflecting any particular theory of social action.

Numerous violent incidents involving hostility between whites and Indians occurred in the early history of what is now British Columbia. A. G. Morice gives examples of some which occurred in the interior during the era of the fur trade.¹ Though individual acts of violence occurred during this period, there is reason to believe that because of the interdependence of the fur trader and the Indian a relatively stable relationship involving a considerable degree of trust had been built up over a period of time between the fur traders and many groups of native people with whom they had to do. However, this trust does not seem to have developed between the fur traders and the Chilcotins.

After the Fraser River gold rush which began in 1858 clashes occurred which indicated a marked difference between the earlier relationship of Indian and fur trader and that of the Indian and those whites brought in by the gold rush.² A difference in the roles of the fur traders and the


miners helps account for the increased conflict that came with the gold rush. The fur trader, while making a profit for his company, was also performing a service which the Indian valued. Through the fur trader the native received goods which he was otherwise unable to obtain. The miner, essentially, was there to take something of which the Indians had learned the value but for which the miner did not expect to pay the Indians. Most others brought in by the gold rush, like the miners, had no relationship of interdependence with the Indians.

Though Governor Douglas by asserting British authority helped to minimize violence, other incidents continued to occur. Isolated killings of whites on the northern coast of British Columbia were not uncommon in the years immediately prior to the Chilcotin uprising.

Any study of the relations between whites and Indians during the colonial period, and for some time subsequently for that matter, is limited by the fact that the written records of the period are almost entirely the work of the whites. A study of the Chilcotin Uprising is no exception. However, it must be the best documented instance of conflict between Indians and whites in British Columbia. Accounts published in the nineteenth century together with a large amount of unpublished material give a detailed and largely verifiable picture of the events of the uprising. Fortunately we have two fairly full accounts which, though recorded by whites, shed considerable light on the attitudes of Chilcotins involved in the uprising. Begbie’s “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians” put us on the right track with regard to the chief motivating cause of the massacres, though in the twentieth century we are interested in going into causes more deeply than were contemporaries. Lundin Brown’s *Klatsassan* is extremely valuable for the light it throws on the Chilcotins’ thinking, since his narrative includes a first person account of his dealings with the Chilcotin prisoners. 

---

3 "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians — Telloot, Klatsassin, Chessus, Fiel or Pierre, Tah-pit & Chedékkii," enclosure in letter, Matt[hew] B. Begbie [to F. Seymour], September 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

The Chilcotins were a semi-nomadic tribe who, prior to their contact with whites, had already modified their original Athapaskan culture. Trade was of some importance to them. They had had mainly friendly relations with their Indian neighbours, but had recurring conflicts with some. These conflicts were marked by sudden retaliatory attacks, the mutilation of bodies, and plundering.

The Chilcotins' social structure was loose rather than rigid. Their sense of unity as a tribe was weak. They did have a concept of territorial boundaries, and, within the tribe, a rudimentary sense of "ownership," or possession through use, of particular fishing areas.\(^5\)

Even before the coming of the Europeans to their region the Chilcotins felt some of the effects of their proximity, since European trade goods reached them through the coastal Indians. The first written reference to the Chilcotins occurs in Simon Fraser's journal for June 1, 1808.\(^6\) From the 1820's to the early 1840's traders attempted to do business with the Chilcotins by means of a fort in their midst. But the history of Fort Chilcotin from the time of its establishment was marked by frequent abandonments and re-occupations, and by a chronic lack of success until it was finally replaced by a fort outside the Chilcotin's territory. There were a number of reasons for its lack of success: the migration of Indians in times of starvation, shortage of personnel, the unwillingness of the Indians to fit into the fur traders' plans for them, and positive animosity between the Indians and fur traders.\(^7\)

It was not until 1842 that the first white missionary, the Catholic priest Modeste Demers, visited the Chilcotins.\(^8\) Missionary contacts were brief and hence superficial. Well before the Chilcotin Uprising the influence of the fur traders on the Chilcotins had waned and visits from missionaries to their territory had apparently ceased. The superficiality of white contacts with the Chilcotins meant that in the years preceding the gold rush the way of life of most of the Chilcotins was still basically unaltered. The Chilcotins seem to have suffered less from the effects of disease and must have suffered less from the effects of alcohol than did other Indians who

---


7 See "Fort Chilcotin," typescript, Archives of British Columbia.

8 "Fort Chilcotin," p. 16.
The Chilcotin Uprising of 1864 were in more intensive contact with the fur traders. At the same time they were perhaps less able to assess the potential power of the whites — and certainly less cowed and more convinced that their own way of life could be preserved. Lacking an understanding of the nature of white culture, the Chilcotins were ill prepared for the torrent of European influence that was to sweep in with the gold rush, affecting even their hitherto isolated tribe.

As the search for gold extended farther and farther up the Fraser River it led naturally to a demand for roads. Two rival paths to "the northern mines" were developed: the Douglas-Lillooet route and the Yale-Lytton route. Almost simultaneously in 1861 interest was aroused in two other possible routes which suggested themselves. One was by way of Bentinck Arm. The other was the route inland from Bute Inlet, the theoretical possibilities of which were no doubt suggested by the inlet's deep penetration into the mainland and its comparative nearness to Victoria. Alfred Waddington, a prominent Vancouver Islander, succeeded in arousing great interest in Victoria in the Bute Inlet route. Several expeditions to the inlet were made.

In March of 1862 Waddington and R. C. Moody, the Chief Commissioner of Land and Works, signed an agreement for the construction of a "bridle road" from Bute or the Homathko River to the Chilcotin, and provision was made in a memorandum of April 16 for its conversion to a wagon road. In 1862 Waddington's men began work on the trail.

In 1863 some Chilcotins, who had come down from the interior, were hired for packing. Seemingly the trade goods they most desired were muskets. The whites bartered their firearms in return for the Indians' labour or furs.

