P atricia Roy and John Herd Thompson entitle the final chapter of their recent history of the province “A New British Columbia?” Covering the period from 1972 to 2004, the chapter begins by discussing the 1972 provincial election, which brought Dave Barrett’s New Democratic Party (NDP) to power after two decades of Social Credit leadership under W.A.C. Bennett. British Columbians were indeed open to change in 1972, “ready to try out a new version of the ‘good life.’” Bennett’s version, for all its populist rhetoric, had made resource-rich British Columbia a welcoming haven for big business in a postwar climate of free enterprise, economic expansion, modernization, and rising living standards. The words “explore, exploit, export!” would form an appropriate “new corporation symbol” for the resource economy, declared Herbert L. McDonald in a 1966 celebration of the province’s history and prospects.2

McDonald’s was an inspirational account, one of foresters, geologists, and engineers “backed by enormous amounts of public and private capital,” shaping an economy to the abundance of “rocks, soil, forests, rivers, the wild game of the land and the silver fishes of the sea.” Behind the “moulders” came the “exploiters,” men “hard and competent, highly trained” in the operation of sophisticated equipment. But this was not the reckless plunder of prewar days, McDonald emphasized. Cut-and-get-out logging had been replaced by sustained yield forestry, regulating the cut of an industry that contributed roughly 30 percent of government revenues. Yet it was difficult for McDonald to portray the commercial

1 The author wishes to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable input.
fishery in such glowing terms. Excessive competition for salmon had reduced annual earnings for 40 percent of the 7,300 boats to under $1,000. Some ten thousand fishers and another four thousand tendermen and shoreworkers produced products valued at $84.6 million in 1965, and the annual salmon catch had doubled in value over the past two decades despite a relatively stable total catch weight. But McDonald was silent on salmon management; his was a story of provincial accomplishment, after all, of British Columbia’s transition from “hewer of wood and drawer of water” to “engineer of timber resources and a producer of hydroelectric power.” Canadian federalism gave Ottawa authority over the salmon fishery, and the author’s relative lack of boosterism in discussing that sector might be read both as sober and as an implicit critique of federal management.3

McDonald’s portrayal of contemporary life in British Columbia captures perfectly the optimism and can-do enthusiasm of the postwar era. Yet just six years later voters rejected the government that presided over that prosperity, endorsing the NDP’s “Enough Is Enough” campaign motto. As George Woodcock explains, in the three years since the 1969 election, inflation, labour strife, a slowing economy, automation in the extractive industries, unwise cabinet appointments, and Bennett’s loss of the “common touch” opened the door to a reinvigorated NDP: “An era of promise seemed about to begin.” The NDP, Barrett writes, was “free and unfettered to roam in new directions.” The result was a tumultuous three-year experiment not in socialism but in social democracy that would bring new social programs, increased funding for education, and more protection for consumers and the elderly. As Philip Resnick put it, Barrett “sought to make capitalism more liveable through social expenditures, rather than attacking capitalism head on.”4

The NDP would also pursue a mixed economy, involving public ownership of troubled forest companies, stricter regulation of industry, and steeper royalties for public resources. Pivotal in this agenda was the new minister of lands, forests and water resources, Bob Williams. His predecessor Ray Williston had controlled the portfolio since an early 1950s bribery scandal involving the award of forest tenures had sent Robert Sommers to prison, and Williams’ arrival brought an abrupt switch in rhetoric. As his party’s forestry critic, Williams had attacked Socred

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3 McDonald, British Columbia, 9, 41-43, 46-47.
resource policies for breeding a monopolistic, inefficient industry. “The companies have received [the] deed to the public’s trees for a song and have given little back either in direct economic returns or reforestation,” he had charged in 1971, following up with a campaign promise that a stronger NDP presence in the Legislature would help ensure “that the penny give-aways will be a thing of the past.”

Now, after the surprise election result, Williams was in position to chart a new course. The NDP government’s difficulties have been well documented. “Dependent on the collaboration and good will of the very capitalists it seeks to restrain,” Resnick argues, social democracy “finds its path ever more circumscribed.” Woodcock, arriving at a similar conclusion, likens the NDP’s accomplishments to “an electoral hiccup.” Barrett, he goes on to say, achieved little in the way of “radical economic action” and did nothing to change the province’s dependence on primary industries that “depleted the environment and its resources.”

This article is in substantial agreement with these interpretations but seeks further insight into the NDP years by focusing on a neglected area of its environmental record. The excellent work of Jeremy Wilson (and, more recently, Gordon Hak) has substantially advanced our understanding of environmental politics during the early 1970s. But Wilson’s primary focus in Talk and Log is on the politics of the province’s wilderness preservation debate, a task that permitted only a cursory analysis of forest practice regulation. This article concerns itself with a subject that Wilson devoted only a page or so to and that Hak mentions only indirectly – the 1972 Planning Guidelines for Coast Logging Operations. The Guidelines, which represented the British Columbia Forest Service’s (BCFS) response to mounting public unease over the ecological consequences of unrestrained clearcutting, were rushed into effect just prior to the 1972 election, becoming official NDP policy in late September without legislative backing.

Fundamental to what Wilson calls the BCFS’s effort to “get modern” in the face of criticism from new environmental organizations, established fish and wildlife groups, commercial fishers, the British Columbia Fish and Wildlife Branch (BCFWB), and the federal Fisheries Service, the Guidelines placed limits on the size of clearcuts and mandated an

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unspecified “green up” period before adjacent timber could be logged. As a makeshift endeavour to convince the public that the day of “multiple-use” forestry had arrived, they pleased no one. Industry’s initial distaste turned quickly to loathing in the face of a worsening forest products market. But the new “patch logging” regulations had few supporters among fisheries interests and environmentalists either. Instead of a checkerboard pattern of cutting watersheds, they favoured leaving a continuous border of timber along the edges of fish-bearing water-courses. Such leavestrips, they argued, were needed to keep riparian areas entirely free from the clearcutting that produced siltation, debris accumulations, and water temperature increases.\(^8\)

The resulting controversy complicated an already uneasy relationship between Williams and senior BCFS officials, raised pressing scientific questions about the role of forests in maintaining healthy freshwater ecosystems, and contributed to debate about the forest industry’s dominance in British Columbia’s political economy. Preceded by one long-running Bennett government and followed by another, the NDP for three years tried to negotiate the difficult path of environmental reform in a staple economy embedded within a federal system. Intra- and intergovernmental conflict festered, as Ottawa’s jurisdiction over salmon confronted Victoria’s control over forests. The BCFWB, responsible for the sport fishery and taking part in enforcement of the federal Fisheries Act, tested its strength against the powerful Forest Service. Forest companies large and small united to fight off the demands of their critics. Foresters in both public and private employ resisted any loss of their land-use planning authority to fisheries biologists. The result was what Ian Mahood, in a plea for a return to old-fashioned sustained yield timber management, called “guerrilla warfare.”\(^9\)

The forests-versus-fisheries conflict captured fewer headlines than did early rounds of the province’s “war in the woods.” But the issues are just as fundamental, the stakes perhaps even higher, and the insights to be gained from its analysis just as important to an understanding of environmental policy-making as are the more fully documented use-versus-preservation disputes. The fish-forestry debate goes to the heart of the human relationship to nature in ways that drawing lines on a map to separate industrial from “wilderness” forestlands does not. The hundreds of streams that wind their way through British Columbia’s rugged coastal topography defy any simple zoning approach to man-

\(^8\) Wilson, *Talk and Log*, 119.
Forests and Fish

agement. Fragile, and enormously significant in determining the health of forests, fish, wildlife, and human societies, riparian areas test our ability to balance economic, social, and ecological demands.\textsuperscript{10}

The Guidelines fell short of meeting this test. Only marginally informed by the available scientific data, drawn up by foresters without consultation with fisheries biologists, and motivated primarily by a desire to maintain industry access to fibre, they were a relatively poor excuse for the balance that multiple-use forestry seemed to imply. But for all their shortcomings, the Guidelines were a real challenge to the status quo – a mode of production that offered no compromise at all. Progressive clearcutting yielded the greatest efficiencies in timber extraction, generated the highest returns for industry and the state, and cleared the ground for the growing of a future crop through artificial regeneration. The bill for ignoring that final step would come due in the early 1980s, but a decade earlier the illusion of abundance still held, and timber liquidation remained the BCFS’s primary mandate.\textsuperscript{11}

That the BCFS saw fit to introduce even a moderate restraint on clearcutting practices has real significance, then, given the traditions and assumptions deeply rooted in the history of industrial forestry in British Columbia. The forest industry’s attack on the Guidelines supports that contention, even as the criticism from fisheries conservation interests suggests that they did not go far enough in the direction of multiple use. At first, Williams seemed resolved to support the Guidelines and change the regulatory regime for forest management. But the constraints imposed by the global capitalist marketplace weakened Williams’ resolve, and his aspirations for increased revenue generation and tighter regulation were undermined by a weakening economy. As the postwar boom sputtered to an end in 1974, he backed off. When Bill Bennett restored the Social Credit Party to power late in 1975, the Guidelines were swept away, dismissed as unduly restrictive by the new forests minister, Tom Waterland. The introduction of an industry-friendly regulatory regime would culminate in a policy of “sympathetic administration” during the early 1980s.


