LESSONS LEARNED:
Settler Colonialism, Development, and the UN Regional Training Centre in Vancouver, 1959–62

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In the spring of 1959, the UN press service and Canada's Department of External Affairs (DEA) announced that the "rivers, forests, cities and industries of western Canada and northwestern United States [would] serve as a laboratory in economic and social development for a new-type training center."[1] The Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows at the University of British Columbia would "enable trainees from underdeveloped countries to study and observe activities in fields such as hydroelectric power, water development, mining, forestry, land management, cooperatives, credit unions, social welfare, and public administration."[2] Press reports explained that the "unique international venture," involving the UN, the Canadian government, and UBC would be located in the Pacific Northwest because "in the past 50 years this area has experienced a most remarkable expansion of population and of economic development."[3] Infused with the postwar optimism associated

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1 United Nations Press Services, Office of Public Information, United Nations, NY, press release OPA/2 TA/756, 3 April 1959, "Training Centre for UN Fellows in Economic and Development to Be Set Up at University of British Columbia" (hereafter "Training Centre for UN Fellows"), University of British Columbia Archives (hereafter UBCA)/Cyril Belshaw Fonds (hereafter CB)/Academic and Non-Governmental Organization Series (hereafter ANGO)/box 2, United Nations Regional Training Centre Sub-Series (2)/5, Vancouver Centre, Publicity (5).

2 Press release, DEA, 3 April 1959, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG25/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1.

3 "UN Students Get Vast Lab," *Windsor Daily Star*, 4 April 1959, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

with Canada's economic progress, British Columbia's resource boom, and international development, the announcement simultaneously highlighted and obscured a history and ongoing reality of settler colonialism and, more broadly, the extent to which Canadian participation in development assistance rested upon a foundation of Indigenous dispossession.

This article explores how settler colonialism intersected with the UN's training centre at UBC, which is built on the territory of the Musqueam people. It uncovers what the Centre's origins and activities say about understandings of development after 1945, especially the Canadian dimension of this global history. Specifically, it interrogates development's pedagogical dimension. Situating "technical assistance" and efforts to identify best practices into the literature on imperialism and settler colonialism, it highlights how, notwithstanding progressive motivations, Canadian academic involvement in development efforts rested upon and reified settler colonialism at home and abroad.[4]

What follows is a response to calls to pay "closer attention to movements, institutions, and categories 'perceived as episodic, abortive, or untimely.'"[5] Notwithstanding its ill-fated and short-run nature, the UN's Vancouver Centre is revelatory of the thinking and dynamics of the period; moreover, such studies are necessary, even inevitable, given that so many development projects were episodic, scattershot, and ephemeral.[6]

Patrick Wolfe's description of settler colonialism as "a structure rather than an event" underscores its ongoing nature, the ways it is "hidden in plain sight by government policies, media representations, education systems, and individually held common-sense ideas," and its need for a narrative that can "supersede (and hide) the relationship of domination."[7]

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4 Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Adam J. Barker, "The Contemporary Reality of Canadian Imperialism: Settler Colonialism and the Hybrid Colonial State," *American Indian Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (2009): 325–51.

5 Philipp Nicolas Lehmann, "Infinite Power to Change the World: Hydroelectricity and Engineered Climate Change in the Atlantropa Project," *American Historical Review* 121, no. 1 (2016): 75, citing Manu Goswami, "Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 5 (2012): 1461–85. See also Jonathan Peyton, *Unbuilt Environments: Tracing Postwar Development in Northwest British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 6, which highlights how *imaginings* of the Pacific Northwest as a space were a crucial prerequisite to the UN Centre.

6 For example, Jacob Shively, "'Good Deeds Aren't Enough': Point Four in Iran, 1949–1953," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 29, no. 3 (2018): 413–31; Nicole Sackley, "Village Models: Etawah, India, and the Making and Remaking of Development in the Early Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 4 (2013): 749–78. For a Canadian example, see Shannon Stunden Bower, "Irrigation Infrastructure, Technocratic Faith, and Tunnel Vision: Canada's Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration in Ghana, 1965–1970," *Agricultural History* 93, no. 2 (2019): 311–40.

7 Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409; Lisa Cooke, "'North' in Contemporary Canadian National-Cultural Imaginaries: A Haunted Phantasm," *Settler Colonial Studies* 6, no. 3 (2016): 236–38.

The creation and continuity of a settler-based economy in the Pacific Northwest depended upon perpetuating and naturalizing the violence and Indigenous dispossession intrinsic to settler colonialism.[8] As such, the region's economic transformation is a powerful example of how mid-twentieth-century normative ideas about capitalist progress were grounded in a larger history of empire. Jen Preston has observed how settler colonialism "colludes with capital … to secure access to land and resources while strategically managing 'the Indian problem.'"[9] This includes the resource extraction preceding, accompanying, and existing *in service to* settler societies, not least in helping obtain "de facto and de jure control of Indigenous lands by creating the necessary legal and institutional architecture … and asserting the legal and political jurisdiction of the … settler-colonial state."[10] Glen Coulthard places Marx's writings on primitive accumulation in dialogue with the history of settler colonialism and Indigenous critical theory to interrogate the "structured dispossession" accompanying the settler order.[11] Yet the resources extracted in the Pacific Northwest were not just material: its "remarkable … economic development" had yielded what the Centre's boosters touted as invaluable lessons – and extracting and propagating such knowledge contributed to Indigenous erasure.

This last point leads back to the history of international development and the need to draw upon works interrogating the divide between the "domestic" and "foreign" spheres of this transnational phenomenon, and which highlight development's imperial origins and emphasize settler

See also Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–40. See especially their discussion of settlers' "moves to innocence."

8 Phil Henderson, "Imagined Communities: The Psychosocial Space of Settler Colonialism," *Settler Colonial Studies* 7, no. 1 (2017): 41–42.

9 Jen Preston, "Neoliberal Settler Colonialism, Canada and the Tar Sands," *Race and Class* 55, no. 2 (2013): 49.

10 Martin Crook, Damien Short, and Nigel South, "Ecocide, Genocide, Capitalism and Colonialism: Consequences for Indigenous Peoples and Global Ecosystems Environments," *Theoretical Criminology* 22, no. 3 (2018): 309. Contemporaneous to the events under study, the Diefenbaker government's "Road to Resources" project celebrated resource extraction in the Arctic – Canada's "new frontier" – as the keystone of a new "national policy of national development." See Cooke, "'North' in Contemporary Canadian National-Cultural Imaginaries," 241; Jonathan Peyton and Arn Keeling, "Extractivism and Canada 150," *Historical Geography* 45, no. 1 (2017): 117–24. Allan Greer's effort to relativize settler colonialism's historical importance by distinguishing between it and the "imperial/commercial penetration" and "extractivist" versions of colonialism is useful in its warning against teleological narratives; however, his heuristic approach leads him to overstate the discreteness of settler colonialism and extractivism. See Allan Greer, "Settler Colonialism and Beyond," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 30, no. 1 (2019): 61–86.

11 Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 7–15.

colonialism's centrality to "European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance."[12] The extensive historiography of development assistance has, among other elements, emphasized education's centrality not just to specific initiatives but also to how "development" was predicated on knowledge generated by centuries of imperial encounter and grounded in notions of scientific observation.[13] Although less copious, the literature on Canadian foreign aid has similarly engaged with pedagogy and knowledge production. David Webster has written of the "modern missionaries," including prominent academics, who proselytized "progress and modernity" while participating in technical assistance.[14] Education also casts a long shadow over the history of settler colonialism in Canada, most infamously in the Indian residential school system but also in the production and transmission of knowledge reinforcing settler control of the land while erasing the Indigenous presence.[15] Conversely, numerous scholars have

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12 Scott Lauria Morgensen, "The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now," *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 1 (2011): 53. For an interrogation of the domestic/international divide, see Amy Offner, *Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019). For a discussion of how imperial encounters shaped development, see Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For a discussion of settler colonialism and the global order, see Bruno Cornellier and Michael R. Griffiths, "Globalizing Unsettlement: An Introduction," *Settler Colonial Studies* 6, no. 4 (2016): 305–16.