On March 22, 1864, a schooner from Victoria arrived at the mouth of the Homathko River at the head of Bute Inlet. It brought workmen and supplies. Also on board was the artist Frederick Whymper, to whom Waddington had offered passage to enable him to view and sketch the magnificent glacier country in the region of Bute Inlet. Whymper jour-

9 "Coast Route Meeting," *Daily British Colonist* (Victoria), June 5, 1861, p. 3, and "Coast Route Meeting," *Colonist*, June 11, 1861, p. 3.

10 Later the Bute Inlet Company was formed, its officers being elected in January of 1863. ("Bute Inlet Company," *Daily British Colonist*, January 7, 1863, p. 3) Late in 1863 Waddington succeeded in obtaining certain modifications to the original agreement.

11 "Latest from Bute Inlet," *Daily British Colonist*, July 6, 1863, p. 3.

12 British Columbia, Governor, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864.
neyed first to the most distant construction camp. On his sketching expe-
dition he made use of the services of “Tellot” [Teloot], an old Chilcotin
“chief” whom Whymper describes as “an Indian of some intelligence.”
After returning and resting at the construction camp, Whymper headed
back towards the coast. He spent two days with Tim Smith, the man in
charge of the ferry across the Homathko at a point about thirty miles
above its mouth. On April 29 late in the evening Whymper reached the
station at the mouth of the river.

Early next morning [he wrote], whilst I was yet sleeping . . . some friendly
Indians broke into the room without warning, and awoke us, saying in an
excited and disjointed manner, that the man in charge of the ferry had been
murdered by the Chilcotens for refusing to give away the provisions and
other property in his care.

Whymper left by canoe that same day, arriving in Victoria on May 5,
bearing news of the ferryman’s rumoured murder. Not till May 11 did
the steamer Emily Harris reach Victoria with the startling news that not
one but fourteen of Waddington’s men had perished.

The main instigator of the Bute Inlet slaughters and the one who stood
out as the leader of the uprising was Klatsassin. His commanding qualities
seemed to have impressed those whites who later conversed with him.
“His was a striking face [wrote Lundin Brown]; the great under-jaw
betokened strong power of will. . . .” The striking impression he made
was felt even by the tough-minded Begbie, who wrote, “Klatsassin is the
finest savage I have met with yet, I think.”

On the morning of April 29 Klatsassin arrived at the ferry site, accom-
panied, it seems, by his two sons, three other Indian men, and some
Indian women. The details of what followed are not clear. Klatsassin
may have first demanded food or other goods from Tim Smith, or the
ferry keeper’s end may have come almost without warning. He was

13 Frederick Whymper, *Travel and Adventure in the Territory of Alaska Formerly
Russian America—Now Ceded to the United States—and in Various Other Parts
14 Ibid., p. 29.
15 “Horrible Massacre,” *Victoria Daily Chronicle*, May 12, 1864, p. 3 (from the extra
of May 11, 1864).
17 Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864.
18 “Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Squinteye’s Declaration,” *Victoria Daily
Chronicle*, May 29, 1864, p. 3.
apparently sitting or standing near the fire when Klatsassin shot him.\(^{19}\) Smith's body was dragged to the river and thrown in.\(^{20}\) It was never found.

Following the killing the Chilcotins proceeded to loot the stores which were kept at the ferry site. The Chilcotins carried off some of the goods, hid others, and destroyed what they could neither use nor carry away. Among the plunder the Indians got possession of two kegs of gunpowder and thirty pounds of balls\(^{21}\) — ammunition which they would find most valuable in a conflict with the whites in which the Chilcotins would be unable to replenish their supplies. The Chilcotins took one other step which indicated foresight. They cast the scow adrift and cut the ferry skiff to pieces with axes, cutting off the up-river whites from the route to the coast. The cable over the river, however, was left where it was.

It so happened that, on the morning of April 29, a Klahuse or Homathko Indian known as Squinteye and the Chilcotin chief Telloot had been sent down-river from the main road-camp (some seven to ten miles on, on the opposite side of the river to the ferry house). About a mile above the ferry, according to Squinteye's later account, they met Klatsassin and the party of Chilcotins already mentioned.\(^{22}\) Klatsassin told Squinteye that he had killed the ferry keeper. After some argument Telloot joined Klatsassin, and Squinteye hurried down river bearing the news of Smith's death. At the station at the mouth of the river the artist Frederick Whymper and his companions were awakened to hear the news, as has been narrated.

The Chilcotins whom Squinteye had met, with the addition of Telloot, proceeded up the river to the main construction camp, where they joined the other Chilcotins employed there. The Chilcotins, it was said, "...talked and joked with the workmen after supper and sang Indian songs during a part of the night."\(^{23}\) The workmen lay down as usual without a watch being kept and without apprehension of danger.

At about dawn the twelve workmen were sleeping in their six tents, with the possible exception of the cook, Charles Butler, who was probably

---

\(^{19}\) A great pool of blood was later found near the fire and a bullet was lodged in a tree close by.


\(^{21}\) Brew to Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], May 23, 1864.

\(^{22}\) "Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Squinteye's Declaration," *Victoria Daily Chronicle*, May 29, 1864, p. 3.

\(^{23}\) "Thrilling Details by Mr. Waddington: Origin of the Massacre," *Victoria Daily Chronicle*, May 29, 1864, p. 3.
attending to the morning fire. The Chilcotins chose this time to attack. Butler was apparently shot in the back and the Chilcotins attacked the other workmen who lay in their tents. The attackers stabbed, clubbed, and shot the men, pulling the tents down over them to prevent escape. The strategy was almost completely successful. Most of the men never had a chance. Philip Buckley, Edward Mosely, and Peter Petersen, however, managed to escape.

