Research Note

THE 2011 VANCOUVER RIOT AND THE ROLE OF FACEBOOK IN CROWD-SOURCED POLICING

Christopher J. Schneider and Daniel Trottier*

The expansion of social media has established the conditions for citizens to document, distribute, and respond quickly to social events, including riots. Building upon the work of media scholars Altheide (1995), Cavender and Bond-Maupin (1993), Fishman and Cavender (1998), and Doyle (2003), along with the surveillance studies of Lyon (2001), Andrejevic (2007), and Haggerty and Ericson (2000), this article uses data from social media users responding to the 15 June 2011 (Stanley Cup) riot in Vancouver as well as police reports that make recommendations for emergent forms of policing. We focus our attention on Facebook, a social media site that was used to identify suspected rioters.¹ This identification was almost entirely organized, framed, and presented by people not affiliated with law enforcement agencies. This “search for justice” occurred alongside standard police efforts.

Responses to the 2011 riot mark the emergence of two phenomena, each with social, legal, and cultural precedents already identified in sociological and criminological research literature. First, there developed an emergent form of collective governance among social media users. We refer to this as crowd-sourced policing. Second, there was an increase in official police use of social media sites for policing and surveillance purposes.

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¹ Social media can be understood as a hybrid of media and interaction. Social networking sites are a form of social media. For a contextual and historical overview of social networking, see boyd and Ellison (2007). At the time of this writing, Facebook was the most popular social media site.
VANCOUVER HOCKEY RIOTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The City of Vancouver was rocked by two strikingly similar riots, which occurred almost exactly seventeen years apart on 14 June 1994 and 15 June 2011. In 1994, crowds spilled out of pubs, where they had watched Game 7 of the Stanley Cup Finals, onto downtown streets following the Vancouver Canucks’ loss in New York. In 2011, crowds were encouraged to gather downtown to watch the decisive seventh game (played in Rogers Arena, Vancouver) on large projection screens erected by the city.

According to a report issued by the British Columbia Police Commission (1994, 9): “More than 8,300 people watched the [1994] game on a wide-screen at the Coliseum at the Pacific National Exhibition grounds, approximately 8 kilometers from the downtown area.” In 2011, a “giant truck-mounted television screen [was] positioned at the intersection of Georgia and Hamilton” streets in Vancouver, with “another fixed television on the plaza in front of the adjacent CBC building” and two more “truck-mounted screens … located at Hamilton and Homer streets.” This small area of downtown Vancouver, known to organizers and police as the “Live Site,” contained approximately fifty-five thousand people (at least twenty-two thousand more than its officially identified “carrying capacity”) (Furlong and Keith 2011, 14, 8).

Following both Canucks’ losses, some of those who had gathered downtown set fires, overturned cars, smashed windows, and even looted retail establishments. Riot police descended and arrested suspected rioters. Media played a prominent role in documenting both riots, and on both occasions police and city officials blamed the media for encouraging large crowds to gather in a confined area.

1994

The 1994 riot, described by the Globe and Mail as a “hockey-riot benchmark,” caused “damage and costs to the city amounting to $800-million” and resulted in hundreds of injuries and dozens of arrests (Howard 1995). Police blamed the presence of local television news media for the riot, claiming their actions had a “provocative quality” (Howard 1994). Since the riot was neither political nor anticipated, police responded with an “escalated force model” (Williams 2007) to disperse between forty-five thousand and seventy thousand people. Media documented the use of force by police, including the use of
canine units and chemical agents to disperse the crowd. The police requested raw footage from local television stations and newspapers immediately after the riot in an effort to identify those involved. This request was refused by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (cbbc) in order to avoid the “unwanted position of being deputies for police” (Canadian Press 1994). Within days, the corporation was compelled by court order to surrender the materials. Executing search warrants, police seized nearly two dozen video tapes from the cbc and confiscated film and negatives from television stations bctv and ckvu, and local newspapers the Vancouver Sun and the Province. According to Vancouver Sun columnist Denny Boyd: “An unfortunate by-product of the street riot is the testiness that has developed between the police department and the Vancouver news media over this matter of film evidence, evidence the police feel they have every right to demand as part of their investigation” (Cernetig 1994). Police edited the confiscated footage, removing depictions of police use of force (Doyle 2003). A report published in the Globe and Mail states: “Television viewers have become weary of the police videos, often obtained by subpoena and search warrant, that spotlight individual rioters” (Lee 1994). The footage (showing rioters) was used in “high-tech computer kiosk[s]” installed around Vancouver in an effort to identify suspects (Lee 1994; Doyle 2003). The public was encouraged to view the videos and to enter the name, address, and even workplace of anybody they recognized in order to aid police in their search for rioters (Doyle 2003).