13 Constantin Katsakioris, "Creating a Socialist Intelligentsia: Soviet Educational Aid and Its Impact on Africa, 1960–1991," *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 226 (2017): 259–88; Madelaine Healey, "'Seeds That May Have Been Planted May Take Root': International Aid Nurses and Projects of Professionalism in Postindependence India, 1947–65," *Nursing History Review* 16 (2008): 58–90; Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997). For a historiographical survey, see Joseph Morgan Hodge, "Writing the History of Development (Part 1: The First Wave)," *Humanity* 6, no. 3 (2016): 429–63; and Joseph Morgan Hodge, "Writing the History of Development (Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider)," *Humanity* 7, no. 1 (2016): 125–74.

14 David Webster, "Modern Missionaries: Canadian Postwar Technical Assistance Advisors in Southeast Asia," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 20, 2 (2009): 88. See also, Ruth Compton Brouwer, *Canada's Global Villagers: CUSO in Development, 1961–86* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); Robin S. Gendron, "Canada's University: Father Lévesque, Canadian Aid, and the National University of Rwanda," *Historical Studies* 73 (2007): 63–86.

15 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, *Canada's Residential Schools: The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015); Liz Newbery, "Canoe Pedagogy and Colonial History: Exploring Contested Spaces of Outdoor Environmental Education," *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 17 (2012): 30–45. See also Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).

highlighted the revival and revalorization of Indigenous knowledge as a vehicle of resistance and resurgence.[16]

By viewing the UN Centre at UBC through such lenses, we can better appreciate its role in mid-twentieth-century efforts to expand and reinforce the liberal capitalist international order. Moreover, this account of ambitions to uncover, elaborate, and transmit development's lessons highlights transnational links between postwar development and empire, notably the generation of knowledge regarding the development of "backward peoples."[17] This includes a Canadian contribution interwoven with Indigenous-settler encounters. As those associated with the Centre elided the Indigenous displacement and dispossession foundational to it, they reified the settler order, not least because the objective was to export and reproduce abroad examples obtained in the Pacific Northwest, thereby producing a narrative naturalizing and legitimizing this colonial space while furthering the "elimination of the native." Ultimately, this story offers an opportunity to explore "the legacies of elimination and dispossession that characterize particular nation-states in their geopolitical reality" and highlight how "settler colonialism is one crucial and constitutive phenomenon undergirding the international order and that of global economics and geopolitics."[18] After discussing the longer-term and immediate contexts that produced the UN centre, analysis shifts to its activities and the actors involved with it. I then recount the Centre's demise before concluding with a reflection on what its rise and fall tells us about the entangled histories of settler colonialism and international development.

TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: EMPIRE AND ITS AFTERLIFE

Claims to knowledge, education, and pedagogy lay at the heart of modern imperialism, with the cultural and scholarly construction of the racialized other a vital precondition to, result of, and justification

[16] Jodi Beniuk, "All My Relations: Reclaiming the Stories of Our Indigenous Grandmothers," *Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture and Social Justice* 37, no. 2 (2016): 161–72; Allan Downey, *The Creator's Game: Lacrosse, Identity, and Indigenous Nationhood* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018); Leanne Simpson, *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back: Stories of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence and a New Emergence* (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 2011).

[17] Draft memorandum to Cabinet [n.d., circa Spring 1950], Canadian contribution to the United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance to the Under-Developed Countries, LAC/6438/5475-DU-1-40/2.

[18] Cornellier and Griffiths, "Globalizing Unsettlement," 307–8.

for European imperialism.[19] Colonial encounters generated a wealth of intellectual production as European thinkers catalogued and presumed to explain differences between populations and societies.[20] By the late nineteenth century, the "science" of colonization provided scholarly cover for imperialism as a gamut of associations, groups, expert missions, publications, and international meetings fostered the transnational circulation of knowledge. The dynamic endured into the interwar period with the rise of colonial humanism, emphasizing the importance of "economic development, native welfare, and the management of indigenous populations."[21] By the 1940s, British and French imperial authorities were embracing development in a bid to legitimize and "reinvigorate colonialism" and, subsequently, as a way to "[convince] themselves that they could give up colonies" by imagining enduring ties and influence in a post-colonization era.[22]

These global trends were abetted by and spurred the emergence of the social sciences and efforts to study human societies to facilitate state intervention in service to idealized organizational norms. Particularly significant in this regard was the emergence of anthropology, with governments increasingly drawing upon such expertise to maximize the efficiency of colonial administration, including the restructuring of Indian policies in North America.[23] Development's rise as a global force, a rapidly evolving colonial context, and the Cold War gave further impetus to collaboration between government and social scientists in North America's rapidly expanding universities to discover "rules for the introduction of capitalist modernity as a general phenomenon."[24]

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[19] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Himadeep Muppidi, *The Colonial Signs of International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 22–23.

[20] McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*; Jane Samson, *Race and Empire* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 26–31.

[21] Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 61–63; Pierre Singaravélou, "Les stratégies d'internationalisation de la question coloniale et la construction transnationale d'une science de la colonisation à la fin du XIXe siècle," *Monde(s)* 1, no. 1 (2012): 151–53; Timothy Livsey, "Imagining an Imperial Modernity: Universities and the West African Roots of Colonial Development," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 44, no. 6 (2016): 952–75.

[22] Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept," in Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, 64.

[23] Nicole Sackley, "Cosmopolitanism and the Uses of Tradition: Robert Redfield and Alternative Visions of Modernization during the Cold War," *Modern Intellectual History* 9, no. 3 (2012): 565–95; Henrika Kuklick, "Introduction," in *A New History of Anthropology*, ed. Henrika Kuklick (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 4; Regna Darnell, "North American Traditions in Anthropology: The Historiographic Baseline," in *A New History of Anthropology*, ed. Henrika Kuklick (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 35–51.

[24] Christopher Simpson, "Universities, Empire, and the Production of Knowledge: An Introduction," in *Universities and Empire, Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War*,

Canada was awash in anthropology's intellectual currents: after all, the imperialism upon which the country is built had contributed to the discipline's emergence, from the proto-ethnographic writings of Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan and Joseph-François Lafitau in New France to those James Cook produced during his voyage to the Pacific Northwest.[25] The country's earliest anthropologists studied Indigenous peoples in order to understand "the evolution of civilization and its impact."[26] Consistent with the gendering of expertise as male that would mark the UN Centre at UBC, the work of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, Marius Barbeau, and Diamond Jenness focused on Indigenous peoples – notably in British Columbia – as objects of anthropological study, consistent with the fact that "of all the social sciences, anthropology [historically] devoted by far the greatest attention to native people in Canada."[27] The period after 1945 saw growing, albeit hesitant, links between the Canadian state and anthropologists as the former looked for guidance in reforming its Indian policy.[28]

Given this history, it is not surprising that education – defined broadly – loomed large after 1945 as "developed" countries imagined a pedagogical relationship with the Third World. Europe's imperial powers, their settler counterparts, and the UN system were summoned to provide decolonizing and semi-colonized peoples "technical assistance" consisting of experts and training. Despite the active involvement of actors and governments in the "underdeveloped world" who were able to "engage with, appropriate, and turn back" developmental logics, such assistance was the

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ed. Christopher Simpson (New York: The New Press, 1998), xvii. See also James Ferguson, "Anthropology and Its Evil Twin, 'Development' in the Constitution of a Discipline," in Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, 150–75.

25 Harry Liebersohn, "Anthropology before Anthropology," in *A New History of Anthropology*, ed. Henrika Kuklick (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 25–26.

26 "Introduction," in *The History of Canadian Anthropology*, ed. M.M. Ames and J. Freedman (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1976), 4.

27 Sally M. Weaver, "The Role of Social Science in Formulating Canadian Indian Policy: A Preliminary History of the Hawthorn-Tremblay Report," in *The History of Canadian Anthropology*, ed. M.M. Ames and J. Freedman (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1976), 53. See also Andrew Nurse, "Marius Barbeau and the Methodology of Salvage Ethnography in Canada, 1911–51," in *Historicizing Canadian Anthropology*, ed. Julia D. Harrison and Regna Darnell (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 52–64; Colin Buchanan, "Canadian Anthropology and Ideas of Aboriginal Emendation," in *Historicizing Canadian Anthropology*, ed. Julia D. Harrison and Regna Darnell (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 93–106; Peter Kulchyski, "Anthropology in the Service of the State: Diamond Jenness and Canadian Indian Policy," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 28, 2 (1993): 21–50.