This is not just a simple story about the fate of a particular regulatory initiative, however. It also addresses critical themes in the history of science and technology, the relationship between traditional wise-use conservationism and environmentalism, and interagency conflict both within the provincial state and in federal-provincial relations. Ottawa’s jurisdiction over salmon stopped at the edge of the stream, where British Columbia’s control over forests kicked in. Untangling these histories demands a focus that takes in clearcutting as a mode of production, the voices of those who resisted that practice’s disruption of freshwater ecosystems, the scientific basis of their arguments, and the obstacles to reform embedded in a provincial economy that saw the returns from forest exploitation far surpass those from fish. The power that flowed from that reality supported the forest industry in its resistance to regulation. A lack of definitive scientific data on fish-forestry interactions in British Columbia further disadvantaged the advocates of a ban on streamside logging. Yet in mediating between the demands of its established partners in forest exploitation, on the one hand, and those of fisheries agencies and conservationists, on the other, the BCFS asserted its autonomy by implementing a set of regulations that the NDP government maintained in the face of criticism from all interests, particularly the forest industry. A half-measure, the Guidelines came as an unwelcome shock to operators unfamiliar with any state interference in their cutting practices, while disappointing those interests seeking a fuller commitment to the protection of salmon habitat.

The story of the Guidelines is thus both one that is consistent with Resnick’s analysis of social democracy’s limits and one that points to the capacity of state managers and politicians to use the power of government in new ways, however hesitantly, in response to emerging social pressures. That the results fell short should come as no surprise: British Columbians were only just beginning to embrace ecological values, the science supporting regulation was not well developed, and the imperative of capital accumulation in a province wedded to forestry profits and revenues all constituted obstacles to multiple-use reform. Still, as a first step on the path to ecosystem management and riparian zone protection under the Forest Practices Code implemented by the NDP governments of Mike Harcourt and Glen Clark in the 1990s, the Guidelines deserve attention.12 The story of their potential, as well as their shortcomings,

reveals much about British Columbia’s political economy in the early 1970s as new ways of thinking about the environment began to challenge the province’s heritage of exploitive resource extraction.

**POSTWAR CLEARCUTTING, SUSTAINED YIELD, AND MULTIPLE USE**

During the long postwar boom, W.A.C. Bennett’s Social Credit government and the dominant firms in British Columbia’s forest industry settled into a cozy relationship under the rhetorical blanket of sustained yield forestry. Notions of teamwork and partnership prevailed in characterizing the sharing of management responsibilities. The Tree Farm Licence policy, created by the coalition government in 1947, had brought 22.5 million acres of forestland under management by 1972 and was the key instrument of joint Crown-corporate stewardship. The tenure “combined the best features of public and private ownership,” Chief Forester C.D. Orchard maintained in persuading British Columbians to overlook its monopolistic features. With long-term control over vast stretches of public forest, licencees would have the tenure security needed to manage wisely for future yields. The Crown, through the British Columbia Forest Service, would take up the role as a “firm but understanding landlord,” corporate self-interest making rigid regulation unnecessary.13

What it all added up to in structural terms, Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner argue in a broader analysis of postwar Canadian forest policy, was industry’s emergence as the state’s “critical partner” in the “timber management regime.” Corporate executives worked closely with government officials through the Council of Forest Industries (COFI) in what Michael Delzell describes as a “clientele pluralist network” of policy-making, “an exclusive and mutually beneficial” arrangement that included a place for smaller operators to make their views known through the Truck Loggers Association (TLA). Concentration of control over the resource under the TFL system topped their list of concerns, especially as the major companies began taking up cutting rights in the Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYU), where the BCFS allotted and supervised timber sales. Small operators also had a place on the TFLs after

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the 1953 introduction of the contractor clause into those contracts, but throughout they maintained that the rules of sustained yield had been rigged against their interests. By 1974, the ten largest firms controlled 54.5 percent of the provincial harvest, up from 37 percent in 1954.\(^{14}\)

Thus, as Wilson notes, postwar forest management “primarily meant dealing with decisions about how the pie should be divided among those clamouring for cutting rights.” Bickering over allocation aside, access to the pie increased as more interior forestland came into production and the annual cut rose from 22 million cubic metres in 1950 to almost 55 million in 1970. For the time being sustained yield produced jobs, profits, revenues, and the welcome appearance of community stability. The BCFS was “among the world leaders in sustained yield forestry,” Herbert McDonald informed British Columbians in a reassuring message that industry and government elites promoted relentlessly. No jurisdiction in the world “controls its basic raw materials in any more positive a fashion than we do in British Columbia,” Ray Williston enthused, citing the “high performance requirements” imposed on TFL holders.\(^{15}\)

Some critics did challenge aspects of the consensus narrative of regulatory and managerial efficiency. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, renamed the New Democratic Party in 1961, had by the late 1950s dropped proposals for nationalization of the forest industry in favour of a more moderate program of regulation. The party continued to denounce monopoly control by the big corporations and to demand higher stumpage charges, but it failed to “articulate a clear, meaty forest policy alternative” until the election of Bob Williams in 1966.\(^{16}\)

Fish and game clubs pressed for recreational access to TFL lands and exerted sporadic pressure for controls on loggers to prevent interference with spawning. The Lake Cowichan Fish and Game Club asked Orchard for closer supervision in 1949, receiving assurances that the BCFS had the matter in hand. A year later the British Columbia Natural Resources Conference called for cooperation between the BCFS and Department of Fisheries in forest management. Orchard responded in

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\(^{15}\) Wilson, Talk and Log, p. 80; McDonald, British Columbia, 43; Ray Williston, “Foreign Capital Investment Defined,” TL, January 1969, 50.

similar fashion: the relationship of logging to fish reproduction would “continue to receive our attention.”

Commercial fisheries’ interests were heard from as well, appearing before the two postwar forestry royal commissions headed by Gordon Sloan to express concern over the forest industry’s rough treatment

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17 W. Palliser to Minister of Lands, 16 March 1949; C.D. Orchard to Lake Cowichan Fish and Game Club, 22 March 1949, file 0669, BC Ministry of Forests Records (hereafter BCMFR); D.B. Turner to E.G. Oldham, 3 April 1950; C.D. Orchard to Turner, 24 April 1950, file 054987, BCMFR.
of salmon spawning grounds. Department of Fisheries Pacific Area Director A.J. Whitmore reported some improvement in industry performance at the 1955 hearings, but the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union (ufawu) persisted in calling attention to the negative effects of watershed clearcutting and careless streamside logging, condemned aerial spraying of DDT to control insect infestations, and expressed concern over log driving as the Skeena, Wannock, Homathko, and Nass rivers came into increased use as log transportation routes.\(^{18}\)

No one spoke out more eloquently or forcefully in the interests of fish habitat than Roderick Haig-Brown, the author-sportsman whose adherence to the tenets of wise-use resourcism loosened during British Columbia’s aggressive industrial assault on nature. By the mid-1960s, Arn Keeling argues, Haig-Brown had adopted a philosophical stance of “ethical conservationism,” a perspective informing “a more encompassing critique of the social and cultural values that engendered the waste of resources and environmental degradation.” Well-connected to the main currents of evolving North American thought on the relationship between humanity and nature, Haig-Brown cited Rachel Carson’s research into the dangers of DDT in a 1962 address to the Victoria Fish and Game Protective Association on the threat posed by forest spraying in British Columbia. He would go on to become a sharp critic of the logging industry, a “transitional figure” who never completely abandoned his faith in the ability of resource managers to achieve balanced use even as he inspired a younger, more radical generation of environmentalists.\(^ {19}\)

During the 1960s sports enthusiasts, fishers, and a few opinion-shapers such as Haig-Brown had mounted an informed critique of


what government and industry called multiple use. It fell well short of constituting a movement, but British Columbians were becoming increasingly worried about their rivers and streams. Later that decade, Keeling notes, “pollution became an outrage in search of a problem.” Those who lived, worked, and played in coastal forestlands did not have to look very hard, and the resulting outcry drew upon three sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, trajectories of demand for change. One, tracing its roots back to the mid-nineteenth century, saw rural people speak out against industrial abuse of the landscape. Look closely at those who use natural resources at the local level, Richard Judd challenges fellow environmental historians, and you will “see the sources of rising conservation consciousness in bold relief.” Gordon Hak has uncovered such a vein of dissent in the Fraser Valley during the 1870s. Similar expressions have emerged from communities like Bella Coola and Hazelton, and during the period in question here, fish and game clubs and commercial fishers led the chorus demanding protection for fish-bearing streams from the ravages of clearcutting.