According to the Globe and Mail on 15 April 1995 (ten months after the riot), the police had made more than 250 arrests, despite the fact that the tapes remained under police review. Identifying suspects through media kiosks allowed police to circumvent any criticism of their handling of the riot, given that images of police misconduct were deleted (Doyle 2003). Police were able to define the situation by providing narratives of the event and using media to help facilitate this process.

2011

Social media were an important and distinguishing feature of the 2011 riot, which at its peak involved approximately 155,000 people in downtown Vancouver (Furlong and Keefe 2011), and was watched by millions more on TV and online. Many people in proximity to, or

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2 Recent reports now claim that there were 150 arrests (cbbc 2011a).
involved in the riot recorded events using the text, photo, and video capabilities of their mobile phones. Much of this content circulated online (mostly through social media), allowing others to view, comment on, and share the material. In a few cases, alleged rioters were actually identified (and named), even as the riot continued. Among these was a young man who was photographed attempting to set fire to a police vehicle. In less than twenty-four hours, seventeen-year-old Nathan Kotylak was identified and named on Facebook by online watchers, despite provisions in the Youth Criminal Justice Act (a 2003 Canadian statute that prohibits media from publishing the names of young offenders). Online threats and harassment forced Kotylak and his family to flee their suburban home in Maple Ridge. In other cases, texts and images circulating online led people to turn themselves in to police. Friends, relatives, and acquaintances turned in others, including a minor identified by his mother. Conner Mcilvenna (who did not participate in the riot), was terminated by his employer, merely for posting “vancouver needed remodeling anyway” on his Facebook page (ctv News 2011).

In rare circumstances, alleged rioters posted “evidence” of their exploits online, which resulted in immediate condemnation by other users.3 Some of this “evidence,” republished by mainstream media reports, likely dredged up more condemnation. Parts of the following Facebook post, made by someone called “Brock Anton,” were among the most republished:

Maced in the face, hit with a baton, tear gassed twice, 6 broken fingers, blood everywhere … Through [sic] the jersey on a burning cop car, flipped some cars, burned some smart cars, burned some cop cars, im [sic] on the news … one word … history : ) : ) : )

The post inspired the creation of the “Brock Anton Sucks Dick” Facebook page as well as “The Ballad of Brock Anton,” a song (with a theme of condemnation) viewed more than sixty-five thousand times on YouTube. These and other negative reactions later led to public criticism of the vitriolic reactions online, prompting Robert Gorcak (creator of the “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos” Facebook page, discussed below) to remark: “It kind of takes me aback to see on our page that people consider it a mob mentality” (Hui 2011). Other criticisms of the online “mob” response were featured in much of the mainstream press. In response, Captain Vancouver (an anonymous creator of a popular

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3 Postings of this nature can be made by anyone, anywhere, and the accuracy of such statements cannot be assumed.
“naming and shaming” website) contended that shaming is an acceptable response when questioning the character of an individual, but: “Uttering threats and physical violence should not be condoned [and] on my site I’ve erased and deleted phone numbers that were placed for that very reason” (Taylor 2011).