Meanwhile, at the advance camp about two miles up-river, the four workmen had risen and breakfasted. Besides the men, there was the cook, a Homathko Indian boy in his teens who was known as George. After breakfast the men went out to work with their axes while George did the dishes. As George was working, about six or seven Indians came to the campsite. One of them George later described as a slave of the Chilcotins; the others were Chilcotins. The slave and one other had no gun; the others had. The Chilcotins went out on the trail and shot the four workmen, with the possible exception of Baptiste Demarest, whose footsteps indicated he may have jumped into the river. “In the place where he leaped,” wrote Chartres Brew after visiting the spot, “no man could escape drowning.” It was Brew’s party which discovered the bodies of the other three men. Gaudet (or Gaudie) had been shot. Clark had been shot and his head beaten in. Brewster too had been shot and his head smashed, and his corpse had been deliberately mutilated.

The slave of the Chilcotins, who knew the Indian boy, told him to run away. About halfway down the trail to the main road-camp George met a large group of Chilcotins hurrying along. The women among them were carrying heavy loads on their backs. With them were about ten men, among whom, George later testified, were Telloot and Klatsassin (as well as Piel or Pierre, Klatsassin’s son, and Chedékki). George hurried on down the trail, passing the main road-camp, where he saw the bodies of some of the white men. Arriving at the ferry site he saw two white men: Mosely and Petersen. George heard them calling and apparently thought they were calling him, but did not go to them. In his haste to get home he swam the river and arrived at the lower station after nightfall with news of the massacre.

24 Testimony of “George” in “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .”; “Tenas George’s Statement” in “Origin of the Massacre.”
25 Letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], May 23, 1864.
26 Testimony of “George” in “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .”; “Tenas George’s Statement” in “Origin of the Massacre”; evidence of “George” in “Proceedings of Inquest,” enclosure with letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], May 23, 1864.
The next day Mosely and Petersen were joined by Buckley, the other survivor. Buckley had been a sailor, so the three men fixed a loop to the cable which stretched across the river and used this to cross to the opposite bank. In about an hour two French-Canadian packers and five Bute Inlet Indians, who had heard of the massacre from George, arrived to rescue them.  

By the time the three survivors of the Bute Inlet massacres had brought their news to Victoria, the Chilcotins had had ample opportunity to cross the Coast Range barrier to the interior. Meanwhile, another group of whites were preparing to enter Chilcotin territory by the Bentinck Arm route. On April 25 Waddington had dispatched the schooner *Amelia* to Bentinck Arm to take up a party of men who were to work on the Bute Inlet Trail from the upper end (the interior). The contract for this work had been awarded to Alexander Macdonald. Macdonald and his partner Manning had a ranch at Puntzi Lake. Manning, who had remained on the ranch, was the only white settler in the whole of the Chilcotin country.

On May 17, 1864, Macdonald set out with his pack train from the head of Bentinck Arm, apparently oblivious of the fate which had overtaken the whites on the Homathko. With Macdonald were seven other white men and a number of Indians. With one of the party, McDougall, was his common law wife, who was a Chilcotin from the Nacoontloon (modern Anahim) Lake band of which Annichim was the chief.

Probably towards the end of May, the pack train arrived at Anahim Lake. Klatsassin had arrived before them. Whether he had learned from the Homathko road workers that the pack train was coming through is uncertain, though it seems likely that he had, and that his trip to Nacoontloon was another example of his deliberate planning. At any rate, he had no doubt already told the Nacoontloon Chilcotins of his signal success on the Homathko, and if he had not already done so he would now, with the arrival of the pack train, point out to them the advantages

---

27 "Buckley's Statement," *Daily British Colonist*, May 12, 1864, p. 3; Buckley's testimony in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians..."; "A Survivor's Account," *Victoria Daily Chronicle*, May 12, 1864, p. 3.

to be gained in attacking and plundering it and annihilating yet another group of white men. His suggestions fell on ready ears, and the massacre might have been a total one had it not been for McDougall’s wife, “Klymtedza.” Visiting with her own people, she learned of the planned attack on the pack train. Apparently her loyalties lay with her husband, for she divulged the secret to the whites. They decided to dig a defensive entrenchment and to throw up earthworks behind which they could occupy a position which could be defended against the Indians. Here, according to Lundin Brown, they remained for two days, awaiting the expected attack. It failed to materialize, and the men decided to leave their crude fortifications and head for the coast, though taking their loads of provisions with them. Somehow the Chilcotins got wind of this. The packers had reached a point possibly ten miles from Anahim Lake on their retreat to the coast when they were suddenly fired on by the Chilcotins who lay in ambush on either side of their pathway. Two of the men, Higgins and McDougall, were killed outright. Macdonald’s horse was shot from under him. He mounted another, and, when that was shot also, continued to put up a fight till he was finally killed. Klymtedza, according to one report, was also killed in the attack.\(^{29}\) Five men managed to escape to Bentinck Arm. Four of the five had been wounded. One of these, John Grant, made his way to the ranch of a settler, Hamilton, and his family. Grant burst in upon the family and told them how his party had been massacred. The Chilcotins were pursuing him, and Grant and the Hamiltons got away in a canoe just in time. They looked back to see the Chilcotins high on the river bank. The Chilcotins, however, did not fire, being apparently distracted by the opportunity for plundering the settler’s house.

Near the shores of Puntzi Lake the settler William Manning had planted a garden and built a log house, and taken advantage of the readily available spring water.\(^{30}\) It so happened that the place Manning had chosen to settle had long been used as a camping ground by some of the Chilcotin Indians. Judge Begbie’s later investigations indicated that

\(^{29}\) There is apparently no account of what happened to the other Indians who were in the party when it was attacked.