The second, related thread, rooted in the thrust for efficiency in resource exploitation, grew out of late nineteenth-century conservationism. Here we see bcfwb officials, joined by those from the federal Fisheries Service, press their professional and institutional agendas. The obstacles might have been more easily overcome had Chief Forester Ernest Manning not died in a 1941 airplane crash. During the late 1930s, Manning seemed willing to promote a more balanced land-use vision to “harmonize” timber production with fish, wildlife, and tourism interests. His successor, C.D. Orchard, shared neither that commitment nor Manning’s enthusiasm for tighter clearcutting regulations. With his passing, an early opportunity to explore the potential of multiple-use forestry was lost.

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A new and potentially richer opportunity emerged three decades later when the two existing strains of conservationism were joined by a third. With the rise of environmentalism – a new social movement that valued nature less for its commodity value than for its capacity to provide an enhanced quality of life for its largely young, urban, middle-class adherents – conservation concerns “took on a new and far-reaching significance.” The appearance in 1969 of both the Society for Pollution and Environmental Control (SPEC) and a BC chapter of the Sierra Club signalled the coming storm. The public was becoming louder in its “efforts to restrict industrial development of the resource,” cofi’s Norm Dusting warned, and executives called on foresters to “bring the voice of reason and fact before these people.” They did so by defining “multiple use,” or “integrated use,” the latter term gaining favour over this period in a way that privileged industry interests over recreational demands. Either could be used to justify opening parks to development and would now become weapons in early 1970s battles over preservation of the Nitinat Triangle and Tsitika watershed on Vancouver Island. The former campaign, cofi explained, would only “lock-up” forests for the “single use of a small group of wilderness lovers.”

The relationship between conservationism and environmentalism remains a matter of debate, and over time divisions would become increasingly evident as the province plunged into a well-documented series of land-use conflicts. In the early 1970s, however, conservationists and young, firebrand environmentalists could agree on the need to control clearcutting. Haig-Brown himself welcomed “the flowering of a new ecological consciousness,” Keeling observes, although his age and background made him uncomfortable with the new movement’s confrontational style. Certainly many of his counterparts had misgivings about the counterculture values of organizations such as Greenpeace. “Hunters are now being assailed by evangelizing sentimentalists,” a 1972 BC Wildlife Federation newsletter remarked, and extremists “would stop everything and try to turn us back to primitive living.” But the forestry–fisheries issue did constitute a common ground upon which

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young and old, rural and urban, could join in seeking to “retain the best of the environment for the greater benefit of everyone.”

The “best of the environment,” for the purposes of this article, meant the riparian areas bordering streams and lakes, and the waters themselves, that broke up coastal woodlands. Science is only just beginning to unravel the complex relationships of forests, water, fish, and wildlife, and some of the assumptions that drove stream management prescriptions through much of the twentieth century have proven misguided. Efforts to clear streams of large, woody debris, for example, have negatively affected fish habitat. Nevertheless, fisheries biologists knew by the early 1970s that coastal logging practices had “detrimental and often disastrous impacts.”

The positioning of yarding equipment near streams destroyed their banks, depositing sediment and leaving enormous debris accumulations, far beyond what normal ecological processes produced. Logging roads crossed streams frequently, and, as networks penetrated steeper, mountainous terrain, runoff and mass soil movements worsened sediment loads. Clearcutting of entire watersheds, typically to the edge of streams and lakes, altered seasonal flows. Low water levels during dry summers made it difficult for salmon to reach their spawning grounds, and higher water temperatures increased stress on young fry. Heavy runoff after fall rains scoured gravel beds, destroying eggs and fry. Removing streamside trees reduced both the food supply and the shade that moderated water temperatures. Cautious about generalizing too broadly, fisheries biologists could state with certainty that logging


had “deleterious effects” on the freshwater habitats of the five species of anadromous Pacific salmon and trout.\textsuperscript{26}

Nor did it take an advanced degree to arrive at such conclusions. The use of bulldozers to extract gravel from streams for road construction, a common practice, deprived salmon of the clean, well-aerated streambeds needed for the laying and fertilization of eggs. Operators just as routinely yarded logs through and across streams, using any natural advantage to lower logging costs. Yarding logs down one Oregon stream had reduced the streambed to “mud, silt, bark, limbs and other debris,” one study showed, reducing spawning capacity by as much as 75 percent. All too often, an American researcher observed, “the ruin of the stream is obvious where gravel beds are buried under silt, where debris chokes the stream, where no food-producing rubble or gravel substrate remains, and where water temperatures reach 75 and 80 degrees.”\textsuperscript{27}

Federal fisheries biologists such as Ferris Neave, W.P. Wickett, and R.E. Forrester had contributed to the understanding of logging’s implications for fish habitat in British Columbia through the postwar period, although the Fisheries Research Board of Canada’s Pacific Biological Station devoted more energy to the problem of pulp mill pollution. The Fisheries Act made it an offence to foul streams with logs and slash, but Ottawa emphasized persuasion, education, and post-logging cleanup rather than policing the woods. A referral system came into effect during the 1950s, in theory permitting fisheries managers to consult on the inclusion of stream-protection clauses in cutting rights, but these were “violated by almost every operation near a stream.”\textsuperscript{28} The US Forest Service had begun providing for leavestrips on timber sales in Pacific Northwest and California National Forests during the 1960s, but the BCFS considered the referral process a nuisance. All interests recognized that the combined forces of federal and provincial fisheries agencies were unequal to the task of Fisheries Act enforcement.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{27} Chapman, “Effects of Logging,” 536.

By the early 1970s, however, an increasingly embattled Forest Service responded with its Guidelines. Ignoring pleas for a mandatory leavestrip policy and a planning partnership with fisheries agencies, the BCFS acted unilaterally in adopting its patch logging restrictions in May 1972. “The public is becoming more and more concerned with the environment … and is demanding protection and proper management of its resources,”

Clearcutting north of Cowichan Lake, 1965. Source: BC Archives, NA-22420

Vancouver District Forester H.M. Pogue informed his staff. But that pressure could not be permitted to undermine the agency’s dominance in land management. “Under no circumstances,” he advised, “can we permit our jurisdiction to be eroded by some other agency, group or department.”

Driven by a commitment to the existing regulatory hierarchy, the Guidelines marked no dramatic shift in the direction of multiple-use forestry as envisioned by fisheries advocates. Clearcutting remained general practice, three hundred acres being the desirable maximum within a patch-logging pattern. All trees above ten feet in height were to be felled within each cutblock. A border of timber might be retained along a stream or lake if required for a “special protection purpose,” but, Pogue emphasized, only under “very special circumstances.” Instead, openings would be restricted to 50 percent of any streamside or lakeshore during a logging sequence. Yarding across streams would be prohibited and extra care taken to minimize the watershed effects of road construction.

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29 H.M. Pogue to All Rangers and Field Staff, Vancouver District, 3 May 1972, Ian T. Cameron Papers, bca, box 1. I will be dealing with the exceedingly complex developments of the 1960s more fully in a separate paper.

30 Pogue to All Rangers and Field Staff, Vancouver District, 3 May 1972.
The Prince Rupert Forest District proposed a similar set of Guidelines for Crown Zellerbach’s Owikeno watershed timber licences that May. The aim, W.G. Hughes explained, was “a very extensive patch logging system in which each and every valley … will always have a fair proportion of its land covered with productive, protective and attractive forest.” Sending a copy to Chief Forester Ian Cameron, Hughes acknowledged that the approach conflicted with the agency’s liquidation policy for the old tenures taken up prior to the 1912 Forest Act. But surely it was better to adjust “than to sacrifice our honest attempt at good forest land management” given the mounting criticism of uncontrolled clearcutting.31

Over the next few months the province was embroiled in the 1972 election campaign. Barrett promised stronger efforts to “translate our natural resources into benefits for the people.” Industry could pay more for Crown timber, and TFL contracts would be renegotiated as they came up for renewal over the next few years. Like Williams, he made frequent reference to the Socred record of generosity towards industry friends, while Comox riding candidate Karen Sanford expressed support for efforts to preserve the White River Valley and pledged stronger measures to stop pollution by pulp mills and logging operations.32