28 Byron King Plant, "'A Relationship and Interchange of Experience': H.B. Hawthorn, Indian Affairs, and the 1955 BC Indian Research Project," *BC Studies* 163 (2009): 5–31; Hugh Shewell, "'What Makes the Indian Tick?' The Influence of Social Sciences on Canada's Indian Policy, 1947–1964," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 34, no. 67 (2001): 133–67.

latest iteration of colonial development.[29] Consistent with imperialism's long history, efforts to train experts for overseas service, and Western aid in general, were marked by an epistemological drive to study "backward" and "underdeveloped" peoples with a view to maximizing aid efficiency. Universities loomed large in such efforts, reflected in the creation of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1951 and Cornell University's promoting for use in overseas technical assistance the anthropological knowledge that its field seminar extracted from Indigenous communities in the American Southwest.[30] Those earmarked for development were perceived as receptacles (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) for Western knowledge. Their pedagogical value arose not from the lessons they could actively impart as subjects but, rather, from their existence, the study of which would generate the knowledge required to act upon them (and others) as objects.

Early Canadian aid efforts reflected the priority accorded to education and training. Canada hosted a series of technical assistance missions through the Colombo Plan – the Commonwealth development assistance initiative to provide an infusion of capital and technical know-how to post-independence South and Southeast Asia. According to Canada's high commission in Karachi, such missions provided "an eye-opener for the more sceptical Asians … and [would] start them thinking along Western lines."[31] Canadian participation in UN and Commonwealth technical assistance also involved offering scholarships in a number of domains; indeed, rather than sending experts abroad, Ottawa's fledging aid establishment quickly came to prefer training individuals in Canada, with the country's universities and technical training schools seen as invaluable training centres where fellowship recipients could obtain an

[29] Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats," 84. See also Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940–70* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[30] J.H. Thurrott to A.E. Ritchie, 22 July 1952, Meeting on Technical Assistance to Under-Developed Areas at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meetings in Quebec, June 1952, LAC/6441/5475-DU-4-40/1; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 173; Jacob Tropp, "Transnational Development Training and Native American 'Laboratories' in the Early Cold War," *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018): 469–90; Ferguson, "Anthropology and Its Evil Twin," 158–61.

[31] Memorandum [by Geoffrey Murray] on policy session of the Council for Technical Co-operation, 4–9 April 1952, LAC/8371/10873-C-1-30/2.1.

understanding and appreciation of Canada's socio-economic development that they could take back home.[32]

A corollary to Canadian aid's educative dimension was recognition of the need to learn from initiatives, and the country's universities jumped at the opportunity. This was apparent as McGill University hosted a seminar in 1954 to "find some principles and methods of [evaluating technical assistance projects] which could be generally applied." Convened by the UN's Technical Assistance Administration (TAA), the event drew Canadian and UN officials as well as academics from McGill, Columbia University, and MIT.[33] McGill's involvement was not the first attempt to position that university in development's pedagogical currents: two years prior, there had been discussion about establishing a centre at the university to study aid efforts and to train visitors from "underdeveloped areas." Maxwell Cohen, a member of the law faculty who had served as special advisor to the TAA's director general, former Canadian diplomat Hugh Keenleyside, argued that it was "abundantly clear there [was] room for an appraisal of what ha[d] been done" and to formulate "possible theories and principles of economic development." Vaunting McGill's location, Cohen alluded to "the acceptance internationally of the results of research" generated "in a country that has never borne colonial responsibilities." Elaborating on the proposal, Cohen's colleague Benjamin Higgins, chief economist for a UN technical assistance mission in Libya, similarly claimed that Canada had never had "ambitions that could possibly be called 'imperialistic'"; indeed, there was a "complete absence of colonial responsibilities from Canadian history."[34] Such expressions of exceptionalism erased the settler colonial reality in Canada.

Notwithstanding aid-related opportunities for collaboration between Ottawa and Canadian universities, they remained rival locations of knowledge production, and doubts in Ottawa about the McGill initiative sealed its fate and anticipated attitudes that would bedevil the Vancouver Centre. A.E. Ritchie, the senior DEA official heading up

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32 J.H. Cleveland, memorandum, 1 September 1949, Canadian Policy Regarding the United Nations Program of Technical Assistance in Economic Development, LAC/6215/5475-DU-1-40; Lester Pearson to George Langford, 19 March 1951, LAC/6441/5475-DU-4-40/1; Draft, n.d., Appraisal of Facilities Available in Canada for Technical Assistance in the Economic Development of South and South East Asia, LAC/6574/11038-40/2.

33 Seminar on evaluation of United Nations technical assistance, McGill University, 11–12 March 1954, McGill University Archives, F.R. Scott Fonds, 29, Technical Assistance, General UN, 1953–54.

34 Maxwell Cohen to Paul G. Hoffman, Ford Foundation, 12 January 1952, LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1; Draft, Proposed Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Development of Under-Developed Areas, n.d., LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1.

the interdepartmental group on technical assistance overseeing Canada's aid, blanched at Cohen and Higgins's proposal, describing it as "rather ambitious and very wooly."[35] The response was equally underwhelming in the department's Information Division, which was responsible for links with educational institutions. There was skepticism about the proposed training at McGill, the view being that "students must be free to attend any one of a range of universities, their place of study being chosen according to the technical knowledge they desire."[36] In the Department of Trade and Commerce, there was concern to maintain a certain control over development-related research. Although generally sympathetic to the proposal, Nik Cavell, head of the unit overseeing Canada's Colombo Plan participation, pointed out that "a considerable amount of research along the lines suggested ha[d] already been done."[37]

Although Ottawa decided not to endorse the McGill initiative, officials nonetheless wanted to learn from development and to maximize efficacy. Chester Ronning, the DEA's foremost expert on East Asia, was convinced that: "we cannot make the most effective use of Colombo Plan funds until we relate our expenditures to the needs of the people of the under-developed areas as determined by research."[38] Canada's high commissioner to India, Escott Reid, bemoaned: "we do not even know what results do flow from the technical assistance we have given to India since no proper procedure for evaluating these results has been evolved."[39] Cavell, despite his earlier reticence about the McGill proposal, admitted: "those of us who work in this aid field … are by no means sure that [this] is the best that can be done." He continued: "much education is still necessary, both in the recipient and donor countries before anyone can say that a real efficiency has been achieved."[40] Meanwhile at the UN, Canada called for expanded links between "suitable academic institutions and bilateral programmes of technical assistance."[41]

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[35] Ritchie to Under-Secretary, 21 November 1952, LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1.

[36] B. Keith to Economic Division, 25 July 1952, LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1.

[37] Nik Cavell to Ritchie, 23 July 1952, LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1.

[38] Chester Ronning to Escott Reid, 22 May 1952, LAC/8408/11038-AB-9-40/1.

[39] Reid to SSEA, 4 April 1955, LAC/8372/10873-C-1-40/3.

[40] Nik Cavell, "Economic Aid and Technical Assistance as an Instrument of Western Policy," speech delivered at the National Defence College, Kingston, Ontario, 12 June 1957, LAC/7337/11038-40/22.1.

[41] Memorandum, n.d., United Nations Regional Training Centre, Vancouver, Canada, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9, Vancouver Centre, Policy (1) [9].

THE VANCOUVER CENTRE: ORIGINS

Such calls found a receptive audience in the TAA, notably in Hugh Keenleyside. Born in Toronto, as an infant Keenleyside moved to Vancouver with his family and participated in British Columbia's "resettlement."[42] Recounting his formative years in a way that all but ignored the region's Indigenous peoples, Keenleyside recalled the "dreams of enormous rapid growth of population sustained by industrial development, expanding trade, increasing national influence, and the multiplication of international contacts." Pursuing his undergraduate studies at UBC, he returned there in 1925 to teach a course tracing "the economic and social development of the Western world." A member of Canada's nascent foreign service, Keenleyside was appointed deputy minister of mines and resources in 1947 and given the chance to shape "resource development, community welfare, and individual lives" as the head of the department housing the Indian Affairs Branch.[43] Reflecting the era's developmentalist ethos, he was convinced Indigenous peoples suffered "the psychological effect of contacts with … mechanized civilization for which … the educational facilities provided by the white man offer[ed] little hope of rapid adaptation" and that, amid a resource-driven economic boom, Ottawa should help "native peoples … make the inevitable changes."[44]

The UN soon beckoned with an invitation to lead a technical assistance mission to Bolivia, and Keenleyside selected as its mining specialist Gilbert Monture, head of the Department of Mines and Resources' mineral resources division. Ottawa officialdom viewed Monture, Kanien'kehá:ka from Six Nations of the Grand River, as a living validation of the country's Indian policy, proof of Canada's socio-economic progress, and evidence of development's ascending logic.[45] Time in Bolivia persuaded Keenleyside of the centrality of expert knowledge and public administration to development assistance and led to his nomination as TAA director general. Leaving the UN in 1959, he would take up the position of chair of British Columbia's power commission, overseeing major hydroelectric projects and advising the government of W.A.C. Bennett on resource development.[46]

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[42] R. Cole Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).