\(^{30}\) Sources for the narrative concerning the killing of Manning are: “Regina v. Tah-pit,” September 29, 1864, in “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .”; letter, William George Cox to A. Birch, Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], June 19, 1864, Archives of British Columbia; British Columbia, “Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865,” IV, 58-80, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, September 9, 1864, No. 37 [Photostat copy of mss. in Archives Department, Ottawa, G. series, no. 353-358]; R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, pp. 36-43.
Manning had driven off these Chilcotins and taken possession of the spring. However, now considered himself on good relations with the Chilcotins. They had worked for him readily, and reportedly he had supported them almost entirely one winter when they were short of food.

However friendly Manning’s relations with the Chilcotins may have appeared to him, it seems there was an underlying resentment towards him which the success of the Chilcotins in killing other whites encouraged them to express in action. The exact date when Manning was killed is uncertain, though it seems to have come after the slaughter of Macdonald’s party.

The Chilcotin who carried out the shooting was Tahpit. But according to Tahpit the instigator of the plot was Annichim (Annaheim), who was there with him when the shooting was done, though Tahpit did not deny his own part in it.

William Manning’s body was later found by the expedition sent under William Cox. It was lying hidden in a stream some fifty yards from the site of the house. A bullet wound passed from the right breast to the left shoulder blade. According to Brown’s account the body was also mutilated.

After Manning was killed the Chilcotins first looted the house, then destroyed it. They also destroyed Manning’s plow and other agricultural implements and wrecked the garden and field. We can hardly doubt the resentment of the Chilcotins towards Manning for taking over their camping ground. Their wrecking of his implements, garden, and field may also have been expressive of resentment against the introduction of agriculture, which they saw as a threat to their way of life based on hunting and fishing.

The massacres on the Homathko, the attack on the pack train, and the killing of William Manning had now revealed the main pattern of the Chilcotin Uprising.

31 M. B. Begbie, note inserted in Nancy’s testimony in “Regina v. Tah-pit,” September 29, 1864, in “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .”

32 Living with Manning was an Indian woman, known as Nancy, who was apparently herself a Chilcotin. Nancy was first warned of the plan to kill Manning. According to one account (given by Brown) she participated in the plot by hiding his ammunition. But her own testimony before Begbie was very different. She said she was told of the plot by two Indian women who warned her to leave, and she herself told Manning. Manning, however, refused to believe that the Chilcotins would harm him. Later Nancy was warned by two other Indian women and she was just leaving when Manning was shot.
In a number of features the uprising was typical of Chilcotin warfare. These features were not exclusively characteristic of the Chilcotins, in that they shared such patterns of warfare with adjacent tribes. However, they do mark the uprising as distinctively native in many of its patterns, in spite of the use of the white man's weapons.

Dawn, the time of the slaughter at the Homathko road camps, was a typical time for Chilcotin surprise attacks. It was no doubt the most favourable one for the element of surprise which was typical of their warfare. The use of ambush to attack the pack train was yet another means of attempting to ensure that the attack was unexpected.

White men in British Columbia had on occasion shown themselves quite capable of ambushing and slaughtering unarmed and unsuspecting Indians. Such action was contrary to the usually-accepted white norms of conduct at the time. But a surprise attack on an unarmed and unsuspecting party was an accepted norm of Chilcotin warfare. The Chilcotin prisoners at Quesnel when first visited by Brown, who had been appointed their chaplain, insisted that "They meant war, not murder" in falling on the road men on the Homathko.

One or two ritualistic or semi-ritualistic features of warfare were present in the uprising. According to the testimony of the Homathko boy, George, one of the Chilcotins at least of those who came to Brewster's camp had his face blackened, a sign well understood to indicate warfare or enmity towards an enemy. The mutilation of the body of an enemy, such as was carried out on the body of Brewster, was another feature of Chilcotin warfare.

In one important way the Chilcotin Uprising differed from previous Chilcotin warfare. In previous times Chilcotins had feuded with Chilcotins of other families or bands in conflicts which displayed family or band consciousness. They had warred on neighbouring tribes, and perhaps shown some evidence in these conflicts of Chilcotin consciousness. But in the Chilcotin Uprising for the first time they warred against the White Man as such. In this they showed evidence of a newly developed Indian consciousness.

'From the very beginning the Chilcotins' actions were directed specifically against whites. In spite of the Chilcotins' previous history of conflict

34 R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 100.
35 Testimony of "George," September 28, 1864, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .
36 Letter, Brew to Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], May 23, 1864.
with the Bute Inlet Indians, Squinteye and the Homathko boy, George, were unharmed. Both were allowed to go their way in spite of the fact that this would enable them to bring the news of the massacre to the ears of the whites at the head of the Inlet. On the other hand, apparently no attempt was made to induce either of the two to join the Chilcotins against the whites. The Chilcotins made a distinction between white and Indian as such. They had developed an Indian consciousness. But they also still distinguished between Chilcotin and non-Chilcotin Indians. Non-Chilcotin Indians were unharmed. Chilcotin Indians of the interior were encouraged to join the uprising. Klatsassin journeyed to Anahim Lake to stir up the Indians there. Booty from the raid on Macdonald’s pack train was reportedly distributed to other Chilcotins who did not participate directly in the attack.

The Chilcotin Uprising was an uprising in that it was directed against all whites in the area where the “insurgent” Chilcotins were, and in defiance of white authority. If it was not a true uprising at the very beginning, it rapidly became one. According to Brown’s account, which may not be very accurate for some of the events which occurred on the Homathko River, the Chilcotins, before the attacks on the road parties, agreed to kill all the whites they could lay their hands on. This may have been before or after the murder of Smith, the ferry-man, an event to which Brown for some reason does not refer. According to “Squinteye’s Declaration,” Telloop for one did not join with Klatsassin till after the murder of Smith. At any rate, the events that materialized gave the evident character of an uprising to the Chilcotins’ actions. And once the colonial government sent expeditions against them the Chilcotins who had openly participated in the uprising were faced with the choice of either giving themselves up or openly resisting the government’s armed expeditions.

