“THE PARK ... IS A MESS”:
Development and Degradation in
British Columbia’s First Provincial Park

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In their important 1977 study of changing perceptions of the BC landscape, historians Maria Tippett and Douglas Cole offered a richly illustrated and revealing survey of etchings, watercolours, and oil-paintings of the province’s mountains, valleys, forests, waters, and settlements. Beginning with the topographical artists who helped record the late eighteenth-century encounters of James Cook and George Vancouver with the northwest coast of the continent (whose works present the landscape in sublime terms, encouraging melancholy contemplation of the awe-full grandeur of Nature), Tippett and Cole marked a progression through the works of painters enslaved by picturesque conventions to the Post-Impressionist vibrancy of canvases by Emily Carr and her contemporaries. Through a century and a half, these authors contended, dominant representations of the landscape moved from portrayals of dull and dreary bleakness to celebrations of magnificent grandeur. The trajectory was summed up in their title: From Desolation to Splendour.¹

As British Columbia’s artists turned to find their subjects “in rugged nature, instead of man’s developments,” parks provided physical expression of the desire to celebrate outstanding natural places and,


perhaps, offered a salve to the wounds inflicted on the environment by development.\textsuperscript{2} Moved by much the same anxiety as possessed Ferdinand V. Hayden, one of the early advocates for Yellowstone Park, who thought that “the vandals who are now waiting to enter into this wonder-land, will in a single season despoil, beyond recovery, these remarkable curiosities, which have required all the cunning skill of nature thousands of years to prepare,” citizens of the United States and Canada supported setting aside particularly valued areas of the landscape for protection and preservation.\textsuperscript{3} In both countries, this impulse produced extensive and much-vaunted systems of national parks as well as large numbers of parks established by state or provincial jurisdictions. A massive and ever-expanding collection of studies traces and analyzes the histories of national parks on both sides of the border;\textsuperscript{4} by contrast, a decidedly modest literature explores the subject of this article and this special issue of \textit{BC Studies}: the perhaps less celebrated yet arguably equally important state and provincial parks systems across North America, which, collectively, attract greater numbers of visitors than do national parks.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3} Marlene D. Merrill, ed., \textit{Yellowstone and the Great West: Journals, Letters, and Images from the 1871 Hayden Expedition} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 210–11.


In recent decades, park creation in British Columbia has often been associated with protest and confrontation. Through the late twentieth century, park defenders engaged in often bitter struggles with advocates of resource development to hold back what they sometimes thought of as the juggernaut of capitalist exploitation of nature. Paradoxically, as artists turned their backs on nature late in the twentieth century, growing numbers of people came to value wild and scenic places the more. In these spaces, it was hoped and believed, the beauties of nature — scenic wonders, spectacular environments, “natural jewels” — could be saved from the forces transforming environments elsewhere, for the “benefit, advantage and enjoyment of the people.” Such views were influenced by the rise, after 1960, of environmentalist sentiment across North America and a growing sense that wilderness was increasingly scarce and threatened.

So, campaigns to save the Stein, the Carmanah Walbran, the Stoltmann Wilderness, Tatshenshini-Alsek, the Great Bear Rainforest, and so on grabbed headlines, spawned protests, and marked a growing (although...}

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6 For more on this theme see Tippett and Cole, Desolation to Splendour, 140.
7 The phrase is from Canada’s Rocky Mountains Park Act, 1887. See “Parks Canada Guiding Principles and Operational Policies: Preface – Early History,” available at: http://www.pc.gc.ca/docs/pc/poli/princip/preface.aspx (accessed 12 July 2011). Of course hopes of keeping nature intact, of saving it as it was, were deeply flawed. For recent commentaries on how the very act of park creation set in motion its own processes of environmental transformation, see M.D. Barringer, Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and the Construction of Nature (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 2002); and Keri Cronin, Manufacturing National Park Nature (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2010).
certainly not unopposed) public sense in British Columbia of the need to act in defence of nature.

Reflecting changing attitudes towards the natural world and environmental stewardship, however, many other parks and protected areas were created quietly on the advice of bureaucrats and by order-in-council under the BC Parks Act. Today, some 13.5 million hectares of British Columbia (approximately 14 percent of its land area) are included within almost nine hundred parks and protected areas, ranging widely in size and located across the length and breadth of the province (see frontispiece on page 4 of this issue). Each of British Columbia’s parks has its particular value, and together they protect, in the words of the BC Ministry of the Environment, “internationally significant ecological and cultural values.” All are “dedicated to the preservation of their natural environments for the inspiration, use and enjoyment of the public,” and the BC Parks Branch conservation management strategy aims to “ensure the ecological integrity of the natural values” within the parks system. Indeed, with two exceptions, current parks legislation prohibits the sale, lease, or granting of land within parks and the removal from them of natural resources (broadly defined to mean “land, water and atmosphere, their mineral, vegetable and other components, and … the flora and fauna on and in them”) unless and as authorized by a park-use permit.

This has not always been the case. Barely twenty years ago a special advisory committee appointed by British Columbia’s minister of environment and parks reported that Strathcona Park (the province’s first such creation, established in 1911 to encompass the “magnificence and the variety” of the “scenic delights” of central Vancouver Island) had been severely despoiled. By the committee’s account:

The Park now embraces a reservoir that was once a lake, logged over forest land that has not been replanted, a number of mineral claims and an operating mine, a power line right-of-way, and a boundary that defies Park principles, not only in its original straightness, but also by

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9 Tweedsmuir is British Columbia’s largest provincial park (989,666 hectares); Memory Island, in Shawinigan Lake, Vancouver Island (less than one hectare) is the smallest.
12 The terms “magnificence” and “scenic variety” are from a report on the intention to establish Strathcona Park. See Anon, “Designed to Be Provincial Park: Reserve Placed on All Unalieneated Lands in the Vicinity of Buttle’s Lake by Provincial Government,” Colonist (Victoria), 1 June 1910.
the revisions that have been made over the years ... Far from realizing the vision of its founders, the Park, in a word, is a mess.13

Understanding how this situation came to be, how an area once a “treasure that the whole province should be proud of” was reduced to seeming disarray,14 traced even in outline as in the remainder of this essay, tells us much – not only about the particular history of Strathcona but also about competing visions of nature and the contingent and constructed qualities of the supposed “wildness” of parks in British Columbia (see Figures 3–7 on pages 27–31 above).

