

Book Reviews

The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1914: A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy. By Barry M. Gough. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1971. Pp. xvi, 294. Illus., maps. \$12.50.

This study, Dr. Gough tells us in his preface, was "undertaken to pursue the argument stated by Holland Rose in relation to the period 1810-1914, namely, that the security of British interests on the Northwest Coast can be attributed mainly to British strength at sea." His interesting and carefully documented narrative, based on a wide variety of primary sources, including Admiralty and Colonial Office records and the archives of the Hudson's Bay Company, amply supports the Rose thesis.

The history of the century falls naturally into three parts. The first, extending to 1844, was marked by the War of 1812 and the joint occupation of the region between California and Alaska agreed to by Great Britain and the United States in 1818. The second, to which Dr. Gough rightly devotes more than two-thirds of his text, comprises the 28 critical years from 1844 to 1872, when relations with the United States were almost continually troubled and were often threatening. After 1872 British sovereignty on the Northwest Coast was secure, and the development of tensions elsewhere made it necessary to reduce the naval forces stationed there, and finally to abolish the Pacific Station altogether. These important but undramatic 43 years are here well summarized in only 23 pages.

In the War of 1812 the point of local interest was Astoria, John Jacob Astor's trading post at the mouth of the Columbia River, and the only American foothold on the Northwest Coast. It became British in 1813, first by purchase and then by a formal act of possession performed by the captain of H.M.S. *Raccoon*. In these transactions the role of the Royal Navy was decisive. The Americans were anxious to defend Astoria, but their naval forces were very limited, and were hampered by the British blockade of their Atlantic ports and bases. Only the frigate *Essex* reached

the Pacific, and after doing considerable damage to shipping she was run to earth and forced to surrender. It is significant that this single action was sufficient to give the British command of the ocean.

Except for its final years, there was little need for naval activity during the period of joint occupation. The British were more concerned about other areas, including Tahiti and Hawaii, and ships of the Royal Navy sailed north of Mexico only eight times in 25 years. To some extent this was because joint occupation, by its very nature, made it impracticable to establish any sort of base on the Coast. This was a problem of long standing for the British, who at the time had no possessions on the west coast of either of the Americas. As a consequence, the Pacific Station, established in 1837 to succeed the old South American Station, continued to have its headquarters at Valparaiso, and to depend chiefly on storeships stationed there, and later further north at Callao. Amongst other things, this produced formidable problems of communication. Cables and telegraphs were nowhere available; four months was the minimum time within which the Admiral commanding at Valparaiso could hope to receive a reply to a dispatch sent to London; a ship normally required about 80 days to travel from Valparaiso to the Northwest Coast. For many years ships on the Station depended primarily on sail, which made their movements slow and unpredictable. Once a ship disappeared over the horizon it might take the Commander-in-Chief months to regain contact with her, even in the face of the most pressing necessity.

Under these conditions it is surprising how well and relatively promptly the Navy was able to respond to the Oregon boundary crisis, which ushered in the anxious years from 1844 to 1872. Both British trading interests (represented by the Hudson's Bay Company) and the future of the territory were involved. The former were the first concern of the Admiral commanding the Pacific Station. In the summer of 1844 H.M.S. *Modeste*, a small sloop that could enter and ascend the Columbia River, was sent to Fort Vancouver, where her visit did much to safeguard the authority and property of the Hudson's Bay Company. Late in the fall of 1845 she returned to the river and remained there until May of 1847, by which time news of the signing of the Oregon Boundary Treaty had been received, and local excitement over the crisis had died down. In the interval, other and larger ships had cruised the Coast and patrolled such strategic waterways as the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound.