METHODOLOGY

In studying the 2011 riot, we draw from two principal data sources: (i) the “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos” Facebook page (http://www.facebook.com/vancouverriot2011photos); and, (2) documents reviewing police performance during the riot. According to the cbc (2011b), the Vancouver Riot Pics page was “the largest Facebook group … devoted solely to posting pictures of the rioters.” The page received over seventy thousand “likes” – in other words, endorsements – in the day following the riot (a very significant number within this time frame) and recorded 102,784 “likes” by 29 June 2011. In the two weeks following the riot, there were an astounding 12,587 postings on the main wall of the site. Use and interest in the page declined steadily thereafter. Between 29 June 2011 and 28 August 2011 the page was “unliked” by 1,967 users, and only 350 postings were made to the page (on the main Facebook wall). Below, we focus exclusively on this page and, particularly, upon the 12,587 postings that were collected for analysis. These postings were gathered in chronological order using Adobe Acrobat Pro and saved as a single PDF document, totalling 2,118 pages. Qualitative document analysis (Altheide and Schneider 2012) revealed how Facebook users characterized those whom they thought to be responsible for the riot. Three interrelated themes emerged from these data: surveillance, policing, and social control. We collapsed surveillance and policing into our concept of crowd-sourced policing, or criminal justice discourse used by citizens on social networking sites in response to the riot.

Facebook wall postings consist of text, photographs, videos, and links to other websites. We included all 12,587 wall postings in our analysis because duplicate postings can be removed and the continuing presence of duplicates may denote the importance users attached to their posts.

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4 Facebook postings that employed discourse consistent with the criminal justice institution were selected for initial analysis. These data led to the discovery and utilization of additional search terms (“criminal,” “stupid,” and “responsible”) used to locate additional data until the “point of saturation” (Glaser and Strauss 1967) – that is, the point at which no additional thematically oriented data emerged.
These data are supplemented with the three official reviews conducted by the City of Vancouver, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), and the commissioned external review. These data are then further contextualized with previous research on the social media practices of university students and university employees conducted before the 2011 Vancouver riot. The triangulation of these data positions attitudes about surveillance strategies on social media and provides a more complete perspective of the 2011 Vancouver riot.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Crowdsourcing refers to work delegated to an unspecified – and now typically online – community (Howe 2008). The phenomenon is not entirely new. One might regard “Wanted” posters as an early example of this approach. However, more recent forms of citizen policing (such as those we now witness online) emerge as a direct product of both social media technologies, and social media cultures. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter, when coupled with mobile and digital photography, enable users to document and disseminate information about criminal events, including riots, with unprecedented speed. Users can quickly identify suspects and gather what they believe to be evidence.

Citizens not affiliated with law enforcement increasingly engage in a form of pseudo-police work on social media sites that we call crowdsourced policing. Various forms of crowd-sourced policing predate the development of social media and include vigilantism (e.g., Bernhard Goetz, the “subway vigilante”) and citizen policing (e.g., various neighborhood watch groups, such as the Guardian Angels). However, we use the term “crowd-sourced policing” to refer to the utilization by social media users of narratives consistent with criminal justice discourse, even as these activities stand apart from modern conventional policing.

Without following any particular criminal justice protocol, online users attempt to bring suspects to the attention of authorities (and others who may be able to identify them) by posting text, photographs, and other content on Facebook. No immediate legal consequences emerge for either the target (e.g., arrests, lawsuits), or the provider of this information (e.g., defamation, libel, harassment).

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5 As indicated by: the lack of authority to use force, a lack of accountability, an absence of enforcement duties, a lack of single organizational presence, no set jurisdiction or centralized control, no holding of office/duty, no specialized function, no twenty-four-hour public service, no salaried personnel, and no preventative element (Williams 2007, 29).
Crowd-sourced policing targets individuals, collects personal information about them, and identifies these people online. Such actions are enabled by the domestication of surveillance technologies (Silverstone and Haddon 1996; Trottier 2011). Most analysts of surveillance have been concerned with citizens under watch by government (Gilliom 2001) or market (Gandy 1993) regimes, but a new literature notes that citizens can direct their gaze back at watchers (Mann, Nolan, and Wellman 2003) and public figures (Mathiesen 1997), and it argues that ubiquitously available digital cameras contribute to a more participatory (Albrechtslund 2008) and empowered (Koskela 2004) kind of lateral surveillance in which individuals are more likely to watch over one another, even though this may also make them more visible to states and institutions.