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For all its remoteness, as Paula Young shows in this issue, the area that became Strathcona Park in 1911 neither lay beyond the claims of resource interests nor stood clear of development for tourism. Although the park’s first superintendent, Reginald H. Thomson, noted in 1913 that nobody questioned “the intention to preserve” Strathcona “as nature made it,” he also understood that the park was “expected to serve as a zoo, an arboretum and as a botanical garden.”15 His plans for the park (largely set aside with the onset of the First World War) included road and trail building; the selection of sites for hotels (and a golf course); increasing the availability of browse for, and preventing the poaching of, elk and deer; reducing the presence of cougars and other predators; and increasing fish and bird populations – strategies entirely congruent with contemporary views that accepted the contrivance, even within parks, of landscapes for human satisfaction.16

13 Peter Larkin, Frances Jones, Roderick Naknakim, and Jim Rutter (Strathcona Park Advisory Committee), Strathcona Park: Restoring the Balance (Victoria: Queen’s Printer, June 1988), vii.
14 This phrase describing the central area of Vancouver Island (including the Buttle Lake area) is from an early advocate for Strathcona Park. See W.W. Bolton, “The Proposed Vancouver Island Provincial Park,” Colonist (magazine section), 12 June 1910; and W.W. Bolton, “The Provincial Park,” Colonist, 5 June 1910.
16 Expenditures on “park improvements” were nonetheless substantial and attracted the ire of many. According to the BC government’s Strathcona Park report for 1915, the eight kilometres or so of roadside along the access road to the park between McIvor Lake and Echo Lake were planted with “500 plane trees, 250 mountain ash, 125 elms, 100 ash, 100 chestnut. All of these trees were four years of age. There were also planted 2,000 seedlings of ash and elm, one year of age; also 1,000 cuttings of a very choice Golden Willow, and 1,000 cuttings of ‘Tolmie’s Siberian Willow’ as well as 8,000 ivy plants, 2,500 broom plants, 300 pounds (155 kgs) of broom seed, 200 pounds of grass seed, and 15 types of herbaceous plants. See Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 99; and “Large Sum Wasted on Strathcona,” Times (Victoria), 8 September 1916. Estimates suggested expenditures of $400,000 by 1916.
Thomson also favoured expansion of the park to encompass new scenic areas, and adjustments to the park’s southern, western and northern boundaries in 1913 brought part of the Bedwell Valley – which contained mineral leases and active placer gold-mining operations – as well as beautiful lakes, rivers, and mountains into the park (Figure 1). The Strathcona Park Act prohibited mining in the park, but government efforts to purchase existing mineral leases failed, and in 1918 an amendment to the act, passed by a newly elected Liberal government, opened Strathcona (with some limitations) to further mineral exploration, claims-staking, and mining.17 With this decision, the balance of administrative interest in the park shifted, portentously, from preservation and tourist promotion to resource extraction.

Even as the Liberal government established new parks, creating Mount Robson in 1913, adding Garibaldi in 1927, and listing thirteen provincial parks by 1930, there was growing concern that provincial parks development had lost its way. Strathcona was a particular enigma. Although there was much talk in the 1920s of its potential for recreation, it was extremely difficult to reach, limiting access for most would-be visitors. The road to Campbell River was opened in 1919, but its northern sections remained rough and treacherous; entering the park from Campbell River required a fifteen-kilometre hike. As the Victoria Chamber of Commerce urged the government to purchase the pre-1911 timber leases around Buttle Lake and Minister of Lands T.D. Pattullo claimed that “we can’t leave timber standing and expect to build up a lumber industry,” the editor of the Victoria Colonist claimed that the government lacked “any policy whatever” for Strathcona Park.18 In retrospect, he may simply have failed to discern it.

A year later, in 1927, the same government amended the 1911 act to allow the water level in Buttle Lake to be raised for hydroelectricity generation. While the Conservative opposition railed against the plan, noting that it “would entirely deface one of the most beautiful wonderlands on the Western Coast,” and arguing that “permitting such a playground of future generation[s] to be raped would be a calamity,” Minister Pattullo polarized the debate in very immediate terms: did public interest lie in “the preservation of this park or encouragement of a large industrial enterprise”? Yes, Buttle Lake was beautiful – but there was “wonderful scenery” all along the coast, clear to Prince Rupert. Besides, there would

17 An Act to Amend the Strathcona Park Act, Bill 33, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of BC, Sessional Papers, 28 March 1918, cited by Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 123.
18 “Strathcona Park” (editorial), Colonist, 2 June 1926.
be new beaches and hotel sites along the edges of the raised lake, and Strathcona was mainly an alpine park anyway. Pattullo liked to think that “all British Columbia … [was] a park” and that the people of the province would “never run short of scenery.” For Liberals, the public interest lay in industrial development, even if that meant sacrificing a public amenity to power an American-owned pulp mill.

In the end, negotiations with the Crown-Willamette Company fell through. Liberals and Conservatives continued to spar over the future of the park, even as the latter, who formed the government in 1928,
purchased several timber leases around Buttle Lake, ostensibly to protect scenic values. Like so many other hotly contested issues of the day, however, this one was pushed into the background by the market crash of 1929 and the economic difficulties that followed. In 1933, otherwise unemployed “relief workers” improved the trail into the park, but this improved access only marginally, and there were few other efforts to develop park infrastructure during the Depression or the war.

Logging within the park, on several tenures not re-acquired by the Crown, stirred resistance early in the 1940s. Initiated by William Reid, wealthy American president of Ducks Unlimited who owned a summer cabin on Buttle Lake, supported by well-known local author Roderick Haig-Brown, and given public traction by the striking photographs of the area taken by New York conservationist (and associate of Franklin D. Roosevelt) Irving Brandt – which were published in the Victoria Times – the protest campaign moved the government to exchange timber licences around Buttle Lake (within and outside the park) for entitlements elsewhere. But fettering (or, more accurately, relocating) development to protect the park was a matter of expedience as much as conviction. Out of public sight, more remote sections of the park remained out of the political mind. Early in the 1940s, loggers began working old tenures in the vicinity of Oshinaw Lake, in the southeast of the park, and in the Elk River Valley, in the north, and were allowed to continue untrammeled into the 1950s. As these tenures carried no obligation to replant, regrowth was slow, and in some places erosion was severe.

19 “BC Pays $335,000 to Conserve Beauty of the Park,” Province (Vancouver), 26 April 1929.
20 Richard Rajala discusses relief work activities at Elk Falls, just outside the park, in “From ‘On-to-Ottawa’ to ‘Bloody Sunday’: Unemployment Relief and British Columbia Forests, 1935-1939,” in Framing Canadian Federalism, ed. Dimitry Anastakis and P.E. Bryden (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 118-30. In 1943 sections of the trail into Strathcona were damaged by construction of the Elk River Timber Company’s logging railroad, which was built to gain access to E&N Railway grant lands at the foot of Buttle Lake, outside the park boundaries.
After the Second World War, resource development quickened across Canada, and industrial activities expanded in response to the booming population and the return of prosperity after two decades of struggle. The provincial government forged ahead, developing new road and rail routes, new forest tenure and licensing systems, and new hydroelectricity schemes to power the economy. On Vancouver Island, which remained unconnected to the mainland’s growing electricity grid, the power question was particularly acute. Campbell River, which drained Buttle Lake, was dammed a few kilometres from its mouth at Elk Falls in 1945 to drive the generators of the hydroelectricity station eventually named after Premier John Hart. Three years later, the British Columbia Power Commission (bcpc) decided to turn Lower Campbell Lake into a storage reservoir for the project (see Figure 2). Local residents, including Haig-Brown, lobbied to preserve fish-spawning areas, small boat access to the lake, and the scenic appeal of the area, but they were left dissatisfied with the commission’s efforts to fulfill its commitments: logs jammed part of the shoreline and several lakeshore properties were damaged.