The boundary question itself was dealt with in London and Washington. The British Government was well aware that the influx of thousands

of American settlers into the valley of the Columbia meant that a substantial part of the Oregon country would become part of the United States, but it was not prepared to yield to President Polk's belligerent demands for the whole of it. For support it turned to the Navy, and a threatened large-scale naval mobilization early in 1846 seems to have been a critical factor in the American decision to accept the 49th parallel as the boundary. In the war over Oregon, as Dr. Gough points out, "the decisive theatre would not be the Northwest Coast but the Atlantic seaboard and Great Lakes region." This was a prospect that gave the Americans pause, especially as the war with Mexico that was to add the whole southwest to the United States was already brewing.

To a considerable extent the history of this period is that of American advance on the Northwest Coast by land and of British counter measures, first by sea, and presently by land as well, but with naval protection and support playing an essential role. The colony of Vancouver Island was established in 1850; in 1858 the Fraser River gold rush erupted on the mainland. An influx of Americans that far exceeded the Oregon immigration of the 1840's followed. British sovereignty might well have been shaken, but by good fortune two ships of the Royal Navy happened to be close at hand. Without them, Dr. Gough points out, "local civil authorities would have been powerless." With them, Governor Douglas was able to seize firm control of the Fraser River — the only easy means of entry for men and supplies — and so maintain both law and order and his own authority.

The Civil War brought five years of tension in the early 1860's, and the Alaska purchase of 1867 caused further uneasiness. Dr. Helmcken recalls in his reminiscences that the Americans "boasted they had sandwiched British Columbia and could eat her up at any time." Fortunately 1867 was also the year of Confederation, and a decisive Canadian approach to the Northwest Coast by land at last got under way, with the important result that British Columbia became part of Canada in 1871. That same year Britain and the United States settled most of their outstanding differences with the Treaty of Washington, and the San Juan arbitration award followed in 1872.

Meanwhile railways had entered the political and military picture. In both the United States and Canada it was recognized that political union without easy and direct communication would be of little effect and almost certainly temporary. It was also recognized in both countries that a railway to the west coast, over which troops, equipment and supplies could be moved quickly, was of great military importance. The first

American line, completed to San Francisco in 1869, was intended not only to keep California in the United States, but to strengthen American defences against possible hostile moves by the British Navy. The Canadian Pacific had a similar dual purpose, but it came on the scene late in the day, when Anglo-American relations had improved greatly, and Canadians were concerned chiefly with its domestic importance.

Mention should be made of the Crimean War, another disturbing event of the mid-century years. The chief factors that affected naval dispositions were the abortive attack on Petropavlovsk, which Dr. Gough describes in interesting detail, and the possibility that the United States might intervene on the side of Russia. The war's only tangible legacy on the Northwest Coast was a group of three modest frame buildings at Esquimalt — soon dubbed the “Crimean huts” — that were intended to serve as a naval hospital and actually became the nucleus of a naval base. The Esquimalt base grew slowly, by fits and starts, but a shore establishment was authorized formally in 1865, and by degrees it became in fact if not in name the headquarters of the Pacific Station. It had much to offer — an excellent harbour, a ready supply of spars for the ships still equipped with sails, and coal from Nanaimo for those with steam engines. Its great lack for many years was a drydock, and this was not provided until 1887, when the importance of the base to the Royal Navy was declining rapidly.

This well designed and produced volume is the first publication of the new University of British Columbia Press, which succeeded the U.B.C. Publications Centre in March 1971. It is pleasant to find that the Press evidently appreciates the value of pictures; 45 well-selected illustrations, as well as seven maps and a striking pictorial dust jacket add much to the interest and attractiveness of the book. The bibliography, though modestly described as “selected” is in fact lengthy and detailed. Footnotes are where they properly belong, at the bottom of the pages of the text. The proofreading has been carefully done; this reviewer noticed only one slip. One minor criticism seems to be in order: the lack of page references in the table of contents may improve appearance, but it is an inconvenience to the reader. Otherwise author and publisher alike have set a high standard for the publications of the new Press.

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W. KAYE LAMB

Trade Liberalization and a Regional Economy, by R. Shearer, J. H. Young & G. R. Munro. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1971. vi, 203 pp. \$5.00.