In describing such lateral surveillance, Andrejevic (2005) identifies a culture that implores individuals not to be “duped” by their peers, and encourages them to investigate and condemn others with the help of surveillance technology. According to Andrejevic, lateral surveillance is important in governing relations among “romantic interests, family, and friends or acquaintances” (488), but, when coupled with social media, such peer-to-peer surveillance gains aggregate features and has enduring consequences. Sites like Facebook are not only repositories of potentially incriminating information, they can also publicize that information, especially because the mix of private and public spaces on these sites can allow incriminating content to leak (Lyon 2001) from an individual profile to a public group. Further, the networked structure of these sites means that users routinely expose their peers, either by posting content about them, or by allowing them to be judged by the company they keep (Wills and Reeves 2009).

This online “naming and shaming” resembles the “hue and cry” of earlier times, when citizens were enlisted to locate and identify suspects. Yet it differs, in that it is shaped by a media culture that invites viewers to bring criminals to justice. Crime-based reality shows have long encouraged audiences to submit information that might lead to the prosecution of criminal suspects (Cavender and Bond-Maupin 1993; Fishman and Cavender 1998). These programs also engage in publicly shaming people caught transgressing on camera (Rapping 2004) and invite viewers to pass moral judgment on them. Although there is a distinction between: (i) top-down efforts by police and broadcast media to solicit information from citizens; and, (2) bottom-up efforts by citizens to informally (or unofficially) gather this information for (or
on behalf of) the criminal justice system, these endeavours increasingly operate in tandem as law enforcement agencies seek to take advantage of spontaneous citizen activity.

VANCOUVER POLICE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Police and other investigators have long adapted to new conditions of information management and visibility, and they are taking a proactive approach to social media (Doyle 2003; Ericson 1989), which are seen as both a challenge to their work, and a potential point of vulnerability for police safety and security. Facebook, Twitter, and similar sites have been indicted for obstructing attempts to maintain order during civil unrest (Halliday 2012), and they have been characterized as a resource for those wanting to carry out attacks against officers (Stevens 2012). Yet social media have been of great value in furthering police work. The vpd “2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review” (one of three official reviews), released 6 September 2011, states that the “phenomenon of turning oneself in to the police seems to be impacted by the media and social media commentary” and that “anecdotally” there was “a slight increase in the number of people who turned themselves in” because of social media (76). A later report, published in the Vancouver Sun (1 November 2011), provided concrete confirmation of this process in operation:

As an example, [vpd chief Jim Chu] cited the case of 21-year-old Vancouver Island man whose photo was posted on the social-networking website Facebook days after the riot. The man contacted police and wanted to apologize for damaging a single car, Chu explained. Investigators initially were going to recommend a single charge against the young man, but held off until video had been processed at a lab in Indianapolis, where officers “tagged” each criminal incident, using descriptors of each person involved. Within 20 minutes of investigators putting the man’s descriptors in the database, the computer returned numerous “hits,” returning new videos of the same suspect engaged in further offences … [H]e is now facing six counts of mischief and three counts of break and enter. (Hall 2011)

The official vpd press release upon which this account is based outlines the vast amount of data provided to, rather than collected by, the vpd, and explains the process entailed in “tagging” offenders in the police database. What the press release fails to mention is that the vpd had asked social media users to “tag or identify people they knew to assist
police in their investigation” and did not subsequently acknowledge the extent to which user “tags” of suspected rioters aided police efforts (vpd 2011, 75). Police work is, and has always been, information work (Ericson and Haggerty 1997), and the vpd has acknowledged the need to develop strategies that integrate social media into its data-gathering.

CROWD-SOURCED POLICING ON FACEBOOK

The emergence and proliferation of social media have established the necessary conditions for citizens to document, distribute, and respond to criminal events such as riots. The implications of this process, we suggest, modify institutional practices and user expectations, resulting in an expanded form of collective governance among social media users, including crowd-sourced policing.

In previous studies on social media and visibility, users acknowledged that unwanted exposure was a possibility. Respondents adopted several strategies to avoid information leaks, ranging from limiting access to their information through tight privacy settings to self-censorship (Trottier 2012). A university student noted: “For me to be caught on photo doing something stupid, I had to be doing something stupid in the first place ... They can’t post photos of me that didn’t happen.” A post on the “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos” Facebook page worked a similar vein:

> It will never cease to amaze me what some people will put on the web; not only were these Vancouver kids rioting, they also collectively decided to document the event and upload all the incriminating evidence along with incriminating comments – stupid kids worldwide, you have met your match in the stupid kids of Vancouver.