Environmental and conservation organizations were busy that summer as well. Over three hundred British Columbians signed a petition protesting BCFS plans to use herbicides to eradicate brush and alder from logged sites near fish-bearing streams in the Bella Coola Valley. The Steelhead Society of BC (SSBC) requested discussions with the BCFS on a streamside leavestrip policy. Deputy Forests Minister J.S. Stokes agreed but emphasized that it all depended upon “analysis of the situation on the ground” rather than upon the application of rigid rules. SPEC’s Smithers branch undertook an independent study of the leavestrip question that July, while BC Wildlife Federation representatives arranged a meeting with Stokes to discuss Forest Service policies. Other conflicts loomed over industrial penetration of the White River watershed on Vancouver Island, the Owikeno Lake watershed on the central coast, and the Babine Lake watershed in the interior. Williston even faced pressure from Cabinet colleagues. Just a few days before the election, Travel Industry Minister Ken Kiernan requested

the implementation of a “reasonable green belt” policy along streams and lakeshores.33

Federal Fisheries Service officials, having invested some $8 million since 1965 in constructing artificial spawning channels to improve the sockeye productivity of Babine Lake, were anxious to minimize habitat destruction by Northwood Pulp Ltd. operations. The bcfs objected to any preclusion of lakeshore logging, pointing to its new policy of leaving half of any lakeshore uncut at any one time. When the Fisheries Research Board established an inter-agency working group to assess the impacts of forestry activity on the Skeena, Stokes nominated a bcfs representative, sending along a reminder that his agency had “the ultimate responsibility for determining how the forests will be managed.” He went further in a memorandum to his Prince Rupert District forester, telling W.G. Hughes that, in the event of recommended restrictions on harvesting, his office must press for cost-benefit analysis.34

Amidst this flurry of activity, the Forest Service’s draft clearcutting Guidelines, not yet released to industry or the public, received a lukewarm response from provincial fisheries officials. Deputy Minister of Recreation and Conservation Lloyd Brooks considered them “a step in the right direction” but rather vague. Fish and Wildlife Branch Director J. Hatter called the Guidelines “too general to be of much value.” More specific and comprehensive forest management regulations were needed. Hatter suggested the establishment of a committee composed of agency and university representatives to devise a systematic, inclusive policymaking process. Just two days after Hatter expressed this desire, on 30 August, British Columbians went to the polls and ended two decades of Social Credit rule. W.A.C. Bennett would wait two weeks before resigning as premier, and forest industry stock values dipped temporarily while corporate leaders fretted about NDP intentions. “If they do some of the things they are talking about, it would be disastrous for the economy,” predicted MacMillan Bloedel’s J.V. Clyne. corf’s Gordon


Draeske fired a warning shot, saying that firms would delay investment planning until arrival of the budget.\textsuperscript{35}

**CHECKERBOARD LOGGING AND SALMON HABITAT**

Bob Williams, the new minister of lands, forests, and water resources, took office having pledged fuller cooperation with those “fighting to arrest the environmental decay of British Columbia,” a larger BCF\textit{w}B budget, and the introduction of a policy of integrated resource use. The transfer of power had not yet been achieved when the BCF\textit{w}B submitted an early-September analysis of the Guidelines to the BCF\textit{s}. P.J. Bandy and M.R. Whatley found a host of problems, starting with the document’s assertion that clearcutting would be the “general practice” rather than just one of an array of methods. The stream protection proposals were “particularly weak,” mistakenly assuming that vegetative cover left after conventional clearcutting afforded adequate protection. They suggested substituting two sets of restrictions. The first aimed to provide “maximum protection against increased temperatures and deposition of debris and silt in streams.” Under these, logging would be prohibited within an area three times the width of any stream or within two hundred feet of any lake or marsh, without the consent of federal and provincial fisheries officials.

The second, less onerous, set of Guidelines would establish the protective measures needed where logging within a leavestrip was deemed acceptable. These would restrict clearcutting to areas of moderate slope and stable soil conditions, limit their extent to just twenty acres, and preserve minor streamside vegetation. Bandy and Whatley also expressed dissatisfaction with the vague provisions for delayed cutting of reserved timber in the patch system, foreseeing the harvest of such areas within a year or two of the first pass. Finally, they considered the restriction of clearcuts to no more than 50 percent of a stream or lake at any one time inadequate, particularly on steep shorelines and long streams. In forwarding the comments to Stokes, Lloyd Brooks described the Guidelines as an “important step forward” despite their shortcomings. The most pressing need, he concluded, was for a clas-
sification of streams to assess their productivity, presumably a two-tier model such as Bandy and Whatley had proposed.\textsuperscript{36}

The Forest Service’s new “Planning Guidelines for Coast Logging Operations” became official on 29 September, with no acknowledgment of \textsc{bcrwb} input, when all coastal operators cutting Crown timber received a copy. Barrett would not convene the Legislature until mid-October, and the Guidelines never made their way into the statutes through a Forest Act amendment. Chief Forester Ian Cameron’s covering letter explained that continued access to forest resources depended upon industry’s acceptance of “the need for maintaining an environment satisfactory and suitable to all British Columbians.” Operators would be given a reasonable time to achieve the new multiple-use standards, with stumpage appraisals making allowance for increased operating costs.\textsuperscript{37}

The official Guidelines marked no sharp change from the direction the Forest Service had been moving along since early 1972, with one significant exception: clearcutting remained the “general practice.” All trees over ten feet in height would be felled regardless of merchantability, with the establishment of even-aged stands the ultimate objective. Measures to provide environmental protection would include the reservation of forest cover for fish, game, and recreational use. That might involve leaving “inaccessible trees” in steep canyons or rocky bluffs, trees on unstable banks, and those along rivers and lakes that could not be removed without damage. Streamside timber might also require special techniques such as selective cutting or smaller patches; but, as a basic guide, clearcuts within “an alternate … system of cut and leave patches” should not exceed two hundred acres in size. Here was the one significant departure from the measures introduced earlier in 1972, and industry would find the reduction from three hundred to two hundred acres unacceptable. Logging of timber adjacent to the openings would be deferred until these had restocked, discouraging water temperature increases and sedimentation. Finally, more rigorous road planning would help keep environmental impacts to a minimum.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{37} I.T. Cameron to All Licensees of Timber Sales, Tree Farm Licenses, and Timber Sale Harvesting Licenses in the Coast Region of British Columbia, 29 September 1972, Cameron Papers, \textsc{bca}, box 1.

Forests and Fish

BCFS approval of operating plans and consultation with “other resource managers” would ensure an “effective base for planning, resource allocation and management,” Cameron concluded. Williams’s role in the Guidelines is unclear, but he would later say that he did not anticipate their introduction until the next summer, followed by a phase-in period. Industry would begin howling about the cost implications within months, while fisheries interests deplored their failure to embody genuine multiple-use principles. What Cameron’s staff thought about the new regulations is a matter for conjecture, but it seems clear that the BCFS hoped to preserve planning flexibility to meet public demands while avoiding the threat of leavestrip legislation. Second, that planning would remain the domain of the forester, not the fisheries manager. Fishery agency input had been disregarded, there would be no permanent leavestrips, and field staff received the Guidelines accompanied by the usual admonition: “Under no circumstances can we permit our jurisdiction to be eroded.”

All of these factors made the Guidelines a less than promising solution to fish-forestry disputes along the coast. Indeed, they probably made

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it more difficult for managers to negotiate informal agreements in the field. When Fisheries Service, bcfs, and Eurocan personnel met in mid-October to discuss the threat logging posed to a stream bordered by unstable slopes on the central coast, TFL No. 41, the issue boiled down to the need for leavestrips. The foresters cited the loss of productive forestland, the impact on the allowable cut, the cost of returning to log reserve timber, and “the danger of precedents” in countering the proposal. The federal official responded by asserting that failure to provide leavestrips would result in legal action under the Fisheries Act — a position that amounted to “resource blackmail,” reported a Prince Rupert District forester. The Guidelines also contributed to the undoing of an agreement that local officials and MacMillan Bloedel managers had worked out providing for leavestrips along the Eve River on Vancouver Island. Meeting to discuss the issue, H.M. Pogue now informed bcfwb officials that, in conformity with the new policy limiting openings to no more than 50 percent of a streamface, 1972 cutting permits had ordered clearcutting to streambanks. That approach obviated the need for leavestrips, Pogue said, but branch officials responded that the Eve River plan should combine that measure with patch logging. Chief Forester Ian Cameron indicated his willingness to consider leavestrip retention in specific circumstances if “compatible with good forest management,” but MacMillan Bloedel cut the trees in question a day or two later.40

Before breaking up, the 25 October gathering provided provincial fisheries officials with an opportunity to express disappointment that their comments on the draft Guidelines had gone unacknowledged. “Not only were our suggestions not incorporated,” a bcfwb official noted, “but they didn’t even have the courtesy to let us know that the Guidelines were being sent out.” Lloyd Brooks also conveyed his frustration over the failure to consider bcfwb recommendations, along with the removal of protective timber along the Eve River. “Maintenance of vegetative cover on streambanks is extremely important for the production of fish,” he informed Williams. Stronger Guidelines were needed, along with “administrative acceptance of their intent and … flexibility in application.”41