Two items about the nature of British Columbia's economy have been reiterated throughout its one hundred years of membership in confederation. First, British Columbia's economy has been depicted as extraordinarily dependent upon its primary resource base for exports both to the rest of the country and outside of Canada. Moreover, given this primary export dependence and coupled with the tariff structure of Canada, it has been argued that the economic welfare of British Columbia has been reduced. The essays by R. Shearer, J. Young and G. Munro attempt to document through available data the first view and assess the second point. Their tactic on the second point is to measure the exclusive income gain to British Columbia of Canada entering a free trade area with the North Atlantic Community.

What is required for their ambitious research effort is first a detailed snapshot of British Columbia's economy (i.e. an input-output table) and next an analytical framework to assess required effects of a lowering of tariff barriers. The first requirement, a description of British Columbia's regional role in a wider economy is told well, especially given the paucity of regional data and the fact that the three authors choose to discuss separately at disparate points in the book the British Columbia economy in general (Shearer); its export industries (Young) and its import competing sector (Munro). These three essays are well integrated and the theme that British Columbia's economy is heavily dependent on its primary based industries (e.g. forestry and mining) is one again reaffirmed.

There are, of course, many important assumptions and analytical remarks made in this paradigm of the economy (e.g. exclusion of the service sector and no dramatic technical or taste changes) which both the sophisticated reader and the professional can perceive and perhaps feel uneasy about. And this raises the important question of what audience this book is directed to: interested laymen, undergraduate, or professional economist? This is a critical point not identified by the authors that leads to a serious difficulty in assessing the expected degree of theoretical sophistication and the importance of the book.

Focussing our attention on the industrial studies of British Columbia's economy Shearer's description provides an adequate basis for analyzing different trade policies regardless of the alternative assumptions or con-

ditional predictions one could counter argue. The same, however, cannot be said about the theoretical construct used by Shearer to explain his descriptive work. In short, Shearer revises Scott's Staple Theory to explain British Columbia's economy by viewing its natural resources as basically immobile and capital and labour mobile. Thus the latter inputs historically received a high return and migrated heavily into the Province. This ignores the fact that the B.C. economy is dominated by strong labour unions that restrict employment but allow high productivity and high returns to a mobile but sometimes unemployed labour input. This situation does not reflect the true relative scarcity of a mobile labour resource.

Shearer expands this theoretical framework in his second essay to analyze the regional impact of free trade on a staple economy. Once again a variant of a well-known analytical tool, Customs Union Theory is used. Regional trade gains or diversion measures; i.e. B.C.'s forced purchasing from lower cost or higher cost sources respectively, are introduced and used to explain B.C.'s economic loss from belonging to a Custom's Union with the rest of Canada. This theoretical tool is quite appropriate. However, Shearer does not inform the reader of two well known problems. First, in order to define regional gains or losses one must have a common definition of a region. According to Shearer a region is an area endowed with some immobile resources. Thus, using this definition any area with some immobile resources can assess its gains or losses to belonging to the Canada Customs Union. Unfortunately, problems of defining an area's degree of resource immobility (must 50% or 1% of its resource be immobile?) and the possibility of making any resource mobile at some cost strips his regional viewpoint of its unique characteristic.

The second absent caveat to Shearer's argument is the Theory of the Second Best. It is well established in the literature that partial movements to a free trade position may not increase welfare (i.e. no net trade gains) if secondary distortions are encountered. Thus, Shearer's main theoretical model which is later amplified to assess British Columbia's position after free trade is questionable for important semantic and analytical reasons.