[43] Hugh L. Keenleyside, *On the Bridge of Time: Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 40, 201, 270.

[44] Ibid., 307, 310.

[45] David Webster, "Canadians and the 'First Wave' of United Nations Technical Assistance," in *Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects*, ed. Colin McCullough and Robert Teigrob (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 94.

[46] Keenleyside, *On the Bridge of Time*, 396, 462.

Already anticipating his retirement from the UN, and with a well-honed eye towards his legacy, Keenleyside began advocating in late 1956 for a technical assistance training centre at UBC that bore a striking resemblance to what his former advisor, Cohen, had proposed for McGill. He envisaged the centre training fellows of the UN and Colombo Plan technical assistance programs. Although "primarily concerned with public administration at all levels … it would also receive and provide for [those] in economic development and social welfare" as well as recruit experts for overseas service. Its sphere of activity would encompass a vast region from San Francisco to Alaska and from the Pacific Coast eastward to Saskatchewan, Montana, and Idaho.[47] The Centre would initially receive two to four dozen fellows; if successful, this would be increased, and placing fellows in Vancouver would become "a continuing feature" of UN programs, perhaps even a template for "the development of similar facilities in other parts of the world."[48]

Keenleyside enthused to UBC's president, N.A.M. MacKenzie, that his proposal had "been received with very real approval" in Ottawa and that there was "no doubt" the Canadian government would cooperate.[49] He was embellishing: officials doubted the Centre was needed, especially given the number of TAA fellows Canada received annually and the unlikelihood Ottawa would use it for Colombo Plan trainees.[50] Skepticism about need informed a belief the Centre's potential benefits did not warrant its cost. The view in trade and commerce was that it would not facilitate "substantially better training than [what was] being arranged through existing facilities"; worse, the "very few experts in Canada to be recruited" meant its recruiting efforts could drive up salaries.[51]

Such criticisms pointed to a concern in Ottawa to maintain control of the hosting of fellows visiting under technical assistance auspices and, especially as Keenleyside's proposal evolved, retaining oversight of expert

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[47] Draft plan for a combined technical assistance training centre to be developed by the United Nations, the Colombo Plan (Canada), and the University of British Columbia, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[48] Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance with Dr. Hugh Keenleyside and Mr. F.J. Tickner, 8 March 1957, LAC/6565/10873-C-40/3.2. By comparison, the United States hosted annually 250 trainees. See also Keenleyside to Garcia [draft letter, n.d.], UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

[49] H.L. Keenleyside to N.A.M. MacKenzie, 28 December 1956, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[50] Copy, Department of Trade and Commerce, inter-office correspondence, D.W. Bartlett to R.W. Rosenthal, n.d., LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Copy, Department of Trade and Commerce, inter-office correspondence, J.T. Hobart to Bartlett, n.d., LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[51] Rosenthal to L.E. Couillard, 6 February 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; John W. Holmes to Keenleyside, 12 August 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Holmes to Rodney Grey, memorandum, 23 August 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

recruitment.[52] Finlay Sim of trade and commerce worried the Centre would duplicate services offered by the department's Technical Cooperation Service.[53] His colleague, Dave Bartlett, preferred "strengthening our Ottawa office rather than … setting up branches in other parts of the country." Paralleling this penchant for centralized control was a preference for decentralized activities: Bartlett was reluctant to see Ottawa put all its eggs in the UBC basket since prospective trainees could "now be sent to any Canadian university where their specific needs [could] best be met." If a UN training centre were to be created, officials preferred it be in central Canada, given that "the tremendous investment in Central Canada – and the concomitant problems – outstrip[ped] anything elsewhere in the country in scale, in variety, and in complexity." Dismissing Keenleyside's boosterism for Vancouver, Bartlett opined: "[there] are not and never will be as good research resources on the West Coast as in the older parts of the country."[54]

Seeking to allay bureaucratic concerns, Keenleyside offered assurances the UN "had no desire whatever to compete" with Canada's aid bureaucracy and explained that, because the UN set experts' salaries, the Centre would have no inflationary effect.[55] By mid-autumn 1957, with officials seemingly placated, he submitted a formal proposal, following this up with a personal letter to John Diefenbaker. Appealing to the prime minister's nationalism, Keenleyside claimed that other countries and "one of the large American universities in California" wanted to host the Centre, and he confessed to being "very happy" to see it established "in Canada and at my own University."[56] Continued misgivings in the DEA, however, meant it took another year for cabinet to authorize Canadian participation in the form of an annual $10,000 grant to the UN for three years.[57] The Vancouver Centre went ahead, but with a less

[52] R.S. MacLean to File, 21 June 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Holmes to Keenleyside, 12 August 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Draft, letter from Acting USSEA to Canadian Delegation to the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 20 September 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[53] Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance with Dr. Hugh Keenleyside and Mr. F.J. Tickner, 8 March 1957, LAC/6565/10873-C-40/3.2.

[54] Bartlett to Couillard, 5 March 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[55] Holmes to Grey, memorandum, 23 August 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[56] Keenleyside to R.A. MacKay, 20 November 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Keenleyside to John Diefenbaker, 22 December 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[57] Couillard to M.W. Sharp, L. Rasminsky, A.F.W. Plumptre, Cavell, 20 December 1957, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Jules Léger to Sidney Smith, memorandum, 17 January 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1; Smith to Keenleyside, 17 February 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1.

than enthusiastic endorsement from Ottawa, where skepticism endured over its need and value, along with sensitivity to any loss of control.[58]

Yet there was room for optimism. Albert Lepawsky, an American member of Keenleyside's Bolivian mission, was tapped as the new facility's director.[59] The Chicago native had worked with the US government and taught at the University of Alabama, where he served as educational director of the Southern Regional Training Programme in Public Administration, established in the 1940s and a "somewhat similar experiment" to the UBC Centre "in a developing area marginal to the Tennessee Valley Region."[60] Lepawsky found an ally in Orville Ault, who had succeeded Cavell as head of Canada's Colombo Plan administration, and made clear to Lepawsky he was "not only … in favour of" the Centre but also "intend[ed] to give [it] all the support that he [could] and … to make use of its facilities."[61]

A PEDAGOGY BUILT ON SETTLER COLONIALISM

The UN Regional Training Centre at UBC came into being on 1 June 1959. Numerous qualities commended its location, including the fact it would lessen the "present excessive accumulation of United Nations technical assistance activities" on the US eastern seaboard.[62] The Centre was nonetheless meant to "assist in strengthening the United Nations services in the western [US]," and so American authorities made available their facilities.[63] This regional vision informed a primary justification for the Centre's location: the Pacific Northwest's socio-economic transformation. The prominence accorded to this in promotional materials was no accident: Keenleyside had told UBC officials how the UN "had in mind an area with experience of about fifty years of rapid economic

[58] External Ott to PERMISNY, 26 September 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1; Memorandum for the Minister, 23 July 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1; Léger to Smith, memorandum, 17 January 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1; External Ott to PERMIS New York, 24 January 1958, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.1.

[59] "Training Centre for UN Fellows," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

[60] H.L. Maggs, "United Nations: An Experiment in Technical Assistance," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 26, no. 1 (1960): 102 (hereafter "Experiment in Technical Assistance"), UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5; Coleman B. Ransone Jr., "The Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration, Three Decades of Cooperative Graduate Education," *Public Administration Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1983): 91–92.