41 Vernon, “Notes on a Meeting,”; I.S. Smith, Monthly Report, October 1972, bca, gr 1027, box 74; L. Brooks to R. Williams, 30 November 1972, bcmfr, file 012359.
The new era of multiple-use regulation had gotten off to a rocky start, then, despite the BCFS's quite significant effort to forge a more moderate clearcutting regime. That many considered this agenda too limited, perhaps even counter-productive, became even clearer before the end of 1972. Fishers from the Ucluelet-Tofino area, having come together in a local Save Our Salmon Committee (sosc) linked to the Pacific Trollers Association, provided a vigorous critique of damage to streams on the west coast of Vancouver Island late in 1972. They felt threatened on all sides, NDP MLA Robert Skelly told Bob Williams. Federal Environment Minister Jack Davis was in the midst of a campaign to reduce the size of the fishing fleet, while logging practices had become even more destructive thanks to the mandatory clearcutting of streambanks. sosc delegates met with Stokes in early November, the latter agreeing to send a senior BCFS officer to Ucluelet for an inspection.42

Williams, too, demanded reports on the matter. Stokes explained that the BCFWB was “not entirely in agreement” with the Guidelines, conceded that damage may have been inflicted under past practices, but promised that the new Guidelines together with “strict administrative control” would bring progress. The agency followed up the next day by issuing “Planning Note #18.” Consideration would now be given to reserving some trees, in selected openings, from cutting. The Planning Note fell short of a multiple-use policy breakthrough, but it does seem to reflect recognition within the BCFS that the Guidelines had not achieved the desired end.43

A week later Stokes dispatched W.F. Tuttle to Ucluelet to inspect several streams with the local forest ranger, three sosc members, and seven other fishers, the itinerary including a Pacific Trollers Association meeting on 29 November. Lost Shoe Creek was the scene of an extensive log and debris jam, the sosc claiming that the coho run was now nearly extinct because spawners could no longer pass the obstruction. Moving on to Kennedy Lake, the sosc asked for an end to MacMillan Bloedel logging along the Maggie River spawning areas. At Indian River an operator had used a tractor to clear debris from a small stream, removing much of the spawning gravel in the process. “The salmon run to this

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43 R. Williams to R.E. Skelly, 14 November 1972; J.S. Stokes, Memorandum to the Minister, 20 November 1972, BCMFR, file 02003; W.G. Hughes, “Planning Note #18, Special Measures in Field Administration of Logging Operations,” 27 November 1972, BCMFR, file 0235258.
small creek may be very significantly reduced for some years,” Tuttle remarked.\textsuperscript{44}

After lunch the group went on to Salmon Creek, site of another log jam, before stopping at MacMillan Bloedel’s log dump at the head of Ucluelet Inlet. Dead fish filled the mouth of Salmon Creek, a nearby maintenance area providing a possible explanation. For years used engine oil had been dumped on the ground to be carried into the stream by autumn rains. Tuttle agreed with the fishers that “the combined effect of log jams and oil seepage into Salmon Creek is having a disastrous effect.” At another creek MacMillan Bloedel and BC Forest Products had cooperated with a Fisheries Service request for leavestrips. Blowdown had eliminated much of the cover, however, a process Tuttle predicted would continue until no trees remained standing. With a bridge washout preventing access to Staghorn Creek, the tour wrapped up at an area clearcut in 1970, where MacMillan Bloedel had yarded logs across the narrow stream, choking it with debris.\textsuperscript{45}

The following morning saw the bcfs representatives attend a tense meeting with the area’s federal fisheries officer, BC Forest Products, and MacMillan Bloedel managers at the latter’s Ucluelet office. Tuttle began by asserting that future logging must avoid debris jams. A MacMillan Bloedel forester then “became very critical not only of the Guidelines but also of Forest Service officials” before being silenced by a superior who went on to say that the afternoon Pacific Trollers Association meeting would promote appreciation of the benefits of “forest cropping” on fish habitat.\textsuperscript{46}

Over forty attended the event, the MacMillan Bloedel forester arguing that progressive clearcutting of watersheds did no harm to fish provided that streamside areas received special care. Studies from Alaska and California were cited indicating that water temperatures in streams passing through clearcuts rarely reached lethal limits. Yarding logs away from streams reduced debris deposition, he admitted, but in some instances dragging logs across watercourses was preferable to constructing bridges or culverts, which promoted siltation. An unimpressed Tuttle noted that the remarks challenged the Guidelines in a number of ways.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} W.F. Tuttle, “Report,” 1 December 1972, bcmfr, file 02003.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} W.F. Tuttle, “Meeting at MacMillan Bloedel Office–Ucluelet,” 4 December 1972, bcmfr, file 02003.
\textsuperscript{47} W.F. Tuttle, “Pacific Trollers Association Meeting at Ucluelet, Nov. 29, 1972,” 6 December 1972, bcmfr, file 02003.
If the MacMillan Bloedel arguments fell flat with Tuttle, the trollers found them even less persuasive. An sosc report to Bob Williams and Jack Davis attributed more inflammatory remarks to the forester, including one to the effect that, even if logging killed off a salmon run almost entirely, the stream would begin to recover within twenty years. “The statement that a run of salmon should be wiped out for over 20 years by one multiple water user is unthinkable, untenable and entirely rejected by this committee,” the sosc informed Williams. The forester’s conclusions regarding stream temperatures also elicited contempt. “Can it truly be said that temperatures in southern BC compare favourably with Alaska?” the sosc asked. And if siltation from logging roads created greater damage than debris jams, why were roads not constructed to higher standards? Logging along salmon-producing streams must be terminated, the sosc concluded in condemning lax forest industry regulation.48

Not even a week passed before Williams heard from the sosc again, this time in a telegram expressing distress over BC Forest Products’ logging of Staghorn Creek. Williams demanded a prompt report, leading to another inspection. That investigation discovered logging debris in one portion of the creek, and in another the fisheries officer had apparently authorized the company to yard across it, causing salmon fry mortality. The ranger’s summary fostered the impression that the sosc telegrams were “over-emphasizing the situation.” However, Tuttle concluded in detailing the Ucluelet-Tofino dispute, some tightening of procedures was required. Much of the debris and many of the logjams dated from the mid-1950s, but other recently logged areas showed little improvement. Prevention could be achieved by following the Planning Guidelines, with greater emphasis on avoiding practices that allowed debris and silt to enter streams. Rangers, though, must retain full authority in the field, considering advice but taking no direction from fisheries officers.49

As 1972 neared its end, then, the Forest Service response to the fish-forestry conflict amounted to faith in the Guidelines that preserved clearcutting as a mode of production while attempting to curb its worst abuses. Emerging out of “a series of Province-wide incidents, conflicts and discussions with other agencies,” they had a questionable scientific foundation and lacked the support of fisheries interests. Exhorting

48 President, Save Our Salmon Committee, to R. Williams, n.d., bcmfr, file 02003.
49 G. Clarke to D. Barrett, 4 December 1972; Save Our Salmon Committee to R. Williams, 4 December 1972; Williams to Save Our Salmon Committee, 5 December 1972; G.F. Hawkey to A.C. Schutz, 6 December 1972; W.F. Tuttle to J.S. Stokes, n.d., bcmfr, file 02003.
loggers to exercise greater care and requiring post-logging cleanup would suffice. Debris, after all, was the easy target; visible to the eye, it posed few of the more complex problems associated with logging’s impact on streamflow, water temperature, food chains, and spawning habitat. The BCFS was muddling through, guided by a Forest Act that made no reference to the protection of watershed, fish, wildlife, and recreational values. Nor was selective logging, which had been rejected as uneconomic and incapable of replacing “overmature, decadent forest with vigorous new forest,” considered viable on the coast.\footnote{S.G. Hynd, “Comments on Planning Guidelines Questions,” 15 December 1972, BCA, GR 1035, box 1.}

Clearcutting, thus, would remain the order of the day, now in “a roughly checkerboard pattern” rather than in a continuous sweep across the landscape. Neither the BCFS nor the industry was prepared to make any permanent sacrifice of timber, let alone to grant fisheries managers planning equality. From the BCFS perspective, on these highly productive sites patch logging was a reasonable compromise, one that preserved both extractive efficiency and a fair proportion of original forest cover until cutblocks had regenerated. How this would work out in a province that planted only about 30 percent of its cutover land annually remained to be seen. Administrative relationships remained confused as BCFS stream protection clauses in cutting rights overlapped with Section 33 of the Fisheries Act. Existing cooperation between the Fisheries Service and the BCFS was a “make-shift compromise,” forester S.G. Hynd remarked, creating an opening for licencees to “play one boss off against another.”\footnote{S.G. Hynd, “Fish Stream and Related Problems,” 1972, BCA, GR 1035, box 1.}