The two descriptive essays by Young and Munro which follow Shearer's provide an interesting summary of B.C.'s export and secondary manufacturing sectors respectively. Young's study, although essential for a comprehensive analysis, is tangential in terms of the key issues of rationalization and employment after free trade, and will not be discussed in detail. Munro's essay, however, is a key component (i.e. about one half) of the book can be faulted on several points. He attempts to assess the efficiency of B.C.'s import competing industries vis à vis its U.S.

counterparts (northwestern region) to measure the effects of free trade. The standard argument of inefficiency is mounted against B.C.'s sectors; namely a lack of economies of scale in many industries. Armed with this information Munro then uses location theory and estimates of scale economies to conclude that only B.C. market oriented industries with little room for scale economies (e.g. bakeries, beverages, etc.) and relatively low wages will prosper after trade barriers against U.S. firms are removed.

Mainly through omission Munro's supply oriented arguments are misleading about the destiny of post free trade industries in B.C. and show only half the picture. It is clear from hindsight that the appreciated Canadian dollar (1971) alters Munro's estimates of low wages in B.C. under a fixed or undervalued exchange rate (seven per cent difference). This recognition of recent reality effectively removes wage differentials as an argument for the competitive advantage of B.C.'s labour intensive industries.

Turning to the demand side, Munro's prognosis of B.C. industry after free trade is even less tenable. Demand factors can and often do distort trading and comparative advantage arguments. Munro ignores these factors, especially the monopoly or oligopoly structure of many of the industries (e.g. paper products, beverage, etc.) in the import competing class. Thus, in a monopolized industry, it is ideal to set up national branch plants to discriminate between markets with different demand patterns regardless of the tariff structure. Munro's discussion of the competitiveness of the sugar industry (p. 138) is a glaring example of this phenomenon. He argues that the viability of this industry is due to supply side advantages. Its existence in B.C. may, however, be just as easily explained by the monopoly position as a buyer of raw materials as well as price setter locally.

Finally, Munro partially ignores the implication of the effective rate of protection on B.C.'s post-free trade economy. Possible loss of output value to B.C.'s secondary manufacturing industry after free trade is revealed not by the nominal values used by Munro but the effective rate of protection of B.C.'s industries. Munro's analysis uses the nominal tariffs reported (i.e. this takes no account of the tariff on industry's inputs as the effective rate does) and then draws his conclusions. As a postscript he appends estimates of effective tariff rates for all Canada and concludes that with the exception of the sash industry there is little variance between the nominal rates for B.C. and the effective tariff rates for Canada. However, it is possible that the effective tariff rates of protection for B.C. are

different than the Canadian figures reported and hence Munro's nominal valuations are meaningless. The rationale for this suspicion is simple. B.C.'s resource base secondary industry would undoubtedly contain less value added but more intermediate inputs than Canada leaving the comparability of aggregate and regional data in doubt.

Regardless of the theoretical importance of the above arguments it is appropriate to question Munro's conclusion that only approximately \$350 million dollars of secondary manufacturing output would be lost with free trade. This still means by his own admission that over 10,000 people or 28% of the 1961 employment level of this industrial group would be unemployed. What will the second order effects be on the service sector of this initial decline in output and unemployment? Munro excludes this analysis for reasons that are not obvious. Since the service sector represents over 60 per cent of B.C.'s labour force only small second order effects on the service industry would be required to vastly increase industrial unemployment after free trade. Moreover, what would happen to the employment and wage level of the secondary industry if oligopolistic firms dominate the post-trade B.C. economy? Theory tells us that lower wages will be paid and even more unemployment than the 10,000 estimated will result. This is a reasonable characterization of the Second Best argument at work in the Munro study and in the B.C. economy. An attempt to make a marginal change toward perfect competition (i.e. no tariffs) has reduced wage levels and any tendency for factor-price equalization. The last point must not be taken lightly since this equalization theory is the heart of the economist's argument for free trade.