The Chilcotin Uprising was not an uprising of all the Chilcotins. The Chilcotins who participated were mainly those who had absorbed the least white culture. They had also been the most isolated from centres of white settlement, and had probably the least understanding of the degree of white strength. Other groups of Chilcotins had been more deeply influenced by the whites and had a better idea of the futility of pitting their strength against that of the Europeans. The unevenness of exposure to white culture worked against the development of a “pan-Chilcotin”

87 “Squinteye’s Declaration,” in “Origin of the Massacre,” makes it appear that Klatsassin through his son Pierre may have pre-arranged the massacre with the Chilcotins at the road camp before coming there himself.
uprising. But the disunity of the Chilcotins also stemmed from aboriginal times. Many other native peoples of North America had a comparable disunity, which goes far to explain the rapid achievement of ascendency by the white man.

The Chilcotin Uprising, like many other human actions carried out by groups and individuals, had one chief motivating cause but many contributing causes. The chief motivating cause — the reason for their actions which was uppermost in the Chilcotins' minds — was given by the Chilcotin prisoners at their trial and in conversation with Judge Begbie, and with Lundin Brown. This was a threat which had been made by someone at Bute Inlet to bring a plague of sickness upon them. The Chilcotins' repeated references to this incident, their unanimous testimony to its occurrence, and the fact that they had no good reason to persist with the story if it were untrue are convincing reasons for accepting it as the chief motivating cause of the uprising.

During the time of the year when no road party was working, early in 1864, a Chilcotin had been left in charge of some Bute Inlet stores. However, he left the vicinity, and while he was gone some Indians (Chilcotins or others) broke into the log storehouse and took the flour. When Waddington's party came up in the spring of 1864, enquiries were made regarding the loss of the flour. When the Chilcotins were questioned they gave no information, but, according to one account, at last said, "You are in our country; you owe us bread." The man who made the threat is unidentified in the documents and printed accounts of the period, but the effect of his attempt to take advantage of Indian beliefs was disastrous. The Chilcotins had not only heard his threat, but also they had actually seen the white man perform what to them seemed powerful magic, by writing down their names. Doubtless they did believe, as Lundin Brown indicates, that the white man had acquired a power of life and death over them, with sinister possibilities for the future. The Chilcotins believed that

38 Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864; R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 100.
40 Ibid., p. 10 and p. 100; also Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864, and Klatsassin's statement (September 29) when brought into court for sentencing, in "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . . ," enclosure in Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864.
through spirits it was possible to bring harm to others. This harm might come through disease.

The Chilcotins’ experience of smallpox added to the effect of the white man’s threat. The smallpox epidemic which had attacked the Chilcotins in 1862 may well have first reached them through their contact with sick white men who were left among them by a party passing through their territory. Probably it was also spread by the Chilcotins’ association with the Bella Cools on the coast. Its effect was devastating.

Not long before the smallpox reached them in 1862 a white man in the interior was said to have threatened to bring the smallpox on the Chilcotins. Whether he actually threatened them with the disease or merely predicted its arrival, his statement and the epidemic that followed had its effect on the Chilcotins’ minds when a real threat was made against them in the spring of 1864.

To the Chilcotins who had come down the Homathko to the Bute Inlet region, wiping out the whites seemed not only a revenge for the threat but also the only way to prevent the whites from bringing the smallpox. Behind the chief motivating cause of the uprising we may discern a number of contributing causes. Some of these, which might be termed “predisposing causes,” were events and circumstances which had no direct connection with the Chilcotins’ deciding to slaughter the whites, but which must have helped to shape their adverse attitude towards the whites.

The Chilcotins from aboriginal times had a history of warfare and feuding with many surrounding groups: specifically with the Homathkos, Shuswaps (except Canyon Shuswaps), Lillooets, and Carriers. Whereas another group might have developed a pattern of avoidance and retreat in the face of encroachments or threatened conflict with others, the Chilcotins had developed a pattern of warfare in self-defence, and in aggression against weaker groups such as the Homathkos. Warfare, then, might

42 “Important from the Coast Route—Destitution and Suffering,” Daily British Colonist, July 22, 1862, p. 3.

43 Morice estimated that two-thirds of the Chilcotins were wiped out. Begbie, who had an opportunity to make a contemporary judgment, thought that one half was a “moderate computation” of the number who died. (A[drian] G[abriel] Morice, The Great Déné Race (St. Gabriel-Mödling, near Vienna, Austria, Administration of “Anthropos” [1928?]), p. 39, cited in Robert Brockstedt Lane, “Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin...,” and letter, Matt[hew] B. Begbie [to F. Seymour], September 30, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

44 See Klatsassin’s statement on being brought in for sentencing, September 29, 1864, in “Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians...”
be expected from the Chilcotins provided the right conditions of provocation or incentive were present.

The pre-gold rush history of Chilcotin dealings with Europeans was marked by frequent uneasy and even hostile relationships with the fur traders. This, we may suppose, left its mark on the Chilcotins’ attitudes towards the white man. At the same time, the Chilcotins during the pre-gold rush period did not develop as great a dependence on the white man as did some other Indian tribes. This would have been particularly true of those Chilcotins who lived far from Fort Alexandria. Lack of economic dependence must have contributed to their independence of attitude, evidenced in their willingness to do without peaceful relations with the white man.

The Chilcotins’ relationships with the missionaries up to the time of the uprising had generally been fleeting and superficial. Here again, those furthest removed from Fort Alexandria would have been least influenced by the missionaries. In view of the fact that the missionaries acted as transmitters of European culture and as intermediaries between the Indians and other whites, the lack of close contact with them must have contributed to the Chilcotins’ unfamiliarity with white culture. This in turn must have greatly increased the possibilities for misunderstanding with the whites, and probably contributed to feelings of bewilderment and fear when the Chilcotins were confronted with European ways.

