“A RELATIONSHIP AND INTERCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE”:
H.B. Hawthorn, Indian Affairs, and the 1955 BC Indian Research Project

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The commissioning of the Indian Research Project occurred during what is often termed the integrationist era in Native-newcomer relations: the roughly two and a half decades after the Second World War, in which the federal government introduced policies designed to integrate Aboriginal people into mainstream Canadian social, political, economic, and administrative life. The decision to undertake the survey came amid

1 I wish to thank Graeme Wynn and two anonymous BC Studies reviewers for their comments on a draft of this article. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 2007 annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
3 The term “Indian” is used throughout this article in specific reference to those people historically defined as such under the Indian Act.
shifting popular attitudes, growing public criticism of assimilationist state policies, and bureaucratic growth and professionalization. As Hugh Shewell notes in his history of Indian welfare in Canada, the so-called “Indian problem” underwent a qualitative shift after the Second World War: Indians went from being seen as the problem to being seen as people with problems. Indeed, if the perceived character of the “Indian problem” was changing in Canadian minds, so too were the means deemed necessary for its solution. Indian affairs officials began searching for new postwar policies to solve what was coming to be seen as Canada’s “Indian administration problem.”

The commissioning of the Indian Research Project in 1954 marked an experimental attempt by government to garner third-party knowledge and social science research for specific policy review and development. More generally, increasing post-Second World War governmental parleys with social scientists reflected what anthropologist H.G. Barnett described in 1957 as postcolonial governments’ growing interest in state-sponsored investigations of Aboriginal customs and institutions for administrative purposes.

Although study of the development of Canadian anthropology has emerged as a topic of scholarly interest in recent years, comparatively little has been written about the specific implications of social science research commissioned for policy purposes. The work of Hawthorn in particular, despite being often cited and credited with pioneering a unique brand of Canadian anthropology, has been only sporadically examined in any depth or with reference to the considerable body of archival material that exists detailing his life’s work. Sally M. Weaver’s examination of Hawthorn’s 1960s national Indian survey and its role in the formulation of the 1969 White Paper policy statement provides a notable exception to this trend. Undertaken a decade prior to the national project, however,

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8 See Julia Harrison and Regina Darnell, eds. Historicizing Canadian Anthropology (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
Hawthorn’s groundbreaking 1955 survey has attracted little scholarly attention.10

Drawing on sources that include the Harry Hawthorn Fonds located in the UBC Archives, federal records, period newspapers, social science literature, and the 1955 survey report itself, this article traces the historical development and operation of the Indian Research Project. In many ways, the survey represented a new type of government-commissioned knowledge, akin to what Max Weber refers to as “official information” – that is, bureaucratically acquired forms of specialized knowledge used to extend state domination.11 In the mid-twentieth century, the department was looking for new data to reformulate Indian administration and to reassert bureaucratic legitimacy in the face of mounting criticisms of prior federal policies. Analysis of the branch’s selective handling, interpretation, and use of the report further points to the survey’s existence as a work of official information. The study was secretly commissioned, and its final report was not disclosed to the public until almost two years after its completion. In the end, Indian affairs administrators selectively interpreted the conclusions of social science scholarship to suit particular bureaucratic and political ends.

In addition to examining the Indian Research Project as official information, this article also considers the broader implications of the survey and, in particular, the role of social scientists in this history. Events surrounding the survey’s commissioning, development, and reception provide a notable example of how the interests of social scientists and government officials, while often compatible, have not always been either synonymous or unitary. The Indian Research Project was a contested enterprise from its commissioning. Indian Affairs Branch staff, senior officials in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and social scientists all participated in and utilized the survey for unique

10 John Leslie devotes the lengthiest attention to the 1955 report in his 1999 doctoral dissertation, which examines post-Second World War Indian policy development. See John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination? The Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD diss., Carlton University, 1999), 274-80.

reasons. While *Indians of British Columbia* might have provided official information that enabled administrators to reinvent policy and to bolster bureaucratic legitimacy, senior department officials conceived of the project as a way of compelling reform in its newly acquired Indian Affairs Branch subsidiary. Social scientists, on the other hand, approached the survey as an opportunity to improve Aboriginal conditions, advance professional career ambitions, and bolster the esteem of modern anthropology. Moreover, following the survey’s completion and its unintended early public disclosure, anthropologists, the press, and Aboriginal advocates all appropriated innovative aspects of the report for an array of additional purposes. In many ways, the Indian Research Project’s contested life and legacy symbolize broader debates then taking place concerning the direction and mandate of Canadian Indian affairs policy.

H.B. HAWTHORN AND THE MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY “INDIAN PROBLEM”

Indian affairs officials in Canada have a lengthy history of drawing on the work of social scientists for policy formation purposes. In 1910, for example, the federal government founded the Anthropology Division of the Geological Survey of Canada, appointing Edward Sapir as director. As Noel Dyck notes, however, early federal interest in social science did not directly relate to anthropology’s formal intellectual undertaking at that time: salvage ethnography, or the construction of precontact ethnological (rather than contemporary) knowledge.\(^{12}\) By the time of the Second World War, both government officials and anthropologists were becoming increasingly interested in the specific application of social science for policy designs. This was notably reflected in the staging of the University of Toronto-Yale University seminar conference entitled “The North American Indian Today,” a 1939 joint Canada-United States meeting of academics, government agents, missionaries, and Indian representatives, the first of its kind in North America.\(^{13}\) Shortly after, the

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13 Ibid., 80. The event was initiated by Yale professor C.T. Loram, who thought that “concrete advantages might be expected from a gathering of those with practical knowledge in the field of modern Indian problems in Canada and the United States.” See C.T. Loram and T.F. McIlwraith, eds. *The North American Indian Today: University of Toronto - Yale University Seminar Conference, Toronto, September 4-16, 1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943), ix-x.
The federal government began commissioning social science researchers to produce contemporary data on Indians in Manitoba, Northern Ontario, and Quebec communities.\textsuperscript{14}