The summary essay written by Shearer attempts to capture the regional gains from free trade by estimating the lower consumer and capital good prices, plus increased revenue from exports that result from free trade. Shearer finds the total gain to free trade in B.C. to be a 5.5 per cent increase in personal income or 185 million dollars. Of course, this estimate is a conditional prediction and is based upon a series of carefully stated assumptions and caveats. However, since important parts of the theoretical concepts (i.e. part of consumer surplus and payments to factors) could not be operationally measured it would seem that Shearer would have invoked the standard procedure of alternative estimates. This is especially true in light of the lengthy and often complex arguments he makes available for this task but does not use.

Once again the remark voiced about the audience direction is apropos. At points the theory is directed to the level of the serious economics student and, given the later limited use of the theory in the form of

alternation estimates, undoubtedly belongs in appendix form. Certainly the cash cost and lost revenue concepts used could have been explained more concisely and the interested reader referred to the appendix or original sources for the multitude of derivations. Other fundamental problems exist though. As Shearer imaginatively constructs the regional effects from the traditional economy wide analysis questions of aggregation errors arise. Why should the described regional supply curve be more or less elastic than the national ones (p. 181)? What if the demand curve for the marginal supplying region was flatter than the national curve? If these two plausible cases hold for instance certain regional effects would be absent (i.e. no regional production changes). Once again at a pivotable point the reader finds reasonable alternatives which are not assessed theoretically or reflected in later dollar estimates of B.C. gains in a free trade situation.

Since it is both rather unfair and naive to attack cautious conditional predictions the remarks concerning the accuracy of estimates will be limited to those of theoretical importance. Shearer's measurement of consumer price differentials is a good case in point since it highlights the ignored effects of non-competitive elements in the whole study. The consumer price differences between Seattle and Vancouver are used to assess the free trade gain to consumers but may reflect nothing more than quasi-monopolists discriminating in two different markets. This is especially true since the author states (p. 198) that prices of high volume retail outlets were used as indicators of differentials between the two countries. These stores may have been either owned or controlled by the same parent companies or non-competitive in other ways. Relaxation of tariffs will not reduce prices in this type of situation. This fact is well documented in instances within cities in the same country where chain stores charge vastly different prices with minimal transport costs. This points out the illusory gains which are difficult to realistically measure in a non-competitive and foreign dominated economy such as B.C.'s. Again the solution would have been a wide range of alternative estimates based on degrees of competitiveness leaving the choice of the appropriate value to the reader.

In sum, after the considerable imaginative effort and detailed rationalization of all the authors throughout the work the reader is left wanting a more elaborate statement of alternative estimates of the impact of trade on Canada's most dynamic western province. In the light of this remark, it is hoped that an updated effort will be forthcoming incorporating such contemporary issues as Japanese trade and the effects of Canadian and

U.S. currency revaluation on British Columbia. Certainly the efforts of Shearer, Young and Munro have set a protective and excellent setting for these tasks.

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Indian Families of the Northwest Coast: The Impact of Change, by Claudia Lewis. University of Chicago Press, 1970, 220 pp.

My first reaction on receiving Claudia Lewis' book was to cheer. Here at last was a study of a contemporary Salish community to recommend to students and the ever growing public which wants to understand Indians. While the book begins to meet the need for studies of Northwest Coast Indians outside the relatively well covered Kwakiutl area, my second thoughts were less positive.

The book is based upon research conducted for a doctoral dissertation nearly twenty years ago and is already dated. The addition of an epilogue after a return visit in 1968 doesn't succeed in bringing it up to date or in illuminating the changes which have taken place. The epilogue bogs down in anecdotal account. One has, at times, a feeling that publication was delayed too long.

More serious and irritating is the thin fiction of anonymity with which the author attempts to conceal the identity of the community being studied. As details are unveiled, the "Camas" Indians, "... a large band ... on a reserve adjacent to one of the island's small prosperous municipalities, a few miles north of Victoria" become obviously identifiable to anyone with a superficial knowledge of British Columbia's geography and Indian settlements. Not only this, but families and individuals stand forth clearly, to those who know the community. The pseudonyms don't hide anything from those in the know and for students on the other side of the continent pseudonyms are at best irrelevant and likely to confuse. One will search bibliographies in vain for further data on the "Camas" unless, God forbid, that, too, becomes a catalogue heading.