Stupidity was a central theme of user postings on Facebook. One user wrote: “its soo funny how stupid people are that this is 2011 not 1994 and will be caught with the help of fb [Facebook].” Another said: “stupid criminals ... police have face recognition software to find people in pics trace to health and drivers cards they did it for Toronto G20.” A third opined:

> these people are so stupid!! LOL dont they realize everyone has cameras and will sell you out for a nickel!! AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH!!! yea post those pics, people will recognize you, give your name ... its gunna be a kina “wheres waldo” game for locals to
play. LETS SEE HOW MANY NAMES WE GET!! A photo says a million things but all the police want is a name.

In a virtual echo, yet another wrote:

These kids spreading violence just proved one thing, anyone born after 1990 is in the “Generation of Stupid”!! Here’s the nail in the coffin, bragging on facebook about how cool it was to loot, smash, hurt, and steal is just awesome!! Keep it coming, the police will find youuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu.

Keeping the theme alive, other users posted: “How stupid can you be? Could you not see the hundreds of spectators with cameras and phones etc?”; “It’s hard to decide which is more stupid: doing something like this, or doing it knowing there are hundreds of cameras around you”; and “these people are stupid enough to be caught on camera stealing.”

Stupidity was even invoked as a reason to punish bystanders. This judgment was both hypocritical (apparently it was acceptable to observe the event on television but not to be physically present at the riot) and ironic (in that many bystanders provided photographic and video evidence that assisted in the identification of rioters). Taken together, these posts offer a simple judgment: “u can’t fix stupidity.”

From this point of view, avoiding prosecution is as simple as not “doing something stupid.” At the bare minimum, uploading incriminating evidence to “Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos” Facebook page is framed as an invitation for police intervention. University student users of social media interviewed in previous research expressed no sympathy for peers who had encounters with police as a result of unsanctioned parties that were advertised on Facebook (Trottier 2012). In effect, they saw social media as public space and accepted that any information online is visible to everyone, including the police. They also acknowledged that online exposure is, at some level, beyond the individual’s control because other users can upload incriminating photographs and text without a person’s consent or awareness. Students reported that this had a chilling effect on their social life. According to one third-year student, his father saw more Facebook content related to “shenanigans” than to the “20 hours a week at the library along with 15 hours a week of classes” (ibid.). The absence or non-use of cameras in professional settings distorts representations of individuals’ lives. This underscores a tension about visibility on social media: it is increasingly a default location for identification, yet it presents a narrow and often incriminating view of its user base.
The ubiquitous presence of cameras in public settings, including those in mobile phones, in the hands of television news media, and retail surveillance devices, implies an acceptance of video recording devices and, by extension, the normalization of police surveillance tactics. Legally, the police could not forcibly seize footage of the riot, and the sheer volume of information available probably made any attempt to do so unreasonable. According to the VPD 2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review released 6 September 2011, “as of July 20 [2011], the VPD received 4,300 email tips, 1,500 hours of video, and 15,000 images as a result of public assistance” (75). A VPD press statement released 31 October 2011 claims to have processed “over 30 terabytes of data” and “over 5,000 hours of video.” Although the authenticity of some photos and videos purporting to depict the 2011 riot was called into question, most were accepted as criminal evidence.

While police sorted through this massive cache of data, social media users were piecing together online narratives of the event without the assistance of the police or the law. Echoing Chief Chu of the VPD, who, in the heat of the riot, averred that “those instigators among the mob were ‘criminals, anarchists, and thugs,’” these narratives claimed that a few “bad apples” (not “true” hockey fans or Vancouverites) were responsible for the melee and suggested that the rest of “us” (i.e., law-abiding responsible citizens of Vancouver and the world) would bring them to “justice.” Although Chief Chu amended his initial claim and acknowledged that “most of the people that joined in the riot … represent[ed] a wider spectrum of young people, many of whom [did] not have criminal records” (Bolan and Lee 2011), the police were unable to monopolize, frame, and ultimately control understanding of the event.

