IN AN IMPORTANT ARTICLE PUBLISHED in this journal more than a decade ago, Richard Mackie argued that the colonization of Vancouver Island by non-Native peoples was a complex process and one that was not simply a consequence of the 1858 gold rush. He described the competing currents as the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) undertook the Island’s colonization after 1849, concentrating on the tensions between local authorities – especially James Douglas – and English politicians as well as the London office of the HBC. The former were intent on facilitating settlement quickly, the latter were determined that the Island’s colonization should conform to contemporary colonial theory, notably the ideas of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. The following pages examine the debates surrounding colonization and colonial theory that were a prominent feature of English political discourse during the mid-nineteenth century. The purpose is to support Mackie’s argument by describing in greater detail the imperial context within which the HBC acquired the grant of Vancouver Island in 1849.

Until very recently, most Canadian historians appeared to have lost interest in the imperial dimension of the country’s past, concentrating instead on the narrative of settlement and encounter as well as the long march to nationhood. On the other hand, the historiography of the British Empire has tended to gloss over the specifics of the colonial
context. A second purpose here is to reconcile these two solitudes by highlighting the connection between the British debates over colonization and the way in which Vancouver Island was drawn into the British world in the mid-nineteenth century.

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In the summer of 1847, a select committee convened by the House of Lords gathered in Westminster, at the centre of the British Empire. Their lordships were beginning to appreciate the full horror of the Irish famine and were sufficiently concerned to appoint a hastily assembled committee to inquire what, if anything, could be done to mitigate this human tragedy.

Twenty-five years earlier, rain had ruined the potato crop in Ireland and hunger was an all too common result. Some had advocated emigration to British North America as the solution to the widespread destitution, leading to official action with the appointment of an agent-general for emigration, Thomas Frederick Elliot. Thus, a quarter of a century later, Elliot was the first witness called by the Lords’ Select Committee that summer of 1847. He faced questions about the efficacy of emigration as a solution to the problems in Ireland and was asked specifically about colonization: “Have you in the course of your Duties attended to the Subject of Colonization generally, and to the various Schemes of Colonization which, in Discussion and in Writing, have been brought before the Public?” Elliot replied that indeed he had given the subject a good deal of thought, although he added that, as far as he was concerned, there seemed to be a good deal of misinformation given on the subject. His questioner probed a little deeper: “Representations have been made to the Committee and to the Public upon the Necessity of giving to Emigration from the United Kingdom more the Character of systematic Colonization than at present. What Definition would you give to the Committee of systematized Colonization, as distinguished from Emigration?” Elliot’s answer suggests a certain weariness. One can imagine him shrugging as he replied:

I think there is none to give. It is, I believe, a mere Delusion to suppose that there is a something definite called Colonization which

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is either wilfully or negligently set aside. There have, indeed, been very able Theories propounded under that Name; but ... I think it can be shown that the whole practicable Part of them has long ago been adopted and carried out. For the present, Emigration seems to be used to mean what actually happens, Colonization to mean any thing whatever that would be better. They are mere Words of Praise and Blame, from which I see nothing for an impartial Inquirer to learn.5

This exchange from the 1847 Select Committee, eighteen months before Vancouver Island was formally declared a British colony, illustrates both how ubiquitous the debates surrounding colonization had become and the fact that the Irish situation often informed such debates. (One of the main figures involved in the controversy surrounding the Vancouver Island grant, James Edward Fitzgerald, was himself Irish and did not hide the fact that his efforts to create an overseas colony were intended to improve the desperate situation in Ireland.)6 These debates reached something of a crescendo in 1849 but had been an influential strand in public discussions of social issues for nearly twenty years.

Elliott was surely correct to suggest that, if emigration and colonization were not synonymous, the terms were very closely linked. As the pace of overseas emigration began to increase by the end of the 1820s, the government grew anxious to ensure that as many as possible of these migrants went to British North America. At the same time, the distribution of colonial land emerged as a critical issue for those in authority in Britain since they had firm views about the opportunities that emigrants should enjoy in overseas colonies. This point comes out clearly in correspondence between the lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada and the Colonial Office dating from 1831.

When Sir John Colborne informed the Colonial Office that he was planning to enable new immigrants to move immediately onto land of their own in Upper Canada, he was cautioned not to do so. Viscount Goderich, the colonial secretary, wrote to the lieutenant-governor posing the rhetorical question, “Without some division of labor, without a class of persons willing to work for wages, how can Society be prevented from

5 Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Colonization from Ireland; Together with the Minutes of Evidence, in Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain, 1847, vi (737), 445, 459-60.
6 According to his biographer, “By the mid-1840s, Irish poverty and famine had batten on that land and fitzGerald returned to live in London, determined to find some way to alleviate Irish distress, not through any of the revolutionary ideas seething through the intellectual minds of Europe during that decade, but through the Young England Movement’s romantic idealism and High Church Toryism combined with Benthamite economics and the colonization theories of Edward Gibbon Wakefield.” See Edmund Bohan, “Blest Madman”: fitzGerald of Canterbury (Christchurch, NZ: Canterbury University Press, 1998), 18-9.
falling into a state of almost primitive rudeness and how are the comforts and refinements of civilized life to be preserved?” Colborne evidently failed to grasp Goderich’s point since a few months later, in May 1832, he enthusiastically described his plans to settle new migrants on their own land. Suspecting that the colonial secretary might not understand his rationale for doing this, Colborne offered the following justification for his actions:

It appears a very rapid improvement in the affairs of a poor Emigrant, to be raised at once from the condition of a laborer to that of a proprietor of fifty or a hundred acres; but, every healthy Emigrant can effect this change by his own industry in two years after his arrival in this Province; therefore more advantage to the Colony will result from his immediate exertions on his own property in a Township which it may be advisable to bring into cultivation, than from his remaining some years in an old Township earning his subsistence as a laborer.8

This provoked an irritable response from London. The colonial secretary referred Colborne to his earlier messages on the topic, adding testily,