The only justification for the use of this sort of concealment is that it may help the individuals described maintain a fiction of anonymity — to say to themselves that the readers will never know with certainty who is being talked about. But given the universal interest humans have in gossip — especially in small communities — it seems to me quite unlikely that those directly concerned will allow, let alone support, such anonymity

when reading the book. In my view, no secrets would be revealed and much confusion averted had we been told that the book was about the Cowichans.

The title of the book is also misleading for it deals exclusively with one band of Coast Salish people and not with the whole Northwest Coast culture area, and it isn't simply a study of family life. Its much closer to being a rather conventional community study, with chapters on the cultural and historical background, an overview of the physical setting, the local economy, and so on. In picturing the life of the "Camas" special attention is indeed given to family structure, childrearing and the constitution of households, but this is necessary in any culture where so much of the activity is hung on the framework of kinship. One cannot write about Salish culture without writing about family life. Claudia Lewis does give us a view of this but it isn't a full study of kinship and family.

On the other hand she doesn't describe the full round of modern Salish life either. Her fieldwork was done during summer months when children are out of school and seasonal employment, worker and family mobility at their peaks. She wasn't able to observe life during the winter when a markedly different set of institutions and seasonal activities present a different "community." She can only offer us tantalizing allusions to the winter spirit-dancing and feasting and we end up with a summer view of the community.

It's also, properly, a woman's view. We are told vividly what people look like, how they dress, what the inside and outside of houses are like. The results of her unstructured, open-ended interviews allow us to sit in on conversations with women — we hear some of their hopes, what they think of their menfolk, children and neighbours. We hear what Claudia Lewis was allowed to hear — and therein lies another limitation of the work. The author was sympathetic and hard working but she never had the chance to get behind the "front" which the Indians presented. She sees and writes of things in her own terms, not the Indians'. This is most evident in the significance which tidiness and cleanliness assume as attributes of three types or stages of households she uses to illustrate the continuum of acculturation. Old fashioned households are dirtier and more untidy than progressive households patterned after the white man's ways. There is truth in this kind of ingenuous illustration. Many whites and Indians conceptualize their differences in something like these terms. But an anthropological study which would assist us in unravelling the complexities and roots of Indian life-styles has got to go more deeply than dirt.

In spite of these negative comments *Indian Families of the Northwest Coast* is easily read and worth reading. Throughout the book the hand and heart of the author are apparent. Her biases are obvious, so too is her humanity. And this has made the difference — she openly shares with us what she saw and heard and what she thinks.

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When Russia was in America, by Mykhaylo Huculak. Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1971. 149 pp. \$6.95.

In 1799 the newly chartered Russian American Company was granted monopoly rights to all Russian territory in North America north of 55° latitude and authorization to extend its control as far south as possible without violating the already established rights of other nations. Under Governor Alexander Baranov, Sitka was established and the Russian flag was planted at Fort Ross in Spanish California. Between the two plantations lay the vast Oregon Country, claimed by both the United States and Great Britain. The vigorous Baranov developed a thriving fur empire the prosperity of which might be measured by the 80,000 sea otters and 1,493,626 fur seals procured between 1797 and 1818. This lucrative trade was threatened by American ships which coasted Russian America, trading directly with the natives. The Russians countered the American encroachment in 1821 by publishing an Imperial ukase which established a *cordon sanitaire* around Russian Alaska for 100 miles from the coastline and reaching as far south as 51° (northern tip of Vancouver Island). The object was to forbid American traders the approaches to the much-prized Russian peltry areas.