This often meant that important legal principles, such as that an accused is innocent until proven guilty, were swept aside in a confident tide of self-righteousness. So one Facebook user posted “Kudos” to “those fans and onlookers who happened to capture these drunken loser [sic] idiots on film … Those rioters are too stupid to realize that they will be caught. VPD, track em all down and give them all what they deserve.” It also demonstrated that public officials could be targeted by social media. For instance, one individual urged fellow Facebook users not to “forget that the cops and the city have been denying fault when it’s plain they could have done more to protect the citizens of Vancouver.” In contrast with 1994, when police maintained tight control of video footage of the riot and edited it to remove evidence of police exercising significant physical force, the sheer quantity of images and the ease of
access to those images meant that police and government officials were potentially subject to public exposure and public shaming.

Clearly, Facebook raises dilemmas that are as yet unresolved. Regarding the 2011 Vancouver riot, three official reports concluded that there was: (1) no intelligence to suggest the onset of a riot; (2) social media are desirable tools for police to use in order to communicate with the public; and, (3) the role of social media in law enforcement should be further explored. Furlong and Keefe (2011), the co-authors of “The Night the City Became a Stadium,” note: “In our interviews and research, next to alcohol-related issues and commentary, social media topped the list of frustrations we heard about” (124).

DISCUSSION: THE SHAPE OF SOCIAL MEDIA POLICING TO COME?

The term “crowd-sourced policing” refers specifically to communicative interactions that support official police work, but that are usually quite removed from it. The 2011 Vancouver riot serves as an insightful example of crowd-sourced policing. Social media users were enthusiastic and expedient in their response to the riot. Within ten minutes of the end of the game, social media users gathered, reposted, and responded to photographs, personal information, and other evidence. This is a prime example of crowd-sourced policing – the organization and use of everyday technology by citizens not affiliated with law enforcement – to scrutinize and persecute fellow citizens suspected of criminal behaviour. These efforts generated public criticism, because of the prejudicial fervour with which users identified and criminalized suspected rioters. Even within the Facebook group, concerned users remarked: “The mentality of this group isn’t very different from the mob mentality [of the rioters].” Yet prevailing criminal justice discourses coupled with readily available new media technologies suggest that we will continue to witness more instances of crowd-sourced policing.

Even as social media complicate police control of evidence and their attempts to frame criminal events, police are harnessing social media in a variety of ways. One of the more prominent strategies is to take a proactive response to social media through public-relations efforts, such as establishing an online police presence. Public relations have always been important to police work in order to gain legitimacy, especially as police struggle to maintain control of media. Public perceptions of
policing are filtered through media (Manning 1978), and social media contribute to this process. Police increasingly focus their efforts to gain control over symbolic meanings in social media. In Canada, for instance, police are harnessing Twitter (Montgomery and Quan 2011) to personalize officers for public-relations purposes by allowing them to disclose a mix of personal and professional details. Police also use services like Facebook to make public appeals for evidence. Through this latter tactic, police formally enrol social media users to extend their surveillance. In the aftermath of criminal events, public appeals by police on Facebook and Twitter, coupled with the enthusiasm and distributed resources of crowd-sourced policing, mark a further expansion of police surveillance into everyday life.

Police also use social media for more formal scrutiny. This is done through conventional means – that is, peer-to-peer interactions. Investigators may try to “friend” a target by pretending to be a stranger, or a known colleague of a peer (Zetter 2010; Kerrigan 2011). They can also use their own profiles to watch over whatever content the target makes available to the public. They can also proceed more covertly by obtaining warrants for information (Lynch 2010), and they are, in fact, currently petitioning for faster backchannels to do this (Singel 2011; Berkow 2011). These developments point to a near future in which police and other investigators will potentially have ever-greater access to social media content – a development that will surely have profound implications for surveillance, and social control. Social media services occupy an ever-larger place in everyday life and social interactions, and this amounts to an increased surveillance of social life. At the same time, social media users themselves show an enthusiasm to actively assist in police work, as demonstrated above.

These discrete surveillance practices on social media mark a profound shift in evidence gathering for investigations, and new kinds of incrimination for users. Even if users are comfortable with the conditions of visibility and exposure on sites like Facebook, new developments will undoubtedly cause concern. Social media policing will continue to increase – and users, scholars, and investigators are only beginning to appreciate the features of these services, as well as the collective effects on those who use them (Dozier 2011). Understanding these developments in relation to social control and everyday life is critical.
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