[61] Memorandum for file [author unknown, n.d.], relations with the Technical Cooperation Division, Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa, Canada, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

[62] Draft plan, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; "Experiment in Technical Assistance," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

[63] Keenleyside to MacKenzie, 14 November 1958, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9; "Training Centre for UN Fellows," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

and social development of a kind that [would] be valuable to students from under-developed areas." He described the region as the part of North America "most comparable to the under-developed countries in that its economic development ha[d] been relatively recent and quite varied."[64] Consistent with Ottawa's own view of western Canada's place in Canadian aid, the emphasis on rapid change meant resource extraction as a driver of development loomed large in visions of the Centre. For UN officials: "the region's natural resources of land, forest, wildlife, minerals, water and energy have provided the basis for significant development which can usefully be studied by personnel from the less materially developed countries."[65]

The Centre was thus built upon the legacy and structuring practices of settler colonialism. After all, the resource extraction referred to was central to an Indigenous dispossession and displacement predicated on "the superiority of European civilization to the ways of the non-European world" and the (ongoing) violent "disruption of Indigenous relationships to land" that were "interred … made pre-modern and backward."[66] From the fur trade, through the Fraser River gold rush and onward, resource extraction was crucial to imposing "a regime of non-Native power that expanded in the colonial period and continue[d] … to the present." Land surveying and management accelerated the seizure of Indigenous lands and the expansion of a settler-driven agricultural system. Consolidating this colonial regime also served the interests of those who saw and reconstructed the land as "an industrial resource to be processed and sold." At first crucial to the labour force associated with this makeover, settler colonialism's eliminatory logic meant that Indigenous peoples were increasingly marginalized, if not excluded, amid large-scale immigration and as what is referred to today as British Columbia's Lower Mainland "passed through a remarkable transformation: from the local worlds of fishing, hunting, and gathering peoples to a modern corner of the world economy."[67] Hugh Keenleyside failed to acknowledge

[64] Article for *External Affairs Bulletin*, 5 May 1959, "Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows," LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/2.2; "Training Centre for UN Fellows," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5; Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance with Dr. Hugh Keenleyside and Mr. F.J. Tickner, 8 March 1957, LAC/6565/10873-C-40/3.2.

[65] "Training Centre for UN Fellows," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5. See also Hobart to Bartlett, n.d., copy, Department of Trade and Commerce, inter-office correspondence, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1.

[66] Harris, *Resettlement of British Columbia*, xii; Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," 5.

[67] Ibid., 67–68, 85–92, 100–1. See also, Laura Ishiguro, "Northwestern North America (Canadian West) to 1900," in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, ed. Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini (New York: Routledge, 2017), 125–38; Elsie Paul, in

this history and contemporary reality as he vaunted the "comparative recentness of development" in the Pacific Northwest and the fact it was "still being actively expanded." Calling for resource development in British Columbia and drawing parallels between it and the Global South, Keenleyside declared, "an unused resource is like money in a sock: it draws no interest, does no one any good."[68] Such comments reflected a settler worldview presuming "dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal" and a legitimacy grounded in "making the land produce" – including lessons for use in international development.[69]

This was the geographic and ideological context within which UN fellows, whose areas of specialization covered "resource development, public administration and social welfare," pursued studies at UBC and a training program offering practical experience in a commercial, industrial, or governmental setting.[70] The education was not limited to the fellows. Recalling examples as recent as the 1954 McGill seminar but reaching back to the colonial sciences, the Centre was tasked with finding "more effective and efficient methods" for technical assistance and assessing "the effectiveness of a more intensive form of fellowship training on a regional basis."[71] Within six months, twenty-five fellows, almost all male, had arrived from Burma, the Republic of China, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Sudan, Thailand, South Korea, and the United Arab Republic.[72] There was also local enthusiasm; by its first anniversary the Centre had "more requests from potential training agencies for fellowship assignments … than it [could] fulfill."[73] Declaring that the Centre was progressing far ahead of schedule, Lepawsky enthused that the UN could consider putting "the experience of the Vancouver Centre 'on the road.'"[74]

collaboration with Paige Raibmon and Harmony Johnson, *Written as I Remember It: Teachings (ʔəms taʔaw) from the Life of a Sliammon Elder* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 65–80; Andrew Parnaby, "'The Best Men That Ever Worked the Lumber': Aboriginal Longshoremen on Burrard Inlet, BC, 1863–1939," *Canadian Historical Review* 87, no. 1 (2006): 53–78.

68 Speeches and articles, address to the British Columbia Natural Resources Conference, 19 November 1959, Hugh Keenleyside Fonds/28/40, LAC/MG31-E102.

69 Draft plan, LAC/6963/5475-DU-35-40/1; Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," 6.

70 "Experiment in Technical Assistance," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5; Lepawsky to Bloch, 1 August 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9; "Training Centre for UN Fellows," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

71 "Experiment in Technical Assistance," UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

72 Note to file, untitled, n.d., UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5. This incomplete list appears to indicate that only two women were among the Centre's first cohort of UN fellows.

73 Albert Lepawsky to Henry S. Bloch, memorandum, 1 August 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

74 Lepawsky to MacKenzie, memorandum, 15 December 1959, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9; Notes for President's Conference, 18 December 1959, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14.

That the Centre's training activities were built upon the practices and structure of settler colonialism was underscored by the fact that the first fellow hosted was the deputy secretary of Burma's Ministry of Land Nationalization. Earlier in his career, U Tun Tin had served as deputy commissioner of Tharrawaddy district, where converting public lands into farm allotments was a key aspect of Burmese development efforts. Tun was assigned to observe the Canadian and US land settlement and management systems, spending time with government officials in Washington and Idaho, including executives of the US Bureau of Land Management, deputy ministers in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, and visiting Saskatchewan's Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development with a view to reporting on cooperative agriculture for a Burmese commission revising existing land laws.[75]

Other fellows learned of hydroelectric development. Japan's Tohru Ishimitsu spent time studying multipurpose river basin development in Saskatchewan, where his fieldwork included the Economic Advisory and Planning Board in Regina and the South Saskatchewan River Development project, California's Central Valley, and the Columbia River basin.[76] Bireswar Chatterjee, a fellow from India, explored hydroelectric development in British Columbia and California, and Soung Rhee carried out an extensive survey of more than four dozen hydro-power sites in British Columbia and the western United States to assist in his works as head of the Korea Electric Power Company's construction department.[77] Among the sites Rhee visited was Alcan's Kemano aluminium smelter project near Kitimat, of which the construction in the early 1950s had provoked the forced relocation of the Cheslatta T'en and flooded their lands.[78]

Other fellows explored the mining industry, consistent with Megan Black's analysis of links between Indigenous dispossession, North

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[75] Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Engineers, *Economic and Engineering Development of Burma*. Prepared for the Government of the Union of Burma, vol. 1 (London: Hazell, Watson and Viney, 1953), 136; United Nations Press Services, Office of Public Information, United Nations, NY, press release OPA/5, 14 September 1959, "Western Canada and Northwestern United States Used as Training Ground in Economic Development for UN Fellows" (hereafter Press Release OPA/5), UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5.

[76] Press release OPA/5, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5; Tohru Ishimitsu, Report on Multiple Purpose River Development, 8 March 1960, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60.

[77] Bireswar Chatterjee, Report on United Nations Fellowship Award in Electric Power Systems Design and Load Forecasting, 11 January 1961, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60; Soung Rhee, Report on Hydro Power Construction, 7 March 1960, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60.

[78] J.E. Windsor and J.A. McVey, "Annihilation of Both Place and Sense of Place: The Experience of the Cheslatta T'En Canadian First Nation within the Context of Large-Scale Environmental Projects," *Geographical Journal* 171, no. 2 (2005): 146–65.

American development assistance, and a resource extraction central to global capitalism's postwar evolution.[79] John Anastopoulos visited British Columbia's Bureau of Mines and spent time with the Canadian and American Geological Surveys to develop a program for "the study and development of [Greece's] mineral wealth as an aid to our economy."[80] Similarly, Maria Caramantzani of Greece's Institute for Geology and Subsurface Research – one of the few women hosted by the Centre – worked in the ore-dressing operations of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, in addition to spending time visiting the US Bureau of Mines in Salt Lake City, Denver, and Reno.[81] Two fellows from Burma familiarized themselves with North America's mining sector, including Maung Tin Nyunt, who returned home recommending that Burma's air force conduct the sort of aerial mineral surveys he had witnessed during a practicum that included Saskatchewan's Department of Mineral Resources.[82]

With his scheduled time as director coming to a close, Lepawsky was convinced that planning for the future was justified.[83] Resource extraction dominated as he recommended the Centre "should now be concentrated on resource development," notably mining, power development, water resources, and lands and forest administration. He also advocated public administration and social welfare training projects "associated with resource-based regions" since "fewer subjects ha[d] as wide an influence in relation to the international development process as resource industries and regionally-based enterprises." Lepawsky estimated that the Centre's "more concrete identification" with resource extraction in the Pacific Northwest and western North America could "strengthen, rather than restrict, the Centre's position in the … international training network."[84] In short, lessons learned from resource extraction linked to settler colonialism in the Lower Mainland and western North America were to be made available to and recommended

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[79] Megan Black, *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[80] John Anastopoulos, Report on Geological Laboratory Exploration, 7 October 1960, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60.