When the bcpc subsequently announced plans to dam Buttle Lake itself, a powerful campaign against the dam gathered momentum, with Haig-Brown and Reid again to the fore. Through the summer of 1951, Victoria and Vancouver newspapers carried articles, editorials, and photographs related to the protest. Late that summer, a public hearing on the matter was told repeatedly that the damming of Buttle Lake would ruin both its ecological integrity and its tourist appeal. Dam opponents claimed they did not simply stand in the way of progress;


25 As a brief submitted to later hearings had it: “It is impossible to raise Buttle Lake and not destroy its beauty. First, the shore line will be logged off and the timber sold; the stumps, windfalls, branches [and] unmerchantable timber will be left lying on the shore; dead trees, laden with branches, will drift out a hundred yards or so, and remain, gradually becoming waterlogged: the shores will be unapproachable because the shore-line will be strewn with debris. The beaches which have been a joy to campers and fishermen, will be flooded and, owing to the precipitous sides of the lake, new beaches will not develop – In place of its beauty, there will be left only a scene of devastation.” See “Courtenay Fish and Game’s Brief Is Presented,” Comox Argus, 4 March 1953.
rather, they suggested that a dam on Upper Campbell Lake would produce many of the benefits and few of the drawbacks of a Buttle Lake dam, not least because it would flood “only logged-off land.” The BCPC responded that an Upper Campbell dam would produce less storage and be more expensive because compensation would be due private owners of the logged and flooded land. Against this, defenders of Buttle Lake threw the estimated economic value of projected tourism to Strathcona
placed by optimistic and probably specious comparison with revenues at Yellowstone, in the United States, at $100 million) and argued that any extra costs incurred in an Upper Campbell project could be offset by incremental increases to electricity rates. So the debate continued, with the value of nature and scenic beauty quickly reduced to an economic calculus. In the end, even this was taken at a discount. The Buttle Lake dam was approved, with provisos requiring the clearing of trees and debris from flooded areas, the stocking of the lake with fish, and the development of new campsites and recreational facilities.

Although the decision found support among politicians and local communities, a good deal of highly visible public opinion was weighted against it. Premier Byron Johnson agreed to further discussion, but shortly thereafter the Social Credit Party swept his coalition from office. A legislative committee established to review the issue confirmed the Buttle Lake recommendation. Still the debate raged. By one count, the Buttle Lake controversy generated over eight hundred articles in four major provincial newspapers between 1951 and 1955. In March 1954, the BCPC revisited the situation, and a few months later Premier W.A.C. Bennett announced that a dam would be built on Upper Campbell Lake after all. This was no victory for the park’s defenders, however. The new dam was so high that, when it was completed in 1958, Upper Campbell and Buttle lakes coalesced, and the level of the latter rose some five metres. Before it did so, about six hundred hectares (fifteen hundred acres) of forest were cleared from the shores of the lake-turned-reservoir.

For Haig-Brown, the dam decision amounted to the “biggest defeat conservation … has taken and the biggest mistake in the history of BC.” He and others, he recalled in the mid-1960s, won a few small victories, “but essentially the battle was lost. The park was violated, the primitive character and beauty of the lakeshore was completely destroyed, flats and beaches were buried under water and the creek mouths were flooded back to falls or box canyons.” Magnificent stands of Douglas fir were felled. Buttle Lake was now but a reservoir, “subject to ugly and depressing draw-down along barren shorelines.” Put simply,

A superlative natural asset, developed through 10,000 years, was reduced to something of quite ordinary dimensions within a year or

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27 Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 114.
two. The park behind it, with its timbered valleys and great alpine areas, remained, but the foremost value of the park, its splendid entrance and supreme show place, the one area that everyone could reach and enjoy, lost all its primitive character and nine-tenths of its meaning.\textsuperscript{28}

“Before” and “After” scenes, published by the \textit{bcpc} in 1958, told a different story. Raising the lake and cutting back timber had revealed a scenic waterfall at Wolf Creek. Higher water levels had brought Myra Falls “into full view.” The shoreline, more free of debris after the clean-up than it had been in 1955, showed “how Man can sometimes improve on Nature.”\textsuperscript{29} (See Figure 3.)

The hydroelectric project was but the first of the postwar depredations. With the repeal of the Strathcona Park Act in 1957, the park was incorporated into the Parks Branch system administered by the newly created Department of Recreation and Conservation. In these booming years, some regarded parks with misgivings, as obstacles to resource development. Indeed, the area of BC parks was reduced by over 40 percent (almost 1.9 million hectares) between 1948 and 1961, mainly to accommodate resource and hydroelectric development.\textsuperscript{30} Still, Strathcona was accorded “Class A” status in the new parks system, implying that it was substantially off limits to industrial activity – if not prospecting for the park’s mineral resources. Although the 1918 amendment to the Strathcona Park Act had technically opened the way to mining in the park, and several claims were staked at Myra Creek and elsewhere in the 1920s, very little mining took place in the ensuing decades. By the 1950s, buoyant world demand and rising prices for base metals drew attention back to the low-grade zinc and copper ores that prospectors had discovered near the southern end of Buttle Lake. The provincial Department of Mines estimated the value of recoverable ore in this vicinity at $100 million.\textsuperscript{31}

Seeing an opportunity, Western Mines Ltd. began to acquire several Crown mineral grants in the park. Although an internal Parks Branch assessment of these activities in 1959 warned of the potential destruction of already-compromised recreational values, prospecting continued. By September 1962, geologists had identified copper, lead, silver, and

zinc deposits sufficient to yield “an estimated net smelter return of about $16 a ton,” which, it was calculated, would “give a net operating profit per ton of approximately $9 on a 500 ton a day operation.” A year or so later, Western Mines unveiled plans for the development of electricity and water supplies (entailing the damming of Thelwood and Tennent creeks), a townsite, a haulage road along the east side of Buttle Lake, and a 750-ton-per-day milling operation to serve an open-pit mine (1 short ton is approximately 900 kg).

When the issue of resource exploitation in provincial parks was raised in the Legislature, in February 1964, the lines between development and conservation interests could not have been drawn more starkly. But the fox was in the chicken coop. Newly appointed minister of recreation and conservation Ken Kiernan (who had been minister of mines through the four previous years in which Western Mines had formulated its designs for Myra Creek) announced “a new approach to industrial activity in parks.” This was “multiple resource use.” Accepting the views, common at the time among mining interests, that minerals were “wasting assets” (one had to “use them or lose them”) and that there could be no such thing as conservation in the extraction of non-renewable resources, Kiernan insisted that, small as they were in area, mining operations could “provide hundreds of jobs without damaging the aesthetic values of a park.”