From the tenor of all these communications I trusted that you would gather my intention that indigent Emigrants should never, except as a measure of the last necessity, be settled on lands allowed them on more favorable terms than to any other Class ... I by no means proceeded on an assent to the doctrine that as any industrious Emigrant can in two years become an owner of Land, it is better for the Province that he should commence immediately on his own property. It is precisely by the prevention of this event that I think the rigid establishment of a high minimum price will be beneficial. I know not how to propound in plainer terms than I have already done ... the necessity that there should be in every Society a class of laborers as well as a class of Capitalists or of landowners.9

Goderich’s letter was an unequivocal statement of the official British position towards the disposal of land in its “settler colonies”; it also explicitly acknowledged the ideological basis of this activity. Influenced by the new colonial theories, notably those propounded by Edward

7 Viscount Goderich, Earl of Ripon (Colonial Secretary), to Sir John Colborne (Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada), 21 November 1831, CO 43/43, p. 200, in the Colonial Office records held at the United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter UKNA), London.
8 Colborne to Goderich, 4 May 1832, CO 42/411, pp. 213-5, UKNA.
9 Goderich to Colborne, 1 January 1833, CO 43/43, pp. 467-9, UKNA.
Gibbon Wakefield, the colonial secretary endorsed the view that land ought to be handed out in such a way as to buttress the existing social order not to undermine it.\textsuperscript{10}

As Richard Mackie suggested, the HBC’s plans for the colonization of Vancouver Island reflected Wakefield’s ideas.\textsuperscript{11} In its instructions to a puzzled James Douglas, who was to act as the company’s land agent in the new colony of Vancouver Island, the HBC’s London office set out its ideas on colonization in much the same language as did the colonial theorists of the 1830s:

You have in former communications been informed of your appointment as Agent of the Hudson’s Bay Company for the sale of lands &c in Vancouvers Island, and of the conditions on which the Company had resolved to dispose of portions of land for settlers ... The Prospectus will have given you a general idea of the System which the Company have resolved to pursue in colonizing the Island, but they think it right to put you in possession of these views in a somewhat more detailed form than the nature and limits of a Prospectus admit.

The object of every sound system of colonization should be, not to re-organize Society on a new basis, which is simply absurd, but to transfer to the new country whatever is most valuable and most approved in the institutions of the old, so that Society may, as far as possible, consist of the same classes, united together by the same ties, and having the same relative duties to perform in the one country as in the other.\textsuperscript{12}

The company’s plans for the colonization of Vancouver Island followed the failure of the British to assert a broader sovereignty on the Pacific coast. Following the War of 1812, the British and American governments had agreed that the 49th parallel would divide the territory that they claimed west from the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains. On the western side of the mountains, however, they agreed to the rather vague concept of joint occupation. In the later 1820s the HBC went out of its

\textsuperscript{10} During the period that Goderich was colonial secretary (1830 - 33), authority rested largely with Under Secretary Lord Howick (later the third Earl Grey), and Grey’s debt to Wakefield’s ideas was well known. (Grey’s entry in the Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 22, suppl., 786 - 9, noted: “Influenced by Wakefield’s schemes for colonisation, he introduced an emigration bill in 1831, and was one of the first to oppose the making of large grants of land in the colonies. His policy on this head took the form of alienation in moderate amounts to private persons and the establishment of a fund for promoting emigration out of the price realised.”) Grey was himself colonial secretary from June 1846 to February 1852.

\textsuperscript{11} Mackie, “Colonization of Vancouver Island,” 6 - 11.

way to ensure that its sphere of operations in the Pacific region was not threatened by competition from either American or Russian traders, the latter being based in Alaska. What the company took to be its southern and eastern boundaries were subject to intensive over-trapping in order to eradicate game and so to create an unprofitable and barren buffer between HBC operations and those of other traders. Coastal traders from afar met artificially high prices, which the company hoped would render their activities prohibitively expensive. The Russians were to be coaxed into various agreements with the HBC that would result in maximum advantage for the latter. The company was a past master at thinking globally and acting locally.13

The British government gave the new HBC, which emerged in 1821 as a result of the amalgamation of the old HBC with the North West Company, an exclusive licence to trade in this region for twenty-one years— to 1842. In 1837 the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada encouraged the company to use the unstable political situation in those colonies as an argument to persuade the government to renew its licence. The HBC pointed out that it was a bulwark against unrest and instability in the western portion of the British sphere of influence in North America and assured the government that it would inaugurate the formal colonization of the Oregon territory. (It subsequently encouraged inhabitants of Red River to move west and to settle on HBC lands in Oregon.) The HBC’s motives were complex, but principal among them was a concern to counter the growing American interest in Oregon—the US secretary of state had sent William Slacum to report on the region in late 1836—as well as the desire to impress the British government with its commitment to colonization and thus to facilitate the renewal of its trading licence.14


The HBC was successful: in the spring of 1838 its exclusive licence to trade was extended for another twenty-one years. The company then decided to create a subsidiary company, the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company. Two areas, at Fort Nisqually and Cowlitz, were set aside for this subsidiary, and these were to have the twin objectives of producing food locally (in part to supply the Russian traders in Alaska) and providing lands for projected colonization by British subjects. But the HBC's colonizing efforts were never very successful. John McLoughlin, the official in charge of its Columbia District, questioned the wisdom of the project and never bothered to hide his doubts from his superiors in London. He pointed out that the relatively few number of emigrants that the company managed to attract to the region soon opted to move south to the Willamette Valley.\textsuperscript{15} By contrast, the early 1840s witnessed the outbreak of Oregon fever in the United States, followed by the arrival of a growing number of Anglo-American settlers travelling west over the Oregon Trail. Their presence helped to bolster US claims to the Columbia Territory, culminating ultimately in the 1846 Oregon Treaty.\textsuperscript{16}

The treaty specifically noted the need to compensate both the HBC and the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company for losses suffered as a result of the establishment of the border along the 49th parallel as both had significant assets in what had become American territory. The events that had led to the 1846 treaty also convinced the British government that it needed to take British colonization in the Pacific Northwest more seriously.