[81] Maria Caramantzani, Report on Ore Dressing, 30 April 1960, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60.

[82] U Sann Maung, Report on Mining and Mineral Economics, n.d., UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60; Maung Tin Nyunt, Report on Minerals Survey and Economic Geology, 29 September 1960, UBCA/Subject Files/36/59-60.

[83] Lewpawsky to Roberto M. Heurtematte and MacKenzie, memorandum, 31 December 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/11, Vancouver Centre, annual reports (11); Lepawsky to Bloch, 1 August 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

[84] Notes for President's Conference, 18 December 1959, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14; Lepawsky to Heurtematte and MacKenzie, memorandum, 31 December 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/11.

for implementation throughout the Global South, even as UN-sponsored activities in the Pacific Northwest reified the settler order.

The entanglements between development and settler colonialism were equally apparent amidst the arrival of Lepawsky's replacement, Cyril Belshaw. Born in Waddington, New Zealand, he was the son of economist Horace Belshaw, who, along with Āpirana Ngata, had organized and chaired the Young Māori Conference in 1939 that assessed Māori socio-economic conditions.[85] The younger Belshaw studied economics at the University of New Zealand and, after spending time in the colonial service in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, pursued a doctorate in social anthropology at the London School of Economics. He joined the Fabian Colonial Bureau that, linked to Britain's Labour Party, promoted a more "progressive" colonialism informed by a developmentalist logic.[86] Belshaw's field research focused on economic growth and its social implications, with his first book tracing the history of colonialism in Melanesia as part of a study of postwar administration and reconstruction in South Pacific Island territories. Pursuing his interest in the "synthesis between economics and anthropology in the interests of administrative development," he produced a study of social and economic welfare in a Papuan community outside of Port Moresby, and an array of publications on community development and economic enterprise in Indigenous communities.[87]

Born and raised in a settler society on one side of the Pacific, the ties of empire and family enabled Belshaw to pursue his career in one on the other side. In 1953, he was offered a post at UBC by fellow New Zealander Harry Hawthorn, a friend of his father who was overseeing

[85] Frank Holmes, "Belshaw, Horace," *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, first published in 1998. *Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4b22/belshaw-horace.

[86] Personal resume of Cyril Belshaw, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/13; Belshaw, note to file, 24 November 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/13; Cyril S. Belshaw, *Bumps on a Long Road: Essays from an Anthropologist's Memory* (Vancouver: Webzines, 2009), 33; Charlotte Lydia Riley, "The Winds of Change Are Blowing Economically: The Labour Party and British Overseas Development, 1940s–1960s," in *Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa: Future Imperfect?*, ed. Andrew W.M. Smith and Chris Jeppesen (London: UCL Press, 2017), 50. Belshaw is infamous for having been charged with but not convicted of the murder of his wife, UBC English professor Betty Belshaw. See Marcus Gee, "Obituary for Noted UBC Professor Cyril Belshaw Left Out One Key Fact – He Was Acquitted at Famous Trial of Killing His Wife," *Globe and Mail*, 10 January 2019.

[87] Press release, 19 January 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/5; Cyril S. Belshaw, *Changing Melanesia: Social Economics of Culture Contact* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1954), ix; Cyril S. Belshaw, *The Great Village: The Economic and Social Welfare of Hanuabada, an Urban Community in Papua* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1957). See also Cyril S. Belshaw, "Canadian Policy and Asian Society," *International Journal* 11, no. 1 (1955–56): 44, in which he calls for "expert anthropological and sociological opinion" to facilitate Canadian technical assistance.

anthropology's postwar expansion at the university.[88] This led to their co-authoring *The Indians of British Columbia* with economist Stuart M. Jamieson. Part of the postwar re-evaluation of Canada's Indian policy, this landmark study on Indigenous administration and development anticipated the national study Hawthorn oversaw in the 1960s. Taking as axiomatic the capitalist development linked to the settler order, and presuming that the acculturative change of Indigenous communities was "irreversible," *Indians of British Columbia* proposed an array of administrative, economic, educational, and economic policies to facilitate the "integration" of the growing Indigenous population amidst rapid industrialization and a new wave of resource extraction.[89]

Visiting the student researchers carrying out fieldwork for this study, Belshaw saw parallels to the situation he had encountered in the Solomon Islands and made "acid comparisons" that Hawthorn subsequently excised from the report "as undiplomatic and likely to be counter-productive."[90] Although they avoided "lengthy reference to comparative experience" elsewhere, the co-authors observed: "a number of features of the local situation are roughly matched in many countries, and plans for the expansion of underdeveloped economies and for community development have been tested in many programmes of international aid and in many systems of administration of dependent peoples."[91] Among the report's recommendations was a community development program Belshaw drafted, inspired by examples in "India, China, and other parts of the Far East, through colonial Africa and the Pacific Islands, to South and Central America" as well as in the United States. *Indians of British Columbia* also drew on the British colonial context and Australian experience in New Guinea to recommend university-based orientation and training for Indian Affairs Branch officers.[92]

Belshaw's connection with Canada's Indian policy did not stop there. He had discussions with B.G. Sivertz, a senior official in the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, about social research in the Arctic, the creation of training courses for administrative personnel, and

[88] Harry Hawthorn to Cyril Belshaw, 28 August 1952, Harry Hawthorn Fonds, correspondence, notes and reports series, box 6, file 4, C.S. Belshaw, UBCA.

[89] Harry B. Hawthorn, Cyril S. Belshaw, and Stuart M. Jamieson, *The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment* (Vancouver: University of California Press and the University of British Columbia, 1958), 12, 268–70; Plant, "'Relationship and Interchange of Experience,'" 5–6.

[90] Belshaw, *Bumps on a Long Road*, 76.

[91] Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, *Indians of British Columbia*, 12.

[92] Plant, "Relationship and Interchange of Experience," 22; Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, *Indians of British Columbia*, 429, 493–94.

more formal training for the recently created Northern Service Officers corps.[93] The National Film Board invited him to conduct a study of "the possible production of film and production materials to assist in the social development of the Indian population."[94] His subsequent report classified Indigenous peoples according to a de facto typology of socio-economic development and devoted considerable space to the educative dimension of Canada's Indian policy and his recommendations for the use of film by "committees on Indian adult education."[95] All told, Belshaw was carried into his new post by the same transnational currents of settler colonialism informing the origins and activities of the Vancouver Centre, as well as Canada's broader participation in international development.[96]

Especially prominent in the Centre's evolving work were the seminars exploring various aspects of technical assistance. Not part of Keenleyside's original vision, these quickly "turned out to be one of the Centre's most fruitful functions."[97] It first organized a seminar for UBC faculty to "evaluate the pedagogical lessons involved in the Centre's methods of training and the implications of technical assistance training methods for the educational process."[98] A more ambitious one followed in August 1960. Chaired by the head of the UN Technical Assistance Board, David Owen, and bringing together American, Canadian, and European participants from academia, business, and governmental and international agencies, the seminar reviewed "the first decade of international training experience" to obtain "some criteria for policy and procedure in the future."[99]

93 Belshaw to B.G. Sivertz, 11 June 1956, UBCA/CB/Professional Correspondence Series/61/5.

94 Report to the National Film Board, the development of Indian films, 1960 (hereafter Report), UBCA/CB/Research and Academic Work Series (hereafter RAW)/73/29; Glover to Belshaw, 2 December 1959, UBCA/CB/RAW/73/25, Film Board, correspondence with NFB (2/2) (25); Guy Glover to Belshaw, 17 December 1959, UBCA/CB/RAW/73/25.