Mining interests inside and outside government concurred. The chief of the province’s mineralogical branch warned against “sterilizing” mineral resources by locking them up in parks – after all, park boundaries were changeable, the locations of mineral deposits were not. In June 1964, Kiernan formally allowed Western Mines to develop its mine in Strathcona Park.

Public supporters of the conservation agenda were outraged. As the controversy grew, mine opponents ranged from local community groups, to unions, to parks and recreation advocates. Early in the 1960s, a pamphlet prepared by the BC Federation of Labour urged people to remember that “parks belong to YOU” and called upon them to resist the government’s plans to allow mining. Several individual union locals...
Figure 3. “Before” and “After” pictures from Progress (1958).
MYRA CREEK
Aerial view of 1955 (inset) shows Myra Falls on west side of Buntle, near the head of the lake. New 1958 shoreline (below) has brought this lovely spot into full view.

Looking southerly along shoreline, east side of Buntle outside Strathcona Park—an interesting comparison. (Above) natural windfall and debris as it was in 1955. (Below) 1958—how Man can sometimes improve on Nature.
– including the Machinists, Fitters and Helpers Local 3 (Victoria), which denounced the “commercial exploitation of the resources” of the park – added their voices. Speaking for recreationalists, Haig-Brown declared that the new approach (which the government refused to recognize as a new policy) meant that parks would be plundered; it was a “Big Steal,” and Kiernan, who had “set back park thinking by sixty years,” had revealed himself unfit for the office he held.

The injuries threatened by mining activity were compounded by other more or less contemporaneous developments. Highway 28 was built through the park to link the east and west coasts of Vancouver Island. The government swapped the rights to large quantities of timber in Strathcona for title to small, well-placed recreational areas (such as Rathtrevor Beach) elsewhere. Although the Forbidden Plateau area was added to the park in 1968, this seemed tainted by the suggestion that it was somehow compensation for what industry had wrought elsewhere in Strathcona. Later Kiernan would argue that he had no choice on the matter of mining, that claims-stakers had inalienable rights, and that enormous compensation would be due Western Mines if it were not allowed to proceed. Soon he came to be known, by those who treasured parks, as the “Minister of Wreck and Con.”

If any doubt remained as to the priorities of Social Credit parks policy, they vanished in February 1965, when Kiernan stood in the House to introduce a new parks act and repeal the Recreation and Conservation Act. Under the new bill the government had the power to “cancel or re-establish any park established under this Act, and [to] … revise the boundaries of any such park to increase or decrease the area of the park or to consolidate two or more parks or to divide an existing park into two or more parks” without legislative debate, through order-in-council.

For examples of the sometimes fierce public reactions to the proposal in the early 1960s, see letters in bca, GR-1991, Parks Branch, reel B0773, sec. 4; and University of British Columbia Special Collections and University Archives, Haig-Brown Papers, box 121, file 3. BC Wildlife Federation, “Submission to Special Legislative Committee Concerning Western Mines Proposed Community Development in Strathcona Park,” 18 February 1966.


In 1970, Liberal MLA Pat McGeer said in the House: “The black day in this House, as far as parks were concerned, was … the date we passed the Parks Act, and at that time the leader of our Party [Mr Perrault] … had this to say about Section 6 of that Act … ‘This measure fails to provide adequate protection for the public against lobbyists of every description … Too much discretionary power is vested in the Cabinet to determine park boundaries. This Bill would deprive the Legislature of any real power to protect our parks. With the fantastic
Two months later, on 13 May 1965, large parts of Strathcona Park, including extensive areas east and southwest of Buttle Lake, were assigned Class B status (see Figure 4). Meanwhile, Jeremy Wilson notes, the weak provincial Parks Branch “meekly acquiesced to the evisceration of demand for parks and recreational areas, there is simply not enough protection of the public interests contained in this Bill.’ Ever since the day that this Bill was passed and the power was taken from this Legislative Assembly, we’ve been on a downhill track as far as parks in British Columbia are concerned … [T]oday we might as well put outside on the front lawn of this Legislature a great big billboard, have it on the Legislative lawn, and put on it ‘Parks for Sale, Parks for Lease or Parks for Swap — cheap prices, get ‘em while they last and apply within.’ Not to this Chamber but to that secret room down the hall where the business of British Columbia is really conducted.” See Province of British Columbia, 1st sess., 29th Parliament, Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 22 January 1970 to 3 April 1970, 295.

In 1962, the Bedwell Valley area had been downgraded to Class B status to permit resource exploitation. This was not done, initially, for the Myra Creek mine, which was permitted in what was a Class A park. See Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 128.
Strathcona,” having been reduced to negotiating the terms of the park’s exploitation.\footnote{Wilson, *Talk and Log*, 98. See also BCA, GR-1991, Parks Branch, reel B01773, sec. 3; and BCA, GR-1991, Parks Branch, reel B01774, sec. 6, 364. Documents in the latter section tallying the extent of resource activity in the park to 1970 listed 21,187 acres (8,575 hectares) alienated to timber companies and 662 exploration applications from mining companies (532 of which were approved).
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Although Western Mines subsequently abandoned the controversial proposed townsite within the park, the disposal of mine waste presented another challenge to both the company and those who opposed its operations. At capacity, 750 tons of ore would be processed and 150 tons of concentrate would be trucked from Myra Creek each day. The remaining six hundred tons of tailings (finely powdered rock mixed with water and containing trace amounts of heavy metals and chemicals used to recover the target minerals) were of no value. Initially, the company proposed their impoundment on land. But early in 1966, it announced its intention to dispose of its tailings in Buttle Lake. This, it claimed, was the better solution. If tailings were deposited on land, rainwater runoff would wash impurities into the lake’s surface waters; disgorging them from a pipeline eighty or one hundred feet (twenty-five to thirty metres) below the surface might make the water “a little bit murky” but would not contaminate it. To “prove” this claim, the mine manager invited reporters to join him in drinking water containing settled tailings. The deputy minister of water resources provided assurances that he would send off “nasty letters” if there was any evidence of pollution, and in August the province’s Pollution Control Board, whose somewhat weak regulatory purview had only been extended to cover Strathcona Park the month previous, approved the dumping without holding hearings on the issue.\footnote{BCA, 88-0408, Environmental Appeal Board, box 79-00, file 3, Pollution Control Board Summary Records, 26 April 1965, 26 June 1965, 5 July 1966; “Lake Dumping of Tailings from Mine ‘Less Dangerous Than on Shore,’” *Vancouver Sun*, 1 March 1966; Ab Kent, “Mine Tailings Used in Drink: No Effect YET,” *Times*, 25 August 1966.