The governor of the HBC wrote to the colonial secretary, Earl Grey, shortly after the treaty was signed in 1846, seeking clarification as to the government's future plans for the region. "The annual ship of the Hudson's Bay Company to the Columbia and Northwest Coast of America is now loading," Pelly explained,

and will be ready to sail about the middle of this month. By this opportunity the Company send out their instructions for the


16 A good deal of scholarship has explored this topic, but for a useful overview see Donald A. Rakestraw, \textit{For Honor or Destiny: The Anglo-American Crisis over the Oregon Territory} (New York: Peter Lang, 1995); as well as the recent chapter by Chad Reimer, "Borders of the Past: The Oregon Boundary Dispute and the Beginnings of Northwest Historiography," in \textit{Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies}, ed. John M. Findlay and Ken S. Coates, 221-45 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
information and guidance of the officers in charge of their interests in that quarter ... The treaty for the division of the Oregon Territory having been concluded ... I now address your Lordship with the view of ascertaining the intentions of Her Majesty's Government as to the acquisition of lands, or formation of settlements, to the North of Lat. 49. The Hudson's Bay Company, having formed an Establishment on the Southern point of Vancouver's Island which they are annually enlarging, are anxious to know whether they will be confirmed in the possession of such lands as they may find it expedient to add to those which they already possess.

When the letter reached Grey, he pencilled in the following comments: “This is a very difficult & important quest^n. Looking to the encroaching spirit of the U.S. I think it is of importance to strengthen the B^th [British] hold upon the territory now assigned to us by treaty by encouraging the settlement upon it of B^th subjects, & I am also of opin^n that such settlement can only be advantageously effected under the auspices of the Hudson's Bay Co. who I am therefore disposed to encourage.”

Grey's attitude likely ensured that the company would receive the grant of Vancouver Island as a proprietary British colony, although the next three years—from 1846 to 1849 (the latter year being the formal date of the Island grant) — witnessed much debate in England over the whole issue of colonization. One reason for this heightened interest, already noted, was the horror of the Irish famine and the idea that colonization might provide some relief. But in addition to the Irish crisis, colonization had been attracting increasing interest for some years, largely as a consequence of Edward Gibbon Wakefield's abilities as a propagandist.

Until the 1830s political economists tended to dismiss colonies as economically undesirable. This reflected Adam Smith's views in The Wealth of Nations, a book that devoted considerable space to the economic disadvantages of mercantilism in general and colonies in particular. One of Wakefield's notable achievements was to persuade almost all of his contemporaries to modify their antipathy to colonies: largely as a consequence of his work, public opinion in the 1830s and 1840s came to view colonization more positively, as one way to mitigate the social

17 Sir John Pelly to Earl Grey, 7 September 1846; and Grey's annotation, in CO 305, UKNA.
18 The significance of Smith's work at this point can scarcely be over-emphasized: “During the half century following the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776, classical political economy emerged as an explanatory mechanism of immense importance, eventually becoming the master social science of modernity and its interpreters the high priests of modern civilization.” See Gregory Claeys, “The 'Survival of the Fittest' and the Origins of Social Darwinism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, 2 (2000): 233.
impact of industrialization in Britain. The period was bracketed by some profound changes, from the first Reform Bill and the abolition of slavery within the British Empire in the early 1830s to the adoption of free trade and responsible government for the colonies in the later 1840s. These shifts took place against a backdrop of widespread social unrest (the Captain Swing riots, the rise of Chartism, and so on), the first factory legislation, and a general preoccupation with what became known as the “condition-of-England” question. Many contemporaries felt that civil society in Britain was not merely altered by the process that we now call the Industrial Revolution but that it was itself undergoing a revolution of sorts. The literature of this period – the work of writers such as Carlyle and Dickens, Mrs Gaskell and George Eliot, and many others – reflects a general sense of unease about the profound changes wrought by industrialization. The debates over colonies and emigration, which grew in importance and frequency in the 1830s and 1840s, were debates about possible solutions to the social problems of this first industrial society.

Edward Gibbon Wakefield was the most influential of those writing and talking about colonization during this period. Many, if not all, of Wakefield’s ideas and plans were anticipated in the thought of others – notably Robert Gourlay and Wilmot Horton – but few could match his skill as a publicist. He may have inherited this ability: his grandmother, Priscilla Wakefield, was a successful author, known for her philanthropy as well as her children’s books, and she played a considerable role in her grandson’s upbringing. His father, Edward Wakefield, was best known for his magisterial two-volume study of Ireland, although he also devoted much time to the advocacy of various reforms. Edward senior counted two prominent intellectuals, James Mill and Francis Place, among his closest friends, and his son grew up in households in which

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19 For example, in his biography of McCulloch, D.P. O’Brien felt obliged to note that “McCulloch was the only major economist [of this period] consistently to oppose Wakefield’s schemes.” See O’Brien, J.R. McCulloch: A Study in Classical Economics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), 342.


political activism and writing were commonplace. Edward Gibbon Wakefield produced a string of publications on the social problems of England – *Facts Relating to the Punishment of Death in the Metropolis* and *Swing Unmasked* being the most notable of these – as well as a series of pamphlets and books elaborating his views on systematic colonization, beginning with *A Letter from Sydney*. This book appeared in 1829 when its author was in jail serving a three-year prison sentence for abducting a young woman in an effort to force her to marry him. The closest he had got to Australia at this point, the title of his book notwithstanding, was sharing accommodation with those who were about to be transported there – fellow convicts destined for the British gulag.

Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, Wakefield spent a good deal of time popularizing his notions of systematic colonization. He seemed to be present whenever colonization was discussed in Britain: he appeared before select committees and was widely credited with altering government policy towards colonies; famously, he played a leading role in the establishment of the colonies of South Australia and New Zealand; he accompanied Durham to Canada in 1838 and wrote an influential section of the subsequent Durham Report (and leaked the report to the media, when it appeared his contribution might be altered against his wishes); he invested in both land and businesses in British North America; and he served as an elected politician in Lower Canada and New Zealand. Given the range of his activities and influence, Wakefield has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention, including eight book-length biographies, a clutch of dissertations and theses, numerous articles, and entries in the British, New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian dictionaries of biography. Opinions about

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Wakefield are sharply divided between those who regard him as a fraud and charlatan, without principles and possessed only of an eye for the main chance, and those who regard him as the father of the British Commonwealth, a far-seeing theorist who single-handedly reversed the climate of opinion in Britain regarding the value and potential of the possessions that made up the British Empire at mid-century.

However one assesses Wakefield’s career, it is clear that he was in close touch with the intellectual currents of his time. For example, he was familiar with classical political economy, and the work of Adam Smith in particular: among other things, Wakefield published an annotated edition of Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* in four volumes.²⁵ He

²⁵ Edward Gibbon Wakefield, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, LL.D. With a Commentary by the Author of “England and America,”* vols. 1 and 2 (London: Charles Knight, 1835); vol. 3, 1836. Wakefield gave Volume 4 a new title: *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, LL.D. With Notes from Ricardo, M’Culloch, Chalmers and other Eminent Political Economists edited by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Esq. With Life of the Author, by Dugald Stewart. A new edition in four volumes. Vol. IV* (London: Charles Knight, 1843). In his Preface (“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” 1: iii–xviii), Wakefield explained why he decided to reissue the book, and, throughout the text, he added explanatory or admonishing notes when he felt that Smith had erred. For example, in Volume 1, page 189, Smith observed that “a man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.” Wakefield added the following footnote: “Considering, however, that the world has been peopled by the removal of human beings, and adventuring to the great streams of emigration which continually flow from Great Britain to North America, and from the eastern shore of that continent into its western wilderness, it does not appear that ‘man is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported.’”
was well regarded by a number of influential thinkers, including the Utilitarians (Bentham wrote enthusiastically of Wakefield’s plans for South Australia),26 the Philosophic Radicals (several of whom were closely associated with Wakefield for a period of time),27 and John Stuart Mill. Mill pressed Wakefield for “a systematic treatise ... in which the whole subject of colonization is treated ... so as to become at once the authoritative book on the subject,” while no less a figure than Karl Marx acknowledged Wakefield’s reputation as “the most notable political economist [of the 1830s].”28

One of Wakefield’s key ideas, adopted enthusiastically by his followers, was that Britain’s colonial policy was ad hoc and often misguided. Successful colonization, they argued, required a far more deliberate approach, informed by a careful study of colonial conditions.29 The aim of colonization ought to be the replication of English society – a theme that was subsequently taken up by the Colonial Office and the HBC, as already noted – and to achieve this, the government needed to


oversee emigration and colonial land policy. The emigration of young couples should be encouraged and a fund maintained to assist such desirable migration. Two key elements of any successful land policy, it was claimed, were the need to concentrate settlement and to fix an artificial “sufficient price.” Wakefield’s insistence on the need to control colonial land policy caused some of his erstwhile supporters – notably John Roebuck and Herman Merivale – to part company with him as colonial self-government became a key goal of colonial reform.30

Although Wakefield’s writings during the 1830s and 1840s encouraged a debate on the need to rethink British colonization, he was not without his critics. His activities were regarded sceptically by another well connected group – namely, the Evangelicals, or “Saints,” whose own lobbying efforts contributed largely to the abolition of slavery in Britain and its Empire.31 The Evangelicals regarded their victory over slavery – the product of a huge and drawn-out public campaign – as only the first step in a battle to establish Christian principles within the Empire. Shortly after the abolition of slavery, they helped to engineer a parliamentary enquiry – a select committee of the House of Commons – which investigated the condition of Aboriginal people within the British Empire and concluded its work in 1837.32 Members of this committee subsequently helped to form the Aborigines’ Protection Society in Britain, which vigilantly tracked the condition and treatment of Native peoples throughout the British Empire, issuing pamphlets, annual reports, and a journal, The Colonial Intelligencer; or, Aborigines’ Friend. Although they had regarded Wakefield's


early efforts to colonize South Australia with cautious acquiescence, they opposed his later plan to colonize New Zealand with some vehemence. By the late 1840s, then, colonization had become a highly contested issue. As a consequence it is next to impossible to identify a consistent government policy; one is left having to acknowledge that “the engine of British expansion throughout the nineteenth century was the chaotic pluralism of private and sub-imperial interests: religious, commercial, strategic, humanitarian, scientific, speculative and migrational. The role of government was sometimes to facilitate, sometimes to regulate, this multiple expansive momentum.”

One reason for this seeming anarchy was the much discussed “condition-of-England” question. During the 1830s and the 1840s, it seemed to many that Britain was in turmoil. The age of Victorian equipoise, if such it was, did not emerge until the 1850s. An earlier historian of the period said that,

From the accession of Pitt in 1784 there has never, I suppose, been a time when the course of politics is so wayward and bewildering as in the years which run from the fall of Peel in 1846 to the appointment of Aberdeen in 1852 ... a man who had gone to sleep in 1846 and woken up in 1850 would have found himself in another world: and the difference, I have often thought, between the England of the last Chartist demonstration in 1848 and the Great Exhibition of 1851, is like the difference in one's own feelings at the beginning and end of a voyage in wartime through waters beset by enemy ships.

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35 G.M. Young, “Mr Gladstone,” in *Today and Yesterday: Collected Essays and Addresses*, 31–3 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1948). Other scholars have made similar arguments about
The dates of 1846 and 1848 were particularly significant: 1846 had seen the triumph of free trade with the repeal of the Corn Laws; 1848 had seen the third and last of the great Chartist petitions. If Britain itself escaped the radical uprisings that visited Europe in the latter year, an argument can be made that its ability to avoid such revolutionary fervour was closely related to its imperial possessions. What is not often widely acknowledged is the extent to which these currents affected western Canada. Donald Ross, for example, wrote confidentially to George Simpson from his post in Norway House in the summer of 1848:

We can no longer hide from ourselves the fact, that free trade notions and the course of events are making such rapid progress, that the day is certainly not far distant, when ours, the last important British monopoly, will necessarily be swept away like all others, by the force of public opinion, or by the still more undesirable but inevitable course of violence and misrule within the country itself — it would therefore in my humble belief be far better to make a merit of necessity than to await the coming storm, for come it will.