The potential merits of utilizing the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and criminologists for bureaucratic purposes gained further recognition during the proceedings of the 1946-48 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act. Testifying before the committee, Indian Affairs Branch director R.A. Hoey lauded the 1928 US Bureau of Indian Affairs-commissioned Meriam Report as having a positive influence on the development of 1930s Indian reorganization policies. Hoey advocated the use of social science research for similar purposes in Canada, adding: “we live in an age when scientific research … is enabling us to rapidly overcome the obstacles once created by time and space.”\textsuperscript{15} Two prominent anthropologists, Diamond Jenness and T.L. McIlwraith, also testified before the committee, the former detailing an accelerated program for Indian assimilation as part of his “Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years.”\textsuperscript{16} Cooperative trends between government officials and social scientists only increased thereafter. In 1949, the branch established the Panel on Indian Research, composed of social scientists and government specialists, “to assist administrative officers to deal with problems related to the adjustment of the Indian population to new conditions.”\textsuperscript{17}

Despite often being couched, by officials like Hoey, in the rhetoric of progressiveness, growing bureaucratic interest in social science research was driven by exogenous pressures as much as by some academic or liberal awakening in the minds of Indian administrators. As Scott Sheffield notes in his intellectual history of Indians and the Second World War, public and governmental faith in the merit and effectiveness of Canadian assimilationist policies was dwindling by the late-1940s.\textsuperscript{18} The denial of basic civil and citizenship rights to Indians, many of whom were Second World War veterans, came to be seen as a perversion of the very

\textsuperscript{14} Shewell, “Enough to keep them alive,” 208-9.

\textsuperscript{15} Prominent university academics were regular attendees at departmental meetings in the 1950s. Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1 (30 May 1946).

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., no. 7 (25 March 1947).

\textsuperscript{17} Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1952-53, 68; See also Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 265-74.

ideals that the Allied effort was meant to protect. Calls for an end to segregationist Indian policies surfaced regularly in newspaper reports, editorials, and photo exposés during the postwar years, much to the embarrassment of Indian affairs officials. Furthermore, enfranchisement, the legal mechanism through which Indians were to abandon their legal and cultural identity, was proceeding at a snail’s pace. Massive postwar Aboriginal population growth, the product of improvements in health and morbidity, meant that, for the first time since systematic records had been kept, “Indians” were increasing rather than diminishing in number. By mid-century, a new policy discourse that emphasized Indian integration with, rather than assimilation into, Canadian mainstream society began gaining momentum.

The Indian Affairs Branch, however, was slow to respond to escalating calls for reform. Three years of Special Joint Committee proceedings disclosed this on an unprecedented public scale, concomitantly attracting criticism of federal Indian policies. While subsequent bureaucratic restructuring and revisions to the Indian Act in 1951 and 1952, respectively, brought some important changes, such as the lifting of the act’s anti-ceremonial provisions and a reduction of ministerial powers, reforms fell short of both popular expectations and committee recommendations. At mid-century, the branch was solidifying its reputation as an irrelevant agency within the federal executive, a “command post” and “lost battalion” repository for conservative-minded ex-military types. Amid this ongoing drive to reform Indian administration – what John Leslie terms the search for a new postwar Indian policy – social science increasingly came to be seen as offering valuable knowledge for administrative review and reform.

The personal initiative and enterprise of scholars such as H.B. Hawthorn also played a significant role in the forging of new relations between social scientists and branch administrators. Originally from

19 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 324.
21 Between 1939 and 1959 alone, Canada’s Indian population grew by more than 50 percent.
22 See Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy, 46. See also Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 49n28.
24 Born in Wellington, New Zealand, in 1910, Hawthorn grew up alongside Maori children and described himself as being “born into an inter-cultural setup.” Initially interested in a career in civil engineering, Hawthorn obtained a BSc (1932) and MSc (1934) in mathematics from
New Zealand, Hawthorn admitted to taking an interest in anthropology as a way of “get[ting] a scientific understanding of how cultures change.” He completed a doctorate at Yale University in 1941 under the supervision of Bronislaw Malinowski before spending five years as part of the faculty of Sarah Lawrence College. Appointed to the newly created UBC Department of Anthropology, Sociology, and Criminology in 1947, Hawthorn came to British Columbia with the intent to:

establish his discipline in an academic setting of the University and in the Province; to offer anthropology as a contribution to the general education of a broad group of students and to begin the selection and training of a few specialists; to establish problems for ethnological research; and, in keeping with conviction that scholarship should be useful as well as decorative, to discover possibilities for the practical application of anthropology in the Province and the country.

A proponent of interdisciplinary research and applied anthropology, Hawthorn envisioned an active role for social scientists with regard to providing government with practical policy advice. He would later reflect: “Perhaps above all I wanted to put anthropology to good use.”

In the United States, anthropologists were emerging as important figures in Indian affairs discussions following the establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. Undoubtedly aware of the growing influence of social science locally and abroad, Hawthorn saw collaborative work with government as enhancing the esteem of anthropology,

References:

25. A prolific writer, Hawthorn authored numerous articles and books over the course of his career. His fieldwork experiences included time spent in New Zealand, Hawaii, the southwest United States, Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. Hawthorn and his wife Audrey were also instrumental in the establishment of the University of British Columbia Museum (later renamed the University of British Columbia Museum of Anthropology). Hawthorn died in 2006.


27. Inglis, “Harry and Audrey Hawthorn,” 3.


permitting access to Aboriginal institutions and policy makers, and providing necessary monies for research. In this era of few major federal funding agencies for academic pursuits, social scientists commonly solicited Indian affairs offices for sponsorship of research initiatives. 

Upon his arrival at UBC, Hawthorn immediately set about attempting to undertake what he described as “a comprehensive study of the changing Indian.” Hawthorn sent a letter to Department of Mines and Resources Deputy Minister Hugh Keenleyside that fall, stating: “I shall work hard to gain and maintain good relations with the governmental agencies and officers interested in the Indian, as such a relationship and interchange of experience is necessary for science.” This introduction, if intended as a subtle solicitation for federal funds to complete his survey, was unsuccessful. Hawthorn’s planned BC Indian survey proved a difficult challenge during his early years at UBC. Occupied with teaching obligations and the onerous task of developing a new university department, Hawthorn had to further delay his survey when he undertook, at the request of the BC government, a study of provincial Doukhobors. Hawthorn, however, did receive a Carnegie Foundation Grant allowing him to expand the UBC department and to conduct new research. Around this time, he completed a study of BC Aboriginal work in Washington State hop yards with the assistance of five UBC anthropology students, including Wilson Duff. This study provides an early glimpse into the policy-focused writing with which Hawthorn’s name would later become synonymous.