The tailings decision redoubled mine opponents’ fury. “Like the person who titters at funerals,” noted a *Vancouver Sun* editorial, the government “has chosen this moment to show that it doesn’t give a damn for history, water conservation, parkland preservation, or the sensibilities of its citizens, if these come in conflict with the will of industry.”\footnote{“A Neat Double-Cross … from a Rubber Stamp: But Give Up? Never!” *Vancouver Sun*, 24 September 1966.} From the BC Wildlife Federation, already deeply agitated by Social Credit environmental protection policy generally, the Buttle Lake episode prompted fierce reactions, including convention resolutions, public
denunciations, and angry briefs to government. The tailings proposal sufficiently offended the sensibilities of Vancouver Island citizens that they formed action groups and, in March 1967, held what may have been the first environmental protest march in British Columbia as nearly one hundred placard-waving people descended on Victoria to present government officials with samples of tailings-laden Buttle Lake water.

Armed with a report from the BC Research Council showing that the tailings might pose serious health dangers to the town’s drinking water, the Campbell River Water Control Board appealed to the BC Supreme Court (where it lost) and the BC Court of Appeal, which quashed the dumping permits on the basis that the board should have held hearings. Western Mines in turn appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada and continued to build its “subaqueous outlet” into the lake under temporary permits, even as reports indicated that its existing holding pond was overflowing into Myra Creek and thence into Buttle Lake.

Although Minister Kiernan refused to drink the “Buttled Water” presented to him by an opposition member in the House, he did participate, in April 1967, in a meeting suggested by Liberal leader Ray Perrault in an effort to cut through the legal imbroglio. Involving representatives from the company, Campbell River, and the government, the resulting “gentlemen’s agreement” saw Western Mines agree to drop its appeal to the Supreme Court, a three-way commitment to sharing the costs of an independent scientific assessment of the dangers posed by the tailing deposits, an agreement that public hearings would be held after this report was completed, and a pledge from the government that no other industrial activity would be permitted in the area around the Myra

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42 The BCWF’s politicization under the leadership of Howard Paish during the 1960s, in response to Buttle Lake and other issues, is discussed in Keeling, “Effluent Society,” 170 and 295-301.
43 “Government Gets ‘Buttled’ Water,” Vancouver Sun, 21 March 1967, cited in University of British Columbia Special Collections and University Archives, Fisheries Association of BC fonds, box 31, file 11. See also University of British Columbia Special Collections and University Archives, submission by the Campbell River District Pollution Control Society to the Pollution Control Board concerning the addition of mine tailings into Buttle Lake, Strathcona Park, Vancouver Island (1968). Public activism against the tailings disposal plan is also considered in Carol Gamey, Mining Conflicts (Victoria: University of Victoria, 1983).
44 “Neat Double-Cross,” Vancouver Sun. The appeal court transcript and decision may be found in bca, GR-114, Fish and Wildlife Branch, box 57, file 40-02-01 1.
45 See stories in British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Sessional Clipping Books (microform), including: “Buttle Lake Fears Just ‘Emotionalism,’” Vancouver Sun, 10 January 1967; Iain Hunter, “Kiernan Ignores Blast on Buttle,” Vancouver Sun, 3 February 1967; “Kiernan Refuses Buttle Cocktail,” Vancouver Sun, 28 February 1967. On another occasion Kiernan claimed to have drunk a glass of the undiluted tailings slurry and said: “It was a bit cloudy and it tasted as if it had a little hit of baking soda in it, but it certainly didn’t have any dangerous chemicals in it.” See “Strathcona Park Mine Defended: Kiernan Raps Sun on Buttle,” Vancouver Sun, 16 June 1967.
Nevertheless, a month later, Kiernan granted Cream Silver Mines, a small company that had been staking claims in the Price Creek area immediately south of the Western Mines operation since 1964, permission to continue exploration in the area.

It would take longer for scientists to agree on the impact of tailings in Buttle Lake. The jointly funded report agreed to in 1967 was finally submitted in 1969. It found no deleterious effects. Two years on, a provincial government report showed marked increases in lead and copper concentrations in lake fish. In 1980 another report suggested that Buttle Lake “could be dead within a decade.” Shortly thereafter, Tom Pederson of the University of British Columbia analyzed dissolved zinc, copper, and cadmium concentrations in interstitial waters collected from the tailings deposit and concluded that there was no release of heavy metals to the overlying lake water and no evidence of significant oxidation. Other studies were not as sanguine. Alan Austin of the University of Victoria and his collaborators reported their comparison of samples taken from “this previously undisturbed, wilderness park lake, during initial activities in 1966–1968 and again in 1980–1982” and found that nutrient levels had remained stable while concentrations of heavy metals had greatly increased largely as a result of acid generation and metals release to groundwater: “Species of both periphyton and phytoplankton, known to be sensitive to heavy metals … [had] dra-

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46 For this meeting, see Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 137; and “Compromise Seen for Western Mines,” Vancouver Sun, 20 April 1967. Public hearings were never held; in fact, in amendments to the Pollution Control Act sparked by the Buttle dispute, the government moved to limit public objections to pollution control permit issuance. See Keeling, “Effluent Society,” 171–72.

47 Gamey, Mining Conflicts, 9.

48 BC Research, The Effect of the Disposal of Mine Tailings by Western Mines Limited on the Water Quality of Buttle Lake (Victoria: Pollution Control Branch, Water Resources Service, Department of Lands, Forests and Water Resources, 1974); “Buttle Lake ‘Could Be Dead within a Decade,’” Colonist, 31 May 1981. Shortly thereafter, Colin Gabelman of the NDP made the following observations on debate in the House on the estimates of the Ministry of Environment: “I want to talk about Buttle Lake. I don’t know where to start, so I decided I would start in … September 1966 … Mr. Kiernan, said at that time in the Legislature: ‘I will not tolerate the pollution of Buttle Lake, and if the biologists say the tailings are toxic to fish, there will be no permission given to dispose of the waste in this way …’ The environmentalists of that day and the opposition members in the House of that day said: ‘You’re going to poison the lake.’ The president of Western Mines at that time, Mr. Wright, said: ‘We could dump the tailings in the lake for years and years with no effect on the water.’ If by ‘years and years’ he meant two or maybe three years, he might have been right, but I doubt it. Because after 14 years the fish are dead, and the heavy metal concentration in that lake is beyond acceptable limits.” See Province of British Columbia, 32nd Parliament, 2nd sess., Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 20 February 1980 to 22 August 1981, 3,595.

matically decreased in abundance. Other more tolerant forms [had] … increased in quantity … and species number and diversity [had] … decreased throughout the lake while near the source of tailings effluent cell density was substantially lower.”