In fact, the storm had already begun, chiefly as a consequence of the work of James Edward Fitzgerald and Alexander Kennedy Isbister. These two individuals — Fitzgerald, an official with the British Museum, and Isbister, the mixed-blood son of the Prairie fur trade who had moved to Britain — wrote and agitated against the HBC with some success. Their criticism of the company rested on several claims, although their central point was its allegedly shoddy treatment of Native people generally and events at Red River in particular; the invalidity of its original charter; and the need to embrace free trade in colonial affairs (as Britain had the period: Robert Gray, for example, notes that "a series of events ... realigned political and cultural attitudes in the later 1840s and early 1850s." See Gray, The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830—1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1996]); compare the comments in Harrison, "1848."


"Private & Confidential," Donald Ross to George Simpson, 21 August 1848, D-5/22, Simpson Inward Correspondence, Hudson’s Bay Company Archives. Interestingly enough, the letter was written just three days after the debate over the Vancouver Island grant to the HBC had taken place in the House of Commons, a world away from Norway House.

done at home) rather than to continue to support an anachronistic monopoly. In 1847 Isbister presented a memorial and petition to the Colonial Office on behalf of “the Natives of Rupert’s Land,” which led him into an all-out public relations war with HBC governor J.H. Pelly and with Merivale, the permanent under-secretary of the Colonial Office. Fitzgerald’s interest in emigration, noted already, reflected his efforts to mitigate the horror of the Irish Famine. In the spring of 1847, he developed an elaborate plan for colonizing Vancouver Island and forwarded it to the Colonial Office.

He had originally imagined that his scheme for colonizing Vancouver Island would meet with the approval and support of the HBC, but this support was not forthcoming. Fitzgerald then began to work in tandem with Isbister, feeding influential opposition politicians information and reports critical of the company. Fitzgerald also published a series of articles about Vancouver Island, culminating in 1849 with *An Examination of the Charter and Proceedings of the Hudson’s Bay Company, with Reference to the Grant of Vancouver’s Island.*

Fitzgerald was responding to Robert Montgomery Martin’s *The Hudson’s Bay Territories and Vancouver’s Island, with an exposition of the chartered rights, conduct, and policy of the honorable Hudson’s Bay Corporation*, published several months earlier. Fitzgerald told Gladstone — to whom he dedicated his own book — that the HBC was plainly behind Martin’s book: “That this

39 See Alexander Kennedy Isbister, *A Few Words on the Hudson’s Bay Company; With a Statement of the Grievances of the Native and Half-caste Indians, Addressed to the British Government through their Delegates now in London* (London: C. Gilpin, 1847). Note also the comments on this memorial in Cooper’s book, *Alexander Kennedy Isbister*, especially page 127 and, more generally, in the chapter “Memorial and Petition,” 107–42; Doug Owram, *Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856–1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 26–30; and Rich, *History of the Hudson’s Bay Company*, 545–6. Isbister was mentioned by name in the House of Commons, when a member asked if a commission had been appointed to look into his complaints against the HBC (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: Third Series, vol. 100, Comprising the period from the third day of July to the ninth day of August, 1848, 13 July 1848, 469–70), and several of his letters to the Colonial Office were reprinted in the British Parliamentary Papers (see the Irish University Press Series, Papers Relating to Canada 1870–52, 19: 37–51).

40 See Galbraith, “James Edward Fitzgerald,” 195–6. Fitzgerald’s plan for Vancouver Island is contained in his letter to Benjamin Hawes at the Colonial Office, 9 June 1847, which is reprinted in the Report of the Provincial Archives Department of the Province of British Columbia for the Year Ended December 31st, 1913 (Victoria: King’s Printer, 1914), 54–62.

elaborate defence of the Company has appeared under authority is not a matter of doubt... The whole tenor of the book is sufficient evidence that the Company’s purse has stimulated the author’s brains.”

The HBC—largely through the efforts of its governor, Sir John Pelly—had continued its conversation with the Colonial Office over the company’s status on the Pacific coast, following Pelly’s query about its future in light of the 1846 Oregon Treaty. By 1848 it was becoming apparent that the government intended to allow the company to assume control of Vancouver Island as a proprietary colony, in exchange for a commitment to pursue its colonization. Two influential politicians—Gladstone (Grey’s predecessor as colonial secretary) and his close friend and associate, Lord Lincoln—decided to challenge the government’s intention with regard to Vancouver Island. Isbister and Fitzgerald provided the two men with arguments and evidence.

The opposition to the grant of Vancouver Island to the HBC began in earnest in the summer of 1848. In July Lincoln began to ask questions in the House of Commons, and the following month Gladstone participated dramatically in the debate over the island grant to the HBC. The debate in the Commons took place on 18 August, and Gladstone spoke for nearly two hours against the grant, grounding his critique firmly in the ideology of free trade. Beginning with a quotation from Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* (“Of all expedients which could be found for stunting the trade of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is the most effectual”), Gladstone delivered a ringing denunciation of the HBC: “There never was a case in which the evils of monopoly acquired a more rank development than in the instance of that Company.”