Oversight of the Indian Affairs Branch shifted from the Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950. The transfer proved to be a propitious step, enabling


31 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 1, file 1, “H.B. Hawthorn to Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, 15 September 1947.”


the commissioning of the Indian Research Project. As Leslie notes, the
new department had greater research and liaison capabilities than did its
predecessor and was already involved in studies of the social adjustment
and citizenship education of newly-arrived immigrants.\textsuperscript{34} Citizenship
and immigration was also home to more liberally minded senior civil
service “mandarins” and “movers and shakers,” such as Assistant Deputy
Minister Jean Boucher and Citizenship Branch director Eugene Bus-
sières. Department minister J.W. Pickersgill and Deputy Minister Laval
Fortier, in turn, provided political support for the commissioning of a
study of BC Indians.\textsuperscript{35} That Hawthorn’s next exchange with federal
officials came at the latter’s initiative reflected the changes then taking
place within the senior reaches of the Indian affairs bureaucracy.

On 30 March 1953, Fortier wrote to Hawthorn requesting information
on research dealing with the economic and political adjustment of BC
Indians.\textsuperscript{36} Hawthorn responded by noting that “a great deal has been
done though not very much has been made available, and that still less
has been collated as to give a comprehensive picture of the changing life
of the Indians of this region.” Hawthorn also voiced his agreement with a
statement contained in Boucher’s earlier letter: “It is my belief, of course,
that without abandoning many of his native characteristics, the Indian
can eventually become an equal and active member of the Canadian
nation.”\textsuperscript{37} Discussions for a province-wide survey developed out of this
exchange. Hawthorn drafted a project proposal and budget, which were
delivered to Boucher the following January. Initially entitled \textit{A Social
Science Survey of the Indian Communities of British Columbia}, the project’s
main stated objectives were: “To make a survey of contemporary Indian
life in British Columbia, with an analysis of the principal factors affecting
the adaptation of individuals and communities to the environment of
Canadian administration and civilization.”\textsuperscript{38} Mindful of his sponsor,
Hawthorn was careful to stress matters of administration no fewer than
three times in the proposal. The report’s other stated goals included
assessments of Indian economy, psychological health, social welfare,
and, more generally, processes of Indian adjustment and development.
Hawthorn planned to complete the project research and the writing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 276, 282.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 274. See also J.L. Granatstein, \textit{The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957}
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
\item \textsuperscript{36} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 2, “Laval Fortier to H.B. Hawthorn, 30 March 1953.”
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., “H.B. Hawthorn to Laval Fortier, 8 April 1953.”
\item \textsuperscript{38} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 9, “Tentative Draft: A Social Science Survey of the Indian
Communities of British Columbia: Outline of Objectives and Organization of Proposed Work.”
\end{itemize}
of the report in a span of eighteen months, tentatively beginning that spring.\textsuperscript{39}

It became evident almost immediately that Hawthorn and departmental officials approached the project differently. While Boucher’s initial reaction to Hawthorn’s proposal was one of “general agreement,” he took exception to the estimated budget of $70,000. Boucher remarked that a project of this magnitude was unprecedented for government and that the sum was too unrealistically high to gain political approval.\textsuperscript{40} Afraid of alienating his patron, Hawthorn amended the budget and, in mid-March, the Treasury Board approved a project submission for roughly 30 percent less than the initial estimate.\textsuperscript{41} Despite having fewer funds than first hoped for, Hawthorn was elated by the prospects of receiving such an amount. He later admitted to Boucher: “the [survey] responsibility is a terrific one. I am very conscious of the debt the social sciences owe you in your personal campaign to have Ottawa realize their usefulness.”\textsuperscript{42}

In addition to budget amendments, federal officials also insisted that the Treasury Board submission describe the project in significantly different terms than those found in the initial agreement reached between Hawthorn and Boucher. The earlier agreement stated that the survey’s main objectives were “to make a survey of contemporary Indian life in British Columbia, with an analysis of the principal factors affecting the adaptation of individuals and communities to the environment of Canadian administration and civilization.”\textsuperscript{43} The terms of reference of the Treasury Board submission, however, framed the project within a combination of existing citizenship and Indian affairs policy mandates: “to provide additional facilities for citizenship instruction, for the studies of Indian groups and for research in the integration of newcomers.” Funds were to be made available to Hawthorn’s team “for the study of Indian groups in Canada from a Citizenship standpoint to form the basis on which to judge advancement to the point of readiness for enfranchisement.”\textsuperscript{44} In addition to defining the project in different terms

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.; Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 2, “Jean Boucher to H.B. Hawthorn, 29 January 1954.”
\textsuperscript{41} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 2, “Jean Boucher to H.B. Hawthorn, 17 March 1954.”
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., “Hawthorn to Boucher, 2 April 1954.”
\textsuperscript{43} Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 9, “Tentative Draft: A Social Science Survey of the Indian Communities of British Columbia: Outline of Objectives and Organization of Proposed Work.”
\textsuperscript{44} RG 10, Central Registry Series, vol. 8616, reel C-14235, file 1/1-15, pt. 3, “Laval Fortier to Treasury Board, 15 March 1954.”
than did the initial agreement, the Treasury Board submission also excluded two provisions that had been agreed to earlier: “a) The survey will bear primarily on practical questions, and the findings should be such as could be translated into administrative practices . . . b) The report should be as critical and objective as possible.”

Again, the revised submission couched the purpose of the project in more familiar assimilationist policy terms:

Long range planning in the field of Indian administration calls more urgently than ever for a non-partisan, systematic, comprehensive and reliable investigation of the present economy of Indian groups, of their progress towards self-responsibility and self-reliability, of their attitudes towards the general Canadian way of life, as well as of the attitudes of Canadian groups and individuals towards them.

In addition to removing provisos inviting critical objectivity and obliging government to implement report recommendations, the Treasury Board submission coined the project as an inventory of Indian progress towards self-sufficiency. This submission was the official document circulated within government to describe the survey.