95 Report, UBCA/CB/RAW/73/29.

96 As director of the UN Centre, Belshaw was assisted by Arthur Sager, who had been born on Gitxsan territory near Hazelton in northern British Columbia, where his father was a medical missionary, and had spent his formative years in the mining community of Surf Inlet and Port Simpson. See "In Memoriam – Arthur Sager," *Trek: The Magazine of the University of British Columbia* 62, no. 3 (2007): 53; Belshaw, *Bumps on a Long Road*, 172; Arthur H. Sager, *The Sager Saga: A Family History* (Vancouver: Arthur H. Sager, 1998), 63–66.

97 Lepawsky to Heurtematte and Mackenzie, memorandum, 31 December 1960, report, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/11.

98 Lepawsky to Bloch, memorandum, 1 August 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

99 Albert Lepawsky, *Agenda for International Training: Proceedings of a Seminar on the Training of Personnel from Developing Countries* (Vancouver: Published for the Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows by Publications Centre, University of British Columbia, 1962), viii; Seminar on the training of personnel from developing countries under technical assistance programmes, Vancouver, 21–27 August 1960, author unknown, n.d., LAC/5141/5475-DU-35-40/3.

The national origins of this seminar's participants underscore how such events are easily situated within the history of imperial pedagogy and colonial development, which, in the Canadian context, was linked to settler colonialism. It was particularly telling when discussion turned to the "untapped resources" represented by "regions within the developed countries which are still in the process of development," and the need "to show personnel from developing countries the less developed or underdeveloped aspects of the developed country's technology and culture." William B. Baker, director of the University of Saskatchewan's Centre for Community Studies, which was increasingly interested in Indigenous communities as it sought the integration of rural areas into the province's socio-economic order, alluded to these when he suggested that "increased attention … be deliberately given during the international training process to those chronically depressed areas and groups which still exist in the developed countries" since "the policies and projects designed for the alleviation of problems of these areas … offer some of the most pertinent training experience for persons from developing countries."[100]

Settler colonialism's logic was equally apparent during a seminar on international river basin development that the Centre hosted in 1961. Set against a backdrop of debate over the Canada-US Columbia River Treaty that anticipated intensified hydroelectric development, the seminar explored "one of the major means by which substantial economic growth [was] achieved in the second half of the twentieth century."[101] Seminar attendees, including W.S. Arneil, former Indian commissioner for the BC-Yukon region, affirmed "that the ultimate aim of international river basin development [was] the achievement of better social conditions by supporting economic growth and encouraging optimum use of resources, not only for material but also for cultural and aesthetic ends."[102] In addition to the Columbia River example, participants discussed the St. Lawrence Seaway. Ignoring Haudenosaunee opposition to the federal land expropriations accompanying the Seaway's completion and the disruption caused to the communities of Kahnawà:ke and Akwesasne,

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[100] Lepawsky, *Agenda for International Training*, 10, 21. See also "Centre for Community Studies," *The Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan*, https://esask.uregina.ca/entry/centre_for_community_studies.jsp; Helen Buckley, J.E.M. Kew, and John B. Hawley, *The Indians and Métis of Northern Saskatchewan: A Report of Economic and Social Development* (Saskatoon: Centre for Community Studies, 1963).

[101] J.D. Chapman, *The International River Basin: Proceedings of a Seminar on the Development and Administration of the International River Basin, University of British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Publications Centre, 1963), 1.

[102] Ibid., 16.

they vaunted the fact that "all levels of interest were canvassed, considered and eventually protected by the arrangements which were finally drawn up, so that the Seaway [was] a source of national pride … and provided much opportunity for regional economic development."[103]

GATHERING CLOUDS IN VANCOUVER AND BEYOND

Yet, by the early 1960s, the assumptions upon which the Vancouver Centre had been built were already shifting. Global events and rapidly evolving thinking would produce, over the course of this first "UN Development Decade," stringent critiques of the delivery and nature of postwar aid, including its Eurocentrism. Decolonization and the arrival of a host of new actors at the UN, along with the work of development economists such as Gunnar Myrdal, amplified long-standing calls for more training to take place in the Global South.[104] The changing dynamic was reflected and reinforced by the creation of the UN Special Fund, which envisaged in situ public administration training institutes as a catalyst for its primary objective of more ambitious development schemes. The "remarkable increase in training activity in the developing countries" that accompanied evolving conventional wisdom about development assistance, combined with the UN's financial challenges and "the cost of training in American or Canadian institutions," prompted a decline in the number of fellows sent to Canada and other highly industrialized countries.[105]

The change was apparent in the 40 percent drop in the number of UN fellows that the Centre hosted in 1960. Attempting a positive spin, Lepawsky claimed that increased training in the Global South could only *enhance* the value of the Centre's experimental nature, which would yield lessons applicable elsewhere.[106] The reality, however, was that the Centre was facing a problem in terms of its core mandate. Belshaw was almost plaintive, asking the UN for more fellows, not so much to: "giv[e]

103 Ibid., 34. See also Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NJ: Duke University Press, 2014), 51–53; Daniel MacFarlane, *Negotiating a River: Canada, the US, and the Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 123–28.

104 Reid to USSEA, 30 December 1952, LAC/6592/11038-A-40/3.2; Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development, From Western Origins to Global Faith*, 4th ed. (London: Zed Books, 2014), 89; Matthew Hilton, "International Aid and Development NGOS in Britain and Human Rights since 1945," *Humanity* 3, no. 3 (2012): 453; Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions* (London: G. Duckworth, 1957).

105 Lepawsky to Heurtematte and MacKenzie, 31 December 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/11; Bloch to Belshaw, 16 November 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.

106 Lepawsky to Heurtematte and MacKenzie, 31 December 1960, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/11.

us work to do, but [to permit] us to gain the experience upon which we can consider future arrangements."[107] The director of the UN's bureau of technical assistance operations, Henry Bloch, counselled Belshaw to make up for the decline in TAA referrals by forging links with the UN Specialized Agencies such as UNESCO and the FAO. Although open to the idea, Belshaw observed that progress would be tied closely to "the image of the Centre … in Ottawa" given that the agencies' Canada-based fellowships were administrated through the External Aid Office (EAO), which had been created to consolidate Canada's aid bureaucracy.[108]

The Centre certainly had defenders in Ottawa: Orville Ault found it "dynamic and efficient" when he visited and backed its continuation; he issued instructions to send the Centre "ten or twelve of our trainees" and even planned to use it to recruit experts. But there were also ongoing doubts. Even a sympathetic figure like Ault confessed: "we could not afford to run our operation here on the same proportionate scale."[109] Phil Stuchen, a Department of Trade and Commerce official with significant technical assistance experience, described the Centre as a "most lavish, expensive operation." Citing Greece's Maria Caramantzani as an example, he wondered whether the benefits obtained from the time and money spent on her training in the mining sector in British Columbia and the United States might not "have been acquired by a month's stay at the Bureau of Mines in Ottawa and a couple of months' assignment in the Sudbury and Rouyn mining areas."[110]

Word of growing skepticism in New York and Ottawa fuelled malaise in Vancouver, despite talk in the latter about integrating the Centre more fully into the UBC community. A faculty advisory committee including Harry Hawthorn was struck in the spring of 1961 to redefine the Centre's organization, objectives, and activities in a bid to address all three partners' concerns.[111] Committee chair G. Neil Perry, dean of the Faculty of Commerce, emphasized: "neither Ottawa nor New York appear … very enthusiastic about continuing the Centre in its present form" but might "welcome sensible suggestions as to how some of the functions … might be continued." He also warned: "the case for the continuation of

[107] Belshaw to Bloch, 4 April 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14.

[108] Belshaw to Bloch, 30 January 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14.

[109] O.E. Ault to A.S. McGill, 28 September 1960, LAC/5141/5475-DU-35-40/3.

[110] Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows [likely Phil Stuchen] n.d., LAC/5141/5475-DU-35-40/3.