44 For Lincoln’s efforts, see *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: Third Series*, vol. 100, Comprising the period from the third day of July to the ninth day of August, 1848, to July 1848, 307–10; 13 July 1848, 469–70; and 17 July 1848, 510–2. For the debate on the grant of Vancouver’s Island, see *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates: Third Series*, vol. 101, Comprising the period from the tenth day of August to the fifth day of September, 1848, 18 August 1848, 263–307.
aggravated by absolutism in politics covered by the cloak of impenetrable secrecy.\textsuperscript{45} Gladstone’s arguments appear to have struck a nerve: in its coverage of his speech, The Times noted that “the right hon. gentleman resumed his seat amidst loud cheers from all parts of the house.”\textsuperscript{46}

Gladstone and others went to considerable lengths to oppose the government over the grant. Gladstone devoted his evenings, in August 1848, to reading books about the Pacific coast and the HBC – books supplied by Fitzgerald.\textsuperscript{47} It surprised no one that the government was able to carry the day and gain parliamentary approval for the grant. Still, the opposition certainly had an impact. Ellice, the company’s leading advocate in the Commons, wrote angrily to the colonial secretary, Earl Grey (his brother-in-law), shortly after the parliamentary debate over Vancouver Island, to complain about the provisions in the grant to the HBC. Grey admitted in his reply, “I don’t deny the force of many of your object\textsuperscript{48} to the arrangement we have made, but under the circumstances I don’t see what we c\textsuperscript{d} have done better. It is quite true as you say that Gladstone has much to answer. He has greatly increased all the difficulties with which we have to contend.”\textsuperscript{48} Other HBC officials continued to reflect on the debate over the grant. George Simpson, who, like Ellice, had doubts about the wisdom of the company’s pursuit of colonization, said to James Douglas: “I think the capabilities of the Island are greatly overrated by Messrs Gladstone, Hume, \& others who have been so severe on the Colonial Office for putting Vancouver’s Island under the Company’s direction.” Meanwhile, in the Arctic, John Rae wrote to Simpson: “I had written a few remarks on Fitzgerald’s book


\textsuperscript{46} See “Vancouver’s Island,” The Times, 19 August 1848, 3-4.


\textsuperscript{48} Letter from third Earl Grey to Ellice, 23 September 1848, in Ellice Papers Correspondence, 1847-1849, MG 24, A 2, vol. 20, 685-6, microfilm reel C-4639, National Archives of Canada.
pointing out the exaggeration and utter falsehood he had brought forward as facts either for the support or foundation of his arguments, and intended to have forwarded them to you, but scarcity of paper, and other considerations caused me to change my mind."

The company's opponents were unrepentant. Gladstone, for one, remained proud of his efforts to undermine the HBC's position in western North America. Nearly fifty years later he recalled the debate in a brief autobiographical passage:

"The question of the Hudson's Bay Company was rather bravely and very warmly taken up by Lord Lincoln and myself with the support of the few but able friends of freedom in colonial government. I always thought the case very strong, and the subject full of interest ... Mr. Ellice ... secured Lord Grey, the Colonial Secretary, who opposed us with perverseness but with effect. Our object was to obtain a judicial decision upon the claims of the Company. I never could believe, especially considering the prior decisions of the Courts on monopolies, that it was legally in the power of Charles II to mark off a vast portion of a continent, and invest a handful of his subjects with power to exclude from those territories all other subjects of the Crown. At last we obtained from the Colonial Office what we thought was a promise that such a decision should be obtained. But we were eventually put off, in this really great case, by what I thought a rather impudent proceeding. The opinion of the Law Officers was taken as a fulfilment of the promise to us. Our weakness lay in this, that we could obtain no support from Sir R. Peel or Sir James Graham. I remember when Lincoln and I had an interview with Peel on the subject. He did not express any dissent from our opinions; but declared his aversion to any proceeding which might endanger the position of the Government. His reason was that if they went out they would be succeeded by the Protectionists, who in their frantic zeal for the restoration of Protection would probably convulse the country. A wonderful misjudgment."

The passage underlines Gladstone's close alliance with Lord Lincoln (later the fifth Duke of Newcastle and himself colonial secretary from 1859 to 1864) in the fight against the HBC. Events in Lincoln's personal

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50 Historical Manuscripts Commission, John Brooke and Mary Sorensen, eds., The Prime Ministers' Papers: W.E. Gladstone, vol. 1, Autobiographica (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
life prevented him from playing a role in the August 1848 debate, but he continued to pester the government with questions, even after the grant had been made. In June 1849, for example, Lincoln moved "that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, setting forth that this House has taken into its consideration the papers, which Her Majesty has graciously commanded to be presented to it with regard to Vancouver's Island by Royal Charter to the Hudson's Bay Company; and is of opinion, that from the constitution of that body, from its past history, from the nature of its objects, and from the training of its agents, it is ill-adapted for superintending the establishment of any colony founded upon principles of political and commercial freedom." Lincoln spoke to a nearly empty House and consequently the debate was counted out. Gladstone also continued to raise the issue of the island grant and to refer critically to the HBC, although it must have been clear to both men that the grant was now a fait accompli.

More generally, throughout 1848 and 1849 colonial matters remained the focus of a good deal of public attention. Both Roebuck and

Office, 1971), 66-7. Gladstone's account was written 8 September 1897. For the writing of this autobiographical fragment, see the Introduction, especially 3-5.


See Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: Third Series, vol. 106, Comprising the period from the twelfth day of June, to the sixth day of July, 1849, 19 June 1849, 591-2.

For evidence of Gladstone's continuing interest, see Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: Third Series, vol. 106, Comprising the period from the twelfth day of June, to the sixth day of July, 1849, 26 June 1849, 987 (where Gladstone refers to Vancouver Island), and 5 July 1849, 1355-62 (where Gladstone speaks on the HBC).