The issue of publicity surrounding the government’s involvement in the survey was another sensitive area for officials. Fearing potential public backlash and political repercussions from a report potentially critical of, yet funded by, the federal government, Boucher instructed Hawthorn that the department’s connection to the research was to remain undisclosed. As Boucher explained: “In order to avoid unseasonable questions from the floor of the house of [sic] from the public, the practice here is definitely not to give any publicity to the fact that the Government is sponsoring the research project, until a political decision has been taken on the final report.” Boucher instructed Hawthorn, whenever necessary, to present the project as a university undertaking, further commenting: “You can always say that you have the full cooperation of the Indian Affairs Branch, without mentioning all the forms that cooperation takes.” In addition to concealing departmental funding of the project and reserving the right to make a political decision on the final report prior to its release, Boucher sought to review any publications based on

47 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 2, “Jean Boucher to H.B. Hawthorn, 1 June 1954.”
48 Ibid.
Even though senior officials in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration saw the survey as a crucial way of pushing reform in the Indian Affairs Branch, even “mandarins” like Boucher approached the survey cautiously, as an experiment, ever wary of its potential for drawing unflattering public and political attention to the department.

If senior department officers like Boucher were concerned about the survey’s potential for embarrassing disclosures, branch officials were terrified. The branch was still bruised from Special Joint Committee hearings and their exposure of the meagre effectiveness of a half-century of assimilationist federal Indian policies. Ongoing criticisms of branch activities from Indian advocates and opposition MPs in post-Second World War parliamentary debates only fuelled internal fears that Hawthorn’s survey might result in more negative attention. Branch director H.M. Jones was careful to instruct BC Indian Commissioner W.S. Arneil that “no contribution could be made towards accomplishing the original purpose of the survey by introducing personal opinions on controversial subjects.” Later, in the final report, Hawthorn would observe that, initially, there were “natural fears” among branch staff that the research was in the nature of an “investigation.” Federal officials might have overcome their initial suspicions, but their self-protectionist proclivity would endure well after. Interdepartmental circulars in the 1960s aimed at “Preventing Criticism and Reporting Trouble Spots” instructed staff to “prevent or minimize criticism … and forestall any bad publicity that may result.” A secretariat division and office of public information were also later established to interpret departmental policies and to monitor and evaluate public responses.

Even though the survey focused heavily on branch activities and local field administration, Indian affairs officials had little direct or timely involvement in the project’s planning or development. From the

49 RG10, Central Registry Series, vol. 8616, reel C-14235, file 1/1-15, pt. 5, “Jean Boucher to H.B. Hawthorn, 6 April 1954.” Scant records relating to the project were archived in the RG10 filing system. Indian Affairs Annual Reports refers just once to the project, in 1955-56, and only in regard to its completion. See Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1955-56, 45.


beginning, the BC study was a venture between Hawthorn and senior officials in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Boucher, for example, only informed Commissioner Arneil that the project was being undertaken in February 1954, almost a year into preliminary discussions with Hawthorn. Officials like Boucher likely saw the relegation of branch staff in survey planning as a way of acquiring critical and objective information. The direct involvement of senior departmental officials and social scientists in Indian policy development, however, implicitly challenged the long-centralized structure and rigid organizational protocols of the branch. It was also likely the source of friction between senior departmental and branch personnel. Leslie, for instance, notes how Fortier’s relationship with Jones was tinged with personal rivalry and suspicion. Still, branch officials clung to hope that, despite being demoted to a consultative role in its undertaking, the survey might still serve their interests. In May 1954, Jones told Arneil: “it is hoped that the final results of this study will be of assistance to this Administration not only in respect to British Columbia but in planning the advancement of Indians generally.” Jones instructed Arneil to cooperate and assist with the project, a message the commissioner subsequently forwarded to field staff.

Once Treasury Board approval was secured, project research began that spring. Hawthorn served as director, assisted by Cyril Belshaw; Stuart Jamieson acted as lead economist. Two teams filled out the remaining project staff: (1) senior specialists hired to examine and coordinate major thematic areas and (2) student researchers recruited to carry out fieldwork. A general plan crafted in the early months of the project outlined the desiderata of research and the selection of communities for analysis.


54 The strict bureaucratic order of the Indian Affairs Branch “command post” would be further tested several years later, in 1965, with the introduction of the short-lived Community Development Program. Both Rob Cunningham and Hugh Shewell suggest that the branch’s centralist outlook and rigid hierarchical protocols proved incapable of accommodating the structural change proposed by the new program. See Rob Cunningham, “Community Development at the Department of Indian Affairs in the 1960s: Much Ado about Nothing” (MA thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1997); Hugh Shewell, “Bitterness behind every smiling face: Community Development and Canada’s First Nations, 1954-1968,” Canadian Historical Review 83, 1 (2002), 58-84.

55 Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 321.


Overall, the project was split into three stages: fieldwork and specialized research, consolidated analysis, and the writing of the final report. Community studies, consisting of the summer work of twelve student researchers sent to question Aboriginal informants, church representatives, and other specialists, provided raw data that senior specialists were to integrate into general surveys. Although an attempt was made to base community study samplings on social and economic type rather than on geographical spread, only twenty-eight Aboriginal communities and groups were identified for analysis. The survey’s main focus was on lower mainland and coastal groups, the traditional focus of Northwest Coast American anthropology. Jointly authored by Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, the project’s final report was completed in the summer of 1955. The survey was subsequently reformatted and edited for length before being published by the presses at the universities of California and Toronto in 1958. The following brief summary is based on the initial 1955 report.

**INDIANS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Approximately one thousand pages in length, *Indians of British Columbia* is an impressive work consisting of thirty-four chapters covering a range of economic, cultural, demographic, political, and administrative topics. It adopts an acculturationist theoretical approach, an analytical mode of framing cultural change as dynamic, bilateral, and not necessarily entailing shifts in cultural values. The report explicitly rejects racial arguments about Indian inferiority in favour of an interpretive model.