The gold rush brought the sudden influx of a large white population distinctly different from the fur traders in many ways. These new Europeans — miners and those who followed in their tracks — had no relationships of essential interdependence with the Indians, no long background in dealing with the Indians, and in some cases had attitudes of positive hostility towards them. We have little knowledge of whatever direct dealings the Chilcotins had with the gold miners. They would have had much less to do with them than the Indians of the Fraser River. But some parties bound for the Cariboo passed through Chilcotin territory by

45 Lundin Brown in instructing the prisoners in Christian teaching found that “One of them had been pretty fully instructed by a Roman Catholic priest, and he had imparted what he knew to the others.” (R. C. Lundin-Brown, Klatsassin, p. 104). It may be noted, however, that only one had been “pretty fully instructed”; and it seems likely that he had imparted most of his instruction to the others after they had been condemned and after Brown had first visited them. Judging from Morice, the contact with missionaries of those Chilcotins living at a distance from Fort Alexandria was very superficial. Adrian Gabriel Morice, History of the Catholic Church in Western Canada, from Lake Superior to the Pacific (1659-1895) (2 vols.; Toronto: Musson, 1910), II.
the Bentinck Arm route. And the Chilcotins may well have heard stories of the conflict between miners and Indians in the Fraser Canyon.

The smallpox outbreak of 1862-63 had wiped out a large proportion of the Chilcotin population and must have created great disruption in Chilcotin society. Some of the circumstances under which the smallpox came to the Chilcotins were such as to link it in their minds with the influx of the whites.

Prior to the threat made against the Chilcotins at Bute Inlet, then, the Chilcotins who were later involved in the uprising had had few experiences which would be likely to dispose them to trust the whites or develop friendliness towards them, and a number of experiences which would be likely to arouse their hostility. And their culture from aboriginal times favoured the expression of this hostility in acts of war if opportunity offered.

A number of occurrences directly connected with the roadbuilding enterprise which may be regarded as grievances from the Chilcotins' viewpoint, aggravated the harm done by the threat made against the Chilcotins.

Waddington’s trail had just entered or was about to enter Chilcotin territory and the Chilcotins may by now have been growing uneasy at the thought of a possible influx of settlers into the Chilcotin region once the trail was extended farther. Their experiences with Manning, who had occupied a Chilcotin campsite, would surely have aroused some uneasiness.

The failure of Waddington’s party to provide Chilcotins with food when the road party arrived in March of 1864 must have caused resentment. This resentment was increased by Brewster’s failure to provide the Chilcotins with food in addition to wages once the interior Indians began working for the road builders. Brewster’s unwillingness to supply food on the basis the Chilcotins regarded as their right must certainly have contributed to the special ill-will they felt towards him, ill-will which was no doubt extended by association to the other road builders. Grudges against other workmen such as Clark and possibly Smith, and fresh irritations that occurred from time to time must have served to aggravate the Chilcotins’ largely hidden hostility towards the whites.

Among the causes of the uprising the material incentive of plunder must have played a definite part. It was customary for the Chilcotins to feast on the enemies’ supplies. Booty was a natural fruit of warfare. To the frequently hungry and poverty stricken Chilcotins the provisions which

46 Lane, “Cultural Relations of the Chilcotin Indians of West Central British Columbia,” p. 55.
they knew were kept for the road party must have seemed a most attractive store of wealth in goods and food ready for the taking. Plunder was not the main cause of the uprising, but it must have been a powerful incentive, and one which Klatsassin could use to persuade others to join in his plot to annihilate the road workers. In persuading the Anahim Chilcotins to join him in attacking the pack train, plunder must have played an equally important part—or likely a more important one, since the Anahim Indians had not the same direct experience of the threat against them nor of the aggravating grievances which Klatsassin’s immediate followers had. Again, in the attack on Manning the knowledge that there was booty to be gained must have encouraged the Chilcotins to kill the settler.

No matter how numerous the motives of the Chilcotins nor how great the hostility which had been built up, the uprising would not have taken place had not the right facilitating factors been present to make the enterprise seem likely to be successful.

One of these factors was the defenceless state of the whites on the Bute Inlet Trail. The ferry keeper was alone, and the road workers were split into two parties, the advance one consisting of only four white men.\(^\text{47}\) Not only did the whites have little or no ammunition, but no watch was kept at night. In short, the road party was an ideal target for the type of surprise attack the Chilcotins were in the habit of resorting to in their warfare. In addition to this, the Chilcotins had acquired the advantage of the white man’s arms and ammunition.

Thanks, ironically, to the mediation of Waddington, the Chilcotins had in the two years that preceded the uprising gained in security by the fact that peace had been made with the Homathkos, Klahuse, and Euclataws, three coastal groups whom they had previously regarded as enemies.\(^\text{48}\) It is likely that the feeling of increased security which must have come to them contributed to their confidence in attacking the whites.

Finally, among the circumstances which helped to make the uprising possible was the circumstance of effective leadership. Without Klatsassin’s leadership it is doubtful whether the attacks on the road workmen on the Homathko would have ever been carried out, let alone carried out with almost complete success as they were. The first white to be killed was killed by Klatsassin, and his role in every part of the uprising with the

\(^{47}\) Strictly speaking, one of these men, Baptiste Demarest, was of mixed blood.

\(^{48}\) British Columbia, Governor, “Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865,” IV, 18-19, Frederick Seymour to the Duke of Newcastle, May 20, 1864, No. 7.
exception of the attack on Manning was a prominent one. His leadership stemmed from his ability and his apparently forceful personality. Yet the fact that he embarked on what was from the beginning a hopeless resistance to the white man shows how little he understood the weakness of his own people’s position and the strength of the white men’s.