The growing English interest in colonial matters, 1848-49, is described in John M. Ward, Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies 1846-1857: A Study of Self-Government and Self-Interest (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1998), 166-9. Ward points out that colonial affairs attracted "an unusually large degree of attention" in 1849 and 1850 (166), noting: "Between December 1848 and May 1849 The Times published a series of leading articles, which discussed the political problems of the colonial empire and suggested liberal solutions. Taken as a whole, they presented a fairly good picture of the more intelligent sort of discussion going on at the time among some of the parliamentarians and others alertly interested in the empire" (ibid.). See also Brook Burdick Ballard, "Colonial Reformers as an Imperial Factor, 1845-1855" (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1967), especially the two chapters entitled "Colonial Reform as a Political Force: 1846-1849," 347-98, and "Colonial Reform as a Political Force: 1849-1852," 399-434.
Wakefield published significant books on colonization in 1849, for example, books that attracted a good deal of attention, while the excitement generated by the California gold rush also helped to maintain interest in the Pacific coast of North America. Colonation was also repeatedly brought up in the House of Commons, notably by Roebuck and Molesworth. In the course of these debates, the grant of Vancouver Island was a frequent point of reference. Accompanying these debates was further activity by those who had opposed the grant to Vancouver Island and remained interested in colonial matters. Gladstone took to giving public speeches on systematic colonization, couched in Wakefieldian language, assuring his audience that “the object [of colonization] was to reproduce the likeness of England – to reproduce its laws and manners, as they were doing in Australia, New Zealand, North America, and the Cape, thereby contributing to the general happiness of mankind. That was the purpose of colonization.” At one point he was apparently planning a book on the subject, although his friend Lincoln suggested that a series of articles for the Morning Chronicle might be more effective; Wakefield worried aloud at the prospect of such competition as he was in the final stages of producing his own much delayed A View of the Art of Colonization. And during the summer of 1849, a prominent group of politicians and others interested


56 Note especially Molesworth’s famous speech of 26 June 1849, reprinted in Selected Speeches of Sir William Molesworth, Bart., P.C., M.P., On Questions Relating to Colonial Policy, ed. Hugh Edward Egerton (London: John Murray, 1903), 216–64. Molesworth listed all the errors in colonial affairs made by the Colonial Office since 1846, ending with “the transfer of Vancouver’s Island to the Hudson’s Bay Company” (226). He went on to observe that “it would be easy to take colony after colony and show in each a series of lamentable blunders which have been committed by the Colonial Office. For instance, ... how Vancouver’s Island was thrown away — all through the ignorance, negligence, and vacillation of the Colonial Office” (232).

57 The Spectator, no. 1083, 31 March 1849, 290.

58 See Lincoln to Gladstone, 4 October 1848, Ne C 164/1-2 4.10.1848, in “Political: General, 1832–1864 Ne C 164/1-2 1832–1864,” GB 099 Ne C, Newcastle Collection, the University of Nottingham Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections. And Wakefield’s letter to Godley, 8 November, 1848, printed in Edward Jerningham Wakefield, The Founders of Canterbury (Folkestone and London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1973), 31–2 (reprint of the 1868 edition). Note also Knaplund’s comments in Gladstone and Britain’s Imperial Policy, 59–60.
Wakefield and Fitzgerald participated in the Colonial Reform Association, but both men soon opted to become emigrants themselves. Fitzgerald was disappointed by the failure of his colonization project for Vancouver Island, although he concluded, in light of the California gold rush, that any colonizing enterprise on the Pacific coast was doomed to fail at that time. Wakefield had become involved in yet another association, this time to transplant a model Anglican community to Canterbury on New Zealand’s South Island—a scheme in which Fitzgerald decided to participate. The two subsequently left for New Zealand, where both would become well known politicians. Wakefield remained there until his death in 1862, but Fitzgerald returned briefly to Britain as Canterbury’s immigration agent in the late 1850s. Now something of a public figure, Fitzgerald was offered two colonial governorships during his time in London, including that of the newly created British Columbia, but he declined both and opted to return to New Zealand.

Many years later—in 1893—Fitzgerald would once again assist Gladstone in a manner that recalled the 1848 debate on the Island grant. Britain’s aging prime minister was trying to resolve that country’s troubled relationship with Ireland and introduced a bill in the House of Commons that would bring a measure of Home Rule to Ireland. During a speech defending his proposed legislation, Gladstone produced a recent letter from Fitzgerald (“a gentleman whom I had the privilege of knowing 50 years ago”). Fitzgerald’s letter compared the self-government, or “home rule,” enjoyed by New Zealand, Canada, and the Australian colonies with the situation in Ireland, concluding that

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self-government had brought numerous advantages to the colonies, as it surely would also to Ireland. After he had read Fitzgerald’s letter to the House, Gladstone observed, “That is the whole case in a nutshell.” This time, Fitzgerald’s assistance was perhaps more successful: the bill received majority support of the Commons, although it was subsequently rejected by the Lords.62

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In an article on “Vancouver’s Island, the New Colony” published in August 1848, Fitzgerald claimed that “on all sides a muttering of many voices is heard: the mass is thinking and speaking everywhere of Colonisation and the Colonial Office – that is, of making Colonies, and of governing them when made. There is a deep and active conviction awake, that the great task of this generation allotted to the English race is Colonisation.”63 Fitzgerald’s (admittedly self-serving) analysis had more than a grain of truth to it: public debate about colonization formed the backdrop to Vancouver Island’s initial incorporation into the British world. Yet despite this ongoing contemporary discussion, historians have often taken a rather narrow view of the grant of Vancouver Island. Much of the historiography is preoccupied with a debate about why the HBC accepted (or perhaps solicited) the grant from the Colonial Office.

The Island grant came just as the British government dramatically changed its trade policy, a reorientation that was closely related to the debate over colonization. The contemporary significance of the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts is hard to exaggerate: as another has argued, “From the 1840s at the latest, the universal virtues of free trade entered the canon. Colonization of new lands by British migrants enjoyed similar broad support.”64 Nor were the consequences of this shift


63 James Edward Fitzgerald, Vancouver’s Island, the New Colony (London: Simmonds, 1848), 3 (reproduced in CIHM/ICMH Microfiche series = no. 16846).

lost on those in the settler colonies, as the dramatic example of Montreal in April 1849 suggests. Further west, during that same spring, the Métis of Red River juxtaposed free trade to the HBC's monopoly position at the trial of Pierre Guillaume Sayer and three others for violating that monopoly. When the court recorder reminded them of the company's exclusive licence to trade, they pointed out "that the [HBC's] Charter had been challenged by many eminent authorities" and, by way of proof, produced the 19 August 1848 issue of The Times, describing Gladstone's denunciation of the company and its Island grant.65 The Métis were not the only people in the HBC's trading area who felt that the company's position was more vulnerable as free trade gained ascendancy in Britain. "The day is certainly not far distant," Donald Ross had warned from Norway House, "when ours, the last important British monopoly, will necessarily be swept away like all others."66