58 The data from community fieldwork took two forms: questionnaires and field notes written by the students documenting their experiences and observations. Although the records of specific researchers and communities vary, both questionnaires and field notes yield insights into social, economic, and political aspects of communities as well as into the individual experiences of the student researchers in various locales. An assemblage of senior scholars completed the specialist studies, including W. Dixon (social welfare services); J.D. Chapman (resource economics); and E.K. Nelson, Ronald Shearer, and Malcolm Matheson (economics and criminology). See Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 14, file 7, C.S. Belshaw, “Progress Report: Indian Research Project: The Social and Economic Condition of the Reserves of British Columbia,” n.d., 7–8; Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, *Indians of British Columbia: A Study*, v–vi, 5.


61 Raymond H.C. Teske Jr. and Bardin H. Nelson describe how acculturationist and assimilationist approaches represent separate, distinct analytical paradigms. They note that, although acculturation must precede assimilation, the former can occur without the latter.
based on cultural conflict and change. The theme of Indian adjustment to, rather than assimilation into, Canadian economy and society informs the overarching approach of the study. Indian social and economic underdevelopment is attributed to identifiable material factors such as systemic legal, economic, political, and regional inequalities between Indians and non-Indians. Roughly half of the chapters deal with contemporary economic topics, while remaining sections canvas social and administrative matters.

*Indians of British Columbia* operates on the general tenet that Indian communities are in a state of determined social, economic, and cultural transition. The report’s introductory chapter states: “Our research work takes as axiomatic that the acculturative change of the Indian is irreversible and is going to continue, no matter what is done or desired by anyone … If present trends are maintained, change will go on to a final point of nearly complete cultural assimilation and racial amalgamation.”62 Although described as an inevitable consequence of present trends, assimilation was noted not only as being unlikely to occur for decades but also as being unlikely to occur equally across all Aboriginal communities. The report speculates that the most pressing problem facing government is the possibility that “separate communities may exist for any foreseeable future.”63

Rather than endorse either pressurized cultural assimilation or a reversal of the process of change, the report advocates a need-based approach to Indian policy: “Administrative policy should aim at aiding the Indian to meet his needs as social science reveals them and fulfil his goals as he perceives them; it should be related to the physical and mental health of the individual and the welfare of the community.”64 Elaborating on how future change was to be administered and directed, the report states:

The Indian population should be able to take full and undifferentiated part in organized political, educational and other national and provincial institutions and … there should be a free and easy relationship, without hostility, between Indians and Whites … We would not advocate, as a matter of ethical principle, further deliberate pressure or

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63 Ibid., 32.
64 Ibid., 37.
planning directed towards the changing of custom, attitude or belief. Such further change should be a matter for the Indian’s own decision. 65

In line with their call for greater Indian equality and self-determination, the authors of the report advocate the immediate extension of full voting and liquor rights to Indians and the abolishment of enfranchisement. The survey states: “We can only conclude that the policy of enfranchisement is a complete failure, and that it has no effect in attracting Indians into Canadian society at large.” 66 Within the contention that changes of a social and cultural nature only occur at the behest of Aboriginal people lay a fundamental critique of the long-standing paternalistic orientation of Canadian Indian policy.

In addition to rejecting the goal of cultural assimilation, the report demands a rethinking of the Indian bureaucracy’s operational existence. It was the responsibility of the Indian Affairs Branch and other governmental bodies – not Indians alone – to remedy social and economic inequalities. This was to be achieved through the adoption of progressive educational, fiscal, and economic policies aimed at improving Indian welfare. BC Indians, Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson note, were in a state of both cultural and economic transition. The branch’s mission should thus be “to create, as far as in its power, conditions which will enable the Indian people to adjust further to Canadian society in ways which are compatible with their freedom and welfare, and with the recognition that Indians have an equal right to human respect and self-respect.” 67 Towards this end, the report conceives of the Indian Affairs Branch and Indian reserves as necessarily serving long-term functions. The recommendation that the Indian affairs bureaucracy exist in perpetuity tacitly challenged the long-standing notion that the Indian administrative apparatus would cease to exist following the termination of Indian status.

Some of the report’s most detailed programs for change come with regard to local government and the role of agency superintendents. The survey calls for sweeping reforms to an existing band council system described as being prone to sectional interests and social schisms. The two-year elected term for band councillors, for instance, is deemed as too short; leaders often acquired positions based on hereditary rather than on administrative capabilities. 68 The larger problem, according to the

65 Ibid., 33.
66 Ibid., 977.
67 Ibid., 981.
68 Ibid., 921–22.
report, however, again relates to the structure of Indian administration rather than to Aboriginal people themselves. Superintendents and the minister, Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson argue, held excessive powers and intervened in too many band matters. In addition to being overworked and underpaid, agency superintendents are described as being too paternalistic and often in conflicts of interest with the real needs of bands. Tucked away in the chapter entitled “The Political Structure of the Community” lies the greatest criticism of the overbearing powers of the superintendent: “This is one of the most revealing lacks in the administration of Indian Affairs, since it documents with clarity our contention that the focus of administrative action is not the education of the Indian, except in a narrow formal sense, but the manipulation of his property.”

In remedy, the report encourages a lessening of bureaucratic centralization and control, two forces seen as counterproductive to the realization of Indian economic well-being. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson urge a reduction in the powers and responsibilities of agency superintendents, reallocations of duties between local bands and the commissioner’s office in Vancouver, and changes to band administration to separate matters of local authority from those of financial trust. Apparently, an earlier redistribution of superintendent responsibilities in 1947 failed to remedy related problems.

The survey recommendations implicitly condemn existing branch programming as incapable of improving Indian economy. With keen foresight into subsequent decades, Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson identify the uncertain economic position of Aboriginal people moving into the later twentieth century. This precariousness, they note, was owed to the combination of three current trends: (1) rapid industrial expansion and mechanization, (2) Aboriginal population growth, and (3) declining employment opportunities in primary industries of high Indian concentration. The report points to the lack of Indian capital, credit, and equity – endemic causes of Indians’ low incomes and insecure economic base – as inhibiting the prospects of success for those seeking to make the transition to more viable economic pursuits. The proposed solution lay in the adoption of new inter- and cross-governmental initiatives aimed at promoting Indian welfare. All new initiatives, the report urges, must take into account the needs of both a growing and

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69 Ibid., 939.
70 Ibid., 917, 1019-21.
71 Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1947-8, 206.
industrializing urban Indian population as well as the needs of those remaining on-reserve and employed in traditional vocations. Although Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson advocate off-reserve movement and the incorporation of some reserves as municipalities, they also argue for the maintenance of reserves in perpetuity for those people unable or unwilling to make the transition to off-reserve industrial life. 73 Indians of British Columbia also points out the futility of integrationist efforts in the absence of significant capital allocations. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson recommend general increases in federal funding for the purposes of promoting Indian enterprise, employment diversification, job training and placement, and the creation of a community development program.