The uncontrolled experiment with subaqueous tailings disposal ended ignominiously after the company was charged under the Fisheries Act in 1981. The company was convicted four years later, found guilty of depositing a deleterious substance into water frequented by fish, and admonished by the court for its “casual disregard … tantamount to willful blindness.” By this time, the company had been required to switch to land disposal of tailings. Although this produced new concerns about acid rock drainage, it appeared to improve conditions in Buttle Lake.51

The continued presence of the mine remained an irritant nonetheless. When the New Democratic Party won a majority in the election of 1972, parks were near the top of their agenda. They declared a moratorium on resource extraction in parks and moved quickly to create new, enlarge some existing, and better protect all parks.52 Although they did not restore Strathcona to Class A status, or restrict Western Mines’ existing operations, amendments to the Mineral Act in 1973 required claim holders to seek special authorization from the province to work claims in parks and permitted resource extraction in Class B parks only if it “seem[ed] necessary to the planned recreational use of the park” or was “not detrimental” to its recreational or social values.53

Coupled with significant revisions to the structure of mining taxation,


51 Sierra Legal Defence Fund, *Digging up Trouble: The Legacy of Mining in BC* (Vancouver: Sierra Legal Defence Fund, 1998), 41.


this led Western Mines to lay off workers and threaten closure of its operations. Some saw this as political bluster, even as Western Mines was acquired by the mining multinational Brascan. Overall, however, there is little doubt that the mining lobby played a large role, during this tumultuous period in BC politics, in the 1975 electoral defeat of the NDP.\textsuperscript{54} As Jeremy Wilson and Richard Rajala have pointed out, the NDP interregnum reformed, but failed to decisively transform, forestry and parks regulation at Strathcona, as elsewhere.\textsuperscript{55} The newly elected Social Credit government proceeded, almost immediately, to repeal its predecessor’s amendments to the Mineral Act and the Mineral Royalties Act, although it chose not to rescind the 1973 moratorium on resource extraction in parks.

The Brascan takeover of Western Mines, which became known as Westmin Resources after 1981, provided the capital needed for exploitation of a rich new body of ore discovered in 1979. Presented with an application from the company to expand its operations, Minister of the Environment Stephen Rogers responded positively, but not without some embarrassment, when it became clear that the public hearings he proposed had been pre-empted by the company’s decision to proceed with the sinking of a 750-metre shaft. New offices, hoists, compressors, conveyors, and a 2,700-ton-per-day mill were soon added to the Myra Creek site.

The stakes were raised dramatically in 1987, when Environment Minister Stephen Rogers announced, and orders-in-council subsequently realized, enormous changes to Strathcona Park. In an echo of the original Western Mines debate, following the recommendations of the government-appointed Wilderness Advisory Committee to delete large areas from the park for resource extraction, Rogers claimed, with respect to mining, that the government proceeded with great reluctance but had either to allow “controlled exploration” or “pay unacceptably high compensation fees to the owners of existing tenures.”\textsuperscript{56} In sum, these changes added small parcels to the periphery of the park, removed large areas from its boundaries, restored the Class B and Nature Conservancy areas to their 1964 status as Class A park, and designated an extensive


\textsuperscript{56} Sierra Legal Defence Fund, \textit{Digging up Trouble}, 40. Rogers suggested the company’s rights had been clearly established by the Supreme Court of Canada – although the BC Supreme Court and a subsequent independent legal opinion on the implications of the case to which he referred, concerning claims in Wells Grey Park, indicated otherwise.
tract in the heart of the park the “Strathcona Recreation Area,” in which resource extraction would be allowed (see Figure 5). Accusations flew, Westmin was seen to be a major beneficiary of the changes, and Rogers admitted that he was a shareholder in a family trust with investments in Westmin.\textsuperscript{57} The changes more directly favoured Casamiro Resources and Cream Silver, which held claims in the Drinkwater Valley and Cream Lake areas, respectively, and whose operations became the target for protestors.

The threat of further mining spurred the formation of a group called the Friends of Strathcona Park. With roots (initially un-nurtured) in a 1984 conference on BC parks, at which Jim Boulding, owner-operator of Strathcona Park Lodge (situated just outside the park boundary),

\textsuperscript{57} Although Premier van der Zalm made light of the conflict of interest allegations, Rogers was replaced as environment minister before the orders-in-council were approved.
spoke of the ravages inflicted on the park over the years, the group came together under the leadership of Boulding and Steve and Marlene Smith early in 1986. Finding support among local hikers and environmentalists, building alliances with other conservation groups, and criticizing the work of the province’s Wilderness Advisory Committee, which was heavy with representatives from the resource industries, they built strong community support. In the fall of 1987 their membership, organized in ten local chapters, topped one thousand; within a year it had peaked at three thousand. The “Friends” lost no time in assessing the effects of Social Credit policy changes:

The whole of the Bedwell Valley … [stands] to be logged and mined. Also areas such as Price Creek, Cream Lake, Mount Septimus, Big Interior Mountain, Nine Peaks and even around Della Falls (the highest waterfall in Canada) all come under the industrial shadow. This monstrous act will cut the (OUR) Park in two and ruin this beautiful, popular alpine area for untold generations to come.

The dispute escalated from outrage to activism once exploration and drilling began. Following the recent histories of group protest and civil disobedience in defence of the environment in British Columbia – as evident at Meares Island, South Moresby Island, and Clayoquot Sound – and motivated by memories of the way in which Western Mines had developed from “a little bit of exploration” into a major mine, the Friends of Strathcona Park organized a mid-winter blockade of the road to Cream Lake and, helped by media interest in the Rogers-Westmin story, continued to draw public attention to the threat new mining posed to the park through the early part of 1988. At the end of January 1988, three Friends of Strathcona Park were placed under arrest at Price Creek – reputedly the first persons to be arrested in defence of an existing national or provincial park in Canada.

Increasing media coverage focused on the threat of acid mine drainage and water pollution and the Friends’ alliance with local indigenous people who praised their efforts to protect “our Hereditary environment.” As the protest gained traction, supporters of the alliance made the


59 Quoted in Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 163.

60 This discussion is a précis of material discussed in Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 186-207.
argument that “it is not just about Strathcona Park, it’s about the future of British Columbia.”61 By mid-March, sixty-four protesters had been arrested. Seeking some relief, Rogers’ replacement as minister, Bruce Strachan, appointed the Strathcona Park Advisory Committee, chaired by biologist and former Wilderness Advisory Committee member Peter Larkin, with instructions to review the park boundaries and industrial resource uses within them. In May, an order-in-council prohibited mineral exploration in the park through August 1988.