Ross was hardly alone in this view. J.H. Pelly, the most significant actor on behalf of the HBC in its negotiations with the Colonial Office over the Island grant, likely knew the mind of the government on trade matters: he was, after all, former governor of the Bank of England and, throughout this period, remained one of its directors. The HBC was engaged in a rearguard struggle to delay the inevitable. The company's efforts to diversify its operations were perhaps necessary to counter the apparent demise of the fur trade, but even diversification would not end the groundswell of opposition to the HBC's position as the last great monopolist. This opposition re-emerged with even greater force in 1857, when a parliamentary committee sat "to consider the state of those possessions in North America which are under the administration of the Hudson's Bay Company, or over which they possess a license to trade." Pamphlets written for the occasion reminded their readers of the earlier controversy over the Island grant: for instance, the Liverpool financial Reform Association urged people to remember "that evidence most condemnatory of the Company and its system was before the Government in 1847-9; that the Government of that day could see nothing in it requiring parliamentary investigation, refused to appoint a commission of inquiry, - and would not refer the question to the decision of either of the tribunals recommended by its law officers." Its


66 Ross to Simpson, 21 August 1848.
Situating Vancouver Island

conclusion recalled the language of Gladstone's speech against the Island grant in August 1848: "The history of the world presents no example of a monopoly so monstrous and so prejudicial as that of the Hudson's Bay Company." It is difficult to assess the influence of such critiques, but certainly Edward Ellice, a vociferous advocate for the company, was careful to qualify his comments in its defence when he appeared before the select committee: "Vancouver's Island is under the management of the Hudson's Bay Company, and with respect to it, as with respect to many other things connected with the Hudson's Bay Company, very much misrepresentation has prevailed; of course I cannot say that it is advisable to maintain a monopoly where you can do without it, and if the monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company is not a necessity, then I have little to say in its favour." The following year, in 1858, the British government assumed direct authority over Vancouver Island, something that the parliamentary committee had recommended.

Contemporary debates in England informed the way in which imperial authorities incorporated Vancouver Island into the British world. This article has sought to extend Mackie's description of its early colonization by highlighting the significance of those debates. But a broader historiographical point can also be made. Neglecting the British context glosses over the region's colonial origins. While it is

67 Liverpool Financial Reform Association, The Hudson's Bay Company versus Magna Charta and the British People... (Liverpool: The Association, 1857), 34-5. Compare Andrew Freeport's pamphlet, The Case of the Hudson's Bay Company in a letter to Lord Palmerston (London: E. Stanford, 1857), which recalled Lord Lincoln's efforts against the HBC in 1849. Lincoln's speech, wrote Freeport indignantly, "failed to stir the lazy apathy of the men whom England trusted with the guardianship of her interests and honor — Her Majesty's faithful Commons were counted out. But this was not all, for shortly afterwards Lord Grey, being then Colonial Minister, found no difficulty in getting the assent of Parliament to an arrangement, by which the valuable possession of Vancouver's Island was added, with large powers, to the then existing territories of the Company" (3 [emphasis in original]). John Darwin has argued that historians have not appreciated the significance of such pamphlets: "the lobbying and counter-lobbying waged through newspapers, 'pamphlet wars' and professional networks to influence domestic opinion ... need to be more fully integrated into the larger picture of imperial expansion" (Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians," 641-2).

68 For the Select Committee's recommendation, see Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Report from the Select Committee on the Hudson's Bay Company, together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index (London: HMSO, 1857), xiii. For Ellice's evidence, see 322-53; the quotation in the text is from 333. J.C. Clarke provides an excellent description of Ellice's testimony, as well as the broader context, in "From Business to Politics: The Ellice Family, 1760-1860" (DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1972), 414-29; compare Howe's comments in "Free Trade and the City of London," 407. The committee itself is the subject of A.A. den Otter's "The 1857 Parliamentary Inquiry, the Hudson's Bay Company, and Rupert's Land's Aboriginal People," Prairie Forum 24, 2 (1999): 143-69. Den Otter's argument applies equally to the earlier debate over Vancouver Island's colonization, and his analysis of the ideas articulated by the company's critics (165) also applies to the criticisms of the company in 1848-49.
certainly the case that "regional specialists have constructed impressive fortresses of knowledge that can easily withstand efforts to incorporate them into any wider union" (as one well known historian of the British Empire noted several years ago in Past and Present), making such connections is a necessary step if regional historians are to avoid charges of parochialism and antiquarianism. This is not to argue for the revival of an arid political imperial history but, rather, simply for the need to connect – or reconnect – the historiography of British Columbia with the very similar issues being debated in the United Kingdom and in other former British colonies, where the legacy of imperialism still casts a long shadow.

69 A.G. Hopkins, "Viewpoint – Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History," Past and Present 164 (1999): 198. Similarly, Peter Burroughs quotes another well-known British scholar who maintains that "British imperial history since the 1980s [has been] balkanised by specialists who jealously carve the subject into narrow slices of territory or period" ("The Imperial Gospel According to Frederick Madden," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30, 3 [2002]: 115).

70 Others have urged that "metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized, need to be brought into one analytic field." See Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 15; compare the similar conclusion in Philip D. Morgan, "Encounters between British and Indigenous Peoples, c. 1500 – c. 1800," in Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 68. An earlier generation of historians was perhaps more sensitive to the need to understand the imperial context: in his conclusion to The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845–1851 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964 [1936]), for example, Gilbert Tucker stressed that "any adequate attempt to study a particular colony during that decisive period from 1846 to 1851 must treat its subject not only as a separate phenomenon, but also and chiefly as a colony, an integral part of a larger political and economic unit" (148).