Finally, it is important to note the absence of interview data or other representations of Aboriginal voice in Indians of British Columbia. Indeed, the survey’s undertaking and drafting of recommendations involved little direct or meaningful consultation either with those most affected or with provincial departments; instead, survey research was conducted in secrecy at both the departmental and community levels. No evidence suggests that even Hawthorn, who argued that Aboriginal people be able to determine their own fate, questioned their exclusion from policy development talks prior to making his recommendations. As a result, it is unlikely that significant numbers of BC Aboriginal people knew of the project and its subsequent report, even after its publication. However, as is discussed below, Aboriginal perspectives on the report did surface following its premature disclosure.

THE REPORT: REACTIONS AND RESISTANCE

Department and branch officials began reviewing the report immediately following its completion. Over the next year, it became increasingly apparent that, while senior departmental officials seemed satisfied with the survey, branch administrators were less enthusiastic and opted to interpret the document on their own terms.74 That following spring, Superintendent of Agencies Jules D’Astous told Director Jones:

73 Ibid., 232, 1021-22.

74 Minister Pickersgill, for instance, publicly praised the report as “very good” and as deserving of lengthy attention by the department. See “Pickersgill Praises Study on Indians,” Warren Baldwin, Province, 23 March 1957, 10; “Pickersgill Declares Sekani Indians ‘Must Move,’” Doug Heal, Province, 30 March 1957, 24. John Leslie also notes how “senior management was satisfied with the Hawthorn report and comforted that Indian integration had been confirmed by outside experts as the legitimate goal of Indian policy.” See Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 279.
“the report will become an outstanding book of reference for all those of us interested in the administration of Indian Affairs for many years to come.”\textsuperscript{75} As D'Astous's comment suggests, for the most part, branch officials saw the report as a reference that could be mined for data over time rather than as a treatise compelling major or immediate policy reform. While some recommendations deemed “apparently desirable” by Jones – such as those pertaining to Indian law enforcement, the proposed inventory-taking of forest resources on reserve lands, and the splitting of the economic development and welfare functions in the branch – were acted upon, most of the survey’s significant proposals were either dismissed or ignored.

The government’s treatment of the project report corresponds to what Max Weber describes as “official information,” “which is only available through administrative channels and which provides him [i.e., the bureaucrat] with the facts on which he can base his actions. Only he who can get access to the facts independently of the officials’ good will can efficiently supervise the administration.”\textsuperscript{76} Knowledge derived from forms of specialized training, Weber goes on to say, is used as “an indispensable precondition for the knowledge of the technical means necessary to the achievement of political goals.”\textsuperscript{77} Weber also describes the secretive handling of official information as a most important “instrument of power.” “Official secrecy,” according to Weber, acts as a device to protect the administration from control.\textsuperscript{78} Branch reactions to the survey corroborate Weber’s theories in a number of ways. With the branch apparently being in no hurry to publicize the existence of the survey or to issue a political decision on its contents, Indians of British Columbia remained a classified document for almost two years following its initial drafting. Pickersgill, however, did agree to allow the Hawthorn Report’s mass publication in May 1956, a decision that went against the wishes of branch officials.\textsuperscript{79} This was not the first time federal officials attempted to suppress the publication of anthropological research. Almost thirty

\textsuperscript{75} LAC, RG10, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/19-2-0, pt. 1, “Memorandum to the Director, 4 May 1956.”

\textsuperscript{76} Weber, Economy and Society, 1418.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 1419.


years earlier, McIlwraith’s *The Bella Coola Indians* faced similar scrutiny and censorship for content deemed “offensive.”

Rather than engage the report in its entirety or respond to its more controversial stated principles – such as the need for a rethinking of the government’s primary functions and orientation – branch officials internalized the survey, responding selectively to recommendations on a point-by-point basis. One common response strategy was simply to affirm that recommendations were already established practice or long-term goals; another was to dismiss them as unrealistic. For example, proposals to increase the number of social workers, placement officers, and other specialized staff were deemed “impractical, too idealistic, or expensive” and were thus rejected. Officials also deflected proposals as being beyond branch responsibility or control. Jones remarked that the proposal to increase band self-government powers was contingent upon other factors, including “changes in legislation, changes in attitude on the part of the Indians … [and] the creation of a desire among the Indians to assume the responsibilities of self-government.” Another branch memorandum dismissed the report’s claim that superintendents were too authoritarian and were failing to provide educative functions; instead, meagre achievements in Indian self-administration were blamed on a lack of initiative on the part of band councils. As these comments indicate, officials held that unfavourable Indian attitudes and behaviour were what prevented administrators from carrying out survey recommendations.

The report clearly hit some nerves within bureaucratic circles. Ever defensive, officials attacked the predicated assumptions behind some recommendations, particularly when it came to the land question. In response to Hawthorn’s call for the issuance of a joint federal-provincial statement with respect to land “that [would] reassure the Indians of Governmental adherence to liberal and protective principles,” the branch stated, incredulously:

> We cannot agree or disagree with this recommendation as we do not understand it. It may be read as suggesting that neither the Gov-

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82 LAC, RG19, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/9-2-0, pt. 1, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 22 January 1959.”

83 LAC, RG19, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/9-2-0, pt. 1, “Memorandum to Mr. Fairholm, n.d.”

ernment of British Columbia nor Canada had adhered to liberal and protective principles in the past. The validity of such suggestion is open to question for in no other part of Canada was there such care taken ... in the selection and allotment of reserves nor can it be said with any certainty that the Indians did not receive a fair share of land based on their requirements of the day.\textsuperscript{85}

Another response tactic was to ignore report recommendations altogether. Officials apparently chose not to comment on the survey’s rebuke of enfranchisement in the chapter entitled “Indians in the Canadian Polity.”