By the end of 1972, resource managers, regardless of agency or field, felt the pressure of increased public demand. “Outside influences” had become more vocal and militant, the Association of Professional Foresters of British Columbia (APFBC) concluded at its annual meeting that year. BCFWB conservation officers noticed the changing times too. “Much of this seems to stem from the general increase of interest in ecology,” said a Lower Mainland report. “Problems that were once routinely handled have become controversial.” For instance, the SOSC invited Victoria Sierra Club chapter president John Willow up-island to inspect Indian River and Staghorn Creek. Calling the damage he witnessed shocking, Willow demanded stronger measures. Neither “checkerboard logging,” nor a “ten-foot greenstrip of salal and salmonberry” on the banks of streams was a credible solution, the SOSC told Williams. All
logging within two hundred feet of important fish-producing rivers and lakes should be halted immediately, with future operations on less valuable streams conducted on a selective basis only. Williams himself inspected Indian River, returning to say that the entire question of stream protection required study, a “beefed up” bcfwb staff, and closer liaison between the various agencies. Foresters should listen more closely to the bcfwb, he stressed, going on to blame the Fisheries Service for failing to enforce federal legislation.\footnote{Charles L. Shaw, “Foresters’ New Role Analyzed,” \textit{Forest Industries} 9 (May 1972): 48-49; BC Department of Recreation and Conservation, Fish and Wildlife Branch, Monthly Activity Report, November/December 1972, BCA, GR 1027, box 74; Save Our Salmon Committee to R. Williams, December 1972, BCMFR, file 02003; “‘Shocking’ Damage to Salmon Streams,” \textit{Victoria Daily Times}, 28 December 1972, 29; \textit{Steelhead Society of British Columbia Newsletter} (January 1973), 3; “Ucluelet Fishermen Win Action,” \textit{Fisherman}, 19 January 1973, 7.}

Williams and his Forest Service would also hear from the Steelhead Society of BC (ssbc) regarding cutting plans for the Dean River and White River watersheds in late 1972. ssbc president Barry Thornton then headed a delegation that met with cofi’s Land-Use Committee, expressing the desire for fifty-foot reserves on all fish-bearing streams. But, like the sosc, the organization endorsed selective logging of some reserves provided that 75 percent of the shade remained. Inter-agency field crews should mark out leavestrips in advance of logging, a proposal cofi’s Mike Painter said might involve the examination of ten thousand to thirty thousand miles of streambank annually. Besides, cofi’s team argued, foresters were now competent water-quality managers, and even streams subject to past ill-treatment had recovered.

Discussion then turned to the Guidelines. Given that some bcfs personnel did not seem “attuned to the needs of other users,” a hopelessly optimistic ssbc representative asked if industry could lobby for better rules. The Guidelines were overly restrictive and costly, cofi replied, and the extra road mileage needed to gain access to an equivalent amount of timber might worsen stream siltation.\footnote{B.M. Thornton to J.S. Stokes, 18 September 1972; Stokes to Thornton, 3 October 1972; I.T. Cameron to C. Woods, 3 November 1972, BCMFR, file 02003; \textit{Steelhead Society of British Columbia Newsletter} (January 1973), 1-3.}

The new year brought only a deepening of the fish-forestry conflict. Promises of better performance to come had not swayed the sosc, which organized an 11 January protest at the Legislature. About forty Island fishers arrived in trucks carrying slash and debris collected from streams along with salmon alleged to have perished in their futile upstream struggle. Parading with placards and distributing leaflets, they made what the \textit{Colonist} described as a “simple, down-to-earth plea” for better
logging practices, tougher Fisheries Act enforcement, inclusion of leave-
strip provisions in the Guidelines, and federal-provincial cooperation
in a salmon stream survey. Organizations lending support included the
ufawu, the Sierra Club, spec, the Federation of BC Naturalists, and
the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, a broad consensus representing “the
opinion of thousands [who were] increasingly troubled by the apparent
lack of concern for natural assets,” said the Victoria Daily Times. The
sosc had won a clear, if temporary, victory in the public relations war.
Williams ordered a halt to logging along Staghorn Creek and Indian
River on 12 January 1973, pending an investigation, and announced a
province-wide study of the problem by the Legislature’s Select Standing
Committee on Forestry and Fisheries.54

But as the province began to drift into its “environment-versus-jobs”
scenario of land-use conflict, Williams discovered the balance was
easier to assert than to achieve. A long shutdown would mean layoffs
for loggers employed by BC Forest Products’ contractor Millstream
Timbers. Informing Williams of this fact, the union camp committee
carried its expectation of lost wage reimbursement from either
the bcfs, Fisheries Service, or Pacific Trollers Association. Another
contractor, Empco Construction Ltd., was also idle. Citing the NDP’s
campaign promise to make things easier for the independents, Empco
now accused the Barrett government of acting hastily to appease
environmentalists. “If it is going to be the government’s policy to bow
to every environmental group’s demands without reasonable study and
sensible decisions,” Empco protested, “our type of business is going to
be in chaos.”55

In fact, Williams had tried to mitigate the effects of the shutdown
order, hurrying to Ucluelet on 14 January for another inspection. That
trip revealed enough damage to justify a halt to falling along the
streams. Nonetheless, he allowed removal of the downed timber and
had his personnel work with managers in laying out plans for logging
more distant areas. These steps he explained to both Empco and the
Millstream loggers, giving assurances that the Select Committee’s

54 “Logging Labeled Salmon Killer,” Victoria Daily Times, 10 January 1973, 1; “Logging Fish Fill
Times, 11 January 1973, 4; “Simple, Sane and Sound,” Colonist, 14 January 1973, 4; Fisherman,
“Ucluelet Fishermen,” 7.
55 Camp Committee, Millstream Timbers, to R. Williams, 17 January 1973; Empco Construction
Ltd. to D. Barrett, 16 January 1973, bcmfr, file 02003.
review would produce methods permitting environmental protection, revenue generation, and woods employment.\textsuperscript{56}

Promises were wearing thin, however, and failed to answer the question of whether the Ucluelet problems represented an isolated case of poor planning or a fundamental, coast-wide defect. A 23 January Sierra Club public forum in Vancouver, described by a \textit{Vancouver Sun} reporter as a “show trial” on streamside logging, saw both viewpoints expressed. ssc president Barry Thornton presented a “damming” slide exhibit of “eroded banks, ruined spawning beds and clogged rivers” on Vancouver Island. Clearcutting to the water’s edge was responsible for the carnage, Thornton said, in setting out the proposal for a ban on logging within at least fifty feet of spawning streams. An sosc member found that insufficient; consideration should rather be given to the establishment of six-hundred-foot “intensive management” zones along streams, a Roderick Haig-Brown proposal. Stream protection, in any event, was a wiser investment than the construction of “chrome-plated fish hatcheries.”\textsuperscript{57}

MacMillan Bloedel’s Grant Ainscough spoke for industry, admitting to past mistakes but emphasizing recent innovations such as experimental planting of fast-growing willow and poplar trees to provide post-logging shade and streambank stability. No agreement existed on proper leavestrip width, Ainscough continued, as proposals ranged from fifty to several hundred feet. “Emotions ran high at times” in the question period that followed, and H.M. Pogue confessed that his explanation of what had gone wrong at Ucluelet – that the logging had been planned with adequate consultation but that “obviously someone made a mistake” – did not satisfy the audience.\textsuperscript{58}

Publicity surrounding these events, coupled with ongoing BC Wildlife Federation criticism of logging practices, undermined the legitimacy of such explanations. Assurances that current planning procedures met the multiple-use test sounded increasingly hollow, despite staff increases for the BC Fish and Wildlife Branch and Williams’s new Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, a multidisciplinary unit founded to achieve a more rational planning approach. As for the Forest Service, Jeremy Wilson notes that the NDP years brought the agency close to “an institutional nervous breakdown.” Suspicious of

\textsuperscript{56} R. Williams to B. White, 5 February 1973; R. Williams to A.N. Heyd, 21 February 1973; R. Williams to Empco Construction Ltd., 7 February 1973, bcmfr, file 02003.