The Strathcona Park Advisory Committee received 250 written and 145 oral submissions (many of which were by persons who also made written depositions) as well as almost fifty exhibits (documents).62 According to John Dwyer, who analyzed 224 of the written submissions in his MA thesis, five sought information and only seventeen (three by individuals and the remainder from corporate interests or their representatives) favoured further resource extraction in the park. The Friends of Strathcona Park filed a collective statement, and some thirty members of that organization submitted independently.63 Among them, Ruth Masters, who had been hiking in the park since 1938 and who had been prominent in the blockades, argued that Strathcona was probably the most mismanaged park in Canada. “If all the conniving, corruption, lies, land rape, patronage, stealing and vandalizing which make up the sorry history of Strathcona Park were ever documented,” she told the Advisory Committee, “the story would not go into a volume – you’d have a whole library.”64

Submitted in June 1988, the Strathcona Park Advisory Committee’s report was a mere eighty-seven pages, but it conveyed a strong message – encapsulated in the title of this article – and offered some forty-four recommendations it deemed to be “achievable, sound and responsible.”65 When the report was released to the public on 1 September 1988, new environment minister Terry Huberts acknowledged that it was “time to clear up old mistakes made at Strathcona so that the Park … [could] achieve its potential as first perceived so many years ago.” There would be no further mining activity in the park beyond the Westmin site:

62 Larkin et al., Strathcona Park, 1.
63 Dwyer, “Conflicts over Wilderness,” 207–18.
64 Ibid., 210. See also Hazel Lennox, Us Dames Have Come a Long Way – The Story of Ruth Masters as Told by Hazel Lennox (Courtenay, BC: Hazel Lennox, 2008).
65 Larkin et al., Strathcona Park, 88.
“no new tenures will be issued, and no new mineral exploration or logging allowed.” Further, as the Advisory Committee recommended, there would be public discussion before the park’s final boundaries were set by legislation. In June 1989 an order-in-council restored much of the contested Strathcona Recreation Area created in 1987 to Class A park status. In 1990, the government amended the Park Act, establishing Strathcona as a Class A park. At the same time, a thirty-three-square-kilometre Class B park (known as Strathcona-Westmin Provincial Park) was created within the boundaries of the Class A park, and a park-use permit allowed mining within this restricted area. Two additional park-use permits authorized water storage and power generation for the Myra Falls mine in adjoining parts of Strathcona Park.

The incongruity of a major mine in the midst of a wilderness park aside, much had been salvaged. But the battle was not over. The Steering Committee appointed to consider management options for the park mooted whether plans should maximize wilderness in the park; make remote areas more accessible through the development of trails, backcountry facilities, and aircraft landing facilities; or open up the area by constructing a highway linking Buttle Lake with the south via the Drinkwater Valley and the Port Alberni road. Reconciling recreational use with wilderness preservation was no easy task, yet if the “man-made” park boundary had failed to “preserve Strathcona as it was created,” the park’s natural walls, “steep one thousand metre mountainsides,” set a “huge and seldom visited” alpine backcountry apart from the more accessible valleys. The park master plan, released in 1993, predictably sought a compromise by highlighting various recreational opportunities and identifying “suitable locations and acceptable levels of use … for horse riding, hiking, camping and winter recreation activities,” while limiting aircraft, helicopter, and motor boat use and defining acceptable commercial recreation services.

Meanwhile, both Casimiro Resources and Cream Silver pursued claims for compensation for what they considered the unjustified taking

66 “News Release: Strathcona Committee Report Released,” appended to Larkin et al., Strathcona Park. Note that the agreement was specific to Strathcona. The news release included a statement from Minister of Mines Jack Davis: “I’m pleased that the controversy at Strathcona has finally been resolved. It’s clear that the public want Strathcona to be a Class A Park. Elsewhere in the Province I’m committed to the principle of multiple use in Recreation Areas. With proper planning and reclamation there’s no reason why mining and forestry and other resources uses cannot co-exist with recreational interests.”


68 Ibid.
of their mining rights. And in 1997, the Myra Falls mine brought a new underground deposit, Battle Gap, into production, feeding a mill that now processes 1.4 million tons of ore each year. For all that, almost half of the park’s 250,000-hectare area is today set aside in three roadless tracts designated as nature conservancy areas and dedicated to the preservation of the undisturbed natural environment.

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In the summer of 2010, a group of hikers, canoeists, photographers, and adventurers retraced the route from Campbell River followed by Price Ellison and his companions through the centre of Vancouver Island to Port Alberni in 1910, a journey generally regarded as instrumental in the designation of Strathcona as British Columbia’s first provincial park. Initiating an eighteen-month-long celebration of BC Parks, while seeking to raise awareness of and develop a legacy fund for improved stewardship, management, and environmental rehabilitation in Strathcona Park – and heavily sponsored, presumably without irony, by NVI Mining Ltd., Myra Falls Operations (owned by Breakwater Resources, the successor to Westmin) – this expedition announced itself as “ReWriting BC History.”

Much has been written and rewritten on and about Strathcona Park in the last one hundred years, and these stories, imprinted on the landscape as well as in the pages of books, journals, newspapers, and reports, warrant careful analysis and reflection on their meanings. First, perhaps, they chart the ebb and flow of enthusiasm for and commitment to environmental preservation in a frontier society, and they demonstrate that neither frontiers nor (for all that their boundaries accord them special status and encourage conceptions of them as sanctuaries) parks are “islands” free of influence from outside, set apart from larger discourses about nature-society relations, and beyond the fickle winds of political interest or commodity market cycles.

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Conservation, it has been said many times, is a full-stomach phenomenon, but this aphorism, suggesting that people protect environments when their material needs are well met, identifies a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for environmental action, and it downplays historical contingencies shaped by aspirations, opportunities, and politics. In the years before the First World War, to be sure, as the rush for British Columbia’s resource spoils proceeded apace and the provincial economy boomed, the designation of Strathcona as a provincial park was both feasible and congruent with prevailing ideas about setting aside remote and spectacular areas for revenue as well as rejuvenation.\textsuperscript{71} Narrower resource development agendas gained the upper hand at various times, but hydro-development aside, they were not much flexed in Strathcona (due to low ore grades and poor commodity prices) until the late 1950s. However, the rising prosperity of the postwar economic boom was built on industrial expansion, especially the exploitation of forest and mineral resources, and there was little ideological or, initially, popular support for efforts to throttle back the engines of economic progress on account of the environmental damage they produced.

Still, the embrace of new managerial ideas gave new purchase to older notions of conservation as efficient use in post-Second World War British Columbia. As the maximum sustainable yield concept was applied to the harvesting of fisheries and forests, many believed that science had provided the means to realize what nineteenth-century conservationist George Perkins Marsh had called “mankind’s mission … to subdue and domesticate nature.”\textsuperscript{72} Hard as they campaigned against raising Buttle Lake in the 1950s and 1960s, those in the vanguard of this protest neither questioned the ultimate need for resource development nor opposed industrial activity in parks tout court. Their purpose was not to undermine growth or challenge progress but, rather, to argue that recreation, particularly angling, represented a better, higher use for the particular piece of water that was Buttle Lake than did hydroelectric power generation. Conservation, wrote Haig-Brown, was “a dynamic not a static conception.” Its point was not to hang on to things, “like

\textsuperscript{71} This distinction was framed in various ways (e.g., secular and sacred, commercial and humanitarian) by the first commissioner of Canada’s National Parks, J.B. Harkin. See Alan MacEachern, \textit{Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-1970} (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 30-32; and Graeme Wynn, “That Fatal Breath of ‘Improvement,’” foreword to Keri Cronin’s \textit{Manufacturing National Park Nature} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), xi-xxii.

a miser to his gold,” but to put them to use “seeking a valuable return from them and at the same time ensuring future yields of at least equal value.” Resource development could be “shoddy and uncaring” (as in the Lower Campbell Lake episode), and it might be in the wrong place (as with the Buttle Lake proposal – for let there be no mistake, Haig-Brown and his associates regarded the infringement of park boundaries by resource developers as antithetical to the very conservation and planning principles supposedly guiding resource development), but these were problems of implementation rather than inevitable and damning corollaries of exploitation per se.