[111] Belshaw to MacKenzie, 13 November 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10, Vancouver Centre, Policy, p. 3 (10); Belshaw to G.C. Andrew, 21 February 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/6, Vancouver Centre-Advisory Committee (6).

the Centre as a purely university function will … be harder to establish unless financial support continues to be forthcoming from Ottawa and New York."[112] As for Belshaw, he pronounced the Centre "defective in two main ways": it had failed to cultivate adequate links with the UN Specialized Agencies and had insufficiently "developed its role as an experimenter and initiator of new programmes."[113]

Faced with such shortcomings, doubts in Ottawa and New York, and the need to justify the Centre's existence, Belshaw proposed transforming it into a new office to oversee UBC's growing international operations. This new entity could carry on the Centre's administrative and educational functions for the UN and Ottawa, albeit henceforth on a fee-for-service basis, while pursuing its pedagogical mission by "undertak[ing] educational experiments on behalf of the United Nations, the Canadian Government, and other organizations."[114] By mid-July, a high-level meeting at UBC produced an agreement that Belshaw's proposed office would succeed the Centre when its original mandate expired in May 1962 and, pending new agreements with the UN and the EAO, inherit its work on their behalf.[115] From New York, Bloch sent encouraging words, although he cautioned that the number of fellows the UN could send was "likely to remain small." The situation in Ottawa appeared similarly promising to Belshaw, who insisted: "[there is] no doubt that Ottawa's demands for our services are growing."[116]

However, with UN attention and resources shifting to training in the Global South, the new fee-for-service arrangement effectively enabled the TAA to disentangle itself from the Centre and shift the financial burden to UBC. Belshaw was made to realize the situation in late 1961 as President MacKenzie informed him that budgetary concerns meant the university was unable to finance the Centre beyond its original mandate.[117] As relations between UBC's president and Belshaw degenerated, Hugh Keenleyside, by this time chair of the British Columbia Power Commission, urged UBC to reverse its decision, warning that, beyond questions of prestige, US universities would seize the opportunity and "we in Canada [would] lose one of the most constructive contri-

[112] G. Neil Perry to Belshaw, memorandum, 11 April 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/6.
[113] Belshaw to Bloch, 13 July 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14.
[114] Proposal for reorganization [by Belshaw], 14 June 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14.
[115] Belshaw to MacKenzie, 28 July 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9.
[116] Bloch to Belshaw, 3 August 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/14; Bloch to Belshaw, 16 November 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/9; Belshaw to MacKenzie, 13 November 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.
[117] MacKenzie to Belshaw, 9 December 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.

butions that we have been making to the programmes of international aid."[118]

Increasingly desperate, Belshaw pounced on news that the Diefenbaker government was increasing the federal grant to universities and argued that the budgetary rationale for ending the Centre no longer held. Barely a month after announcing its demise, he rejoiced: "prognostications for the future of the Centre's work are now much more hopeful."[119] Certainly, Bloch offered assurances that: "[The UN did] not, in any way, withdraw our interest or support [in the Centre] … [I]t would be very unfortunate, indeed, if [it] were to be discontinued … when [its] efforts are beginning to yield encouraging results."[120] But doubts endured in Ottawa, where Herb Moran, the EAO's director general, dismissed the new fee-for-service arrangement as prohibitively costly. Moreover, Moran's canvass of officials confirmed his "impression that very little use [had] been made of the Centre in the past" and that increasing the EAO's use of it would require "changes … regarded as inadvisable by all concerned here." He preferred to rely on the facilities Ottawa had long used to recruit experts, attaching far greater importance to such links than to a centre with uncertain long-term prospects.[121]

UBC's Board of Governors nonetheless approved continuing the revamped Centre as a "holding operation" for a year.[122] Informing Bloch and Secretary of State for Eternal Affairs Howard Green, MacKenzie explained he wished to avoid any suggestion that "we in Canada do not feel the United Nations is important or that its work should be more curtailed and limited." UBC's president was more candid with Moran. Conceding grudgingly that there could "still [be] a useful function for [the Centre] to perform on a limited basis," he explained that, encouraged by certain colleagues, he had been "tempted to … wipe [it] out" but had worried that "this might be used to criticize the United Nations Secretariat, the Government of Canada and this University."[123] The

[118] Keenleyside to Phyllis G. Ross, 27 December 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10. See also MacKenzie to Belshaw, 21 December 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10; Belshaw to MacKenzie, 27 December 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10; MacKenzie to Belshaw, 28 December 1961, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.

[119] Belshaw to Bloch, 2 February 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10. See also G.O.B. Davies to Belshaw, 9 January 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10; Belshaw to Keenleyside, 20 February 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.

[120] Bloch to MacKenzie, 20 February 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.

[121] Herbert O. Moran to MacKenzie, 19 February 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/10.

[122] MacKenzie to Belshaw, 12 April 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/7, Policy, Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows to 31 May 1962 (7).

[123] MacKenzie to Howard Green, 5 April 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/7; MacKenzie to Bloch, 5 April 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/7; MacKenzie to Moran, 5 April 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/7.

renamed "United Nations Educational Centre" came into operation at the end of May 1962, but the respite was short-lived: by that autumn, after MacKenzie's successor John B. Macdonald opposed Belshaw's bid to obtain funding from the Carnegie Foundation, the final curtain came down on the Centre.[124]

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Certainly, this account could be dismissed as an effort to recover a footnote in the history of Canadian aid, Canada's relations with the UN, or UBC. Yet, notwithstanding its short-lived nature and anticlimactic end, the tale of the Regional Centre for UN Fellows in Vancouver holds lessons regarding the thinking and dynamics during the period of its existence and offers insight relevant to Canadian aid history and to international development's global history. Tracing the Centre's genealogy underscores continuities between development efforts and European imperialisms and their accompanying notions of colonial development. Indeed, Belshaw, whose career played out along trans-imperial and trans-Pacific circuits, embodied such continuities. Even if, during this period when development was still "incubating," the educational relationship was viewed in theoretical and rhetorical terms as less unidirectional, in practice the *knowledge* of development was alleged to be held primarily in Western repositories.[125] Universities and academics occupied an important self-appointed role in this regard as they gathered, analyzed, and distributed such knowledge, a dynamic reinforced by the links between government and the social sciences. Beyond being tasked with transmitting expertise for the betterment of the "underdeveloped," the UBC Centre was the latest attempt to obtain the lessons necessary for the international community, particularly the highly industrialized, capitalist world, to get development "right."

In this latter regard, exploring the Centre's activities, notably the growing prominence of resource extraction, provides lessons on the intimacy of links between Western aid efforts, normative ideas regarding capitalist development, and the evolution of global capitalism after the Second World War. The exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of western North America in general, and British Columbia's Lower Mainland in particular, were alleged to have generated knowledge

[124] Belshaw to Bloch, 9 April 1962, UBCA/CB/ANGO/2/8; Arthur Rae McCombs, "International House on the University of British Columbia Campus" (MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 1974), 56; Belshaw, *Bumps on a Long Road*, 120.

[125] Rist, *History of Development*, 89.

and to possess intrinsic pedagogical value that could and should be shared, thereby strengthening capitalism's transnational reach. Given the subsequent global expansion of Canada's mining industry, one could go so far as to claim that, ultimately, the real "students" of development were not the UN fellows for whom the Centre arranged placements but, rather, the resource enterprises welcoming such fellows and increasingly active in the Global South in the latter half of the twentieth century.[126] The extractive imperative draws attention to the extent to which notions and narratives of progress associated with settler colonialism – including but by no means limited to its manifestation in British Columbia – intersected with the creation, activities, and figures associated with the UN Regional Training Centre. Individuals such as Hugh Keenleyside, Albert Lepawsky, Cyril Belshaw, and others certainly viewed their commitment to development through a progressive, decolonizing lens, but their contributions to and understanding of UN activities in Vancouver were predicated on and reified settler colonialism. This occurred via their vaunting as a normative model a capitalist development built on Indigenous dispossession: their pedagogical efforts contributed to a narrative obscuring, justifying, and naturalizing this dispossession. Indeed, we can situate the Centre, the technical assistance it oversaw, and its work to elaborate and promote development's lessons into a vaster transnational history of settler colonialism ranging from Bolivia to New York, from London and Montreal to Auckland and Vancouver, and from the South Pacific to British Columbia's interior. The interwoven histories of Indigenous dispossession at the heart of western North America's "development," and the pedagogical role that settler societies such as Canada arrogated to themselves, underscores the necessity of paying further heed to the myriad ways in which Indigenous-settler encounters shaped how settler states participated in international development.

[126] Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, "Canadian Mining in Latin America (1990 to Present): A Provisional History," *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 41, no. 1 (2016): 95–113.