The massacres on the Homathko and the later slaughter of whites in the interior captured the attention of the white European populace of the Pacific colonies of British North America. Governor Frederick Seymour, who had arrived in the mainland colony of British Columbia only two weeks prior to the Homathko killings, reacted with alacrity to this first crisis of his new position. He immediately wrote to Lord Gilford, the Senior Naval Officer stationed at Esquimalt, for assistance. He also had a letter sent off to William G. Cox, Gold Commissioner in the Cariboo, requesting that he organize an expedition from Alexandria which would penetrate the Chilcotin country to demand the surrender of those responsible for the massacre.

On May 15 Police Magistrate Chartres Brew and a force of twenty-eight men sworn as special constables were despatched to Bute Inlet. Brew’s party found the evidence of the Homathko slaughter, including the bodies of three of the workers at the advance camp. On May 26 Governor Seymour left New Westminster for Bute Inlet on board the Forward. Seymour and Brew’s party returned to New Westminster on May 31. On June 8 Cox’s expedition, made up of fifty men and an Indian boy, left Alexandria. Later its size was apparently increased to some sixty or sixty-five men.

Arriving at Puntzi Lake on June 12 Cox discovered the body of William Manning. The next day a party sent out by Cox was fired on by Indians concealed in the woods, and one man was wounded in the thigh.

49 Ibid.
51 C[hartres] Brew to Colonial Secretary [Arthur N. Birch], May 23, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.
52 “Return of the Bute Inlet Expedition,” British Columbian (New Westminster), June 1, 1864, p. 3.
54 British Columbia, Governor, “Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch, to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865,” [Photostat copy of mss. in Public Archives of Canada, G. series, no. 353-358], IV, 47 & 76, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, August 30, 1864, No. 25.
Cox and his party remained at Puntzi Lake, taking refuge in a rude fort which they constructed.

Meanwhile, a party of forty volunteers under the command of Chartres Brew had been raised in New Westminster. Seymour, enthusiastic and adventurous, decided to accompany Brew’s expedition himself. The H.M.S. *Sutlej* carried Seymour, Brew, and the men of the expedition north to Bentinck Arm. They landed at “Rascal’s Village” (Bella Coola), and on the twentieth of June set out for Puntzi Lake. On the path leading up the “Great Slide” some shouts were heard in the bushes, and Indians who were with the expedition “captured” a Chilcotin who was lurking nearby. Possibly, in the light of what happened a little later, the Chilcotin meant to be captured.

Arriving at Anahim Lake, the whites found Nacoontloon, Annichim’s village, deserted. Soon the expedition came across signs of goods from Macdonald’s ill fated expedition. After several miles they came upon the wolf-torn body of Macdonald. Some distance on was the body of Higgins, and still further the remains of McDougall. Next day the expedition passed the earthworks which Macdonald and his party had thrown up. About two miles further on was a palisaded blockhouse of the Indians. This the whites destroyed by fire. The smoke apparently alarmed some Chilcotins camped across the lake. A shot was heard, and some hours later the men of the expedition discovered about a dozen hastily abandoned huts. A “flying party” of twenty-five was sent after the Indians. The party followed the Indians for many days, guided mainly by the Chilcotin who had been “captured” on the Great Slide. In the end their guide deserted them, and they were forced to make their way back without having achieved success.

Meanwhile, the rest of the New Westminster Volunteers with Brew and Seymour had pushed on to Puntzi Lake where they joined Cox’s party on July 6. It was arranged that Cox’s men should now head in the direction of Tatla Lake and the mountains of Bute Inlet. This they did, and the New Westminster party with Seymour and Brew was left holding the position at Puntzi.

Cox’s party travelled to a region beyond Tatla Lake. Signs of the

57 R. C. Lundin Brown, *Klatsassin*, pp. 65-68, and “News from the Chilacoten Country” (“Intelligence . . . received from Lieut. Cooper, Aid-de-Camp to . . . the Governor”), *British Columbia*, August 6, 1864, p. 3.
Chilcotins were evident, but the Indians generally kept out of shooting distance. On July 17, however, Donald McLean left the campsite in search of Chilcotins. He was shot by a marksman concealed in the bushes. McLean was a man experienced as a fur trader, whose reputation as an “expert” in dealing with the Indians had made him somewhat of a hero in both British Columbia and Vancouver Island. Rumour had it that nineteen Indians had at one time or another fallen at the hands of this self-appointed avenger, who was apparently as ruthless as he was bold.

When the Alexandria party returned to Puntzi Lake on July 20, Cox advised Seymour that the pursuit of the Indians be given up until the winter, when starvation might force them to surrender. But, fearing the results of the loss of face if the Chilcotin insurgents were allowed to gain an apparent victory, Seymour ordered that the New Westminster Volunteers take up the work of scouring the country, while Cox’s men were to man the “fort” at Puntzi Lake.

Before the New Westminster Volunteers had a chance to leave, however, a large party of Indians appeared, which turned out to be the Chilcotin leader Alexis, whom Cox had summoned, and his followers. Seymour’s conversation with Alexis was unsatisfactory to the Governor, but revealing as to Alexis’s attitude. Seymour complained of the murder of Manning in what he apparently regarded as Alexis’s territory. Alexis’s response tells something both about the impact of white society on Indian society and about the fragmentary nature of authority among the Chilcotins.

He said, which is true [wrote Seymour], that the great Chiefs have lost much of their authority since the Indians hear every white man assume the distinction. That the men under Klatsassin and Tellot have renounced all connection with him, and have a right to make war on us without it being any affair of his.

Seymour, having decided that he had accomplished his purpose in the expedition, left for Alexandria on July 25, with the intention of visiting

58 Sources for the account of McLean’s death are: Weekly Colonist, August 2, 1864; “News from the Chilicooten Country,” British Columbian, August 3, 1864, p. 2; “News from the Chilacoten [sic] Country,” British Columbian, August 6, 1864, p. 3; “Diary of a Volunteer,” Daily British Colonist, October 15, 1864; copy of despatch, Seymour to Cardwell, August 30, 1864, No. 25; copy of despatch, Seymour to Cardwell, September 9, 1864, No. 37; R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, pp. 68-76.