Faith in technology, upon which the high modernist ethos of the 1950s and 1960s rested, was gradually undermined by scepticism about expert knowledge and the power of those who claimed it, a scepticism that grew (at least in part) from the publication of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* in 1962. Carson’s powerful argument about the bioaccumulation of chemical pesticides and the interconnectedness of nature heightened public awareness of the perils of pollution and provided an important foundation for the emergence of a new environmental movement concerned, as Samuel P. Hays summarized it, with questions of beauty, health, and permanence. Even arch-conservationist Haig-Brown, confronted with the onslaught of industrial resource exploitation inside and outside Strathcona Park, found himself driven towards more radical expressions of ecological values and an embrace, however tentative, of the nascent environmental activist movements stirring in late-1960s British Columbia. More recently, the birth of the Tin Wis Coalition out of the civil disobedience actions of First Nations and the Friends of Strathcona Park completed the arc of environmental attitudes traced in the history of park policies and debates.

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75 Keeling, “Dynamic.”

The rising tide of ecological values overspilled the technocentric assurances provided by miners and regulators about their ability to contain the environmental impact of a mine in the park. Western Mines’ plan to dispose of mine tailings in Buttle Lake was predicated on the conviction that the assimilative capacities of air and water were a kind of resource and that there should be no restriction on its use unless it affected “downstream” uses of the environment – thus the protracted debate about the toxicity, or otherwise, of tailings in the lake. Since its establishment in 1956, the provincial Pollution Control Board had sought to keep effluent discharges beneath the deemed assimilative capacity of provincial water bodies, but it operated without water-quality standards and undertook almost no monitoring or enforcement. Its review of the Buttle Lake tailings application was cursory, its approval never in doubt. But fears of environmental collapse quickly came to dominate the environmental discourse of the late 1960s. With pollution suddenly among the foremost concerns of North Americans, the potentially detrimental health effects of heavy metals and other chemicals in mine tailings led to what may have been the province’s first modern environmental protest march and made the Western Mines-Buttle Lake controversy a highly visible opening skirmish in what would become a pitched battle between the government and environmentalists over industrial pollution in British Columbia.

At the same time, the presence of a polluting mine within a park came to exemplify modern industrial society’s greed and disregard for nature. Much public support for the “second-wave” of postwar environmentalism turned on the growing conviction that such sights/sites were endangered.77 From this it followed that those who valued the beauty of nature needed to act to protect it from the ravages being wrought by economic growth. Against this backdrop, continuing assaults on the environment of Strathcona seemed a particular affront. If parks, recognized and defined for their splendour, were vulnerable to despoliation, what value remained in the symbolism of wildness and purity associated with those places? So the campaign by the Friends of Strathcona Park served as a touchstone of what was important, just as the recommendations of the Strathcona Park Advisory Committee demonstrated what was possible, in defence of nature.

Second, inscriptions on and about Strathcona offer powerful reminders that, although parks as purposefully defined, bounded containers of nature often magnify larger struggles over social uses and perceptions of the environment, physical expressions of cultural ideas about the environment and the effects of human activity within it change over time. Moreover, although their imprints on the landscape are often enduring, they are rarely immutable. Put more simply, scars heal, more or less quickly, and measures of the disfigurement they cause vary with the scale and angle of view. Today’s park advocates might look askance at Reginald Thomson’s ambitious plans for manipulation of the park environment to benefit recreationalists, and perhaps despair at the environmental vandalism perpetrated by Western Mines, even as they lose heart over the fact that the company was permitted to get away with it. But both episodes reflected prevailing attitudes, among park planners in the first instance and among miners, entrepreneurs, politicians, and many citizens in the second, and their consequences warrant brief assessment.

Among the legacies of Thomson’s efforts are unknown numbers of trees (ash, willow, chestnut) and the broom and ivy evident along the main road entering the park, their histories of introduction into the Buttle Lake corridor largely forgotten and their status as exotics mostly overlooked. Western Mines’ legacy is more mixed. The road along Buttle Lake carries tourists into the heart of the park, even as it conveys copper and zinc concentrate towards Campbell River. The extent and effects of pollution in the Campbell River system remain uncertain. The mine, with its 240 kilometres of drifts, shafts, and stopes underground, has a significant footprint on approximately two square kilometres of the surface. Nevertheless, current operations crush the ore below ground; use half the material that settles out in the tailings pond (along with waste rock left at the surface by earlier mining) to back-fill mined-out workings; and run water from the mine, mill, and tailings pond through half a dozen settling or polishing ponds to clean it before re-use or release. By its own account, the company’s reclamation plan for its Myra Falls site “is to return the land to its natural state, and re-designate the [area] as Class A park.” Nvi claims to have spent $2 million working towards this goal, to have set aside another $10 million for future work, and to have anticipated total expenditures of over $21.1 million for full reclamation.78

Finally, reflection on the chequered past of Strathcona Park drives home the important lesson that historical perspective is both informative and empowering. As this article demonstrates, the story of British Columbia’s first, and now much-celebrated, provincial park is far from straightforward. Once considered “only of value to the sportsman, the artist and the mountaineer” this “veritable wonderland of mountain peaks and glaciers, tumultuous waterfalls, gem-like lakes and sombre forests” was “set apart as a public park and pleasure ground for the benefit, advantage, and enjoyment of the people of British Columbia,” only, as Ruth Masters observed, for “large tracts of the parkland … [to be] logged, mined, burned, dammed, flooded, drilled, bulldozed, paved, poisoned – and stolen.” Yet, pronounced “a mess” in 1988, it is once again advertised as “a beautiful mountain wilderness.”

To ignore this contested past, to assume that things were ever thus, is not only to disregard the successes and failures, the hopes and disappointments of those who preceded us, but also to rob the landscape of its embedded meaning by ignoring the long engagement of humans with this place and failing to appreciate its hybrid qualities. Against this backdrop it is well to recall the warning sounded by Philip Stone, leader of the Strathcona Centennial Expedition:

Strathcona is still not immune to the whims of political office and recent cutbacks in the Park’s Department [do] not bode well for a smooth ride ahead. Those who love and cherish Strathcona Park should remain vigilant to ensure that it remains part of our children’s heritage.

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