Mr. Huculak's detailed research is chiefly concerned with the negotiations which followed the protests of both Great Britain and the United States. As joint occupants of the Oregon Country they vigorously disputed both the Russian territorial claims and the commercial and maritime restrictions of the ukase, but it was abundantly clear to all disputants that no party was in a bellicose mood and that flexibility of approach would be exercised by the two great powers, who had bigger fish to fry in the European theater, and by the new republic, which was busy consolidating an empire in Louisiana.

The amicable working out of an acceptable solution was largely the

work of Pierre de Poletica and Nesselrode for the Russians, John Quincy Adams and Henry Middleton for the United States, and Stratford Canning for the British. According to two separate treaties signed in 1824 and 1825 the Russians withdrew all claims to territory south of $54^{\circ} 40'$ in return for formal recognition of their right to all the coast north of that point. They received also all the territory west of the 141st meridian (present-day Alaska-Yukon boundary), a territory to which the Russians had made no claim based on exploration or settlement. The United States received free trade concessions in Russian Alaska for a period of ten years. The British were granted similar trading rights, and, more important for the Hudson's Bay Company, British subjects were guaranteed the permanent right to travel through the Russian coastal strip to their fur areas in the northernmost Columbia. That concession allowed the British to establish unchallenged control over the fur trade of New Caledonia and to carry out through the Russian panhandle furs which might have gone to the Russian company. In the long run, of course, the United States proved to be the major victor, for she eventually fell heir to the generous boundary provisions granted the Russians, but that is another story that does not concern us here.

The author evinces a special pride in the Ukrainian nationality of Count de Poletica, and not without reason. Still, it was not an unusual practice at the time for strangers to occupy high positions in the imperial undertakings of the great nations. The Hudson's Bay Company was dominated by Scotsmen who held half a continent for London; and Astor's Scotsmen in the Pacific Fur Company might have served the United States equally well had the War of 1812 not destroyed any chance of success for their undertaking. Bering, the explorer who made possible the Russian drive into North America was a Dane, and Baranov, who made Russia a force in the Northwest, was a Finn. For that matter, Nesselrode, the conciliatory Russian foreign minister, was a German.

This worthwhile book suffers from inadequate editing and proof-reading. Was it really necessary to begin the story of the Alaska boundary negotiations with Columbus' landfall? And surely the presence of the Hudson's Bay Company on the Northwest Coast could be accepted without going back to John Cabot's voyage to Labrador. And Joel Colton is not Yoel Colton and was the *American Historical Review* really published in London by Macmillan? If local publishers are to be taken seriously they must offer their authors better editorial service than Mr. Huculak received. Despite these stylistic lapses we owe a real debt to the author for presenting a mine of valuable information about the little known Poletica

and the role he played in negotiating the boundary treaties. Heretofore it was available only in Russian or Ukrainian.

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JOSEPH C. LAWRENCE

Aboriginal Man and Environments on the Plateau of Northwest America,
edited by Arnoud H. Stryd and Rachel A. Smith, Calgary: The
Students' Press, 1971. 261 pp.

This small volume containing 17 papers from the third conference on Early Man and his Environments held at Calgary in 1970 is a useful contribution to our knowledge of the prehistory of the interior of British Columbia. The papers range from preliminary reports on recent excavations to discussions and applications of particular archaeological methods and theoretical models. Six of the papers are concerned specifically with archaeological research in British Columbia and report on excavations at Adams Lake, the Arrow Lakes, Anahim Lake, and the Nicola Valley. Two papers cover recent research in Washington and Montana and one is concerned with the Waterton Lakes area in Alberta. Four other papers relate more to paleoecology and geology and of these the report by Brian Reeves on the coalescence of the Laurentide and Cordilleran ice sheets should be read by all archaeologists because of its implications for the peopling of the New World. One paper compares aboriginal burial practices between the Canadian and American Plateau regions, and the others are largely method and theory.

The volume is generally well edited, although there are some incorrect figure references, and some of the illustrations have been reproduced badly. The papers are by and large technical in nature and will appeal to the professional archaeologist more than to the casual reader.

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