\textsuperscript{58} H.M. Pogue to J.S. Stokes, 24 January 1973, bcmfr, file 02003.
its leaders’ close relations with the large companies, Williams looked elsewhere for answers.\textsuperscript{59}

Unnerved by Williams’s radical rhetoric after the cozy Williston years, industry wanted answers as well. What sort of animal was the new minister, a fire-breathing socialist or a pragmatic administrator? Williams kept them guessing. Chief Forester Ian Cameron informed the TLA’s January 1973 convention of his boss’s opinion that the Crown charged too little for its trees. But, Cameron assured his audience, the minister was well aware of the need for fair investment returns, and NDP social programs depended on a revenue-generating forest sector. The government even came bearing gifts, as Trade Minister Alex Macdonald announced a $660,000 grant to match contributions by COFI and Ottawa in promoting BC plywood exports.\textsuperscript{60}

Williams himself addressed COFI’s annual meeting that spring, taking a “mild, genial approach” in his brief remarks. “Out of it all emerged a feeling that ideological differences won’t be allowed to stand in the way of a working partnership between the Social Democrats of Victoria and the forest industry brass of downtown Vancouver,” one report noted. Williams expressed recognition of the “necessary partnership” that the government-industry relationship involved, but he warned that it “might not be as easy as in the past.” Small wonder, perhaps, that executives and independents alike grumbled about an inability to predict Williams’s next move.\textsuperscript{61}

Meanwhile, as the fish-forestry wars faded from the headlines that spring, the agencies again worked to improve coordination. In March the BCFS began providing copies of planning documents to the Fisheries Service and the BCFWB. But would their recommendations be accepted and communicated to the operator? Sceptical fisheries agencies called for another link in the “information relay.” A BCFWB supervisor informed his BCFS counterpart that companies were “taking advantage of the ambiguities and placing agency field staff ‘behind the eight ball.’” Managing the flow of information quickly proved problematic, however, as fisheries managers found themselves “deluged” with logging plans.\textsuperscript{62}


\textsuperscript{61} “Williams Warns,” BCL, no. 57, May 1973, 78.

\textsuperscript{62} J. Hatter to I.T. Cameron, 24 January 1973, BCFMR, file 02003; R. Goodlad to W.G. Hughes, 7 March 1973, box 1; W.G. Hughes to All Licensees, 19 March 1973, BCA, GR 1035, box 1; G.A. West to M. Pogue, 20 March 1973, BCFMR, file 0218081; Unidentified to S.G. Hynd, 15
Nevertheless, a more consultative, if not exactly collaborative, approach to planning had begun to take shape. Around the province fisheries officers handled hundreds of timber cutting referrals, attending meetings with BCFS officials and company managers to discuss logging plans. “Nothing engages our attention at present more than the effect on fisheries of our cutting plans,” one north coast forester noted. But the BCrWB remained confined to a frustrating advisory role, “trying to minimize damage” to its resource interests by providing input to a stronger agency holding the ultimate authority to make timber allocation decisions.63

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And on the central issue of leavestrips, forest managers yielded ground grudgingly, demanding hard data concerning the effect of logging practices on fish habitat. Industry wanted the three agencies with jurisdiction over streamside cutting to come up with a clear, unified set of policies based on the multiple-use concept rather than a single-use approach. Claiming that the entire multiple-use concept was at stake, COFI president Gordon Draeske provided additional clarity: any streambank protection measures must be “compatible with effective timber harvesting.”

Consensus had been reached, at least, on the need for more British Columbia–based research, giving rise to the Carnation Creek project in 1970. This salmon stream within MacMillan Bloedel’s Franklin River Division on Vancouver Island became home to a sixteen-year study involving the company, Fisheries Service, Pacific Biological Station, and Pacific Forestry Centre scientists. Pre-logging studies would run until 1975, however, before harvesting began under a variety of approaches designed to permit long-term analysis of stream impacts. The project generated over two hundred publications by 2005, informing British Columbia’s 1987 Coastal Fisheries-Forestry Guidelines and the 1995 Forest Practices Code. But that lay in the future; in the early 1970s, foresters could continue to argue that they should not be subjected to regulations based upon American research.

Federal researchers had not been idle. Fisheries Research Board scientist David Narver had sufficient command of the literature on fish-logging interactions to present a review of debris effects at the 1971 Oregon State University Symposium on Forest Land Uses and Stream Environment. Nor was empirical, albeit tentative, data completely lacking from the BC coast. Narver had begun studying the effects of clearcutting on two small Vancouver Island streams in 1970, summarizing his findings in a 1972 Fisheries Research Board report. He found almost twice as many trout in the uncut area of one creek as he did in its logged section. Stream temperatures were also higher in the logged

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stretches, approaching lethal maximums for a few hours on some days. Stream channels had suffered erosion in clearcut sections as well.66

THE SELECT STANDING COMMITTEE INVESTIGATES

Narver’s tentative conclusions represented no immediate solution to Williams’s regulatory dilemma. For that, he would turn to the Select Standing Committee on Forestry and Fisheries (SSCFF), which began its investigation under Chair Robert Skelly in mid-March 1973. Even before the forum got under way, however, industry attacked the Guidelines in TLA and COFI briefs to Williams and Cameron. The two associations conveyed a similar diagnosis of their “many critical and immediate problems,” deploping the rigid Guidelines interpretation by the BCFS. Industry accepted its “balanced use” responsibilities, but the Guidelines as constituted would have to go. Topping industry’s litany of complaints was the deferred logging of timber adjacent to the two-hundred-acre cutblocks. The 50 percent rule along streams and the two-hundred-acre limit on clearcuts were also being rigidly applied, even where other values did not justify such protection.67

Several crippling consequences followed from these misguided policies, industry claimed. Dispersal of clearcuts increased road construction costs to “completely impractical levels.” Operators would be unable to reach their allowable cuts given the difficulty of implementation, the lack of alternative development areas, and the short “lead time” allowed in meeting Guidelines criteria. Reduced production, in turn, would lift fixed costs to a breaking point, and scarce low-elevation stands, conserved for winter logging to ensure continuity of employment, must now be logged more quickly. Why should the resulting “prohibitive increase in both operating and capital costs” be thrust upon industry alone? Forced to absorb the expense of multiple use, industry would


perform with reluctance in an atmosphere of “continual argument and controversy,” slowing expansion in the provincial annual cut.\(^{68}\)

The Guidelines hardly justified such an assortment of ills, industry argued. Indeed, they seemed less effective than arrangements previously adopted in cooperation with fisheries agencies. The Guidelines, in short, suffered from the critical weakness of inflexibility. Fish habitat requirements would be better met with planning geared to “specific needs in individual areas,” involving the progressive clearcutting of less sensitive sites. Patch logging not only had “dubious aesthetic value” but also prolonged logging in areas that, if clearcut completely, would be more quickly available to other users. From the forest industry’s perspective, then, the Guidelines were a misguided regulatory exercise, a “simplistic formula” that failed to deliver social or environmental benefits. Moreover, no delay in returning to the cooperative model of informal negotiation under foresters’ control could be tolerated. The sscff inquiry would not be completed in time to avoid a “serious curtailment of log production.” Consultation among senior industry, bcfs, and bcfwb officials should begin immediately on a new set of modified Guidelines. COFI, apparently, thought it best to leave the feds out of the discussion.\(^{69}\)

The sscff hearings saw bcfs leaders express faith both in the Guidelines as the key to flexible on-site application of multiple-use land management principles and in the ability of foresters to make such judgements in the public interest. Industry submissions deplored the agency’s inflexible application of rules, which drove costs to unbearable heights, delayed operators’ access to valuable timber, and rendered rational management impossible. Applied gradually and selectively, on the other hand, a reworked set of Guidelines administered by foresters was preferable to the more odious threat of leavestrip legislation. The forestry profession, represented by the abcpf and Canadian Institute of Forestry, joined the chorus in support of “on the ground assessment” by foresters rather than leavestrip regulation. Dispersed clumps of streamside trees would suffice. “I credit fish with some common sense,” abcpf president G.V. Wellburn said. “If there is no shade where they are, they will swim to where there is shade.”\(^{70}\)


\(^{69}\) Ibid., 3-4.

The TLA’s Ian Mahood blended sound analysis of the Guidelines’ origins and biting criticism of an “excursion into fantasy” destined to bring massive unemployment to BC communities. Having come under attack, he argued, the BCFS had thrown the Guidelines together without adequate consultation, succeeding only in igniting another round of attacks from those who had “nominated themselves opponents of almost anything that relates to logging and forestry.” Federal interference, the conflicting agendas of provincial agencies, and meddling by preservationists now made resource management a sort of “guerilla warfare.” Peace, and with it a return to rationality, would come only by restoring professional forest managers to full authority.71

While the SSCFF hearings provided industry and its professional allies with the opportunity to depict streamside regulation as the path to ruin, fishery supporters, including the SSBC, the Pacific Salmon Society, the SOBC, the UFAWU, and SPEC, advocated habitat protection in the form of leavestrips and more sensitive treatment of watersheds. Taken as a whole, their arguments rested on a good deal of scientific evidence (albeit little of which was generated in British Columbia), questioned the BCFS’s administrative dominance, and called for multiple-use forestry to achieve something more than what the SSBC called a “callous disregard for any other resource.” That organization drew on Roderick Haig-Brown’s idea for a ban on logging within protective strips three times the stream’s width, these at the inner edge of wider six-hundred-foot “conservation belts,” where selective logging would be permitted so long as habitat requirements took priority. SPEC’s Smithers chapter came forward with a similar proposal, contrasting “the material demands of an exploding acquisitive, profit-oriented population” to society’s expanding recreational needs and its “growing appreciation of the [natural] world and man’s place in it.”72
Only the new federal Department of Environment’s Fisheries and Marine Service could offer solid scientific legitimacy, however, and the submission from a Pacific Biological Station team fell somewhat short of endorsing mandatory leavestrips. Asserting the value of streamside vegetation, and declaring that present practices “may substantially reduce salmon and trout populations,” the federal biologists advised that “blanket ironclad provisions for green strips should not be adopted.” Instead, operators and resource managers should retain decision-making flexibility, evaluating stream conditions on an individual basis. Searching for an acceptable compromise, they offered a tentative course of action that had a good deal in common with various other proposals. In most cases a leavestrip of two to three times a stream’s width would suffice, the biologists concluded, and they argued that the Guidelines should be “substantially modified and strengthened” to address the concerns of all interests, including those of the forest industry.73