Branch and department officials might have paid lip service to the report’s utility, but few of the survey’s significant proposals were ever implemented. Indian affairs officials handled the survey as “official information,” being unable or unwilling to implement its recommendations for significant change. Moreover, Weber’s suggestion that “policy-making is not a technical affair, and hence not the business of the professional civil servant,” is applicable when considering the inability of officials to take comprehensive advantage of the report.\textsuperscript{86} Ironically, the meagre policy repercussions of the 1955 study foreshadowed the fate of the second Hawthorn Report of 1966–67. Sally M. Weaver documents how politicians and senior advisors paid little heed to the recommendations of Hawthorn’s national survey during the formulation of the 1969 federal White Paper Indian policy statement.\textsuperscript{87}

THE REPORT LEAKED

Federal hopes for public non-disclosure of the report – prior to its mass publication or, in the case of Jones, altogether – were dashed in March 1957. Much to the disturbance of officials, the survey was prematurely leaked following a reporter’s discovery of a copy in the UBC library. It is unclear who put the report in the library, but Hawthorn apparently thought the placement of a social science report of this type in the university library was “quite regular.” Even though a draft of the report had been in federal circulation for almost two years, Indian affairs officials were unprepared for the release of what they considered to

\textsuperscript{85} LAC, RGio, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/19-2-o, pt. 1, “The Indians of British Columbia’ Chapter 5 [IAB summary and responses, n.d.].”

\textsuperscript{86} Weber, \textit{Economy and Society}, 149.

\textsuperscript{87} Weaver, “The Hawthorn Report,” 88-89. See also Weaver, \textit{Making Canadian Indian Policy}, 24, 128.
be a restricted document. News of the leaked report spread quickly. Newspapers spanning the country covered the story for several weeks. Most media accounts described Indians of British Columbia as far-reaching and controversial, drawing particular attention to its recommendations for Indian alcohol rights, fewer governmental controls, greater band council responsibility, and municipal integration. Interest in the report even appears to have traversed the US border. Former US commissioner of Indian affairs William Brophy requested a copy of the report, only to be told by Jones that no issues could be spared.

Because the report was not adequately distributed and was unaccompanied by any explanatory federal news release, early media interpretations of its significance and recommendations varied widely. Reporters misquoted basic data pertaining to the project; other accounts mischaracterized it as recommending “complete abolition of the Indian Act and its replacement with a revolutionary Bill of Rights.” Newspaper story headlines included: “Indian Administration ‘50 Years Out of Date’”; “Revolution for Indians: Probe Wants Old Methods Thrown Out”; “Urge Indian Rights Bill: Study in BC Draws Drastic Policy Change”, “Investigators Suggest New Deal for Indians”; and “UBC Research Team Proposes Sweeping Reforms for Indians.” Media accounts of the report, in turn, took on a life of their own, prompting additional rounds of public and political reactions. In a Nanaimo Free Press article, BC Indian Advisory Committee member and North Vancouver mayor Charles Cates called the prospects of an Indian bill of rights “a bit of hysteria.” BC minister for labour Lyle Wicks felt the need to comment that “there is no snap or pat cure” to the problems facing Indian people. A more sympathetic Prince George Citizen editorialist pointed out popular ignorance of Indian problems and Canadians’ moral obligation to improve the conditions of a “wasted people.”

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89 LAC, RG10, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/19-2-0, pt. 1, “H.M. Jones to William A. Brophy, 14 May 1957.” At the time, Brophy was acting as executive director of the US Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian.
90 See Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 14, file 25, “[Media] Clippings.”
Another contributing factor to early confusion surrounding the report arose from its academic orientation and character. With regard to its length, format, and layout, the report was a unique work of applied anthropology. Revisions undertaken in preparation for mass publication – notably a change in title and removal of the list of executive recommendations – further affirmed the report’s identity as a product of social science research. Hawthorn described the survey to its Canadian publisher, the University of Toronto Press, in precisely these terms, noting: “It will make its primary contribution as a work of applied anthropology. It is a survey of contemporary Indian life and a policy guide for the Indians of British Columbia and for the Provincial and Federal governments.”

Typical of a social science monograph, the report was also distributed internationally for academic peer review, and this occurred as much as a year prior to its public disclosure. Anthropologists embraced the report on scholarly terms, praising its innovativeness and scope. McIlwraith and Ernest Beaghole, for instance, described the study as “monumental,” while Felix Keesing and Raymond Firth praised its utility and scope. Helen Codere termed the survey a “break-through” work for both anthropologists and administrators, adding: “I have never seen anything on any applied anthropological topic so full of ideas, sound arguments and supporting data. Aside from its policy importance it has a separate importance as an anthropological document.” Hawthorn’s contributions to the Canadian anthropological profession would continue to garner scholarly praise decades later.

Aboriginal attitudes towards the Hawthorn study are more difficult to discern, but period sources indicate that many responded favourably to it.

95 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 11, “Author’s Information Sheet – 3, [n.d.].” During the revision process leading up to this, further difficulties arose over whether the work was to be termed a contemporary ethnography with comment on administration or, as Hawthorn sought, “an analysis of Indian welfare with stress on those aspects responsive to administrative action, with ethnographic and historical data given only to the extent that they were needed for comprehension, planning and achievement of welfare goals.” See Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 12, file 11, Hawthorn to Jeanneret, 19 November 1956.
In a March 1957 *Victoria Daily Times* article, Aboriginal artist and writer George Clutesi lauded the report as an “Indian Bill of Rights.” Calling Hawthorn a dear friend, Clutesi went even further, labelling the survey “one of the greatest steps ever taken toward Indian emancipation.” The newspaper of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, the *Native Voice*, also reported the study as “revolutionary,” with a story in the June issue predicting that “a new way of life for BC’s 30,000 Indians is in the offing if Ottawa acts on [the survey] recommendations.” Brotherhood president Reverend Peter Kelly described the report in similarly positive terms following its 1958 publication as *Indians of British Columbia*. Speaking before the 1959 Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Kelly said he hoped that the project would “present a positive, progressive pattern for development of the well being and prosperity of the native citizens of the province.” The survey was deemed useful enough to circulate among the members of the second postwar joint committee struck to examine Indian administration.