59 R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, p. 69.

the Cariboo before returning to New Westminster. Brew and his men left Puntzi on August 8 and arrived at Lake Tathalco [Tatlayoko?] on the twelfth. The men searched the district in the area of the lakes and the Homathko River and saw signs of Indians, but failed to make contact with any of them.61

Possibly even before Brew and his party left Puntzi Lake, the son of Tahpit, one of the insurgent chiefs, had come to William Cox's camp with a message from Klatsassin and Telloot.62 The message reportedly was that if the whites would remain where they were the two Chilcotin chiefs would gather together all the murderers and come and give themselves up. Cox replied to the effect that, though he would not remain where he was encamped, he would be camped for a few days at the Hudson's Bay Company's old fort on what he called the "Chezco" River. Klatsassin if he wished could surrender himself there. On August 10 Tahpit's son came to the camp at the fort site which Cox had mentioned. He said that Klatsassin had sent runners to the Indians who were scattered about the mountains and that within four days they would be in. Four days later he returned with the message that Klatsassin, Telloot and six others would come in the next morning. Klatsassin had not, however, succeeded in finding the other Indians concerned in the massacre. The next morning the eight Chilcotins came as promised. Quietly, the leading Chilcotins involved in the uprising and some of their most deeply implicated followers entered William Cox's camp unarmed and peacefully.63 As far as Cox was concerned it was an outright surrender on the part of these Chilcotins. It is certain, though, that it would never have come about in the way it did had the Chilcotins understood the consequences of their surrender. Klatsassin and his followers had interpreted a message received from Cox as a promise that they would be allowed to camp in freedom near Cox, that they would not be killed, and that they would have an interview with Governor Seymour himself. That there was misunderstanding is certain. Whether or not the Chilcotins were deliberately misled seems, now, impossible to ascertain.

The trials of six of the eight Chilcotins who surrendered were held at

61 Letter, C. Brew to the Governor [F. Seymour], August 18, 1864, and letter, C. Brew to Colonial Secretary [of B.C.], September 8, 1864, Archives of British Columbia.

62 Letter, J. D. B. Ogilvy to the editor ("The Chilacoaten Expedition"), British Columbian, September 17, 1864, p. 3.

63 Klatsassin's statement before W. Cox is quoted in "Glorious News from the Chilacooten Country! The Expedition Safe! Surrender of Eight of the Murderers!" British Columbia, August 24, 1864, p. 3.
Quesnel on September 28 and 29, before Chief Justice Matthew Baillie Begbie. The jury found five of the six guilty of the capital offences they were charged with. The convicted prisoners were Klatassain, Telloot, Tahpit, Piel, and Chessus. Begbie sentenced all five to be hanged. Chedékki, whom no witnesses had recognized but who it was said would be recognized by Petersen, was to be sent to New Westminster for trial. Later, while being taken there, he managed to escape, and was never caught. The other two prisoners, Thananinki[?] and his son, Cheloot, had no specific charge against them and had already been allowed to go free.

The final decision as to whether the hangings were to be carried out was Seymour's, since he had the power to exercise clemency. This, however, he did not see fit to do. On October 2, as Begbie was about to leave, R. C. Lundin Brown, a minister of the Church of England, arrived at Quesnel. He boarded the steamer Enterprise, and there had a word with the judge, who told him about the condemned Chilcotins. Lundin Brown agreed to stay and give spiritual instruction to the condemned men.

The morning of their execution the prisoners had breakfast, and then as they were one by one readied for execution the minister spoke the words "Jesu Christ nerhunschita sincha coontse" ("Jesus Christ be with thy spirit.") In the midst of all this Tahpit suddenly called out to his fellow-prisoners to "have courage." Then, addressing the Carrier Indians who were gathered there and who had been formerly at war with the Chilcotins, he said, "Tell the Chilcoatens to cease anger against the whites." He then added, "We are going to see the Great Father."

The next year Ahan, another of the Chilcotins who had been involved in the uprising, decided to attempt to make peace with the white authorities. He travelled down the Bella Coola River with several hundred dollars' worth of furs which he regarded as compensation for his part in the massacres. Annichim informed the whites of his coming, and Ahan was taken into custody, as was Lutas, a relative of his who was also said to have been involved in the massacres. On July 3 and 4, 1865, Ahan and Lutas were tried and the death sentence was passed on them. Ahan

---

64 Letter, Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864, and enclosed "Notes taken by the Court at the trial of 6 Indians . . .," September 30, 1864.

65 Begbie [to Seymour], September 30, 1864, and British Columbia, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 119-120, Frederick Seymour to Edward Cardwell, November 23, 1864, No. 69.

66 R. C. Lundin Brown, Klatsassan, pp. 120-121.
was executed on July 18, but Lutas was pardoned — the only one of the Chilcotins sentenced to whom the executive extended clemency.\textsuperscript{67}

Though for a time it took up so much of the attention of colonial officialdom, the Chilcotin Uprising can hardly be termed a major event in the history of British Columbia. Yet it rewards closer study than it has been given in the past, for it is a striking example of violence resulting from the clash of two mutually unintelligible cultures.

\textsuperscript{67} "The Chilicoaten Murderers," \textit{British Columbian}, June 1, 1865, p. 3; British Columbia, "Despatches from Governor Seymour and Administrator Birch to the Colonial Office, Apr. 26, 1864 to Dec. 20, 1865," IV, 249-251, Seymour to Cardwell, June 8, 1865, No. 81; "The Special Assize," \textit{British Columbian}, July 4, 1865, p. 3; "Royal Clemency," \textit{British Columbian}, July 15, 1865, p. 3; "Executed," \textit{British Columbian}, July 18, 1865, p. 3.