Science, of course, had always been heavily contested terrain in BC forestry matters, with only marginal influence on the making of policy. Progressive clearcutting’s efficiencies had trumped abundant findings that cast doubt on the practice’s capacity to renew forests, and no chance existed in the early 1970s that the NDP would simply take biological science as a basis for renewing a fisheries resource of much less economic value. Williams had already denied a Steelhead Society demand for an immediate moratorium on streambank logging, citing the need for site-specific scrutiny of requirements. Early on then, it seemed likely that habitat protection would remain, as the SBC put it, a matter of “negotiating every yard of every river or stream in order to establish the minimum needs of adjacent fish life.” Hoping for a “redefinition of land-use priorities,” but pessimistic about the prospects in a province where logging “had absolute priority,” Haig-Brown described multiple use as little more than empty rhetoric.74


74 “M-B Charged with Polluting Kelsey Bay Spawning Area,” Fisherman, 13 April 1973, 8; “Society Wires Williams: ‘End Streambank Logging,’” Fisherman, 8 June 1973, 8; Mark

The ssccff’s mid-October report put its faith in improved planning, rather than regulation, as a solution to the fish-forestry problem. An acceleration of inventory programs, better coordination between agencies, and more experts would rectify a situation that had seen Guidelines imposed to minimize the deleterious effects of resource exploitation “without adequate knowledge of these effects.” The ssccff’s handling of the critical leavestrip issue bore the imprint of industry, bcfs, and forestry organization advice on the futility of a legislative remedy. The variability of watershed conditions made it “impossible to prescribe a green belt of sufficient width that would apply throughout the province.” High-value streams and lakes should be reserved from cutting, however, until all agencies had been consulted on protective measures.75

For the forest industry, the regulatory bullet had been dodged, leaving it reasonably content. Better yet, pending further study, Forest Service field staff would retain their authority. Conservationists such as the ssbc’s Barry Thornton expressed initial faith in the report’s potential to bring about a “new era” in resource management. Still waiting for action a year later, an impatient Thornton termed it incredible that no legislation had been introduced to protect watersheds and streams from “the gross abuse of company practices or BC Forest Service dictum.”76

ECONOMIC WOES, THE SOCREDS, AND THE PRACTICAL APPROACH

The ssccff hearings conform to what Jeremy Wilson has neatly characterized as the province’s “talk-and-log” approach to forest management. The exact status of the Guidelines seemed in doubt as industry complaints continued to pour in. Adding to Williams’s problems, and weakening his resolve, forest revenues began falling as the impact of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo ripped through the world economy. cofi, MacMillan Bloedel president Dennis Timmis, and the tla besieged the NDP with demands for a relaxation of Guidelines enforcement during the winter of 1974, predicting shutdowns and layoffs unless logging costs came down. A Lumberman reporter left an interview that autumn satisfied that Williams had no intention of

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“play[ing] hard during the current difficult times.” Another chortled that the slumping lumber market had “underlined the impossibility of trying to shore up a socialist platform in a sea of free enterprise.” But that same observer noted that the minister’s bark had, from the start, been much worse than his bite. On the whole, Williams had “not bowed to political ideology or lived up to his own public rhetoric.”

Ultimately, the NDP opted for a new planning initiative, adopting the “folio planning system” that saw agencies contribute fish, wildlife, recreational, and forest industry data for compilation on overlay maps as a basis for company development plans. Swapping “rigid” Guidelines for “flexible” folio planning appealed greatly to industry. Since, in theory, the folio process incorporated specific constraints in accordance with an area’s various resource values, “the so-called Coast Guidelines will no longer apply in the area included in the plan,” Victoria informed district foresters in March 1975.

Indeed, by that time a beleaguered Williams had hit something of a wall. Forest revenues had fallen from $287.2 million in 1973–74 to just $189 million in the next fiscal year, and the trend would continue. Reducing stumpage rates in the latter part of 1974 and appointing Peter Pearse to head a royal commission on tenure and forest policy, Williams put his reform ambitions on hold. Resource-rich but capital-poor, British Columbia had always relied on outside investment to turn its trees into commodities competitive on world markets – a structural constraint on regulation that only deepened with the end of the postwar boom. Williams and the BCFS had withstood formidable industry opposition to the Guidelines, however, refusing to revert back to the continuous clear-cutting that had inspired public outcry. To do so would have sacrificed legitimacy in a province undergoing an environmental awakening, just as going further in protecting fish habitat would have jeopardized (beyond all repair) relations with its most vital industry.

British Columbia’s brief embrace of social democracy ended on 11 December 1975, at the same time as Peter Pearse received the submissions that would shape his report to new Social Credit forests minister Tom


78 W. Young to District Foresters, 27 March 1975, bcmfr, file 033286.

Forests and Fish

Waterland. Space does not permit more than a cursory glance at what followed, but the NDP effort at striking a balance between capital accumulation and environmental protection is better understood by briefly considering the fate of the Guidelines under Socred administration. Acting on industry advice and “a dislike for any government interference in the marketplace,” Waterland immediately lightened the regulatory burden. Multiple use took on “a more flexible and reasonable” character, a trade journal reported. Guidelines application would be “less rigid than in the past,” the bcfs informed bcfwb staff. “Neither regulations nor a firm Chief Forester directive,” the Guidelines would be subject to a “practical approach” on a site-specific basis as the slow process of folio planning went forward. A shift towards continuous clearcutting occurred as “economic factors” shaped forest management, while the Socreds opposed a stronger Canada Fisheries Act on the grounds that it ran counter to the principles of multiple use. 80

Would Williams have taken a tougher stance had the election produced an NDP victory? The evidence suggests that by mid-1974, industry recovery and investor confidence had begun to take priority over tenure reform and regulation. “Any political group in power is going to have to recognize the capital investment in place and the jobs involved,” Williams told the Lumberman late the following summer. “Anybody who doesn’t think our party would … just doesn’t understand the political process.” Williams, former cofi staffer Mike Apsey recalls, was a social democrat “with a good grasp of how the business world really worked.” Yet it seems unlikely that the NDP would have moved as quickly as Social Credit in freeing the forest industry from control. Ideologically committed to free-market capitalism and a forest practice model that equated continuous clearcutting with corporate efficiency, the Socreds left the salmon and trout to fend for themselves. The result was heightened federal-provincial conflict and a deepening conviction on the part of groups such as the ufawu, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club,

and the BC Wildlife Federation that the BCFS was industry’s ally in the fight against environmental values. The atmosphere of distrust was fuelled by the Riley Creek episode later that decade, which saw a federal fisheries officer arrest loggers for threatening a Graham Island salmon run, Waterland authorize continued cutting despite a federal stop order, and a retreat by Ottawa that resulted in post-logging slides at Riley Creek after heavy rains in the winter of 1978.81

And so it went, as the compromises of the Coast Logging Guidelines were forgotten in a process that culminated in the Socreds’ “sympathetic administration” regime of the early 1980s. “River after river has seen its runs reduced and lost by the disastrous effects of clearcut riverside logging,” Arthur Mayse lamented in 1981 as the forest industry rolled through the landscape with barely a hitch. Hatchery production and the construction of spawning channels under the $500 million Salmon Enhancement Program and, ultimately, salmon farming provided easier technological fixes than confronting the complexities of managing ecosystems. The Guidelines, admittedly, had been inspired by an agency’s need to maintain credibility with an aroused public rather than by any commitment to ecological principles. Still, Williams kept them in place despite harsh attacks from an industry unfamiliar with even mild constraints on its operational practices until Bill Bennett’s election ended British Columbia’s first brief experience of social democracy in action. For the time being, the fish would have to rely on their common sense.82

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81 Brian Martin, “‘Any political group must recognize investment ... jobs’: Bob Williams,” BCL, September 1975, 22–23; Mike Apsey, as told to Ken Drushka and Matt Hughes, What’s All This Got to Do with the Price of 2 x 4’s? (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2006), 92.

For discussion of the Riley Creek incident, see Rajala, Up-Coast, 204–205.