**CONCLUSION**

The convoluted life and legacy of the Indian Research Project indicate that relations between social scientists and government officials around the mid-twentieth century were less than uniform or consonant. Archival evidence documenting the multifarious developments, uses, and impacts of Hawthorn’s 1955 report reveals the interplay of contrasting interests and agendas – differences often under-accounted for in scholarship that stresses the colonialist implications of anthropological research that was used for policy purposes. Barnett observed this dissonance as early as 1957 in his study *Anthropology in Administration*:

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100 “New Deal under Study,” *Native Voice*, June 1957, 1.
101 Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 6 (2 July 1959), 141. Hawthorn had previously worked with many BC Aboriginal leaders through the Native Brotherhood of BC, the BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society, and the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada-funded Committee on Indian Research. See Inglis, “Harry and Audrey Hawthorn,” 3.
102 LAC, RG 10, Central Registry Series, vol. 7982, file 1/19-2-0, pt. 1, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 June 1959.”
103 Jonathan Peyton and Robert Hancock, for instance, theorize that the work of anthropologists, Hawthorn included, was corroborative of Canadian state formation. “Anthropology,” they contend, “was complicit in the subjugation of First Nations through its compliance with and contributions to state ideology.” Shewell similarly frames the growing federal use of social science after the Second World War as facilitating a reinvention of governmental paternalism “based on the ‘benevolence’ of secular understanding, knowledge, and the tools of social
Although anthropologists and administrators thus agree on the importance of ethnographic knowledge for the determination of policy, there has been no unanimity among them as to the kind of information required or as to the best means of obtaining it … Consequently, there has been no uniform or consistent practice in colonial government – or its similitudes – with respect to the employment of technical personnel – or its similitudes – in this specialized field of knowledge.104

Barnett might well have been describing the Indian Research Project. Academics, senior departmental officials, and branch administrators may have agreed on the need for ethnographic research, but each participated in and utilized the survey for distinctly different purposes. Hawthorn viewed involvement with the federal government as “a relationship and interchange of experience,” a way to effect positive policy change, further academic credentials, and bolster the emergent field of modern anthropology. Even within the federal setting, significant differences in opinion existed. Senior Department of Citizenship and Immigration mandarins commissioned the survey as a way to advance a new integrationist policy agenda and to compel reform in the Indian Affairs Branch. When considering the full range of interested participants involved, it becomes apparent that the Indian Research Project did not solely function, either by extension or by structural implication, as a simple corollary to state power. The evidence presented above corroborates the work of Sally M. Weaver and other recent scholars, which demonstrates that the Indian affairs bureaucracy does not always operate or perform as a monolith.105


While Hawthorn’s 1950s survey clearly endorsed integrationist measures and can be read as colonialist when assessed by modern standards, for its time, it was highly innovative. Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson delivered one of the most comprehensive and critical accounts of assimilation policy and the Indian affairs bureaucracy since its inception in 1880. Several Indian advocates endorsed the survey after its unintended public disclosure, likely for this reason alone. Indians of British Columbia symbolizes changing popular postwar sensibilities, growing concern over the plight of Aboriginal people, and widening debates over the direction of Canadian Indian policy in the mid-twentieth century. A contested entity from its commissioning, the Indian Research Project was as heterogeneous in function and legacy as was Hawthorn’s subsequent two-volume national survey, which rearticulated several nascent principles first articulated in the earlier report. Coining the concept of “citizens plus,” Hawthorn’s 1966-67 A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A Report on Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies helped fuel and legitimize Aboriginal protests following the release of the 1969 federal White Paper. Both the national and the earlier BC survey need to be seen as part of a larger continuum of growing public debate and shifting Canadian Indian policies that began in the aftermath of the Second World War.

For the “command post” Indian Affairs Branch of the mid-twentieth century, however, old habits died hard. Following the public disclosure and widespread publication of the report, branch officials continued to adhere to paternalistic policies while concomitantly embracing new social science research for more familiar bureaucratic application. In 1960, for example, the Research and Surveys Section was added for the stated purposes of developing Indian labour and economic development programs on and off reserve as well as “establishing a general inventory of the resources available to Indian bands.” The branch’s stated rationale

106 See Bryan Palmer, Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 389.
108 LAC, RGio, Central Registry Series, vol. 8567, file 1/5-2, pt. 3, “Memorandum to the Acting Deputy Minister, 26 April 1963.”
for the creation of the Cultural Affairs Section in 1966 further spoke of the new official role afforded to social science in Indian programming: “The second half of the twentieth century … provides a new era. A finer appreciation of the social sciences permits the Indian and non-Indian to understand each other better.”

Perhaps the greatest indicator of the federal government’s ongoing interest in social science as “official information” was the 1963 decision to commission a second Indian Research Project. Unlike the earlier survey, however, the second Hawthorn survey was an independent branch undertaking, significantly larger than the first, and national in scope. Branch administrators were also more careful to define it in far narrower terms than those agreed to by Hawthorn and Boucher in 1953. In a personal note regarding preliminary meetings with Hawthorn about the national project, Jones wrote:

As a social scientist Dr. Hawthorn may tend to be more interested in knowledge for knowledge’s sake than in its specific administrative application. It is important that our position be made clear, i.e. we want positive results which we can apply administratively – the study must be useful to us … [W]e do not want to spend money seeking what has already been revealed by research here and in the USA.

The branch’s decision to commission a second report, as well as Hawthorn’s conditional agreement to direct it alongside Associate Director Marc-Adélard Tremblay, speaks of the reciprocal yet ambivalent relationship that, by that time, had developed between social science and Indian affairs administrators.

111 Faced with more specific terms of reference and guidelines, Hawthorn only agreed to head the project on the condition that he would maintain his university position and residence in Vancouver and be allowed to publish the final report. See Harry Hawthorn Fonds, box 31, file 18, “Jones to Hawthorn,” 8 February 1963; LAC, RG10, Central Registry Series, vol. 7983, file t/19-2-10, pt. 1, “C.I. Fairholm to Acting Senior Administrative Officer, 13 March 1963.” See also Weaver, “A Case Study on the Role of the Social Sciences,” 4.